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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Ownership of affordable housing is made possible through the concept of sectional title, 
which maximizes the number of available homes per square meter and makes optimum 
use of available land. The utilization of sectional title schemes to provide housing to a 
broader base of South Africans would only be successful if schemes are provided with 
an efficient management structure. Besides the general meeting, the two most 
important dramatis personae in the management of sectional title schemes are the 
trustees and the managing agent. This thesis will focus on the role played by these 
administrators in the governance of sectional title schemes. 
 
The discussion will commence with an exposition of the legal status of both these role 
players followed by an examination of the reasons for their election and appointment to 
perform the day-to-day management functions of the body corporate. In order for these 
role players to carry out their functions effectively they need to be suitably qualified and 
should have the personal qualities required to execute the task. Furthermore, the role 
players should be properly elected or appointed to their positions by established 
administrative procedures. The powers, functions and duties of the trustees and the 
managing agent must be clearly defined with the minimum overlap between their tasks 
to ensure certainty, and to avoid a situation where a certain function is either not 
performed at all, or where a single function is performed by two or more of the role 
players. Due to the fact that these role players should be held accountable for abuses or 
negligence in the performance of their functions, the fiduciary position and instances of 
indemnification of trustees for negligent execution of their duties will then be dealt with. 
This will be followed by an examination of the remuneration payable to trustees and 
managing agents and their claims for expenses incurred in the performance of their 
functions. Finally, the terms of appointment of the managing agent will be scrutinized 
and the circumstances in which his appointment and the office of trustees may be 
terminated will be placed on the table.   
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The thesis will regularly identify particular deficiencies in the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 
1986 and the prescribed management rules relating to trustees and managing agents. 
Where appropriate and practicable, reference will be made to the manner in which New 
South Wales, Singapore, Malaysia, China and Germany deal with particular 
shortcomings. The aim is to search for potentially more appropriate solutions to iron out 
such problems, and thereby to regulate the governance of sectional title schemes in 
South Africa more effectively. 
 
Where a sectional title scheme faces financial ruin or experiences flagrant managerial 
mismanagement, the Sectional Titles Act provides for the appointment of an 
administrator. This measure of last resort should be avoided by ensuring that properly 
elected, qualified and accountable managerial role players administer the scheme. 
Therefore, I propose that the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (or rather the future 
Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011) should be amended to make 
provision for the mandatory appointment of a professional manager as the sole 
executive organ of the body corporate assisted by an elected board of trustees 
consisting of sectional owners, and who act merely in a advisory capacity. The status of 
the managing agent would be elevated to that of an executive organ of the body 
corporate. This will mean greater responsibilities for the managing agent, but would 
result in more efficient management of South African sectional title schemes.   
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Die instelling van deeleiendom verwesenlik die droom van menige Suid-Afrikaners om 
eiendomsreg van n bekostigbare woning te verkry, aangesien dit meer wonings per 
vierkante meter deur die optimale benutting van grond verseker. Die gebruik van 
deeltitelskemas om behuising te voorsien aan ŉ wyer spektrum van Suid-Afrikaners sal 
egter slegs met sukses bekroon word indien voorsiening gemaak word vir ŉ 
doeltreffende bestuurs struktuur. Afgesien van die algemene vergadering, berus die 
bestuur van deeltitelskemas by twee belangrike rolspelers, naamlik die trustees en die 
bestuursagent. Hierdie tesis sal fokus op die rol wat hierdie twee dramatis personae 
speel in die administrasie van deeltitelskemas. 
 
Die bespreking sal aanvang neem met ŉ uiteensetting van die regs status van die twee 
rolspelers, gevolg deur ŉ omvattende ondersoek van hoekom hulle verkies of aangestel 
word om die daaglikse bestuursfunksies van die regspersoon te verrig. Ten einde hulle 
funksies doeltreffend uit te voer, moet albei rolspelers oor toepaslike kwalifikasies en 
gepaste persoonlike eienskappe beskik vir die soort werk wat aan hulle toevertrou word.  
Verder moet trustees behoorlik verkies en bestuursagente behoorlik aangestel word 
ingevolge gevestigde administratiewe prosedures. Die magte, funksies en verpligtinge 
van elke rolspeler moet ook duidelik uiteengesit word ten einde te verhoed dat bepaalde 
funksies nie uitgevoer word nie, of dat die trustees en die bestuursagent koppe stamp 
oor die uitvoering van ŉ bepaalde taak. Aangesien die rolspelers aanspreeklik gehou 
word vir enige misbruik van mag of nalatigheid in die uitvoering van hulle funksies, word 
die vertrouensverhouding tussen die rolspelers en deeleienaars bespreek, sowel as die 
vrywaring van trustees vir alle verliese wat in die verrigting van hul funksies sonder 
growwe nalatigheid aan hulle kant veroorsaak word. Dit sal gevolg word deur ŉ 
ondersoek na die vergoeding van trustees en bestuursagente, met verwysing daarna 
dat hulle betaling vir hulle uitgawes kan eis. Ter afsluiting sal die bepalings wat die 
aanstelling van die bestuursagent raak, asook die omstandighede waarin trustees van 
hul amp onthef, of die aanstelling van die bestuursagent beëindig kan word, behoorlik 
ondersoek word. 
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Hierdie tesis sal deurgaans bepaalde tekortkominge in die Wet op Deeltitels 95 van 
1986 en die reëls wat verband hou met trustees en bestuursagente aandui. Waar 
doenlik, sal regsvergelykend verwys word na oplossings wat die regstelsels van Nieu-
Suid Wallis, Singapore, Maleisië Sjina en Duitsland bevat om soortgelyke probleme die 
hoof te bied. Die doel is om die bestaande tekortkominge uit te stryk en dus die bestuur 
van Suid-Afrikaanse deeltitelskemas meer doeltreffend te beheer.  
 
Indien ŉ deeltitelskema finansiële ondergang of verregaande wanbestuur in die gesig 
staar, maak die Wet op Deeltitels voorsiening vir die aanstelling van ŉ administrateur. 
Dit is die laaste uitweg en behoort vermy te word, deur die bestuur van ŉ  
deeltitelskema in die hande te plaas van behoorlik verkose, gekwalifiseerde rolspelers 
wat verantwoordelik gehou kan word vir wanbestuur. Daarom stel ek voor dat die Wet 
op Deeltitels 95 van 1986 (of eerder die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas 8 van 
2011) gewysig word om voorsiening te maak vir die aanstelling van ŉ professionele 
bestuurder as die enigste uitvoerende orgaan van die regspersoon bygestaan deur ŉ 
raad van trustees bestaande uit deeleienaars in ŉ raadgewende hoedanigheid. Dit sal 
die status van die bestuursagent verhoog tot dié van ŉ uitvoerende orgaan van die 
regspersoon wat groter aanspreeklikheid sal meebring en terselfdertyd doeltreffender 
bestuur van suid-afrikaanse deeltitlelskemas tot gevolg sal hê.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The South African government is faced with the daunting challenge of providing housing 
for previously disadvantaged persons who were debarred by racially discriminatory 
legislation from purchasing and owning a home in certain parts of South Africa during 
the Apartheid era.1 The tumultuous political changes that occurred in South Africa in the 
1990’s stimulated rapid and uncontrolled urbanization.2 Promises by political parties of 
free housing created a sense of dependence as well as unrealistic and escalating 
expectations. The goal of achieving one home for each family is becoming more 
unattainable as time passes which, in turn, creates a large backlog. The increase in 
illegal immigrants streaming into cities; crime and corruption; planning difficulties; social 
and political instability; and non-inclusion into the tax base aggravate this challenge.3 
There is a shortage of land available in urban areas for such housing and suitable land 
is becoming scarcer as time passes. Rezoning is time consuming, while building costs 
are just escalating. It is for these reasons that informal housing settlements (otherwise 
known as “squatter camps”) are growing substantially. Added to this is the fact that 
squatters living in informal settlements choose to remain outside the formal housing 
sector in order to avoid regulation and having to pay taxes. Some recipients even 
choose to remain in squatter camps in return for the money received from letting or 
selling their free housing. Security of tenure alone does not lift people out of the 
doldrums of poverty. Capital creation in the form of formal housing does stimulate the 
economy.4 Participation in the formal economy ensures a more stable society of law 
abiding, prosperous, responsible, self-sufficient, and tax-paying citizens.5  
 
 
                                            
1 Group Areas Act 36 of 1996 and the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984; GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles 
2 T Maree “Rapid urbanisation – the high road and a low road” (April 2010) 36 MCS Courier 9.  
3 Maree (April 2010) MCS Courier 10. 
4 11. 
5 10. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 2 
Ownership of affordable housing could be made possible through the concept of 
sectional title. Each section can be individually bought and owned with joint ownership 
of the common property. This option has various advantages. There is a sense of 
exclusive ownership that engenders pride and a higher degree of responsibility and a 
duty of care. Joint ownership of common property creates a situation where the owners 
can have common facilities such as a swimming pool, while not having the sole 
expense of maintaining such a facility. Entering the formal housing market allows 
people to obtain related benefits such as mortgage finance and the market related 
profits on the sale of the property. It also broadens the tax base of municipalities. 
Furthermore, it provides authorities with a fixed address for service delivery and other 
administrative purposes, and the procurement of statistical data for example as a 
census. This goes toward counteracting illegality, corruption and crime.6 Most 
importantly it also counters the shortage of land argument, especially in cities, as the 
building comprising the sectional title scheme can be multi-storied, creating large floor 
areas without making use of much space on the ground. This makes optimum use of 
available land and maximizes the number of available homes per square meter. By the 
more efficient use of available land the possibility of residential home ownership in 
urban locations is brought within the reach of lower income groups in society.7 The state 
can offer subsidies and tax exemptions in order to encourage affordable sectional title 
developments.  
 
Following the constitutional objective of promoting access to adequate housing8 for 
previously disadvantaged persons who were excluded from home ownership in certain 
areas, many municipalities have embarked on a strategy of making rental housing, 
previously owned by local authorities, available to be purchased and owned by tenants.9 
This strategy can be a viable option as is illustrated by the eThekwini (Durban) 
Municipality which started an upgrade program whereby its low-cost rental housing 
stock is being upgraded to a high standard of habitability. This includes the installation 
                                            
6 Maree (April 2010) MCS Courier 11. 
7 CG Van der Merwe “Sectional Titles” in CG van der Merwe & JC Sonnekus (eds) Sectional Titles, Share Blocks 
and Time-sharing Volume 1 (Service Issue 18 2014) 1-11. 
8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26(1). 
9 Maree (June 2006) MCS Courier 1.  
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of prepaid water and electricity meters, the writing off of rental arrears and outstanding 
municipal charges and a rates exemption. The tenant is given the option to take 
ownership, free of all costs. The arrears are endorsed on the title deeds and become 
payable if the owner decides to sell. The upgrade includes complete redecoration of all 
exterior walls, repainting, re-puttying and glazing of steel window frames, waterproofing 
of roofs, and replacement of certain sewer pipes, roofs, toilets and doors. Electrical re-
wiring is also done in all the flats, as is waterproofing of bathrooms, and prepaid meters 
or flow limiters to control water consumption are installed for free. Despite all this, the 
schemes are showing signs of collapsing. The main reason is the mismanagement of 
these schemes and the inability of the members to pay the monthly levy.10  
 
This illustrates that one of the essential elements for the success of such an initiative 
depends on an efficient management structure being put in place. Van der Merwe 
warns that such a large-scale initiative to supply affordable housing is doomed to failure 
unless it is supplemented by a strategy, which includes initial management by outside 
agencies and the gradual introduction of self-management, accompanied by effective 
and compulsory education and continual training.11 Ideally these schemes should 
ultimately be self-managed, but this can only be achieved if the members of the newly 
formed bodies corporate are educated on the complicated concepts of sectional title 
law. The concept of sectional titles is relatively new in South Africa,12 and there are 
complicated management matters relating to sectional titles. There are certain 
challenges such as management, maintenance, co-operative environment, levies and 
rules that are common to all sectional title owners, irrespective of their social or financial 
status. These matters all require some level of understanding, acknowledgement and 
commitment to make a scheme functional and efficient.13  
 
The solution of using sectional title schemes to provide housing to a broader base of 
South African citizens would therefore not be effective, unless the scheme is initially 
                                            
10 S Mohammed “The challenges of sectional title in the low cost sector” (July 2010) 5-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 
1. 
11 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(13). 
12 The first Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 came into operation in 1973. 
13 Mohammed (July 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
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established by a competent developer, and then managed by an efficient management 
structure. Regulation of these role players and refinement of the provisions that apply to 
them are necessary to ensure the success, congeniality and efficacy of sectional title 
schemes in South Africa. It is imperative that the emerging generation of sectional title 
owners be educated on all the matters regarding the administration, control and 
management of the scheme. The Community Schemes Ombud Service, once 
established, will be perfectly placed to provide the training and education to owners as 
set out in section 4 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the 
“CSOSA”) that deals with the functions of the Service.14 
 
The initiative to supply affordable housing in the form of sectional titles will not work if it 
is not accompanied by a programme that includes subsidized initial management by 
professional outsiders leading to the gradual introduction of self-management. Training 
will only be successful with the full participation of stakeholders such as government, 
municipalities, and investors such as banks.15 Success will not only be measured on the 
number of housing units supplied, but also by the durability of the scheme and the long-
term benefits to the recipients. Therefore, the security of tenure needs to be converted 
into socio-economic growth.16 Failure will have grave socio-economic and political 
consequences.  
 
Although I am aware that proper management of sectional title schemes cannot 
guarantee access to housing, it is my submission that if sectional titles were to play a 
role in providing an option to secure the constitutional right to adequate housing it would 
not be a viable option if bodies corporate were not managed properly. The sustainability 
of sectional title schemes relies on the vaious role players to properly administer the 
scheme and maintain the building in a good condition. 
 
In terms of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the “STA”) sectional ownership consists 
of three elements which are inextricably linked, namely individual ownership in a 
                                            
14 CSOSA s 4(2)(b). 
15 Maree (June 2006) MCS Courier 2. 
16 2. 
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section;17 joint ownership in the common property of the sectional title scheme18 and 
membership of the community of owners.19 The unit owners’ interests are indivisibly 
linked in an intensified and diverse community of property.20 Once a sectional title 
scheme has been legally established the success or failure of the scheme depends 
largely on the effective and efficient establishment and management of the scheme.21 
Shared ownership of the common property gives rise to the need for collective decision-
making.22 The sectional owners have to sacrifice some of their independence and 
individual decision-making in the interests of the community as a whole.23 This requires 
collective action in the form of a central management body.24 The lack of organization 
can create insoluble disputes between the owners and other role players, and can make 
maintenance and management of the sectional title scheme virtually impossible. The 
inevitable chaos caused by the lack of a well-organized management structure is 
illustrated by the earliest type of apartment ownership schemes in Germany, called the 
Stockwerkseigentum.25 These residential buildings did not have a centralized 
management structure to organise maintenance, which caused endless disputes 
amongst the residents. 
 
The South African sectional title legislation creates a management structure. As soon as 
any person other than the developer becomes the registered owner of a unit, a body 
corporate is formed. Each sectional unit owner automatically becomes a member of this 
central management body when the unit is registered in his or her name.26 This juristic 
body is tasked with the “control, management and administration of the scheme.”27 The 
                                            
17 STA s 2(b). 
18 STA s 2(c). 
19 STA s 36(1) [STSMA s 2(1)]. 
20 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-5. 
21 CG Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles (Strata) 
Act” (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 172. 
22 L Chen The Making of Chinese Condominium Law (2010) 109. 
23 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-6. 
24 14-6. 
25 CG Van der Merwe “Apartment ownership” in N Drobnig & K Zweigart (eds) International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law VI Chapter 5 “Property and Trust” (1994) 3 141; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-5. 
26 STA s 36(1) [STSMA s 2(1)]. 
27 STA s 36(4) [STSMA s 2(5)]. 
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STA sets out a non-exhaustive list of functions and powers of the body corporate.28 The 
body corporate has administrative, accounting and secretarial duties. It is a juristic body 
without an intellect, voice or other human attributes and therefore performs such 
functions through its principal organs, namely the owners in the general meeting and 
the board of trustees. The trustees are appointed at the annual general meeting by the 
body corporate to act as its representatives.29 Whereas the function of the general 
meeting is mainly legislative, the trustees have an executive and administrative 
function.30 The general meeting sets the standards and policies for the management 
and administration of the scheme. The trustees handle the day-to-day administration by 
performing the functions and exercising the powers prescribed by the management 
rules of the scheme, by giving effect to resolutions of the general meeting of the body 
corporate, and by exercising the statutory functions and duties of the body corporate.31 
Their duties and powers are subject to any restriction imposed, or direction given at a 
general meeting.32 The trustees perform these functions and duties with the possible 
assistance of a managing agent.  
 
A successful management structure is of the utmost importance to the community of 
owners and the financial institutions with an interest in the scheme. It also ensures the 
durability of the scheme.33 The value of a sectional title scheme and its individual units 
is very closely connected to the quality of scheme management. The value of the units 
in the scheme will depend not only on criteria such as the location, size, and age and 
quality of the building comprising the scheme, but also on the condition of the common 
property. Unless maintenance is done regularly and adequately the building will fall into 
a state of disrepair. Sound management also requires proper financial administration, 
which includes the collection of levies that are added to an administrative fund for the 
maintenance of the scheme. When banks are assessing unit values for the purpose of 
                                            
28 Section 37 and 38 of the STA, which has been replaced by section 3, 4 and 5 of the STSMA. 
29 It is important to note that in bodies corporate that have just been established, all the owners are trustees and the 
developer is the chairman of the trustees until the first formal meeting is held; M Constas & K Bleijs Demystifying 
Sectional Title 2 ed (2009) 17.  
30 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-112. 
31 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
32 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1) and s 7(3)]. 
33 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-5. 
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bond applications and mortgage finance they will consider certain matters such as 
whether the levies are sufficient to cover the expenses of the body corporate; whether 
sufficient provisions are made for a reserve fund to defray future and incidental 
expenses; whether annual general meetings are held regularly and timeously and the 
agenda requirements for these meetings are complied with; whether the financial 
statements are up to date and duly audited; whether the arrears ratio is within 
acceptable limits and whether effective steps are taken to collect arrear levies; and 
whether the scheme is adequately insured and the premiums are paid up to date. In 
order to combat the “cycle of decline” it is essential that trustees ensure that realistic 
budgets are adopted; that all statutory and administrative requirements for prudent 
management are complied with; that maintenance is performed regularly and 
meticulously and that levy defaulters are dealt with decisively.34  
 
The underlying assumption to this thesis is that the success or failure of a sectional title 
scheme depends largely on the effective and efficient management of that scheme.35 
Various role players undertake these tasks. The research for this thesis will focus on the 
two role players that I consider play the most significant role in this context, namely the 
trustees and the managing agent. I will propose that it is better to appoint a professional 
manager as the executive organ to manage the scheme rather than to leave this task to 
the trustees. The reasons for this proposal will become clear after the role of the 
trustees and the managing agent are critically and comparatively examined. Where a 
sectional title scheme is under pressure of financial ruin or there is serious managerial 
mismanagement, there is a court procedure for the appointment of an administrator. 
This is a measure of last resort and should be avoided by ensuring that properly 
elected, qualified and accountable managerial role players administer the scheme.  
 
In order for these role players to perform these tasks in such a way that the sectional 
title scheme can flourish and have a long-term future, certain assumptions need to be 
made. The first assumption is that these role players need to be suitably qualified and 
                                            
34 T Maree “What are the determinants of value for sectional title homes?” (April 2010) 36 MSC Courier 6. 
35 CG Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles (Strata) 
Act” (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 172. 
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should have the qualities required for fulfilling their functions. Secondly, the role players 
should be properly elected or appointed to their positions by established administrative 
procedures. Thirdly, the powers, functions and duties of each role player must be clearly 
defined with the minimum overlap between tasks to ensure certainty, so as to avoid a 
situation where a task is either not performed at all or where a single task is performed 
by two or more of the role players. If the assumptions are met it will increase the 
efficiency of the governance of the sectional title scheme. Furthermore, the role players 
should be held accountable for abuses or negligence in the performance of one or more 
of their functions. Additionally, there should be some form of publicity of the fact that the 
person has been appointed or elected to that role. This will ensure that owners, tenants, 
third parties and all other interested parties are informed of whom they should be 
dealing with. Finally, there is an assumption that there needs to be a set of rules in 
place that regulates the termination of appointment of a particular role player. If these 
assumptions are correct then the relevant regulations in South African law relating to 
the role players and their functions in respect of the administration and governance of a 
sectional title scheme need to be discussed and developed in order to improve 
deficiencies and facilitate the best possible solutions. 
 
This thesis will be structured in four stages. The first stage relates to the definition and 
description of the general concepts forming the basis of the thesis. Sectional title is a 
specialized field of property law with terminology that is unique to the field. This stage is 
significant in that it is essential for understanding the discussions that will follow in the 
next stages. These definitions and descriptions will be discussed in each chapter as the 
term or concept becomes relevant to the discussion. 
 
The next stages deal with each of the two selected role players in the governance of 
sectional title schemes. The second stage, consisting of seven chapters, deals primarily 
with the governance of the sectional title scheme, with the trustees playing the most 
important role here. Chapter two starts by putting the management role of the trustees 
into perspective. I shall discuss the legal status of the trustees, and also show that, in 
Germany, the management of a scheme is entrusted to a professional manager instead 
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of to a group of persons consisting mainly of members of the body corporate. There will 
be an examination of the reasons for the election and the requirement for the existence 
of the trustees to perform the day-to-day management functions of the body corporate. 
Chapter three places an emphasis on the nomination and election of trustees. I will set 
out the possible provision in the legislation for the appointment of trustees in the initial 
period before the first annual general meeting is held in the scheme. Following on this I 
shall explore the important topic of eligibility of individuals who may be elected as 
trustees. I will then discuss and examine the allocation of the number of trustees 
required for a scheme, their nomination and election. The costly and time-consuming 
process of going to court to dispute the proper election of trustees will be criticized. I 
follow this by recommending the New South Wales and Singaporean provisions 
allowing for the removal of and the election of new trustees at a special general 
meeting. I will explore the consequences of the lack, in the STA or the prescribed 
management rules contained in Annexure 8 of the Regulations made under the STA, of 
any requirement for persons to possess certain qualities or qualifications to become a 
trustee. The next chapter will focus on the fiduciary duty of the trustees and the 
indemnification of the trustees. I will also discuss the consequences of the trustees’ 
transactions with third parties. Chapter five focuses on the role played by trustees in the 
daily operation of sectional title schemes, with an emphasis on their powers, duties, 
rights and functions. The division of powers between the trustees and owners in the 
general meeting will be outlined. An important management and operating function of 
the trustees are the meetings that the trustees must hold to make various management 
decisions. In chapter six I will deal with trustee meetings. Chapter seven deals with the 
various office bearers that are elected to assist in the management of the sectional title 
scheme. These office bearers are the chairperson, secretary and treasurer. Further 
important matters such as the remuneration of trustees and payment of their expenses 
will be dealt with. The last chapter will focus on the term of office of trustees, which will 
include topics such as the duration of office; the filling of vacancies; the appointment of 
alternate trustees; the rotation of trustees and the removal of trustees. I will then discuss 
the circumstances under which a trustee can be disqualified from holding office. Finally, 
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I will set out a recommendation for a legislative procedure to recover books, records, 
accounts or other property from trustees who have left office. 
The third stage deals with the management and administration of the sectional title 
scheme. The focus in this stage will be on how the managing agent should play the 
pivotal role in the management of the scheme. In some European countries a 
professional manager must by law be appointed to perform the executive functions of 
the body corporate.36 In South Africa the executive powers are placed in the hands of 
the trustees.37 Even though the appointment of a managing agent is not mandatory in 
South Africa,38 the trustees39 are empowered to appoint a managing agent to whom 
some or all of the duties of the the trustees are delegated in terms of a contract of 
employment40 and must do so if required by the body corporate41 or a bank.42 The 
scope of the managing agent’s functions and powers will depend on the terms of its 
contract of appointment. Therefore, the trustees handle the day-to-day administration 
and management of the sectional title scheme with the possible assistance of a 
managing agent. I will propose that it is better to appoint a managing agent to manage 
the larger sectional title schemes, rather than to leave this task to the trustees. Since at 
least half of the trustees of a sectional title scheme have to be owners or spouses of 
owners,43 it is common practice in South Africa for the trustees to appoint a managing 
agent as they have limited time, experience and qualifications at their disposal to 
manage the scheme themselves. The nature and size of the scheme will determine 
whether the trustees require assistance in the performance of their functions and duties. 
                                            
36 L Chen & CG van der Merwe “Reflections of the role of the managing agent in South African and Chinese 
sectional title (condominium) legislation” (2009) 1 TSAR 22. 
37 Section 36(4) and section 37 of the STA regulates the South African position. Section 2(5) of the STSMA will 
replace section 36(4) of the STA, and section 3 of the STSMA will replace section 37 of the STA.  
38 Annexure 8 rules 42 and 46(1); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 22. 
39 By passing a resolution to appoint a managing agent at a trustee’s meeting. 
40 Annexure 8 rule 46(1). 
41 By passing a normal resolution taken at a special meeting. 
42 Holding more than 25% of the bonds over the units in the scheme can instruct the trustees to appoint a managing 
agent. 
43 Annexure 8 rule 5(a). 
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Trustees of larger44 mixed-use45 schemes and holiday resort schemes that require 
specialized financial training46 will usually need the assistance of a managing agent. 
There will be a focus on providing suggestions through comparative analysis on how 
South Africa can effectively regulate managing agent policies and practices in 
legislation. Most importantly I will propose suggestions for improvements in the 
sectional title legislation regulating the appointment of managing agents. The reasons 
for this proposal will become clear after the roles of the trustees and the managing 
agent are critically and comparatively examined. 
 
I will start the discussion by explaining the need for the appointment of a managing 
agent to a sectional title scheme. During this discussion the reasons for the appointment 
of the agent; the advantages and disadvantages of appointing an agent and outlining 
the type of scheme that will most benefit from the appointment of a managing agent will 
be set out. Difficulties with regard to collecting arrear levies and the challenges in 
organsing annual general meetings will be discussed in detail to show how complex and 
cumbersome the task of administering and managing a scheme can be, and how the 
appointment of a managing agent is the best option available to the trustees. The next 
discussion will focus on the appointment procedure itself. I will discuss the appointment 
of a managing agent before the inaugural general meeting. There will be a focus on the 
persons who can be appointed as managing agents; the parties who can appoint the 
managing agent; the circumstances under which a managing agent is appointed and 
the requirements for the process of appointment of the managing agent. The contract of 
appointment will be dealt with separately as it is such a fundamental requirement in the 
appointment of a managing agent. An important issue relates to the qualities and 
qualifications necessary to become a managing agent, as one of the most problematic 
aspects relating to the managing agent is the lack of any legislative requirement that the 
managing agent have any form of qualification to act as a managing agent. There will 
                                            
44 It has been suggested to the sectional titles regulation board that it should be obligatory for sectional title schemes 
consisting of more than fifty units to employ a professional managing agent; Proposals to Sectional Titles 
Regulation Board (March 2003) 3.2. 2; Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 23. 
45 A mixed-use scheme is a scheme containing both residential and commercial units. 
46 Annexure 8 rule 42 provides that managing agents may be appointed to operate current and savings accounts of 
the body corporate; Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 23. 
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be a discussion on how best to select a managing agent. The next discussion will focus 
on the liability of the managing agent. One of the most important issues here is the legal 
status of the managing agent. The question whether the managing agent is merely an 
employee will be answered, and this answer will go toward clarifying the fiduciary duty 
of the managing agent. The possible indemnification of the managing agent will be 
discussed. I will also set out the principles of the remuneration and payment of 
expenses to the managing agent. The consequences of the appointment of a managing 
agent will be set out. These consequences include the powers, duties, rights and 
functions of the managing agent. The final discussion will focus on the term of 
appointment of a managing agent including topics such as the period of the 
appointment of the managing agent and the termination of appointment of the managing 
agent. Finally the question as to whether the managing agent can retain the books and 
records of the body corporate after his or her services have been terminated will be 
addressed.  
 
The final phase of the thesis will consist of concluding remarks on the material 
discussed in the previous phases. I shall attempt to summarize and suggest potential 
solutions to the shortcomings that have been highlighted in each of the stages. This 
discussion will hopefully also bring the thesis to a dramatic climax in which answers to 
the questions regarding the major role players in the management of a sectional title 
schemes posed in the introduction will be given. This stage brings the thesis together in 
a dynamic connection between introduction and conclusion.  
 
In order to comprehensively discuss and suggest possible solutions to shortcomings 
related to the issues in each stage of the thesis, comparative references to the manner 
in which other jurisdictions handle these issues will be made, where appropriate. 
Sectional ownership is widely recognized in many countries. Many sectional title 
statutes endeavour to solve similar practical problems experienced by apartment 
ownership schemes.47 Where foreign systems offer different and potentially better 
solutions, these solutions will be discussed. In this way a comparative study will assist 
                                            
47 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-8. 
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in finding answers for rendering the governance of sectional title schemes in South 
Africa more effective. The position in New South Wales is of the most significant as 
South Africa, Singapore and Malaysia have all modeled their sectional titles legislation 
on the New South Wales’ Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act 17 of 1961.48  
 
I will also make reference to the Chinese position. The predominant form of housing in 
China is the condominium. The reason for this is that there is a scarcity of urban land 
and a high population density.49 Management of the condominium schemes tends to be 
chaotic due to the lack of a proper legal framework with regard to the appointment and 
functions of the managing agents.50 The condominium concept was recently recognized 
in the newly enacted Chinese Property Code, but there is no detailed and uniform 
nationwide condominium statute. The condominium stakeholders were provided with 
the Property Management Regulation.51 The fragmented provisions on condominium 
management need to be consolidated and incorporated into a future statute. Since 
China and South Africa require the condominium regime to house the majority of its 
citizens, it seems obvious that the proper management of the scheme is fundamental. 
The most relevant similarity though is in the manner in which both countries have left 
the managing agent industry largely unregulated and dependent on the industry 
regulating itself by an internal code of conduct.52  
 
There will also be references to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 1994 
(most recently amended in 2014) (the “UCIOA”) of the United States of America. I will 
finally look at the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (the “WEG”) of Germany. This is an 
interesting comparison as the WEG was one of the foreign statutes that influenced the 
                                            
48 This Act was repealed and replaced by the Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973. The latter Act was renamed the Strata 
Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 68 of 1973 which, together with the Strata Schemes (Leasehold 
Development) Act 219 of 1986, deals with development related matters pertaining to schemes in New South Wales. 
Management and resolution of dispute aspects of schemes are dealt with in the Strata Schemes Management Act 138 
of 1996; T Keang Sood Strata Title in Singapore and Malaysia 3 ed (2009) 3; F Andreone “50 Years of Australian 
Strata Titles” (July 2011) 6-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 3.  
49 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 1. 
50 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 23. 
51 Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007). 
52 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 24. 
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South African Sectional Titles Act.53 Furthermore, both jurisdictions are governed by the 
Roman law maxim superficies solo cedit,54 which means:  
 
“what is built on the land, accedes to the land.”  
 
This created the need for a statutory exception in order to establish apartment 
ownership. These foreign jurisdictions differ from the South African legislation, and can 
therefore offer suggestions for the improvement and refinement of the South African 
legislation in the different areas of management discussed in this thesis. 
 
A crucial development in South African sectional title legislation occurred in 2011 with 
the promulgation of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (the 
“STSMA”) and the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the “CSOSA”). 
The management provisions in the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the “STA”) were 
deleted and re-assembled in the STSMA, while leaving the technical registration and 
survey provisions in the STA. The separation of the management and registration 
matters was achieved by the repeal of the management provisions in the STA in the 
Schedule to the STSMA, and their simultaneous re-enactment in the STSMA. The STA 
is left containing only registration and land survey provisions, and is to be administered 
by the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, the successor of the 
Department of Land Affairs. The STSMA (together with the CSOSA) will be 
administered by the Department of Human Settlements, formerly the Department of 
Housing. The STSMA will only come into operation at a date fixed by the President by 
proclamation in the Gazette which will necessarily be after Regulations under these 
Acts have been enacted. The provisions in the CSOSA requiring consideration and 
determination by the ombud service will obviously only come into operation at the date 
at which the ombud service is in full operation.55 The STSMA, while re-enacting most of 
the management provisions of the repealed provisions of the STA, has introduced 
                                            
53 Van der Merwe Sectional Title 1-8;  
54 CG Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act and the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz” (1974) CILSA 165; Z Van der 
Merwe Constitutionality of the rules governing sectional titles LLM thesis (2010) 33. 
55 STSMA s 22. 
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several innovations in order to streamline and modernise these provisions. The rules 
prescribed under the STA must continue to apply to new and existing schemes until the 
Minister has made regulations prescribing management and conduct rules referred to in 
section 10(2) of the STSMA.56 At present in South Africa Annexures 8 and 9 of the 
Regulations made under the STA provide so-called prescribed management and 
conduct rules respectively, which set out a basic framework for the management of the 
scheme and the behaviour of owners in the scheme. This thesis will refer to the 
provisions of both the STA and the STSMA dealing with the trustees and managing 
agents as key role players in the governance of sectional title schemes. 
 
It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to a better understanding and give more clarity 
of the roles that are played and should be played by the major management actors of a 
sectional title scheme. The success and sustainability of a sectional title scheme 
depends not only on suitable statutory management provisions, but also on the manner 
in which these role players of the scheme apply these rules in practice. Without effective 
and efficient management the scheme will degenerate into an ungovernable slum. The 
aim of the thesis is therefore not only to find theoretical solutions for the burning 
governance issues in sectional titles, but also to consider the practical impact of these 
solutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
56 STSMA s 21. 
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Chapter 2: Legal status of and need for trustees 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
The focus in the following seven chapters will be on the trustees. In this chapter, I will 
endeavour to place the role that trustees play in the management of the sectional title 
scheme into perspective. Following this I shall compare the legal status of South African 
trustees with that of the corresponding executive committees, councils or boards in 
other jurisdictions. I will show that in Germany the management of a scheme is 
entrusted to a professional manager instead of to a group of persons consisting mainly 
of members of the body corporate. I shall then explore the need for the appointment of 
trustees to perform the day-to-day management functions of the body corporate, instead 
of following the laborious process of referring all decisions to the general meeting of 
owners. My conclusion will summarize the salient points on the topic and suggest 
possible improvements or solutions to shortcomings in the legislation. 
2 2 Management role of the trustees in perspective  
 
The South African sectional titles legislation57 sets out a management structure for 
sectional title schemes. As soon as any person other than the developer becomes the 
registered owner of a unit, a body corporate is formed.58 Each sectional owner 
automatically becomes a member of this central management body when the unit is 
registered in his or her name.59 In Reddy v Body Corporate of Croftdene Mall60 the court 
remarked that:  
 
                                            
57 Previously management issue were dealt with in the STA, but will be dealt with in the STSMA once in operation. 
58 STA s 36(1) [STSMA s 2(1)]. This must be read with sections 36(1), (2) and (3) of the STA, which requires that 
the registrar must issue a certificate after a unit is registered in a name other than the developer. This has the effect 
of the establishment of the body corporate in terms of the STSMA. The registrar must the lodge the certificate with 
the chief ombud. The registration issue is therefore dealt with in the STA, while the management issues will be dealt 
with in the STSMA. 
59 STA s 36(1) [STSMA s 2(1)]. 
60 2002 5 SA 640 (D&CLD) 644C. 
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“No sectional title scheme can exist without a body corporate. It is as it were an 
essential limb of a scheme – indeed, perhaps its right arm.”61  
 
The body corporate must act in accordance with the legislation and the rules in making 
and enforcing decisions relating to the management of the sectional title scheme. This 
juristic body is tasked with the enforcement of the rules and the control, management 
and administration of the common property for the benefit of all owners.62 The South 
African legislation sets out a non-exhaustive list of functions and powers of the body 
corporate63 that includes administrative, accounting and secretarial duties. However, the 
body corporate is a juristic body, and therefore performs such functions through the 
members in the general meeting and the board of trustees.64  
 
The trustees are appointed at the annual general meeting by the body corporate to act 
as its representatives. Whereas the function of the general meeting is mainly legislative, 
the trustees have an executive and administrative function.65 The general meeting sets 
the standards and policies for the management and administration of the scheme. The 
trustees handle the day-to-day administration and management of the scheme, with the 
possible assistance of a managing agent.66 The trustees perform the functions and 
exercise the powers prescribed by the management rules of the scheme by giving effect 
to resolutions of the general meeting of the body corporate and by exercising its 
statutory functions and duties in terms of the Act.67  
 
 
 
                                            
61 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-6. 
62 STA s 36(4) [STSMA s 2(5)]. 
63 STA s 37 and 38 [STSMA s 3, 4 and 5]. 
64 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-6. 
65 14-112. 
66 Body Corporate of Albany Court and 17 Others v Nedbank and Others [2008] JOL 21739 (W) para 12; Van der 
Merwe Sectional Titles 14-112.  
67 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
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2 3 Legal status of trustees 
2 3 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows I will discuss the legal status of the trustees. This topic is also closely 
related to the fiduciary duty of the trustees that will be comprehensively discussed later 
in chapter four. I will also compare the legal status of South African trustees with their 
counterparts, namely executive committees, councils and boards in foreign jurisdictions. 
2 3 2 South African position 
 
In South African law of trusts, the trustees stand in the position of trust towards the 
beneficiaries of a trust. In Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s Trustee68 the Appeal Court 
stated that:  
 
“Trustees means persons entrusted (as owners or otherwise) with the control of 
property with which they are bound to deal for the benefit of others.”  
 
In Zinn No v Westminister NO69 the trustee was defined as: 
 
“One who is entrusted with the affairs of another.”  
 
These definitions correspond to a certain extent with the provisions concerning trustees 
in the STA and STSMA.70 The trustees, who are mainly elected from amongst the 
sectional owners, are the physical functionaries who perform the statutory executive 
and administrative powers71 and duties72 of the body corporate for the benefit of the unit 
owners.73 The trustees also perform the functions and exercise the powers prescribed 
                                            
68 1915 AD 491 499. 
69 1936 AD 89 96. 
70 STA s 36(4) read with s 39(1) [STSMA s 2(5) read with s 7(1)]; Body Corporate of La Roche Resort 
Administration Services [2003] JOL 11655 (N) 3; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-112. 
71 STA s 37 [STSMA s 3]. 
72 STA s 38 [STSMA ss 4 and 5]. 
73 STS s 40 [STSMA s 8]. 
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by the management rules74 and by resolutions passed in the general meeting. 
Therefore, the trustees are the executive and administrative organ of the body 
corporate.  
 
The trustees are not in a contractual relationship with the body corporate, but rather in a 
relationship of trust with the body corporate. If a trustee enters into a contractual 
relationship with the body corporate, for example a contract of lease for a common 
property parking bay, then this contractual relationship does not influence the nature of 
his or her office as trustee.  
 
The prescribed management rules clearly state that the trustees “hold office.”75 The 
office of trustees is analogous to directors of a company, while the owners are similar to 
the shareholders of the company. The trustees, like the directors of a company, act as 
the executive council, and like directors they are in a fiduciary relationship with the body 
corporate. They must act honestly and in good faith, and must only act in the best 
interests of the body corporate.76 There must not be any conflicts of material interest, 
and they cannot derive any economic benefit from their position.77 Trustees can be 
sued, but must be indemnified by the body corporate for all costs, losses, expenses and 
claims incurred in the performance of their functions, except in cases of dishonesty or 
gross negligence.78  
 
The South African legislation provides that the body corporate has perpetual succession 
and is capable of suing and of being sued in its corporate name in respect of any 
contract entered into by the body corporate; any damage to the common property; any 
matter in connection with the land or building for which the body corporate is liable or for 
which the owners are jointly liable; any matter arising out of the exercise of any of its 
powers or the performance or non-performance of any of its duties under the Act or any 
                                            
74 Annexure 8 rules 28 – 44. 
75 Annexure 8 rule 4(2) and 6. It should be noted that prescribed management rule 47 alo refers to the managing 
agent holding office. This creates confusion as to the exact legal status of the trustees and managing agent. 
76 STA s 40(2)(a) [STSMA s 8(2)(a)]. 
77 STA s 40(2)(b) [STSMA s 8(2)(b)]. 
78 Annexure 8 rule 12.  
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rule and any claim against the developer in respect of the scheme if so determined by 
special resolution.79 Therefore, the body corporate has the legal standing to sue on 
matters concerning the sectional title scheme.80 Unlike the body corporate that has 
perpetual succession, the trustees are not a separate legal entity. For this reason, the 
trustees cannot collectively commence legal proceedings or be proceeded against as 
defendants collectively. Unless the trustee is personally liable, any proceedings initiated 
against the trustees must be done against the body corporate.  
 
Trustees should be specifically authorized by the general meeting, who have passed a 
direction to bring the legal action81 as granting the trustees the power to sue in court 
without reservation could lead to large financial legal fees for the body corporate. This is 
especially the case in situations where unit owners refuse to pay their contributions. 
Court proceedings are expensive, time-consuming and tedious. The cost of court 
proceedings can be more expensive than the money claimed. If the trustees have 
unfettered power to bring a monetary claim in court, they could choose to resolve the 
money dispute in court rather than to employ more amicable persuasion, mediation or 
arbitration. Furthermore, litigation may not be in the best interests of maintaining a 
harmonious community. The trustees do not always have the necessary legal 
knowledge and experience when to comes to litigation. Commencing litigation 
proceedings in court should always be a measure of last resort. When a legal matter 
arises which involves a large sum of money or fundamental interests of the unit owners, 
the power to commence legal proceedings should be placed in the hands of the general 
meeting, while legal matters involving small expenditure and daily issues would be left 
to the trustees to deal with. The general meeting can pass a resolution to define what 
matters constitute a fundamental matter or large expenditure. 
 
 
                                            
79 STA s 36(6) [STSMA s 2(7)]. 
80 STA s 36(6). 
81 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
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2 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
Foreign jurisdictions such as New South Wales, Singapore and Malaysia also elect a 
group of persons consisting mainly of owners to act as the executive committee of the 
body corporate in order to handle the routine administration and management of the 
scheme. The terminology used, namely “executive committee” or “council” instead of 
“trustees” might differ, but the basic structure and function of these executive 
committees are substantially similar to the South African trustees.  
 
The New South Wales Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996 (the “NSW Strata 
Schemes Management Act”) defines the executive committee as the elected group of 
owners or owner’s nominees responsible for assisting the owners corporation (body 
corporate) in the day-to-day management of the strata scheme, subject to the 
restrictions in the Act and Regulations.82 The executive committee is therefore the 
executive arm of the owners corporation. It has a similar function to a board of directors 
controlling a company. Unlike the owners corporation, the executive committee is not a 
separate legal entity in itself and cannot commence legal proceedings in its own name. 
All proceedings for and against, whether legal or otherwise, must be brought in the 
name of the owners corporation. The legal status of the executive committee of the 
owners corporation is aptly defined in the decision of the New South Wales Appeal 
Court in the case Owners of Johnston Court – Strata Plan no 5493 v Dumancic:83  
 
“The council has no corporate status… there is no legal entity, nor any entity 
entitled ‘council of Owners of Johnston Court’ … the defendant named has no 
relevant legal identity for the purpose of being sued …  the council, a collegiate 
group of persons, has no function other than to perform the functions of a 
corporate body.”84  
 
                                            
82 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(4) and s 21(3). 
83 (1990) NSW Titles Cases 80-0001. 
84 (1990) NSW Titles Cases 80-0001 at 60,053 and 60,054; Keang Sood Strata Title 310. 
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The NSW Strata Schemes Management Act confers many of the powers of the owners 
corporation on the executive committee.85 The owners corporation may limit the matters 
that the executive committee may decide, and the Act stipulates various matters that 
must be decided by the owners corporation in general meeting.86 The general meeting 
may continue to exercise all or any of the functions conferred on it by the Act or the by-
laws even though an executive committee holds office.87 In the event of a disagreement 
between the owners corporation and the executive committee the decision of the 
owners corporation prevails, despite any other provision of the Act.88  
 
In Singapore in terms of the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act 47 of 
2004 (2008 Revised Edition) (the “BMSMA”) the members of the management 
corporation (body corporate) elect a council consisting of a small group of proprietors 
(owners) whose principal function is the day-to-day management of the scheme. 
Without the election of such a council89 it would be necessary to convene a general 
meeting for every management decision that needs to be made.90 Despite the existence 
of the council, the BMSMA empowers the management corporation in general meeting 
to exercise or perform all or any of its powers, duties and functions conferred or 
imposed on it by the Act or the by-laws.91 The management corporation may also 
remove from the council the power to make decisions on specific matters so that only 
the management corporation may decide on those matters in general meeting.92  
 
The Strata Titles Act 318 of 1985 (the “Strata Titles Act”) of Malaysia contains 
substantially similar provisions. The council, subject to restrictions imposed or directions 
given by the management corporation (body corporate) at the general meeting, must 
                                            
85 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21. 
86 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(2) (a) and (b). 
87 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(3). 
88 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(4). 
89 This situation could arise where the proprietors decline to be nominated for the council; refuse to nominate 
candidates or resign from office if elected. 
90 BMSMA s 53(10); Keang Sood Strata Title 309. 
91 BMSMA s 58(2); This is similar to the NSW Wales Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(3). 
92 BMSMA s 59; This is similar to the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(2). 
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exercise the powers and perform the duties of the management corporation.93 Unlike 
the management corporation, the council is not a separate legal entity. Any proceedings 
instituted by or against it must be in the name of the management corporation. It is for 
this reason that the management corporation has control of the scheme. This is different 
to the position of directors of a company who have control of the day-to-day 
management of the company with which the general meeting cannot interfere.94 
 
Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008 (the “UCIOA”) of the United 
States of America the executive board is a group of persons that represents the unit 
owners similar to the trustees in South Africa. The executive board has an executive 
and administrative function, and is elected to execute owners’ resolutions of the general 
meeting, and to administer the day-to-day affairs of the scheme.95 The executive board 
must perform its duties subject to the restrictions imposed by a declaration, the by-laws 
and in other provisions of the UCIOA.96 The executive board is expressly restricted from 
dealing with the winding down of a scheme; amending a declaration; having anything to 
do with either the election of the executive board members or determining the board 
members’ qualifications, powers, duties and terms of office.97 The courts will consider 
whether the executive board has an exclusive standing to bring legal action on behalf of 
the management association, and will usually hold that the association has exclusive 
standing to assert, for example, claims concerning the handling of association funds 
and matters affecting the common property.  
 
In China the executive council also has an executive and administrative function. Its 
status is the same as in South Africa and the United States.98 Internally the executive 
council is regarded as the standing committee of the condominium association (body 
corporate), but when it comes to external transactions with third parties the executive 
                                            
93 Strata Titles Act s 39(4); Sarawak Strata Titles Ordinance 1995 s 23(3); and Sabah Land (Subsidiary Title) 
Enactment 9 of 1972 s 14(3). 
94 Keang Sood Strata Title 310. 
95 UCIOA § 3-103. 
96 UCIOA § 3-103(a). 
97 UCIOA § 3-103(b). 
98 Chinese Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 15; Chen Chinese Condominium Law141. 
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council acts as an agent of the association.99 The executive council must perform its 
duties subject to the restrictions imposed by the Act, the by-laws and the general 
meeting’s resolutions. The executive council is in principle entitled to exercise all the 
executive powers and duties of the condominium association subject to certain 
restrictions. In this way the executive council is seen as subordinate to the general 
meeting.100  
 
In contrast to the position in South Africa, New South Wales, Singapore, Malaysia the 
United States and China, the executive organ of the German body corporate 
(Gemeinschaft der Wohnungseigentümer) is not an elected group of owners, but an 
appointed single professional manager (Verwalter), who may be assisted by an advisory 
council consisting of unit owners (Verwaltungsbeirat).101 The professional manager is in 
fact the executive organ of the body corporate, and is not merely an agent of the body 
corporate as is the case of the managing agent of South Africa, New South Wales, 
Singapore and China.102 The general meeting of owners has to appoint a professional 
manager by majority vote.103 The owners can also, by majority vote, appoint a council 
consisting of unit owners in addition to the Verwalter.104 It consists of three sectional 
owners, one of them being the chairperson of the Verwaltungsbeirat.105 This provision is 
non-mandatory, and therefore the owners can agree on a different number of members 
or can appoint non-owners as members of the council in terms of the the general set of 
rules for the scheme (Gemeinschaftsordnung).106 This German advisory council is an 
administrative advisory council and is an optional institution to assist the manager with 
his tasks.107 The manager cannot be a member of the council. The membership in the 
council is an honorary office just like the position of a South African trustee. Apart from 
these general statements the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (the “WEG”) does not contain 
                                            
99 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 142. 
100 143. 
101 WEG § 29; Pienaar Sectional Titles (2010) 173.  
102 D Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs of the South African Sectional 
Titles Act and the German Wohnungseigentusgesetz LLM dissertation University of Stellenbosch (2012) 31. 
103 WEG § 26.  
104 WEG § 29(1). 
105 WEG § 29(1). 
106 Reinlein Comparison of legislative and executive management organs 32. 
107 WEG § 29(2). 
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any further specific provisions concerning the advisory council. The Act is silent on the 
duration of membership of the advisory council. The term of office of a member of the 
council is therefore unlimited and only ends when the member is removed from office or 
when the member resigns. The council is an important communication link between the 
owners and the manager, and can influence the decisions of the manager. It also serves 
as a first discussion centre for the owners and is regarded as a body that can be trusted 
with the affairs of the scheme.108 This would be useful in larger or mixed-use schemes 
where a single professional manager cannot execute and perform all the executive 
functions and duties alone.109 The council has no executive powers as such, but rather 
acts as an advisory body that could to a certain degree control the activities of the 
professional manager.110 The council monitors and comments on the financial reports of 
the manager before the reports are presented to the general meeting.111 The chairman 
convenes meetings of the council as and when it is required.112 Therefore, both 
jurisdictions provide for optional management staff to supplement the executive 
management organs.113  
 
The professional manager is appointed contractually, and may be dismissed if he or she 
does not exercise his or her executive function in a professional manner. This keeps 
him or her accountable. He or she or a professional management firm can be appointed 
for a maximum period of five years in general, but the first appointment after the 
establishment of a scheme can only be for a maximum period of three years.114 The 
manager receives remuneration for the proper execution of his or her duties. 
Furthermore, the powers and duties of the professional manager are determined largely 
by the provisions of the WEG,115 and not only by the terms of his or her contract of 
appointment and the resolutions of the body corporate, as is the case with the South 
                                            
108 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 33. 
109 33. 
110 32. 
111 WEG § 29(3). 
112 WEG § 29(4). 
113 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 31. 
114 WEG § 26(1). 
115 WEG § 27; Pienaar Sectional Titles 174; Reinlein Comparison of legislative and executive management organs 
31. 
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African managing agent. The manager has wide general powers to manage the 
scheme, which includes all measures that are necessary for the maintenance of the 
common property and the financial management of the scheme. After the reform of the 
WEG in 2007 the Verwalter can also take all measures that are necessary for instituting 
legal proceedings on behalf of the owners and the community of owners if he or she is 
authorised to do so by a majority resolution of the owners.116 These tasks and powers of 
the professional manager are mandatory and cannot be taken away.117 
 
In practice the professional manager’s powers are often overestimated either by its 
members, the other owners or the manager himself. The manager often relies on the 
approval of the advisory council in matters for which it has no competence at all. Some 
members assume incorrectly that they have the power to give instructions to the 
manager or even to the owners. Some owners consider the members of the advisory 
council to be their representatives in their relationships with the manager or third 
parties. However, the functions and powers of the Verwaltungsbeirat are limited 
functions and powers accorded to it in terms of the WEG or by a unanimous 
resolution.118  
 
The two main functions of the Verwaltungsbeirat in terms of the WEG are to support119 
and to audit the financial documentation of the professional manager.120 Therefore, 
there is a supportive function on the one hand and a supervising function on the other 
hand.121 The auditing function means that the council should check the budget 
(Wirtschaftsplan), payments (Abrechnung), accounting (Rechnungslegung) and 
estimation of costs (Kostenanschläge), and comment on these matters before the 
general meeting decides on them. The manager has the duty to grant access to all 
financial documentation that must be audited by the council. If the manager impedes the 
council, for example, by not providing the books of accounts or other financial 
                                            
116 WEG § 27(2) and (3). 
117 WEG § 27(4); Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 31. 
118 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 33-34. 
119 WEG § 29(2). 
120 WEG § 29(3). 
121 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 35. 
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documents for auditing, the manager may be removed from office.122 The auditing 
function of the council as provided for in the WEG is formulated as a mandatory 
provision. Therefore, it is more of a duty than a right as it goes further than a simple 
right of auditing the financial affairs of the manager. However, if the council does not 
audit the financial documentation of the manager, the general meeting can still adopt a 
valid resolution to approve the financial documentation presented by the manager at the 
general meeting.  
 
The members of the council are entitled to transfer their auditing task to one or more of 
their members. The auditing has to be carried out in a neutral and appropriate manner 
in accordance with general auditing principles consisting of both a calculation and a 
substantive inspection. The calculation part involves an inspection of whether the 
revenue and expenditure are balanced in the current account. The substantive check 
investigates whether the account of revenue and expenditure rendered are assigned to 
the community of owners and whether the expenditure was objectively necessary. It is 
important that all accountancy files and documents are presented to the council in a 
complete form so that the council can render a statement on the accounts of the 
scheme.123 This can be done in writing or orally at the general meeting. The statement 
should also include a comment on the manner in which the manager complied with his 
function to render proper accounts. This statement can be very valuable to owners who 
must approve the annual budget and other financial documentation presented by the 
manager at a general meeting, and for the extension of the appointment of the 
manager.124  
 
The council is not only an audit institution. Supporting the Verwalter is an even more 
important function than the audit function.125 This right of supervision does not include 
the authority to give directives to the Verwalter, except if the owners granted such a 
power to the Verwaltungsbeirat by a resolution. Such supporting function does not 
                                            
122 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 36. 
123 WEG § 29(3). 
124 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 37. 
125 34. 
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include a power to take over the functions of the Verwalter as the responsibility for the 
executive management of the scheme stays with the Verwalter. The Verwalter cannot 
be exempted from liability in acting on a matter which had been approved by the 
Verwaltungsbeirat.126 The supporting function of the Verwaltungsbeirat is not further 
defined or explained in the WEG. The members of the Verwaltungsbeirat do not have 
the power to represent the community of owners in terms of section 29 WEG in 
transactions with either the Verwalter or third persons. Nevertheless, there are a range 
of matters where the Verwaltungsbeirat can offer support to the Verwalter. These 
include preparation of the general meeting and the agenda for the meeting, assistance 
in the implementation of resolutions, the enforcement of the conduct rules 
(Hausordnung), the completion of repairs and maintenance work, the collection of 
quotations from maintenance contractors and the selection of the most suitable 
contractor to do the work, the management of the common funds and making 
information available to owners. However, the support cannot be forced upon the 
Verwalter. The non-acceptance of support offered, does not represent a violation of his 
obligations.  
 
The council cannot be described as a council of experts as it consists of owners, who 
are not necessarily experts. It would be desirable to have expert support for the 
manager, but this has not been laid down as one of the criteria for the appointment of 
members of a council.127 The council can influence the decisions of the manager, and 
can also not be considered an advisory organ without responsibility. As mentioned 
above it has an audit and advisory function, and the members can to some extent be 
held liable for neglect in the performance of these functions. The council cannot be 
overburdened with too many functions and powers and an extension of its liability in the 
performance of these functions and the exercise of these powers.128 The provisions 
concerning the council in the WEG129 are non-mandatory and can therefore be 
excluded, expanded or accepted as they stand. Consequently, it is up to the owners to 
                                            
126 36. 
127 34. 
128 33. 
129 WEG § 29. 
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design the rights, functions and powers of a council, if appointed, by agreement or 
resolution.130 
2 4 The need for trustees 
2 4 1 Introduction 
 
Although the general meeting is the most important organ of the body corporate, the 
trustees play a very important role in the day-to-day management of a sectional title 
scheme. The general meeting acts as the brain, while the trustees act as the brawn of 
the body corporate. This is illustrated by the fact that the functions and powers of the 
body corporate must, subject to the provisions of the Act, the rules and any restriction 
imposed or direction given at a general meeting of the owners of sections, be performed 
and exercised by the trustees holding office in terms of the rules.131  
2 4 2 South African position 
 
Whereas the function of the general meeting is mainly legislative, the trustees have an 
executive and administrative function.132 The general meeting sets the standards and 
policies for the management of the scheme. The trustees handle the day-to-day 
management of the scheme by giving effect to resolutions of the general meeting, and 
by exercising their statutory functions and duties. In very small schemes it is possible 
that the owners manage the scheme by unanimous agreement or by decisions adopted 
in general meeting.133 In larger schemes the owners need to elect a small 
representative group as trustees to perform the task of management of the scheme on 
their behalf and for their benefit.  
 
Without the trustees acting as the executive organ of the body corporate the general 
meeting would have to be convened every time it needs to make any decision relating 
                                            
130 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 35. 
131 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)].  
132 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-68. 
133 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 141-142. 
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to the management of the scheme.134 The body corporate would then have to comply 
with all the strict formalities for such meetings.135 This would be a tedious, time 
consuming, cumbersome and a costly process as fourteen days’ notice must be given 
to convene a general meeting.136 Once trustees are elected it is quick and easy to 
convene a meeting of trustees to decide on any matter within their power as only seven 
days’ notice must be given to convene a meeting for the trustees.137 Consequently, the 
main reason for the election of trustees is to avoid the situation where every action on 
behalf of the community of owners needs to be authorized by the general meeting. 
2 4 3 Comparative survey 
 
Without provision for an executive committee, a New South Wales strata scheme would 
have to rely on the community of owners in general meeting to perform these duties, 
and undertake the numerous obligations imposed by the Act, regulations and by-laws 
for the benefit of the owners,138 and would have to comply with the strict formalities for 
holding such meetings.139 Without a secretary, for instance, the general meeting will 
have to issue the relevant notices to convene the meetings.140 More importantly, without 
an executive committee the general meeting would not be in a position to delegate the 
day-to-day administration of the scheme to select persons, and the central 
administration of the scheme would be in disarray.  
 
Even if provision is made for an executive committee, difficulties to fill vacancies in the 
executive committee may leave the management in a shambles. The NSW Strata 
Schemes Management Act mentions two alternatives to overcome this impasse. The 
first alternative allows an owner, mortgagee or covenant chargee141 to apply to an 
Adjudicator for an order that a nominated person (who has consented to that 
nomination) be empowered to call and hold a general meeting within such time as is 
                                            
134 A Ilkin New South Wales Strata and Community Schemes Management and the Law 4 ed (2007) 92. 
135 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-112; NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 16(4); Ilkin NSW Strata 92. 
136 Annexure 8 rule 54(1). 
137 Annexure 8 rule 15(2). 
138 Ilkin NSW Strata 92, 98. 
139 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 16(4). 
140 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(b); Ilkin NSW Strata 98. 
141 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 17(6). 
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specified in the order specifically to try and elect an executive committee.142 The owners 
might feel more obliged to consent to nomination for the executive committee if the 
meeting has been called specifically on an Adjudicator’s order. A meeting held under 
this section is, for the purpose of the election of an executive committee, taken to be the 
first general meeting of the owners corporation.143 The Adjudicator may then order that 
the meeting considers various motions from owners and other persons entitled to 
vote.144 The second alternative is that an owner or other eligible person may apply to an 
Adjudicator seeking an order for the appointment of an administrator.145 If owners 
decline to be nominated as members of the executive committee, fail to nominate 
candidates or resign then the only other options are for the owners corporation to 
appoint a managing agent146 or an administrator147 to manage the scheme.148 
 
It is possible that a strata scheme in Singapore is left without a council due to the fact 
that none of the proprietors want to be members of the council; elected members resign 
during their term of office or the number of resignations leave the council without a 
quorum. As in New South Wales the management corporation administers the scheme 
by appointing a managing agent149 or a Strata Titles Board makes an order for an 
administrator to administer the scheme where there is no executive council.150 In the 
event that the scheme is not properly maintained the Commissioner of Buildings could 
issue a notice to compel the proprietors (owners) to take the necessary corrective 
actions.151 The proprietors can also apply to the Strata Titles Board to compel the 
election and appointment of new office bearers.152 Where this problem persists and 
                                            
142 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 17(1) and s 17(2); Ilkin NSW Strata 99. 
143 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 17(3). 
144 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 17(4). 
145 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 162; Ilkin NSW Strata 99, 111. 
146 Appointed in terms of NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28. 
147 Appointed in terms of NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 162 or s 183B. 
148 Ilkin NSW Strata 92. 
149 BMSMA s 66; Keang Sood Strata Title 324. 
150 BMSMA s 112. 
151 BMSMA s 6. 
152 BMSMA s 102. 
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there is no council, the administration and management of the scheme will be left to the 
entire body of proprietors.153  
 
In Malaysia the Commissioner of Buildings may authorize in writing any proprietor to 
convene an extraordinary general meeting.154 Alternatively, the management 
corporation may apply to court for the appointment of an administrator to manage the 
scheme.155 If the management corporation is not functioning satisfactorily a proprietor or 
any other person or body with a registered interest in a parcel (unit) may lodge a 
complaint with the Commissioner. The Commissioner may then, if satisfied that it is in 
the interests of the parcel proprietors (unit owners) in the subdivided building or land 
concerned, appoint a managing agent to exercise the powers and discharge the duties 
and functions of the management corporation or that of its council.156 
2 5 Conclusion 
 
The need for an executive organ of the body corporate is of the utmost importance for 
the effective and efficient day-to-day management and administration of the sectional 
title scheme. This is illustrated by the above overview of the situation in South Africa, 
New South Wales, Singapore and Malaysia. Without the election of trustees the general 
meeting of owners would have to convene a general meeting any time a decision needs 
to be taken regarding the management of the scheme. This is a time consuming and 
expensive task that can be avoided by electing an efficient board of trustees, executive 
committee, council or board.  
 
Furthermore, sectional titles legislation imposes numerous duties on those appointed by 
the trustees, especially to the positions of chairperson, secretary and treasurer. Without 
trustees to make these appointments the positions would not be filled and the numerous 
functions imposed by the Act and rules for the benefit of the owners would have to be 
                                            
153 BMSMA s 53(10). 
154 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 9(3). There is no provision such as this in the Sarawak Ordinance or the 
Sabah Enactment. 
155 Strata Titles Act s 51; Sarawak Ordinance s 27; Sabah Enactment s 17A. 
156 Strata Titles Act ss 50(1) and (2)(a). 
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performed by the owners in general meeting. In South Africa the rules provide that the 
trustees elected at the first general meeting must appoint a chairperson from among 
themselves at the commencement of the first meeting of trustees.157 As it is not 
mandatory to appoint a managing agent in South Africa, the lack of a provision in the 
rules of a provision obligating the trustees to appoint a secretary and treasurer is a 
shortcoming. In larger mixed-use and self-managed schemes the election of not only a 
chairperson, but also a secretary and treasurer should not only be strongly encouraged, 
but should be made obligatory in the rules. Once appointed, they can divide the 
numerous tasks imposed by the Act, rules and resolutions of the body corporate 
amongst themselves. Naturally this task will be facilitated more efficiently by the 
appointment of a chairperson, secretary and treasurer. I will discuss these office 
bearers in more detail in chapter 7. 
 
South African legislation should, similar to other jurisdictions, specifically legislate for 
the situation where no trustees have been elected or the requisite number of trustees 
cannot be filled. In New South Wales an owner, mortgagee or covenant chargee158 can 
apply to an Adjudicator for an order that a nominated person be empowered to call a 
general meeting specifically to try and elect an executive committee.159 In Singapore the 
owners can apply to the Strata Titles Board to compel the election and appointment of 
new office bearers.160 However this might not solve the problem if the situation is due to 
the apathy of owners to serve on the council. In Malaysia the Commissioner of Buildings 
may authorize in writing any proprietor to convene an extraordinary general meeting 
that may provide for the duties and powers of the council to be exercisable by the 
proprietors in general meeting.161 This is a cumbersome way to exercise the functions. 
The position in Singapore where the Commissioner of Buildings could issue a notice to 
compel the subsidiary proprietors to take the necessary corrective actions in the event 
that the scheme is not being properly maintained is also a useful provision in the case of 
                                            
157 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
158 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 17(6). 
159 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 17(1); Ilkin NSW Strata 99. 
160 BMSMA s 102. 
161 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 9(3). There is no provision such as this in the Sarawak Ordinance or the 
Sabah Enactment. 
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emergencies.162 In instances where management of the scheme is left to the owners in 
general meeting or by unanimous consent, the provision that makes individual unit 
owners jointly and severally liable for the payment of all the debts of the body corporate 
would be essential to provide for sufficient money to undertake the require maintenance 
and management matters.163 
 
It is for these reasons that I submit that it should be mandatory that a professional 
manager be appointed to manage sectional title schemes. This would be preferable to a 
situation where there are no willing or able persons to act as trustees, thereby requiring 
the general meeting to be convened every time the body corporate needs to make any 
decision relating to the governance of the scheme. There is an obvious need for an 
executive and administrative organ of the body corporate. The South African legislation 
has provided for this. The trustees are elected annually, and a majority of the trustees 
must be owners who often do not have any knowledge or experience of the 
administration and management issues relating to sectional titles. In my opinion the 
German system of appointing an experienced and knowledgeable professional manager 
as an executive organ of the body corporate, who may be assisted by an advisory 
council, is preferable to the position in South Africa where the trustees are elected as 
the executive arm of the scheme, who may supplement their expertise by appointing a 
managing agent to assist them in the day-to-day management of the scheme. The 
professional manager would then be an organ of the body corporate, and not merely an 
agent that is appointed contractually as is currently the case of the managing agent in 
South Africa, Australia and China. This equates the professional manager with the 
trustees, except that he or she is appointed contractually, and may be dismissed if he or 
she does not exercise his or her executive function in a professional manner that keeps 
him or her accountable. A shortcoming to this type of executive organ is that while an 
owner can be appointed as manager, a non-owner or indeed a professional managing 
firm is in practice appointed as manager of a scheme. However, this lack of personal 
                                            
162 BMSMA s 6. 
163 S 55(6). 
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interest is counteracted by the fact that an advisory council consisting of unit owners 
may assist the professional manager. 
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Chapter 3: Number, nomination and election of 
eligible trustees 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will focus on the nomination and election of trustees. I will first consider the 
question whether legislation does or should provide for the existence of a board of 
trustees or members of the executive committee, council or board in the initial period 
before the first general meeting is held. Following on this I shall explore the important 
question as to who is eligible to be elected as a trustee at the first and subsequent 
annual general meetings of the body corporate. I will then examine the number of 
trustees that should be elected. Once this is established I will discuss the nomination of 
trustees and their subsequent election.  
 
A significant shortcoming of the South African legislation is that it does not require the 
trustees to possess certain qualities or qualifications to be elected to the office of 
trustee. I will explore the consequences of the lack of any such requirement in the 
STSMA, STA and the prescribed management rules. Each topic will contain 
comparative material on how other jurisdictions deal with that particular matter. My 
concluding remarks will summarize the salient points on each topic and suggest 
possible improvements or solutions to perceived shortcomings in the South African 
sectional title law.  
3 2 Provision for trustees in the initial period before first general meeting 
3 2 1 South African position 
 
The Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 (the “1971 Act”) together with its rules contained in 
Schedule 1 and 2 did not deal satisfactorily with the position of trustees during the initial 
period before the first general meeting (also referred to as the “inaugural general 
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meeting”). The only relevant provision was that the trustees had to be elected at the first 
general meeting.164 The 1971 Act did not:  
 
“Saddle someone with the responsibility to convene the first general meeting and 
to designate someone to act on behalf of the body corporate pending the election 
of the first trustees at the first general meeting.”165  
 
There was no provision made for the calling of the first general meeting within a 
specified amount of time. The fact that the developer usually managed the scheme 
during this period opened the door for abuse of power by the developer.  
 
The second generation Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the “STA”) solved this 
shortcoming by not only providing that the first general meeting must be held within 60 
days after the establishment of the body corporate, but also by engaging the owners as 
trustees to help in the management of the scheme during this period. The rules provide 
that all owners are trustees from the date of establishment of the body corporate until 
the first general meeting. At the start of the first general meeting they must retire, but 
are still eligible for election as trustees at that meeting.166 The developer or his nominee 
must act as chairperson from the date of establishment of the body corporate. At the 
meeting he has to retire as trustee and chairperson, but is still eligible for re-election to 
these posts.167 At the commencement of the first meeting of trustees, after their 
election, the trustees must elect a chairman from among their number who must hold 
office as such until the end of the next annual general meeting of the members of the 
body corporate.168 Although all owners automatically act as trustees from the moment of 
establishment of the body corporate, the body corporate only becomes a viable 
management structure with the election of trustees at the first general meeting.  
 
                                            
164 Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 Schedule 1 rule 1. 
165 Body Corporate of La Roche v Resort Administration Services CC [2003] JOL 11655 (N) para 8. 
166 Annexure 8 rule 4(2). 
167 Annexure 8 rule 4(3). 
168 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
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The rationale for the owners automatically being trustees from the date of establishment 
of the body corporate was explained in Body Corporate of La Roche v Resort 
Administration Services169 where the High Court stated:  
 
“Unless owners were automatically trustees, the sectional title scheme would 
flounder in chaos until the proper appointment of trustees.”170  
 
Therefore, the STA and the prescribed management rules eliminated the shortcoming in 
the 1971 Act. It saddled the developer with the duty to hold the first general meeting 
within 60 days, and opted for making all the owners trustees during the initial period,171 
instead of designating someone to act on behalf of the body corporate pending the 
election of the trustees at the first annual general meeting.172 The practical problem that 
might arise is that in the case of sales from building plans there may be a large number 
of transfers to sectional owners before the first general meeting, resulting in numerous 
trustees. This should not, however, cause too much concern because the developer is 
obliged to hold the first general meeting within 60 days after the establishment of the 
body corporate. All the owners will hold their position as trustees until new trustees are 
elected at the first annual general meeting. The developer, who generally owns most of 
the units in the scheme, initially dominates the management of a new scheme. 
Developers frequently use their initial superior voting powers to influence decision-
making and to impose their will upon the owners. It often happens that early trustees 
would support the developer’s position.173  
 
Once the first trustees have been elected the operational control is gradually transferred 
from the developer to the trustees.174 Although the developer is treated in the same way 
                                            
169 [2003] JOL 11655 (N). 
170 Paras 8-9. 
171 Annexure 8 rule 50(1); STA s 36(7)(a) [STSMA s 2(8)(a)].  
172 [2003] JOL 11655 (N) para 8; Pienaar Sectional Titles 172. 
173 T Maree “Freezing the developer’s voting powers” (June 2006) 20 MCS Courier 7. 
174 The developer must account to the body corporate for the period from the establishment of the body corporate 
until the first trustees are elected in order for him or her to recover his or her expenditure for this period. At such 
meeting the developer must furnish the members with a copy of the sectional plan; a certificate from the local 
authority to the effect that all rates due up to the date of the establishment of the body corporate have been paid; and 
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as the other owners, he or she will be able to control the election of the trustees as long 
as he or she owns the majority of the units.175 Nevertheless, the dominance of the 
developer is desirable in the initial stage due to his or her intimate involvement with the 
project; the relative ignorance of new owners; their lack of cohesion and their inability to 
function as a group.176 This, however, needs to be balanced against the possible abuse 
of his or her initial voting powers to influence decision-making. 
3 2 2 Comparative survey 
 
The New South Wales legislation contains more comprehensive (and also more 
complicated) provisions on members of the executive committee during the initial 
period.177 The legislation distinguishes between two types of strata title schemes, 
namely small strata schemes consisting only of two lots (units) and those with more 
than two lots. In the case of a two-lot strata scheme where only one owner owns each 
lot, the executive committee (consisting of both sole owners) is formed on the same day 
as the owners corporation is formed, which is the date on which the strata plan is 
registered. If one lot is owned by a corporation or by co-owners then the executive 
committee (consisting of a nominee or the co-owner appointed by the other co-owners) 
will be formed when the company nominee is determined, or when the section 118 
notice which identifies the lot owners is entered in the strata roll.178  
 
Where a strata scheme has more than two lots, there is no provision for the 
establishment of an executive committee consisting of all the owners in the scheme at 
the initial stage as in South Africa. There is no obligation on the developer or owners 
corporation to establish an executive committee in the initial stage before the first 
                                                                                                                                             
proof of revenue and expenditure concerning the management of the scheme from the date of the first occupation of 
any unit until the date of the establishment of the body corporate; STA s 36(7)(a)(i)-(iii) [STSMA s 2(8)(c)(i)-(iii)]. 
175 Maree (June 2006) MCS Courier 7. 
176 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-8. 
177 The executive committee can be constituted at three different points in time. An executive committee can be 
constituted either at the constitution of executive committee in the initial period before first general meeting; at the 
first annual general meeting; or at subsequent annual and extraordinary general meetings; Ilkin NSW Strata 93. 
178 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cls 1(2)(a) and 1(2)(c). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 40 
general meeting, which may be postponed for a long time.179 An executive committee 
might only be brought into being after having been elected at the first general meeting 
convened by the developer. The agenda of this meeting must include the election of an 
executive committee.180   
 
In the initial phase the scheme will be administered by the owners corporation in 
general meeting by complying with the Act’s strict formalities for the convening of such 
meetings. Alternatively, a managing agent will be appointed against payment of a fee, 
or on occasion the original owner (developer) or his agent will manage the day-to-day 
operation of the scheme.181 At this early stage in the scheme’s existence the current 
owners might wish to elect an executive committee to administer the scheme in order to 
avoid the the payment of the managing agent’s charges; the onerous and strict 
formalities in convening general meetings to take decisions and to avoid leaving the 
management of the scheme in the hands of the original owner who is unfamiliar with the 
Act’s complicated management provisions. The owners corporation is therefore 
empowered to elect an executive committee in the interim period before the first general 
meeting.182 This executive committee may not necessarily include the original owner.183 
The reduction of a developer’s unit entitlement (participation quota), if it is more than 
one-half of the aggregate unit entitlement in the scheme to one-third of the aggregate 
total of the scheme,184 prevents abuses by the developer in the initial phase.  
 
The election of an executive committee in the interim period has the following 
advantages: it ensures that the details of owners, mortgagees and covenant chargee’s 
are recorded in the strata roll (deeds registry); that levies and any other moneys and 
any interest owed by lot holders are paid to the owners corporation; that motions are 
drafted outlining the specific matters to be considered; that motion can be served on the 
secretary (who will normally be the original owner or his agent duly authorized in 
                                            
179 This occurs where some original owners do not anticipate early sales of their units or if they do not want to sell 
their units immediately after registration of the strata plan; Ilkin NSW Strata 94. 
180 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2 cl 3(c); and sch 3, cl 2(7). 
181 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 24.  
182 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 16(2). 
183 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 16; and sch 3, cl 2(7); Ilkin NSW Strata 94. 
184 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 18(3). 
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writing)185 and that an extraordinary general meeting will be convened under a 
chairperson (who will again normally be the original owner or an appointed agent)186 to 
proceed through steps prescribed by regulations 17 and 18.187 Once the executive 
committee is elected it must appoint a chairperson, secretary and treasurer at the first 
executive committee meeting held thereafter.188 The office bearers shall then hold the 
same respective positions in the owners corporation.189 The chairperson (who is the 
original owner or an appointed agent)190 is responsible for the conduct of the election. If 
the procedure is breached an eligible applicant may lodge an application with an 
Adjudicator for an order against the chairperson.191 
 
In Singapore the council of the management corporation for the initial period consists of 
each proprietor (owner) who is a natural person or the proprietor’s nominee, together 
with the nominee of each proprietor that is a company.192 If there is only one subsidiary 
proprietor, then he or she may take any decision, and such decision is deemed to be 
the decision of the council of the management corporation.193 Therefore, in Singapore 
where there is no council of the management corporation, the management corporation 
itself must manage the scheme during the initial period.194 
 
In Malaysia where there are no more than three proprietors (owners), during the initial 
period before the first general meeting has been held then the council (trustees) 
consists of all the proprietors.195 This may be construed as making provision for a 
council consisting of the first three proprietors during the period between the time of 
registration of the strata title application or the opening of a book of the strata register, 
                                            
185 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 24. 
186 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 24. 
187 I will comprehensively discuss regulations 17 and 18 later in this chapter. 
188 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 18(1). 
189 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 18(2). 
190 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 24. 
191 In terms of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138 or s 153 (whichever is more appropriate); Ilkin NSW 
Strata 94. 
192 BMSMA s 53(2). 
193 BMSMA s 53(3). 
194 BMSMA s 53(10). 
195 Strata Titles Act; Sarawak Ordinance; Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 2(2). 
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as the case may be, and the first general meeting of the management corporation.196 
This ensures proper management of the strata scheme from the time of the 
management corporation’s inception.  
 
In terms of the United States UCIOA all the owners are not automatically members of 
the executive council from the time of establishment of the owners’ association as is the 
position during the initial period in South Africa. The UCIOA allows the developer to 
appoint transitional council members who will be removed at the first general meeting. 
New council members will be elected or transitional council members can be re-
elected.197 The developer must then hand over control of the association to the owner 
elected council members within a specified time. The UCIOA sets out specific 
provisions for the gradual turnover of control.198  
 
Instead of allowing developers to appoint a provisional executive council on the model 
of the American UCIOA, the important Chinese Management Property Regulation of 
2003 makes provision for the developer to appoint a professional managing agent 
during the initial period.199  
3 3 Eligibility to be elected as a trustee 
3 3 1 Introduction 
 
All jurisdictions make provision for the election of trustees or an executive committee, 
council or board at the first general meeting of the scheme. The next crucial question to 
consider is who will qualify to be elected as trustees. The primary focus of this 
subsection will be on the persons eligible to be nominated and elected as trustees. As 
part of this discussion I shall consider the mixture of owners and outsiders required to 
make up a group of trustees. It is important to note that the “eligibility” of persons to be 
                                            
196 Keang Sood Strata Titles  312. 
197 UCIOA § 3-103(d). 
198 UCIOA s §-103(e). Sixty days after the developer transfers title to purchasers of 25% of the units, at least one 
member and not less than 25% of the members of the executive board must be elected by the unit owners. Sixty days 
after the title transfer of 50% of the units to purchasers not less than 33% of the members of the executive board 
must be elected by unit owners. 
199 Property Management Regulation of 2003 arts 21-26; Chen Chinese Condominium Law148.  
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elected as trustees should not be confused with the “qualifications” required to be 
elected as a trustees, which I will examine later in this chapter. 
3 3 2 South African position 
 
Prescribed management rule 5 indicates which persons are eligible for nomination and 
election as trustees. The rule stipulates that a person shall not be required to be an 
owner or the nominee of a juristic person, in order to be eligible for the office of a 
trustee.200 This rule is subject to two provisos namely that the majority of trustees must 
be owners or spouses of owners, and that the managing agent or any of his or her 
employees or an employee of the body corporate may not be a trustee, unless he or 
she is also an owner.201 
 
The fact that non-owners, and not only owners or nominees of juristic persons, may be 
elected as trustees was confirmed in Torgos (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors 
Aweigh and another,202 where it was stated that a trustee does not necessarily cease to 
be a trustee on the sale of his unit to a third person. Although one would logically expect 
only owners of units or nominees of juristic persons to be trustees, prescribed 
management rule 5 permits a non-owner to be a trustee.  
 
The first proviso is that the majority of trustees must be owners or spouses of owners.203 
Although this proviso could prove to be too restrictive, its aim is to ensure that the 
majority of the trustees, as owners, have a personal interest in the efficient 
management of the scheme, while leaving it open for a small number of suitably 
qualified outsiders to be elected as trustees to bring the required experience and skill to 
the mix of trustees. It furthermore caters for instances where an insufficient number of 
owners or their spouses are prepared to serve as trustees.204 It might also be easier in 
                                            
200 Annexure 8 rule 5. 
201 Annexure 8 rules 5(a) and (b). 
202 2006 3 SA 369 (W) para11. 
203 Annexure 8 rule 5(a). 
204 Van der Merwe (1999) Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 180-181. 
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practice to remove outsider trustees than owner trustees from trusteeship in cases 
where they are not pulling their weight.  
 
A husband and wife, who own a unit jointly, can both be trustees. This follows from the 
definition of  “owner” in section 1 of the STA in terms of which both husband and wife 
will qualify either as an owner or the spouse of an owner. It can be argued that this 
could cause problems due to the fact that too much control exists under one roof.205 
However, there is no restriction disallowing two residents of the same section from 
acting as trustees of the body corporate, provided that the majority of trustees are 
owners or spouses of owners.206 
 
The second proviso is that the managing agent or any of his or her employees or an 
employee of the body corporate may not be a trustee unless he or she is an owner.207 
The relaxation of the rule that managing agents and employees of the body corporate 
can be trustees if they are owners of a section was introduced in 2000.208 A possible 
reason for this relaxation may be the difficulty in practice to obtain professional trustees 
and to fulfill the requirement that at least half of the trustees must be owners.209 
Although the provision is intended to ensure that at least half the trustees must be 
owners, there is a concern of ethical conflict that managing agents or employees (even 
if owners) may not always serve the best interests of the body corporate.210 A situation 
could arise where a managing agent wields enough power in the board of trustees to 
ensure that the services of the firm he or she works for are constantly retained 
regardless of the low standard of service. Another area of conflict is that the board of 
trustees, of which he or she is a member, sets the managing agent’s remuneration. 
                                            
205 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 37. 
206 J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: Two too many trustees” (September 2009) 3-9 Paddocks Press 5. 
207 Annexure 8 rule 5(b). 
208 This amendment was introduced by section 8 of GN R 830 in GG 21483 of 25-08-2000. 
209 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-121. 
210 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 36.  
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Furthermore the possibility that owner-trustees may abuse their power to become the 
managing agent is also not excluded by this amendment.211  
 
The reason why the managing agent or employee of the body corporate is not allowed 
to be a trustee (unless they are owners) is therefore to avoid the possible conflict of 
interests between the trustees and the managing agent and the trustees and the 
employees of the body corporate. The function of the trustees is to make executive 
resolutions, and to then execute them or delegate the execution thereof to the 
managing agent or other employees. The managing agent and employees must 
implement the governance and executive functions of the trustees and if employers and 
managing agents can also act as trustees, these functions could become clouded. This 
needs to be balanced against prejudicing an employee of the body corporate who has 
nothing to do with the management, but who has an investment in the scheme.212  
 
The majority of trustees must be either natural persons who own a unit or his or her 
spouse. An owner who is a juristic person, like a limited company or close corporation, 
may not as such be elected as a trustee. Only the representative of the juristic person 
can be elected as a trustee.213 The trustee must therefore be a natural person with 
contractual capacity.214 However, the juristic person may nominate, in accordance with 
its internal governance documents, one or more persons to serve as trustees, just as 
any natural person can. Therefore, a director of a company may sign a nomination form 
either as the sole director or if duly authorised by a resolution of the executive board of 
directors. At the annual general meeting the body corporate can elect one or more 
trustees nominated by a juristic person or owner for the purpose of satisfying the 
requirement that the majority of trustees must be owners or spouses of owners. If a 
director of a limited company and his spouse are both elected as trustees, one of them 
                                            
211 The managing agent and their employees and the employees of the body corporate are also disqualified from 
being appointed by owners as proxies to attend general meetings of the body corporate on their behalf; van der 
Merwe Sectional Titles 14-121. 
212 T Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 2 ed (1999) 71. 
213 T Maree Kits Deeltitel Oplossings (2001) 4.4.  
214 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 2 ed (1999) 71. 
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should not be an owner and should not be considered a spouse of the owner for 
purposes of rule 5(a).215 
 
Many of the members of the body corporate buy their units for investment purposes. 
They do not reside in their sections, and in some cases rarely visit the building. Rule 5 
does not require that the owner must also be an occupier or resident of a unit in the 
sectional title scheme.216 These non-resident owners may not be personally involved or 
interested in the day-to-day management and maintenance of the scheme, and are 
therefore not ideal persons to be elected as trustees. In terms of the management rules 
the duties and powers of the body corporate must be exercised and performed by the 
trustees,217 and the trustees must do all things reasonably necessary for the control, 
management and administration of the common property and the enforcement of the 
rules of the scheme.218 The trustees therefore need to be in open, regular, and speedy 
communication with each other and the members of the body corporate. They must hold 
regular trustee meetings; constantly inform themselves of the affairs of the body 
corporate and have a clear understanding of the day-to-day needs of the body 
corporate. For these reasons trustees must be easily accessible and approachable, and 
consequently non-resident owners are not always the best candidates to be elected as 
trustees.  
 
Due to the fact that the eligibility for the position of trustee is regulated by the prescribed 
management rules, the owners will be able to amend the management rules by way of a 
unanimous resolution of the body corporate219 to require that the trustees must be both 
owner and resident of a section in the scheme. Although such an amendment would 
mean that there would be more personal involvement in the administration of the 
scheme, it must be noted that much more than a “resident trustee” is needed for the 
                                            
215 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: How many trustees can represent an owner who is an artificial person?” 
(June 2008) 3-6 Paddocks Press Newsletter 7.  
216 L De Lange “What to do about non-resident trustees” (July 2007) 25 MCS Courier 5. 
217 Annexure 8 rule 25. 
218 Annexure 8 rule 28(3). 
219 STA s 35(2)(a) [STSMA s 10(2)(a)]. 
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efficient administration of the scheme, such as experience, skill, knowledge and 
participation.220  
 
Until recently there have been no restrictions on levy defaulters being nominated or 
elected as trustees. It has happened in practice that levy defaulters, who have been 
nominated and elected as trustees, gained control of the trustees, manipulated 
decision-making and blocked resolutions to institute levy recovery actions against 
themselves.221 For this reason prescribed management rule 7 was amended by the 
Amendment Regulations of 2013222 to provide the following:  
 
“Nominations by owners for the election of trustees at any annual general 
meeting shall be given in writing, accompanied by the written consent of the 
person nominated, so as to be received at the domicilium of the body corporate 
not later than 48 hours before the meeting: Provided that the trustees are also 
capable of being elected by way of nominations with the consent of the nominee 
given at the meeting itself should be insufficient written nominations be received 
to comply with rule 4(1): Provided further that no nomination or appointment as 
trustee, of a person in breach of rule 64(1) or rule 64(2), may be made or 
accepted.” (My emphasis added) 
 
Since there is no rule 64(1) or 64(2), the correct reference should have been to rule 
64(a) or 64(b).223 Prescribed management rule 64 deals with voting embargoes. Rule 
64(a) deals with owners in arrears with levy payments;224 while rule 64(b) deals with 
owners who consistently breach conduct rules.225 These two classes of defaulters will 
now be debarred from being elected as trustees.  
 
                                            
220 De Lange (July 2007) MCS Courier 5. 
221 T Maree “Latest rule amendments” (April 2013) 44 MSC Courier 1. 
222 Published in GN R 196 in GG 36421 of 14-03-2013.-2 
223 Maree (April 2013) 44 MSC Courier 1. 
224 Annexure 8 rule 64(a). 
225 Annexure 8 rule 64(b). 
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Prescribed management rule 7 has been amended again by the Amendment 
Regulations of 2015,226 and which has provided the addition of the following proviso:  
 
“Provided further that an owner in breach of rule 64 may not nominate any 
person as a trustee.”  
 
Therefore an owner who is in arrears with payment of his levies, or remaining in breach 
of the conduct rules, despite written warning to comply, may also not nominate a person 
for election as a trustee.227 This amendment also corrected the abovementioned error 
by the removal of the reference previously made to the non-existant sub-clauses (1) and 
(2) to prescribed management rule 64. Consequently a person in breach of rule 64 may 
neither be nominated nor elected as trustee or nominate another as trustee. 
 
Concomitant with prescribed management rule 7, rule 13 was amended by the 
Amendment Regulation of 2013.228 Prescribed management rule 13(g) has been 
substituted to read as follows:  
 
“A trustee shall now cease to hold office as such if he is in arrears for more than 
60 days with any levies and contributions payable by him in respect of his unit or 
exclusive use area (if any) and he fails to bring such arrears up to date within 
seven days of being notified in writing to do so.”229  
 
The appointment of a duly appointed trustee will automatically lapse if he or she 
defaults in his or her levy payments and fails to comply with the notice. This 
complements and tightens up the embargo contained in the new prescribed 
management rule 7, on the nomination of trustees by owners who are in arrears as well 
as the nomination and election of trustees who are in arrears.230  
 
                                            
226 Amended in GN R1422 in GG 18387 of 30-06-2015, and took effect from 30 July 2015. 
227 T Maree “Latest rule amendments – Trustees take note!” (July 2015) 50 MCS Courier 2. 
228 Published in GN R 196 in GG 36421 of 14-03-2013. 
229 Annexure 8 rule 13(g). 
230 Maree (April 2013) 44 MSC Courier 2; Maree (July 2015) 50 MCS Courier 2. 
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The prescribed management rules do not set out the minimum qualifications required 
for a person to be elected as a trustee. However, rule 13 sets out the circumstances in 
which trustees cease to hold the office of trustee, with the implication that only certain 
types of persons can qualify as trustees. The relevant circumstances for our purposes, 
mentioned in rule 13, are where a person nominated as trustee becomes of unsound 
mind;231 his or her estate is sequestrated or surrendered as insolvent;232 he or she is 
convicted of an offence which involves dishonesty233 or he or she becomes disqualified 
from being appointed or acting as a director of a company in terms of sections 218 or 
219234 of the 1973 Companies Act.235 Since trustees will in these circumstances 
automatically cease to be trustees, it is suggested that owners who are nominated as 
trustees should be forced to disclose whether they would be disqualified to stay on as 
trustees due to the fact that any of the circumstances mentioned above applies to them. 
A person nominated to the office as trustee should be compelled to declare these facts 
to the existing trustees. 
3 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
In a New South Wales strata scheme consisting of three or more lots (units), an election 
needs to be held to elect the members of the executive committee.236 The NSW Strata 
Schemes Management Act enumerates three categories of persons who are eligible for 
election to the executive committee.237 They are an individual who is an owner as 
                                            
231 Annexure 8 rule 13(b). 
232 Annexure 8 rule 13(c). 
233 Annexure 8 rule 13(d). 
234 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 69. Briefly these provisions are general principles to disqualify a person being a 
director of a company such as minority, un-rehabilitated insolvent, and being removed from office of trust on 
account of misconduct. 
235 Annexures 8 rule 13(f). 
236 In smaller strata schemes consisting of only two lots (units) there is no need to elect members of the executive 
committee (board of trustees) because the owner of each lot by law automatically becomes the member of the 
executive committee. If the lot is owned by one owner then that owner will be the member. If the lot is owned by a 
corporation then the nominee of the corporation will be the member. If the lot is owned by two or more persons then 
the co-owner agreed upon by the other co-owner will be the member of the executive committee, or if there is no 
agreement the co-owner first named on the strata roll will be the executive committee member; NSW Strata 
Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cls 1(2) and 1(3). 
237 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 2(4). 
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specifically defined in the Dictionary attached to the Act;238 a company nominee of a 
corporation that owns a unit and an individual who is not an owner but who is nominated 
by an owner. The last category is subject to the proviso that the owner is not also a 
candidate for election. In practice the owner’s nominee is often a spouse or a relative 
renting the unit from an owner.239  
 
The eligibility of co-owners such as spouses for nomination for election to the executive 
committee is regulated.240 A person who is co-owner of a lot may not be a candidate for 
election as a member of the executive committee, unless the person is nominated for 
office by an owner who is not a co-owner of the lot,241 or by a co-owner of the lot who is 
not a candidate for election as a member.242 
 
The nomination and election of sole owners and co-owners to the executive committee 
are regulated in a very complicated manner. It is sufficient to state that persons that are 
sole owners and co-owners may nominate members for the executive committee, and 
their own nomination and election are limited, amongst other things, by whether they 
owe any money (including interest) to the owners corporation as at the date of the 
notice of the general meeting. However, there are no provisions in the Act that preclude 
the eligibility to the executive committee of an owner who is in arrears with levy 
payments. All nominations are ineffective unless supported by the nominee’s consent. 
The nominee’s written consent can be presented at the meeting to elect the executive 
committee or the nominee can give oral consent at such a meeting.243  
 
Therefore, in New South Wales the members of the council are either owners,244 
representatives of juristic persons who are owners,245 or non-owners who are 
                                            
238 Owner of a lot in a freehold strata scheme means: (a) except as provided by paragraph (b), a person for the time 
being recorded in the Register as entitled to an estate in fee simple in that lot, or (b) a person whose name has been 
entered on a strata roll as the owner in accordance with section 98. 
239 Ilkin NSW Strata 100. 
240 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(5). 
241 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(5)(a). 
242 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(5)(b). 
243 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, reg 17(2). 
244 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(4)(a). 
245 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(4)(b). 
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nominated by owners who are not nominated themselves.246 Although the procedure for 
appointment is comparable to the South African procedure, there is not the same 
restriction that more than half of the trustees must be owners or spouses of owners. 
This enables the members of the owners corporation to nominate and elect any number 
of skilful and experienced people as members of the council.247 
 
In Singapore only individuals that are at least 21 years of age are eligible for election as 
a member of the council.248 Apart from that, a person is eligible if he or she is a 
proprietor (owner) of a lot (unit);249 is nominated for election by a proprietor of a lot 
which is a company250 or is a member of the immediate family of a proprietor of a lot 
and is nominated for election by that proprietor.251  
 
The latter instance is illustrated by Si-Hoe Kok Chun 7 Anor v Ramesh Ramchandani.252 
The husband of a proprietor was elected as a member of the council. The proprietors 
contended that the husband (the respondent) had no business in the management 
corporation as he was not a proprietor. The High Court confirmed that under the then 
section 60(5)(c) of the LTSA (the equivalent of section 53(6)(c) of the BMSMA) a council 
member was not required to be a proprietor. The respondent had been nominated by 
his wife, who was a proprietor, and was therefore eligible for election as a council 
member.  
 
Similar to the recent South African position, an embargo is placed in Singapore on the 
election to the executive council of proprietors who are in arrears with the payment of 
their contributions or any other moneys owed to the management corporation in respect 
of their lots. If they are still in arrears on the third day before the election they are not 
eligible as members of the council.253 However, the BMSMA does not go so far as to 
                                            
246 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(4)(c). 
247 Pienaar Sectional Titles 174. 
248 BMSMA s 53(6). 
249 BMSMA s 53(6)(a). 
250 BMSMA s 53(6)(b). 
251 BMSMA s 53(6)(c). 
252 [2006] 2 SLR 59; Keang Sood Strata Title 313. 
253 BMSMA s 53(7)(a)-(c).  
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place an embargo on the person in arrears to nominate a person for the executive 
council. 
 
The BMSMA contains several complicated provisions designed to prevent cronyism in 
the election of a council that would result in a council consisting of a group of intimate 
friends. An individual who is a joint proprietor (co-owner) of a lot (unit) is not eligible for 
election as a member of the council if the other proprietor is also a candidate or has 
nominated another person for election.254 Consequently, where a lot is jointly owned by 
two or more proprietors, only one of them are eligible for election as a council 
member.255 This is illustrated in Si-Hoe Kok Chun 7 Anor v Ramesh Ramchandani.256 
The appellants were co-proprietors (co-owners) of certain units in a strata scheme. The 
High Court observed that the appointment of both appellants as council members for 
the same year was a breach of the then section 60(6) of the LTSA (the equivalent of 
section 53(8)(a) of the BMSMA) which is one of the sections designed to prevent 
cronyism in the election of members for the executive board.  
 
To prevent absolute control and abuse of position by any one proprietor in the council 
there is a 49% cap on the council seats for any one proprietor.257 The proprietors with 
substantial interests in a development are given a greater say in the management of 
their assets or investments by allowing owners of multiple lots to have proportional 
representation in the council according to share value subject to the 49% cap. This 
would mean that in a fourteen-member council a proprietor could have up to six seats or 
one seat short of half of the total seats. This also prevents cronyism and ensures that 
the interests of the minority proprietors are protected and that the council is not 
dominated by one group of proprietors.258 
 
                                            
254 BMSMA s 53(8)(a); Keang Sood Strata Title 313. 
255 BMSMA s 53(6)(c). 
256 [2006] 2 SLR 59 6; Keang Sood Strata Title 314. 
257 BMSMA s 53(8)(b) read with s 53(12)(a) and (b). 
258 Keang Sood Strata Title 314; van der Merwe (1999) Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 
181. 
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An owner may not nominate a member of his or her family if he himself is nominated;259 
the co-owner of a unit may not be nominated as a member if the other co-owner is 
nominated or if he himself has nominated another person; 260 and an individual who is 
nominated for election by an owner who owns two or more lots is not eligible for election 
as a member of the council if that owner together with his or her nominees nominated at 
the same election or elected or appointed to the council at the same or other election, or 
such of his nominees, exceed the threshold number for that owner determined in that 
manner.261 Finally an undischarged bankrupt is eligible for election as a member of a 
council if he or she or another person has disclosed his or her status as such in writing 
at the time of his nomination.262  
 
The Malaysian provisions are not so elaborate. In terms of the Strata Titles Act it is 
unclear as to whether all or only one of the co-proprietors (co-owners) of a parcel is 
eligible as member of a council. It is recommended that only one of them should be 
eligible to stand for election by virtue of the co-ownership of that parcel as the interests 
of co-proprietors of a parcel are most likely to be similar.263 
 
The UCIOA implies that a council member need not necessarily be a unit owner, but 
this is subject to the proviso that the majority of the executive board members must be 
unit owners.264 This is the same as the position in South Africa, and therefore any 
person who is not an owner can be a council member if nominated by an owner not 
standing for election as a council member.265 However, the South African Act contains 
an important exception in that the managing agent or any of his or her employees or an 
employee of the body corporate may not be a trustee, unless he or she is an owner.266 
                                            
259 BMSMA s 53(6)(c) and s 53(8)(a). 
260 BMSMA s 53(8)(a); Keang Sood Strata Title 313. 
261 BMSMA s 53(8)(b). 
262 BMSMA s 53(9).  
263 Keang Sood Strata Title 314. This argument is supported by the Singapore provision (BMSMA s 53(8)(a)) that 
an individual who is a joint subsidiary proprietor of a lot with another subsidiary proprietor is not eligible for 
election as a member of the council if that other subsidiary proprietor is also a candidate for the election concerned.  
264 UCIOA § 3-103(f). 
265 Chen Chinese Condominium Law148 suggests that the future uniform condominium legislation should follow the 
South African position in this regard. 
266 Annexure 8 rules 5(a) and (b). 
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In China the executive council member must be a unit owner or a representative of a 
unit owned by a corporation.267 Only unit owners can be council members. This is a 
shortcoming as it excludes outside candidates who might introduce some 
professionalism in management by an executive council. There might also not be a 
sufficient number of unit owners who are willing to serve as council members. It is 
noteworthy that in China it is difficult to have experienced council members with the 
required skills since the management of sectional title schemes by unit owners is a 
novelty.268 
3 4 Number, nomination and election of trustees  
3 4 1 Introduction 
 
Having identified the persons who are eligible to be elected as trustees, this discussion 
will first focus on the manner in which the number of trustees for a particular scheme is 
determined. Thereafter the nomination of persons to be elected as trustees will be 
examined. Since the election is a compulsory item on the agenda of the first general 
meeting and all annual general meetings thereafter, the manner in which trustees are 
elected at general meetings will then be dealt with.  
3 4 2 South African position 
 
At the first general meeting and at every annual general meeting held thereafter the 
members of the body corporate must determine the number of trustees that must be 
elected for the upcoming year, and must conduct an election for the purpose of filling 
these positions.269 The number determined may never be less than two trustees.270 The 
original management rules in Schedule 1 of the 1971 Act specified a maximum number 
of seven trustees,271 but this was not repeated in the prescribed management rules in 
                                            
267 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 16(2); Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone of 2007 art 23. 
268 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 148. 
269 Annexure 8 rules 50(2)(vi) and 56(d) and (e). 
270 Annexure 8 rule 4(1). 
271 Schedule 1 s 1 provides that there shall not be less than three and more than seven trustees 
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Annexure 8 of the Regulations of 1988 made under the STA. There is thus currently no 
limit on the maximum number of trustees.  
 
The number of trustees required will depend on the size of the scheme and the nature 
of the duties and functions that must be performed. The number must be decided upon 
at every general meeting and can be amended from time to time in the annual general 
meeting.272 The number need not be the same as for previous years. In principle the 
appointment of too many trustees should be avoided as it could make management 
complicated and cumbersome.273 
 
Only owners274 who are not in arrears with their levy contributions or in persistant 
breach of the scheme rules can nominate trustees.275 The owners must lodge written 
nominations for the election of trustees at the domicilium of the body corporate at least 
48 hours before the annual general meeting. The nominations must be accompanied by 
the written consent of the nominees.276 In the event of an insufficient number of written 
nominations being received, nominations may also be tendered at the general meeting 
with the consent of the nominees.277 Only persons who are familiar with the 
responsibilities that go with the office of trustee should accept such a nomination.  
 
In the event that the nomination for a trustee is not signed then one of two things could 
happen at the annual general meeting.278 If sufficient signed nomination forms have 
been received at least 48 hours before the meeting to fill the number of positions of 
trustees decided upon by the meeting, then the persons who were properly nominated 
will fill the positions and the nominees whose nomination forms were not signed will 
unfortunately have to try again the next year. If an insufficient number of properly signed 
nomination forms was received prior to the meeting the persons whose nomination 
                                            
272 Annexure 8 rule 4(1). 
273 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 71; Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 36. 
274 G Paddock Sectional Survival Manual (2013) 100. 
275 Annexure 8 rule 7. 
276 Annexure 8 rule 7. 
277 Annexure 8 rule 7 read with rule 4(1). 
278 J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: If a trustee nomination is not signed then one of two things could 
happen at the AGM” (July 2010) 5-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
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forms were not correctly completed can be nominated at the meeting. If such 
nomination is consented to, then he or she can stand for election.  
 
Due to the fact that the number of trustees required for a particular scheme for the 
ensuing year will not be public knowledge before determined at the general meeting, it 
will not be clear whether or not the nominations received before the meeting will be 
sufficient to fill the number of trustee positions until this decision has been made. If the 
number of nominations received before the meeting equals the number of trustees 
decided upon at the meeting, then there will be no need for a vote at the meeting, as the 
duly nominated persons will automatically fill these positions. This will be subject to the 
requirement of rule 5 that more than half of the trustees must be owners or spouses of 
owners. If the requirement is not met, more persons will have to be nominated at the 
meeting, until the right mix has been achieved.279  
 
Once all the nominations have been announced, the meeting must vote. After the votes 
have been counted, the chairperson must check how many of the trustees elected are 
owners or spouses of owners and how many are non-owners. If the number of non-
owners outnumbers the number of owners or spouses of owners, then the non-owner 
trustee with the lowest votes in number and value of votes must be eliminated. The 
value is determined by the participation quota set out in the schedule at the back of the 
sectional plan of the scheme in terms of section 5(3)(g) of the STA.280 This process 
must be repeated until the correct mix of trustees is achieved with the majority being 
owners or their spouses.281  
 
                                            
279 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-120. 
280 STA s 1 defines “participation quota” to mean, in relation to a section or an owner of a section, the percentage 
expressed to four decimal places determined in accordance with the provisions of section 32(1) or (2) in respect of 
that section for the purpose of calculating the value of the vote for that owner of the section where it is to be 
reckoned in value; the undivided share in the common property of the owner of the section and the proportion in 
which the owner must make contributions to the administrative fund or be liable for the payment of a judgement 
debt of the body corporate. The participation quota is determined by dividing the floor area, correct to the nearest 
square meter, of the section by the floor area, correct to the nearest square meter, of all the sections in the building 
comprising the scheme. Two effects of the participation quota, namely the value of the vote and responsibility to 
make contibutions or liability to pay judgement debts, of the participation quota can be amended by the making of a 
management or conduct rule in terms of section 32(4) of the STA. 
281 J Paddock “Trustee Nominations and Elections” (August 2010) 5-8 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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The previous prescribed management rule 6 created uncertainty as to whether existing 
trustees should be considered automatically re-elected if there were insufficient or no 
nominations due to the fact that it did not contain the phrase “if so nominated.” Currently 
management rule 6 sets out that trustees are eligible for re-election, but only if they are 
nominated in the same way as any other nominee trustee. These trustees hold office 
only until the next annual general meeting.  
3 4 3 Comparative survey 
 
The election of the executive committee is extensively regulated in New South Wales. 
The election is a compulsory item on the agenda of the first general meeting and all 
annual general meetings thereafter.282 The chairperson is responsible for the conduct of 
the election and must follow the prescribed steps.283 The process starts with the 
chairperson’s announcement that as part of the agenda at the first annual general 
meeting nominations for candidates for the executive committee must be taken; the 
number of members must be decided upon and then the required number of trustees 
must be elected. During the process of election, the eligibility of persons nominated for 
election must be considered.  
 
The regulations set out the procedure for nomination and election of an executive 
committee for a strata scheme comprising more than 2 lots.284 The procedure is 
prescribed by regulations 17 and 18.285 At a meeting of an owners corporation at which 
its executive committee is to be elected, the chairperson must announce the names of 
the candidates already nominated in writing for election to the executive committee,286 
and call for any oral nominations of candidates eligible for election to the executive 
committee.287 Nominations can only be made by persons entitled to vote.288 A written or 
                                            
282 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 2, cl 3(c). 
283 NSW Strata Schemes Management Ac, sch 2, cl 3(c); NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, regs 
17 and 18. 
284 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 16. 
285 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010 made under the Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 
1996. 
286 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(1)(a). 
287 Reg17(1)(b). 
288 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 9(1).  
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oral nomination is ineffective if it is made by a person other than the nominee unless it is 
supported by the consent of the nominee given in writing, if the nominee is not present 
at the meeting,289 or orally, if the nominee is present at the meeting.290 In the event that 
no candidates are nominated or stand for election, there shall be no executive 
committee. The scheme will then have to be administered by the owners corporation in 
general meeting or by a managing agent.291  
 
Where no further nominations are forthcoming the chairperson must declare that 
nominations are closed. After such declaration, the owners corporation is to decide292 
the number of members of the executive committee.293 No minimum number is 
prescribed, but a maximum number of nine is prescribed.294 The previous New South 
Wales Strata Titles Act stipulated one as the minimum number and nine as the 
maximum number of members of the executive committee.295 Certain guidelines are 
used to determine the number of executive committee members required which I will 
discuss in the evaluation below. Once the number is determined, it cannot be changed 
unless altered by a later resolution of the owners corporation. 
 
The chairperson must then proceed with whichever of the following three steps is 
applicable. If the number of candidates nominated equals the number of members of 
the executive committee decided upon, then the chairperson must declare that these 
candidates have been elected to the executive committee.296 There is then no need to 
proceed further with regulation 17. If the number of candidates nominated is less than 
the number of members of the executive committee decided upon, the chairperson must 
declare that those candidates have been elected to the executive committee despite the 
fact that there will be fewer members than required by the resolution.297 The shortfall will 
                                            
289 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(2)(a). 
290 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(2)(b). 
291 Appointed in terms of s 16(4) of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996. 
292 In accordance with NSW Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996, sch 3, cl 2(2). 
293 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(3)  
294 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(2). 
295 NSW Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973 s 71(2). 
296 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(4)(a). 
297 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(4)(a). 
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be accounted for by automatically reducing the number of members required to form the 
executive committee. This step is unlikely to occur in practice because the owners 
corporation is unlikely to decide upon a number of members that exceeds the number of 
candidates nominated. Where no candidates are nominated or stand for election, then 
there shall be no executive committee and the scheme will have to be administered by 
the owners corporation in the general meeting or by a strata managing agent. If the 
number of candidates is more than the number of members of the executive committee 
decided upon the chairperson must arrange for a ballot to be taken.298 
 
Regulation 18 deals with the ballot for the executive committee.299 Prior to the ballot the 
chairperson must announce the name of each candidate and the nominator of the 
candidate concerned.300 The name of the nominator is important as the nominator is 
allowed to terminate the election of the member to the executive committee at a later 
date.301 The chairperson must provide each person present and entitled to vote with a 
blank ballot paper for each lot (unit) in respect of which the person is entitled to vote.302 
It is best to mark the ballot papers with the relevant lot number.  
 
For a vote to be valid, a ballot-paper must be signed by the voter and completed by the 
voter’s writing on it the names of the candidates (without repeating a name) for whom 
the voter desires to vote, the number of names written being no more than the number 
determined by the owners’ corporation as the number of members of the executive 
committee.303 While no name may be repeated, the number of names written does not 
have to equal the number of executive committee members decided upon. The voters 
must specify the capacity in which the voter is exercising a right to vote, whether: as 
owner, first mortgagee or covenant chargee of a lot (identifying the lot),304 or as a 
company nominee,305 or by proxy,306 and if the vote is being cast by proxy, the name 
                                            
298 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(4)(b). 
299 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18.  
300 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(1)(a).  
301 NSW Strata Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(b),  
302 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(1)(b). 
303 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg18(2)(a). 
304 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(2)(b)(i). 
305 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(2)(b)(ii).  
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and capacity of the person who gave the proxy.307 The voters must sign the ballot 
papers and the completed ballot-paper must be returned to the chairperson.308  
 
The chairperson or a person appointed by the chairperson must examine whether the 
ballot papers were validly completed which involves rejecting invalid ballot papers, and 
indicating to the meeting the reason for the rejection such as outstanding financial 
contributions due in respect of a lot (section). The chairperson must then announce how 
many votes each candidate has received.309 Each lot has one vote for each of the 
candidates on the voting paper. Until all places for membership of the executive 
committee have been filled, the chairperson must successively declare elected each 
candidate who has a greater number of votes than all other candidates who have not 
been elected.310 Therefore the candidates who receive the highest number of votes are 
then declared by the chairperson to be the members of the executive committee. 
However, if the original owner (developer) owns one half or more of all the lots in the 
scheme, his or her vote is reduced to one vote for three lots in respect of which he or 
she is entitled to vote. This means that the original owner’s vote is ignored for two out of 
every three lots that he owns.  
 
If a poll is demanded by a person who is present and entitled to vote, then each lot has 
a vote for each of the candidates on the lot’s voting paper, according to the unit 
entitlement (participation quota) of that lot. Thus the candidates who receive the highest 
number of unit entitlements in their favour, being equal to the number of members of the 
executive committee decided upon, are each declared by the chairperson to be 
members of the executive committee. However, if the original owner is the owner of lots 
the sum of whose unit entitlement is equal to one half or more of all the lots in the strata 
scheme then the original owner’s vote for each candidate on a ballot paper is reduced 
to one third of the unit entitlements for that lot. If only one place remains to be filled (in 
respect of the last candidate to be elected) but there are 2 or more eligible candidates 
                                                                                                                                             
306 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(2)(b)(iii).  
307 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(2)(c). 
308 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(3). 
309 NSW Strata Management Act, sch 2, cl 17. 
310 NSW Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(4). 
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with an equal number of votes, the candidate to fill the place is to be decided by a show 
of hands of those present and entitled to vote.311  
 
The Singaporean BMSMA provides, as in the South African legislation, that every 
management corporation must have a council that must consist of such number of 
persons as the management corporation may determine in a general meeting.312 It 
allows a maximum number of 14 council members who are natural persons.313 There is 
no minimum number prescribed. Where there is only one natural proprietor (owner), he 
or she may make any decision that a duly convened council may make, and any such 
decision is deemed to be a decision of the council of the management corporation.314 In 
Malaysia the Strata Titles Act provides that the council must consist of not less than 
three and not more than fourteen proprietors.315 Under the Sarawak Ordinance and 
Sabah Enactment the council must consist of not more than seven proprietors or less 
than three proprietors.316 It is not expressly provided that the members of the council 
must be only natural persons, but this must obviously be the case. In Singapore and 
Malaysia it is unclear whether joint proprietors of a lot are deemed to be one proprietor 
for the purposes of determining the number of proprietors. As the interests of joint 
proprietors are likely to be similar they should be deemed to be one proprietor. This 
argument is supported by the Singapore provision that an individual who is a joint 
proprietor of a lot with another proprietor is not eligible for election as a member of the 
council if that other subsidiary proprietor is also a candidate for the election concerned. 
 
In Singapore and Malaysia the members of the council are elected at each annual 
general meeting.317 The BMSMA expressly provides that every management 
corporation shall have a council after the first annual general meeting.318 The legislation 
                                            
311 Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 18(5). 
312 BMSMA s 53(1). 
313 BMSMA ss 53(1) and 80(4). 
314 BMSMA 53(3).  
315 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 2(1). 
316 Sarawak Ordinance; Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 2(1). 
317 BMSMA s 53(4); Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, paras 2(1) and 8(1); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, 
paras 2(1) and 9(1). 
318 BMSMA s 53(1). 
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does not prescribe the details or procedures on how the council members are to be 
elected at each annual general meeting. This is illustrated by Si-Hoe Kok Chun 7 Anor v 
Ramesh Ramchandani319 where a husband had been nominated and elected to the 
executive council by his wife who was a proprietor. The court found that there was no 
particular formality prescribed for such a nomination.  
 
Under the United States UCIOA owners must elect at least three members to the 
executive board (trustees) of the owners’ association (body corporate).320 The exact 
number of members is stated in the by-laws of the owners’ association.321 The UCIOA 
contains no special provisions regarding the election or re-election of members of the 
executive board, but specifies that the election is subject to the by-laws of the 
association.322 The by-laws may for example require that ballots listing all nominees’ 
names for each unit must be prepared in advance of the election.  
 
Under the Chinese law the number of council members remains largely unregulated at 
national and provincial level.323 The Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone of 2007 stipulates that the number of executive council 
members in an executive council should be an odd number from five to seventeen.324  
3 5 Challenge of the validity of election of trustees in court 
3 5 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows I will consider whether there is any procedure or avenue for parties who 
are displeased with the results of the election to invalidate or amend the result of the 
election of one or more persons to the office of trustee. As I have done before, I shall 
give a comparable account of how these matters are dealt with in foreign jurisdictions.  
                                            
319  [2006] 2 SLR 59. 
320 UCIOA § 3-103(f). 
321 UCIOA § 3-106(a)(1). 
322 UCIOA § 3-106(a). 
323 Neither the Property Management Regulation of 2003, nor the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 
2004 contains a provision regarding the number of council members. 
324 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 art 24. 
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3 5 2 South African position 
 
The STA does not contain a provision that allows owners to challenge the election of 
trustees in a court on the ground that the election process was not followed. This is 
confirmed in Dempa Investments CC v Body Coporate of Los Angeles325 where the 
court pointed out that:  
 
 “There was nothing in the STA or the regulations which requires or even 
authorizes the court to declare that the trustees have been duly elected.”326  
 
However, the facts of the case and the relief sought do not bear this out. In this case the 
applicant sought rescission of an ex parte order in which certain persons were declared 
to be trustees of the body corporate. The judge stated that the order should have been 
set aside in terms of High Court Rule 42(1)(a) as the order was erroneously sought and 
erroneously granted because the interested parties (body corporate) who were 
expected to dispute the election of the trustees should have been cited as respondents. 
Since it was an ex parte order these interested parties had no notice of the order. If 
there were no persons disputing the election of the trustees and their right to hold office, 
as proceeding ex parte would tend to convey, the question arises whether there was 
any real purpose to the declaratory order or whether the question was merely abstract, 
hypothetical or academic. The court therefore set aside the order on the ground that the 
applicant failed to divulge several material facts to the court. However, the court agreed 
from the evidence before it that the trustees were not managing the affairs of the body 
corporate in a proper manner and therefore appointed an administrator as requested by 
the applicant. The existence of the ex parte order was an obstacle to the appointment of 
the administrator, as the two orders would be in conflict and therefore the order for 
rescission had to succeed before the appointment of an administrator could be 
considered. 
 
                                            
325 [2008] JOL 21735 (W). 
326 Para 4. 
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This judgment concerns the invalidation of an ex parte order that ratified the election of 
certain trustees. The court rightly gave reasons why the ex parte order should be 
invalidated. Contrary to the initial statement by the court, courts are thus the proper 
forum to validate or invalidate the election of trustees.  
 
This was confirmed in the unreported case Burger and Others v Friedman and Others327 
which provides an illustration of the role the High Court can play in validating the 
election of trustees. The applicants were owners of units in a sectional title scheme 
known as Mount Curtis in Cape Town. Disputes between various groups made the 
orderly management of the affairs of the body corporate impossible. One group 
(including the applicants) claimed that they were duly elected trustees of the body 
corporate and that they appointed Urbanpace (Pty) Ltd as the managing agent. 
However, another group (including the respondents) contended that they were the duly 
elected trustees and that they appointed the fifth respondent as the managing agent. 
The two managing agents appointed by the different groups sent out conflicting levy 
statements to the owners.328 In support of their claim that they were the validly elected 
trustees, the applicants contended that a number of residential owners entitled to 25% 
of the total quotas of all sections in the scheme requested the existing trustees 
(respondents) on 27 January 2011 to convene  an extraordinary general meeting. The 
existing trustees did not accede to this request. The applicants therefore decided to call 
such a meeting to be held on 28 February. At this meeting the applicants were elected 
as trustees. On an application to the High Court, Griesel J granted an order that the 
applicants were duly elected as trustees of the body corporate of the Mount Curtis 
Sectional Title Scheme SS 85/1989 at the extraordinary general meeting of its members 
held on 28 February 2011.329 The respondents refused to accept the order and 
requested the court to hand down reasons for granting the order.330  
 
                                            
327 WCC 12-12-2009 case no 20156/2011. 
328 Para 2. 
329 Para 1. 
330 Para 3 
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The respondents opposed the order on the grounds that the matter was not urgent and 
that any urgency that existed was self-created; that the court lacked the necessary 
jurisdiction to hear the application because of an arbitration clause in the rules; and that 
the 28 February meeting was not validly convened, with the result that the appointment 
of the applicants as trustees was likewise invalid.331 Griesel J reasoned that the 
argument based on lack of urgency did not withstand scrutiny because the first 
respondent conceded in so many words in his answering affidavit that “the current 
situation is not sustainable.” The applicants pointed out that efforts made by the parties 
to reach a negotiated settlement were unsuccessful. Therefore the delay in bringing an 
application while efforts are being made to avoid litigation could not be advanced as a 
reason to non-suit an applicant. The respondents had furthermore not alleged any 
prejudice to them by the set down of the matter on a truncated timetable. Griesel J 
refused to strike the matter from the roll where full affidavits had been filed and full 
argument had been addressed on behalf of both sides as it would amount to a wasteful 
exercise in futility and it would simply mean that the same costs and efforts would have 
to be duplicated on a subsequent occasion, after the matter had been set down in the 
ordinary course.332  
The argument of the alleged lack of jurisdiction was based on an arbitration clause in 
prescribed management rule 71. The managing agent appointed by the respondents 
was not an owner and therefore was not amenable to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator. 
Furthermore, the alternative relief sought for the appointment of an administrator could 
only be granted by a court and accordingly could not have been sought by the 
applicants other than by way of an application to the court.333 
The respondents relied on the provisions of prescribed management rule 53334 in 
support of the alleged invalidity of the meeting held on 28 February.335 However, Griesel 
                                            
331 Para 5. 
332 Para 6. 
333 Para 7. 
334 Rule 53 states that: “the trustees may whenever they think fit and must upon a request in writing made [either] by 
owners entitled to 25% of the total of the quotas of all sections . . . convene a special general meeting. If the trustees 
fail to call a meeting so requested within fourteen days if the request, the owners . . . concerned shall be entitled 
themselves to call the meeting.” 
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J pointed out that on 27 January the owners entitled to 25% of the total quotas of all 
sections in the scheme (including the applicants) requested that an extraordinary 
general meeting be convened. However, the existing trustees (including the 
respondents) did not convene the extraordinary meeting, but instead gave notice of an 
annual general meeting of the body corporate to be held on 16 March. The notice stated 
that it incorporated the response to the undated request for a special general meeting 
received by the managing agent on 28 January 2011 and presented by a representative 
of the firm of managing agents.336 This notice was not accompanied by the documents 
prescribed by management rule 39(1) (as is required by rule 54(4)) and the group which 
included the applicants advised the respondents that it was not a valid notice of an 
annual general meeting. Consequently, the group of owners including the applicants 
called such an extraordinary general meeting to be held on 28 February due to the fact 
that the trustees had not complied with their request to convene such a meeting.337 The 
fifth respondent (managing agent) was requested on 11 February to send the notice of 
the meeting to all owners, as part of the duties that it was contracted to perform as 
managing agent. It failed to do so, apparently on the instructions of the first respondent. 
On the same date an email communication was sent to 25 of the owners whose e-mail 
addresses were on record. This was followed by a notice of the meeting to all owners 
on 16 February. The meeting was duly held and the applicants duly elected on 28 
February.338  
 
The respondents argued that it was not stated by the applicants that the request made 
by the owners on 27 January had been made to the trustees, or that it was in writing. 
Griesel J responded that the argument was unsustainable as the managing agent, in 
the notice sent to owners of the proposed annual general meeting, referred to the 
“undated request” for a meeting received from the owners. Since oral requests need not 
be dated and the notice of the annual general meeting was sent out by the managing 
agent “on behalf of the trustees”, Griesel J found that the trustees did in fact receive 
                                                                                                                                             
335 WCC 12-12-2009 case no 20156/2011 para 8. 
336 Para 9. 
337 Para10. 
338 Para 11. 
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notice of the request for a special meeting, especially in the absence of any denial by 
them of notice.339  
 
The respondents then argued that rule 54 provides for at least fourteen days’ notice of 
every general meeting to be given to all owners and to the managing agent and that the 
notice in question was only given on 16 February, which was less than fourteen days 
before the meeting. Furthermore the applicants did not allege that the notice of 28 
February meeting was sent to the managing agent.340 Griesel J pointed out that it was 
abundantly clear that the managing agent was well aware of the special meeting and 
did not deny that it had knowledge of the special meeting scheduled for 28 February.341 
As for the alleged short notice the judge stated that notice had been given to owners on 
11 February already, which was more than fourteen days before the meeting. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the peremptory tone of rule 54, Griesel J was of the view 
that the court must adopt a benevolent approach to those requirements. Adopting such 
an approach, he decided that there had been substantial compliance with the provisions 
of the rule. He continued that a court will not take notice of an irregularity in the notice, 
particularly if it is not shown that there is actual prejudice to the rights of the person 
alleged to have been aggrieved by the irregularity. The alleged short notice relied on by 
the respondents was caused by their own mala fide conduct in refusing to accede to the 
legitimate request by the group of owners for a special meeting. The respondents could 
not rely on their own conduct in delaying notice to owners in order to argue that the 
meeting was not validly convened.342  
 
This case shows that an owner or the body corporate could approach court if the validity 
of the election of trustees is disputed. It also shows that despite the peremptory nature 
of the notice requirement for the election of trustees, the court will deviate from the 
provisions in cases of substantial compliance and declare the election valid. 
                                            
339 Para 12. 
340 Para 13. 
341 Para 14. 
342 Para 15. 
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3 5 3 Comparative survey 
In New South Wales, if the procedure is breached, an eligible applicant may lodge an 
application with an Adjudicator for an order against the chairperson, who was 
responsible for the conduct of the election.343 The Adjudicator has a general power to 
make orders to settle disputes or rectify complaints344 on application by an interested 
person.345 This may be used where a chairperson fails to follow the regulation 17 format 
for electing an executive committee.346 An Adjudicator may make an order to settle a 
dispute or complaint about an exercise of, or a failure to exercise, a function conferred 
or imposed by or under this Act or the by-laws in relation to a strata scheme, or the 
operation, administration or management of a strata scheme under this Act.347 An 
owners corporation is taken to have failed to exercise a function if it decides not to 
exercise the function, or application is made to it to exercise the function and it fails for 
two months after the making of the application to exercise the function in accordance 
with the application or to inform the applicant that it has decided not to exercise the 
function in accordance with the application.348  
An Adjudicator can furthermore make an order invalidating resolutions of an owners 
corporation.349 It allows for a resolution or executive committee election to be declared 
invalid for any other breach of the Act in relation to the meeting.350 An Adjudicator may 
make an order invalidating any resolution of, or election held by, the persons present at 
a meeting of an owners corporation if the Adjudicator considers that the provisions of 
the Act have not been complied with in relation to the meeting.351 An Adjudicator may 
refuse to make an order under this section, but only if he or she considers that the 
failure to comply with the provisions of this Act did not adversely affect any person, and 
that compliance with the provisions of the Act would not have resulted in a failure to 
                                            
343 In terms of section 138 or section 153 (whichever is more appropriate) of the Strata Schemes Management Act 
138 of 1996; Ilkin NSW Strata 94. 
344 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138. 
345 SNSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138(5). 
346 Ilkin NSW Strata 440. 
347 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138(1). 
348 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138(2). 
349 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 153. 
350 Ilkin NSW Strata 453. 
351 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 153(1). 
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pass the resolution or have affected the result of the election.352 An application for an 
order under this section may be made only by an owner or first mortgagee of a lot.353  
3 6 Can trustees be elected at a special (extraordinary) general meeting? 
3 6 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows the possibility of electing a trustee at a special or extraordinary general 
meeting will be discussed. I shall give a comparable account of how this matter is dealt 
with in foreign jurisdictions.  
3 6 2 South African position 
 
In Burger and Others v Friedman and Others354 Griesel J handed down reasons for his 
judgement (on request by the respondents) in which he granted the order:  
 
“That it be declared that the Applicants were duly elected as trustees of the body 
corporate of the Mount Curtis Sectional Title Scheme SS 85/1989 at an 
extraordinary general meeting of its members held on 28 February 2011.”355 (My 
italics.) 
 
It is controversial whether trustees can only be elected at an annual general meeting 
and not also at a special general meeting. The problem is that the prescribed 
management rule 6 stipulates that trustees elected at an annual general meeting remain 
in office until the next general meeting. The question that arises when trustees are 
appointed at a special general meeting is what happens to the trustees who were 
elected at the previous annual general meeting? In essence can new trustees be 
elected between two annual general meetings without the office of the existing trustees 
first being terminated?  
 
                                            
352 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 153(2). 
353 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 153(3). 
354 Unreported Case No. 20156/2011. 
355 Para 1. 
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Prescribed management rule 13 allows for the removal of a trustee from office by a 
majority resolution of the body corporate, provided that the intention to vote upon the 
removal from office has been specified in the notice convening the meeting.356 The 
removal of all the trustees at a special meeting can thus be achieved, but not the 
election of new trustees because of the wording of rule 6 states that trustees must be 
elected at an annual general meeting. Prescribed management rule 14 offers a solution 
in that it allows the body corporate at a general meeting (which could include a special 
general meeting) to appoint another trustee in the place of any trustee who has ceased 
to hold office in terms of rule 13, for the unexpired part of the term of office of the trustee 
so replaced. 
3 6 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales an executive committee is elected at either an annual or an 
extraordinary general meeting. As already mentioned two of the compulsory items on 
the agenda of any annual general meeting are the decision as to the number of 
members of the executive committee for the ensuing year and the election of those 
members.357 Until the annual general meeting is held, the members elected at the first 
or a previous annual general meeting would normally continue to hold office and 
administer the scheme. The previous members automatically cease to hold office upon 
election of the new members at the annual general meeting.358 If a new executive 
committee is not elected, the previous members will still remain in office. The remaining 
members have the option of resigning and can do so by serving written notice of 
resignation on the owners’ corporation.359 The members of the executive committee 
normally hold office for about twelve months as this is the period between annual 
general meetings, and any variation in the length of their appointment can be accounted 
for by the fact that the annual general meetings do not have to be held on the same 
date each year.360 The chairperson must follow the same procedure as that for electing 
                                            
356 Annexure 8 rule 13(e). 
357 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 34(e) and (f). 
358 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(d).  
359 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 4(1)(c). 
360 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 31(1). 
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the executive committee at the first general meeting during the initial stage when 
conducting the election of the executive committee at annual or special general 
meetings.  
 
Sometimes owners wish to appoint a new executive committee prior to the next annual 
general meeting. They can do so by following the procedure wherein a special 
resolution can be passed to terminate the office of all executive committee members. 
An elected member of the executive committee must vacate his or her office if a special 
resolution to this effect is adopted.361 All or any of the existing committee members can 
be removed from office by a special resolution.362 Only the general meeting of the 
owners corporation has the power to pass such a resolution because it is a so-called 
restricted matter reserved for the owners in general meeting.363 Therefore, neither the 
executive committee nor a strata managing agent has the power to remove an elected 
member of the executive committee. An extraordinary general meeting can then be held 
to elect a new executive committee. New motions must be listed on the agenda of the 
meeting.364  
 
In Singapore members of council may be elected at any properly convened general 
meeting of the management corporation. In MCST Plan No 460 v Goldhill Properties 
(Pty) Ltd & Others365 certain proprietors wanted to elect council members at an 
extraordinary general meeting to be specially convened for this purpose. The 
chairperson ruled that this was out of order. The High Court held that the chairperson 
was not entitled to do so, and made it clear that an extraordinary general meeting in any 
organization enjoys the same status as an annual general meeting, but for the fact that 
it is convened for some special business of the organization. Therefore the election of 
members of a council need not necessarily take place at an annual general meeting, 
and can be held at any properly convened general meeting of the management 
corporation provided that the election of trustees is especially made part of the agenda. 
                                            
361 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(e). 
362 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(3). 
363 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(2) and s 29(3)(b). 
364 Motions 5 and 6 in Form 12.3; Ilkin NSW Strata 98. 
365 [1991] 3 MLJ 247; Keang Sood Strata Title 311 – 312. 
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Council members can therefore be elected at extraordinary general meetings.366 There 
is some difficulty here with the provisions that the term of office of the members of the 
council lasts until the next annual general meeting unless they are re-elected for the 
next term.367 
3 7 Qualifications required to be elected as a trustee 
 
The heading in prescribed management rule 5 is “qualifications” of trustees.368 This is 
misleading due to the fact that the provisions concerned deal with the eligibility rather 
than the qualifications of a person to become a trustee. In my opinion it is a major 
shortcoming of the South African STA that no qualifications or experience are stipulated 
for persons to be eligible for the office of trustee. It is for this reason that I submit that a 
qualified and and experienced professional manager that is supervised by a regulatory 
body should be elected as the executive organ of a body corporate. 
 
After their election, the new trustees will hold an organizational meeting to allocate 
portfolios and establish committees such as a budget, maintenance and a rules 
committee. During the first few months the board of trustees must deal with a number of 
issues. The agenda for the first annual general meeting for instance requires at least the 
consideration, confirmation or variation of the insurance policies effected by the 
developer of the body corporate; the consideration, confirmation or variation of the 
budget of the body corporate for the ensuing financial year; the consideration and 
approval, with or without amendment, of the financial statements relating to the 
management, control and administration of the building from date of establishment of 
the body corporate to date of notice of the meeting; the taking of cession of such 
contracts relating to the management, control and administration of the building369 as 
may have been entered into by the developer for the continual management, control 
and administration of the building and the common property; the appointment of an 
                                            
366 [1991] 3 MLJ 250. 
367 BMSMA s 53(5); Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, paras 2(1) and (6); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, 
paras 2(1) and (7). 
368 Annexure 8 rule 5. 
369 Subject to STA s 47(2). 
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auditor or an accounting officer; the election of trustees; any restrictions imposed or 
directions given; and the determination of the domicilium citandi et executandi of the 
body corporate.370 The trustees will have to deal with all these matters and will in 
addition have to implement a variety of rules and regulations affecting the common 
property and exercise proper control over the financial affairs of the scheme. 
 
It is important for sectional owners to be able to obtain reliable information from the 
trustees or managing agent concerning their rights and duties as sectional owners. This 
information could for example concern insurance needs, the enforcement of house 
rules, the procedure for letting a unit, or the installation of air-conditioning in a section. 
This wide range of functions have prompted academic observers to enquire how lay 
trustees can be expected to discharge effectively their management and administration 
functions and whether the office should not be reserved for qualified, trained and 
remunerated trustees. Such an enquiry should also take into account the related issue 
of the (very often) misconceived perception amongst owners with regard to the roles 
and duties of the body corporate and trustees, which can (and do) lead to errors in the 
performance of their functions.371 
 
In effect trustees must have leadership skills; the ability to deal with different types of 
people; financial and accounting expertise and experience; legal knowledge; as well as 
administrative, organisational and management skills. The trustees will have to work 
closely together and will have to attend various meetings together and so they will have 
to complement one another in making decisions. Only persons who understand the 
responsibility of the office of trustee should accept a nomination. The trustees must also 
know and understand the STA and the prescribed management rules.372 The ideal 
position would be to have an accountant and lawyer on the board of trustees which, if 
impossible could be overcome by the employment of an experienced managing agent 
who could represent the professional element in executive management.  
                                            
370 Annexure 8 rule 50(2). 
371 M Botha “Is consent by the trustees of the body corporate on the sectional title scheme to conduct business in a 
residential scheme sufficient?” (March 2008) 12.1 Property Law Digest 8. 
372 Annexure 8 and 9. 
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3 8 Conclusion 
 
Regarding the election of trustees in the initial period the South African position that all 
owners automatically become trustees from the date of establishment of the body 
corporate until the first general meeting is the best option. The only concern is that in 
the case of sales of sections from building plans, a very large number of purchasers will 
be registered as sectional owners on the opening of the sectional title register, which 
might make management by all the owners difficult in the initial period. However, in 
practice this should not be too much of a problem, as the first general meeting must be 
held within 60 days.373  
 
The dominance of the developer in the initial stage needs to be balanced against the 
possible abuse of his or her initial voting powers to influence decision-making. This can 
be done by reducing the developer’s voting rights, as is done in New South Wales. 
Another suggestion is the gradual release of control by the developer to the owner 
elected executive members within a specified time as is stipulated in the UCIOA of the 
United States of America.  
 
The Chinese solution to appoint a professional managing agent to supervise the 
developer (who might possibly abuse his power) and assist inexperienced owners 
during the initial stage, will bring a professional element to the scheme at a time when 
the developer and first owners might not have the requisite know-how and experience to 
make sure that the initial management and maintenance decisions are in the best 
interests and for the future well-being of the scheme, and for the benefit of all the 
owners. The fact that the first general meeting must be held within 60 days makes such 
a solution impractical for South Africa. 
 
The requirement, in Singapore, that a person is not eligible for election as a trustee 
unless he or she is an individual of at least 21 years of age is a sensible requirement 
that should be adopted by the South African legislature. I therefore recommend that the 
                                            
373 Annexure 8 rule 50(1); STA s 36(7)(a) [STSMA s 2 (8)(a)].  
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management rules should be amended to reflect this requirement, even though the age 
of majority in South Africa is eighteen years.374 
 
The South African requirement that the majority of trustees must be owners or spouses 
of owners is also commendable.375 The rationale is that this will ensure that the majority 
of trustees will have a genuine financial and personal interest in the efficient and 
effective management of the scheme, while a restricted number of outsiders will bring 
expertise and experience to the table. The fact that there is not a strict embargo on the 
number of eligible non-owners means that the chances are better that a sufficient 
number of persons may be willing to serve as trustees. In addition the disqualification of 
managing agents and employees who are not owners is a sensible provision as it 
prevents any possible conflict of interest. The lifting of such a restriction in the event that 
they are owners, gives them the opportunity to play a role in the management of the 
scheme in which they have a financial investment.  
 
In South Africa, unlike in Singapore, there is no restriction with regard to two residents 
of the same section from acting as trustees of the body corporate. Therefore, a husband 
and wife who co-own a unit can both be elected as trustees. It can be argued that this 
might cause problems on the ground that the couple will dominate the decision making 
which smacks of the kind of cronyism that the Singapore legislation tries to avoid. 
Although the Singapore BSMSA contains several complicated provisions designed to 
prevent cronyism in the election of a council resulting in a council consisting of a group 
of intimate friends,376 these provisions are so detailed and intricate that I do not 
recommend their transplantation into the South African legislation. On the contrary, in 
view of the general apathy of owners to serve as trustees in South Africa, I am of the 
opinion that there should not be a restriction on persons who are willing to act as 
trustees. If a husband who is an accountant, and his wife who is a lawyer, are both 
willing to serve as trustees, they should not be restricted from being elected as such a 
                                            
374 This came in effect on 1 July 2007 in terms of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
375 Chen Chinese Condominium Law148 suggests that the future uniform condominium legislation should follow the 
South African position in this regard. 
376 Van der Merwe (1999) Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 181. 
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restriction would exclude a willing, useful and skilled trustee from being elected. It is still 
the democratic right of the owners not to elect both spouses to the office of trustees.  
 
Prescribed management rule 7 was amended in 2013 to prevent owners who are in 
arrears with their levy payments, or who are in persistent breach of conduct rules from 
being elected as trustees.377 This was a sound development as trustees, who are 
themselves in arrears or persist in breaching the rules of the scheme, should not be in a 
position to take effective action against other defaulters. The trustees should set the 
example to the other owners in honouring their financial and social commitments to the 
body corporate. 
 
There are two inherent defects in rule 64.378 In the first instance, the embargo in respect 
of levies does not include arrear levies in respect of exclusive use areas. Secondly the 
embargo in respect of non-compliance with the rules only refers to conduct rules and 
not to breach of the even more important duties provided for in section 44 of the STA,379 
or prescribed management rule 68 which sets out further important obligations on 
sectional owners.  
 
The Sectional Titles Amendment Regulations of 2015 further amended prescribed 
management rule 7 by the addition another proviso to the effect that an owner who is in 
breach of rule 64 may not nominate any person as trustee.380 Therefore, an owner who 
is in arrears with payment of his levies, or remaining in breach of the conduct rules, 
despite written warning to comply, may also not nominate a person for election as a 
trustee.381 As persons nominated and elected to the board of trustees are always 
natural persons, it may be presumed that the wording of the new rule is wide enough to 
disqualify a person who is the representative of a company or other juristic entity which 
                                            
377 Amended in GN R196 in GG 36241 of 14-03-2013, and took effect from 14 April 2013. 
378 Rule 64 deals with voting embargoes. Rule 64 deals with voting embargoes. Sub-rule (a) deals with owners in 
arrears with levy payments. Sub-rule (b) deals with owners who remain in breach of Conduct Rules; Maree (April 
2013) 44 MSC Courier 1. 
379 Which has now been repealed and replaced by section 13 of the STSMA. 
380 Recently amended in GN R1422 in GG 18387 of 30-06-2015, and took effect from 30 July 2015. 
381 This amendment also corrected an error by the removal of the reference previously made to the non-existant sub-
clauses (1) and (2) to prescribed management rule 64; Maree  (July 2015) 50 MCS Courier 2. 
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owns a unit, from being nominated or elected as trustee if the company or other entity is 
in arrears with the payment of levies.382  
 
It is important to note that where an owner, who is a juristic person, nominates a natural 
person to serve as a trustee as that owner's representative, such actions must be 
authorised in accordance with the juristic person’s internal governance documents. The 
chairperson of the general meeting considering the appointment of trustees should be 
satisfied as to the authority of the person who signs the written nomination form. 
 
The amendment of prescribed management rule 13 has the effect that the appointment 
of a duly elected trustee who defaults in his or her levy payments will automatically 
lapse if he or she fails to comply, within seven days of being notified in writing, to settle 
his debts. This complements and tightens up the embargo on the nomination and 
election of trustees in the prescribed management rule 7. However, the same does not 
apply in the event of the breach of conduct rules. Therefore a trustee, once appointed, 
will not automatically cease to hold office if he or she breaches a conduct rule. This is 
an oversight. Maree draws attention to a technical inaccuracy383 namely that the 
provision is introduced as a “substitution” of rule 13(g) while there is no rule 13(g). The 
provision should therefore have been termed an “addition” rather than a “substitution”. 
The ultimate beneficial result of this amendment is that trustees would be accountable 
and responsible and capable of leading by example. 
 
The fact that the South African prescribed management rules require that every annual 
general meeting must decide anew on the number of trustees for the upcoming year 
may create practical problems. It will not be clear whether or not the written nominations 
received before the annual general meeting will be sufficient to fill the number of trustee 
positions until the annual general meeting, where the number of trustees for the ensuing 
year is decided, is held. Owners would be unable to estimate how many persons should 
be nominated as trustees and would have to keep in mind that the number of trustees 
                                            
382 Maree (April 2013) 44 MSC Courier 2. 
383 Maree (April 2013) 44 MSC Courier 2. 
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eventually elected must represent the correct mix of owners or spouses of owners and 
outsiders. In principle this matter must be sorted out at the general meeting. I suggest 
that the number of trustees required should be decided upon before the first annual 
general meeting, perhaps by the developer at the opening of the sectional title register 
and embodied in a special conduct rule. At that point the size and nature of the scheme 
would already be established and the number of trustees required could be decided. 
This would help avoid the difficulties in establishing whether the number of nominations 
received before the meeting is less than, equals, or is more than the number of trustees 
decided at the meeting. Where there is a change in circumstances requiring either less 
or more trustees the management rule can be changed by unanimous resolution to 
reflect the needs of the particular scheme.384 
 
The South African Act limits the minimum number of trustees to two. Most of the 
jurisdictions discussed above follow this position. The South African stance of not 
setting a cap on the maximum number of trustees, and requiring the general meeting to 
determine the number of trustees in accordance with the size of the particular scheme, 
is also the most satisfactory position. The number of trustees required will depend on 
the size of the scheme and the nature of the duties and functions that must be 
performed. This is also in accordance with the position in most other jurisdictions. The 
appointment of too many trustees should be avoided as it could make management 
complicated and cumbersome.385 An interesting proposal advanced for a Uniform 
Chinese Condominium statute is that the number of trustees elected should be an odd 
number. This is acceptable since an odd number requirement makes reaching decisions 
easier and disposes of the need for the chairman’s casting vote.386  
 
Taking from the position in New South Wales, guidelines used to determine the number 
of trustees should include the fact that there must be at least one member for each of 
the posts of chairperson, secretary and treasurer bearing in mind that one person may 
be appointed to one or more of those offices. More trustees should be elected for larger 
                                            
384 Annexure 8 rule 4(1). 
385 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 71; Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 36. 
386 Chen Chinese Condominium Law149. 
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schemes. Subject to the maximum number of members being elected, it is likely that the 
number of candidates nominated will be the same as the number of members decided 
upon by the first general meeting.  
 
With regard to nomination process the South Africa provision that the nominees must 
consent to their nomination either in writing, or in person at the meeting and that 
existing trustees are eligible for re-election, provided that they are nominated again are 
sound. This helps to ensure that there are sufficient persons that are willing and able to 
fill the position in the executive committee.  
 
A solution to the problem in South Africa of how to decide who is elected from the 
candidates who have been nominated can be found in New South Wales. After the 
number of members has been decided and the chairperson has declared that the 
nominations are closed, he or she shall then proceed with whichever of the following 
three steps is applicable. If the number of candidates nominated equals the number of 
members decided upon then the chairperson must declare that these candidates have 
been elected to the executive committee.387 If the number of candidates nominated is 
less than the number of members decided upon, the chairperson must declare that 
those candidates have been elected despite the fact that there will be fewer members 
than required by the resolution.388 The shortfall will be accounted for by automatically 
reducing the number of members required to form the board of trustees. If the number 
of candidates is more than the number of members of the executive committee decided 
upon the chairperson must arrange for a ballot to be taken.389 The detailed New South 
Wales provisions on the election can be regulated in South Africa by the principles 
covering general meetings in general.  
 
It often occurs that owners are not particularly interested in serving as trustees. This 
apathy can be attributed to a general satisfaction with the way the scheme is being 
                                            
387 Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(4)(a). 
388 Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(4)(a). 
389 Strata Schemes Management Regulations 2010, reg 17(4)(b). 
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managed.390 Since it is not compulsory for the trustees to appoint a managing agent in 
South African schemes, the trustees are indispensable. Owners can be motivated to 
stand as trustees by offering them remuneration for their service, subject to compliance 
with the provisions of prescribed management rule 10, which requires a special 
resolution to authorize payment of an owner trustee for his or her services.391 As the 
position of a trustee is normally a volunteer position many people are not interested in 
giving up their leisure time for free.392 Remuneration of trustees has the advantage that 
the body corporate may hold trustees to detailed performance standards.393 If the 
situation arises where there are insufficient or no owners who are prepared to stand for 
election as trustees then it has been suggested that the scheme would have to be 
managed by the general meeting, which can appoint a managing agent to exercise the 
powers and perform the duties delegated to him or her by the general meeting. An 
alternative is to make sure that the number of trustees decided upon for the ensuing 
year corresponds with the number of trustees nominated and with the requirement that 
the majority of trustees should be owners or spouses of owners.394  
 
In Dempa Investments CC v Body Coporate of Los Angeles,395 the court pointed out 
that there was nothing in the STA or the regulations which requires or even authorizes 
the court to declare that the trustees have been duly elected. This statement is 
incorrect. To the contrary, the courts are currently the only forum available to validate or 
invalidate the election of trustees. This was confirmed in the unreported cases Burger 
and Others v Friedman and Others,396 which provides an illustration of the role the High 
Court can play in validating the election of trustees. The costly and time-consuming 
process of going to court to dispute the proper election of trustees would be avoided by 
providing a similar mechanism as in New South Wales where an eligible applicant may 
                                            
390 J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: No one wants to be a trustee” (July 2010) 5-7 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 6. 
391 Annexure 8 rule 10. 
392 Paddock (July 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
393 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Owners not willing to stand for election as trustees” (July 2009) 4-7 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 10. 
394 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-122. 
395 [2008] JOL 21735 (W) para 4. 
396 WCC 12-12-2009 case no 20156/2011. 
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lodge an application with an Adjudicator. When the CSOS comes into operation it will be 
the best forum to validate the election of trustees. One of the prayers for relief includes 
an order declaring that a resolution, purportedly passed at a meeting of the executive 
committee, or at a general meeting of the association was void or invalid.397 Any person 
who is affected materially can request that the adjudicator declare the election of the 
trustee was either void or is vaild.  
 
It is a useful provision allow for removal of and the election of new trustees at a special 
general meeting. Prescribed management rule 13(e) allows for the removal of a trustee 
from office by a majority resolution of the body corporate, provided that the intention to 
vote upon the removal from office has been specified in the notice convening the 
meeting.398 The replacement of trustees between annual general meetings is provided 
for in terms of prescribed management rule 14. The body corporate may at a general 
meeting appoint another trustee in the place of any trustee who has ceased to hold 
office for the unexpired part of the term of office of the trustee so replaced.399 These two 
rules, read together, provide the opportunity to remove trustees from office before the 
next annual general meeting by a majority resolution of the general meeting. Once the 
resolution is passed the new trustees can be elected at a special general meeting, who 
shall remain in office for the unexpired part of the term of office of the trustee so 
replaced.  
 
What has become clear at this point is that being a trustee takes much time and effort. 
This is especially the case in large schemes that consist of many sections, or where the 
scheme is scattered over a large area of land.400 It involves hard work, dealing with 
varied and strong personalities including apathetic and ignorant owners, and 
complicated financial issues. However, trustees do have a certain degree of control and 
do contribute constructively to the scheme and the value of the property. Trustees can 
therefore play a vital role in the success of the scheme. In the absence of a legislative 
                                            
397 CSOSA s 39(4)(c). 
398 Annexure 8 rule 13(e). 
399 Annexure 8 rule 14. 
400 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 45. 
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provision that makes the appointment of a professional managing agent manadatory, 
trustees should be properly elected, educated, and experienced in all matters relating to 
sectional titles. The management and financial functions of the trustees have social and 
financial consequences for the unit owners and affect the value of the scheme property. 
The problem is that most of the persons who are elected as trustees do not have the 
requisite expertise and experience to manage a sectional title scheme and do not 
understand the nature and extent of an ideal involvement in the running of the office of 
trustees.401 This indicates the dilemma facing sectional title scheme management. It is 
for this reason that providing sectional title as an option for providing access to housing 
would not be a viable option, unless the scheme is managed by qualified and 
professional management organ. 
 
Consequently a professional manager, rather than a group of owners and outsiders, 
should be given the task of administering larger sectional title schemes. It is common 
practice in South Africa for the trustees to appoint a managing agent as the trustees 
have limited time, experience and qualifications at their disposal to properly manage the 
scheme themselves. Trustees of larger mixed-use schemes that require specialized 
financial training402 will usually need the assistance of a managing agent. However, in 
my opinion the German system of appointing an experienced and knowledgeable 
professional manager as an executive organ of the body corporate (who may be 
assisted by an advisory council) is preferable to the position in South Africa where the 
trustees are elected as the executive arm of the scheme, who may supplement their 
expertise by appointing a managing agent to assist them in the day-to-day management 
of the scheme. 
 
 
                                            
401 Strydom Regsapspekte van die Bestuur van ‘n Deeltitelskema (LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch1996) 288. 
402 Annexure 8 rule 42 provides that managing agents may be appointed to operate current and savings accounts of 
the body corporate; Chen and Van der Merwe 2009 TSAR 22-23. 
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Chapter 4: Fiduciary duty of trustees, their 
indemnity and transactions with third parties 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will be devoted to the fiduciary duty of trustees. I will discuss the distinction 
between the role that trustees play in internal relationships with the body corporate, and 
the role that trustees play in transactions with third parties. This will be followed by a 
discussion on the indemnification of trustees for costs, losses, expenses and claims 
incurred in the performance of their duties. I will then examine the validity of acts by 
trustees, and the consequences of their transactions with third parties. Once again each 
topic will contain comparative material on how other jurisdictions deal with the particular 
matter in question.  
4 2 The role of trustees in internal as opposed to external transactions 
 
As I have already explained the trustees are elected annually from amongst the 
sectional owners to act as the executive organ of the body corporate.403 The prescribed 
management rules clearly state that the trustees must “hold office.”404 When the 
trustees act internally there is no need for an agency agreement as they are not 
appointed by contract, but are democratically elected to an office by the owners in the 
general meeting.  
 
It is important to note that when the trustees enter into contracts with third parties on 
behalf of the body corporate they act as agents of the body corporate. The trustees 
need to be authorized to represent the body corporate when entering into transactions 
with third parties. This point will be discussed inmore detail later in this chapter.  
 
                                            
403 STA s 36(4) read with s 39(1) [STSMA s 2(5) read with s 7(1)]; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-68. 
404 Annexure 8 rule 4(2) and 6. 
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When the trustees act in internal and external relations they do so as organ of the body 
corporate. The concepts of trustees as both organ and agent of the body corporate are 
therefore not mutually exclusive. The construction of the trustees as agents when 
transacting with third parties is important to show that the trustees must be authorized to 
represent the body corporate when binding the body corporate and third parties in 
juristic acts. Whether the trustees are dealing with the body corporate directly, or 
binding the body corporate in contracts with third parties, they owe the body corporate a 
fiduciary duty and must act honestly and in good faith, and must only act in the best 
interests of the body corporate. Therefore, trustees are not in a contractual relationship, 
but rather in a relationship of trust with the body corporate. 
4 3 The fiduciary duty of trustees 
4 3 1 South African position 
 
In what follows I will discuss the fiduciary relationship trustees have with the body 
corporate, and the fiduciary duties of the trustees that flow from this relationship. In 
South Africa each trustee of a body corporate stands in a fiduciary relationship to the 
body corporate.405 The duty of care of trustees is fiduciary in nature. This statutory 
provision is in accordance with, and is basically a codification of the common law 
principle, that a person who controls the assets of another, or who holds the power to 
act on behalf of another owes a fiduciary duty towards that person.406 Therefore, a 
person in a fiduciary relationship must exercise his or her powers bona fide and for the 
benefit of the person or body on whose behalf the powers are exercised.  
 
This fiduciary relationship implies firstly that the trustee must act honestly and in good 
faith towards the body corporate.407 The trustee must not act without authority or exceed 
his or her powers of management and representation,408 and must positively exercise 
them in terms of the Act and in the interest of and for the benefit of the body 
                                            
405 STA s 40(1) [STSMA s 8(1)]; Kleynhans NO v Smith [2006] JOL 18048 (T) paras 5 and 8. 
406 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-117; Botha (2008) Property Law Digest 6. 
407 STA s 40(2)(a) [STSMA s 8(2)(a)]. 
408 STA s 40(2)(a)(ii) [STSMA s 8(2)(a)(ii)]; Body Corporate of Albany Court and 17 Others v Nedbank and Others 
[2008] JOL 21739 (W) para 13. 
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corporate.409 Secondly, a trustee must avoid any material conflict between his or her 
own interests and the interests of the body corporate.410 The trustee must not receive411 
any personal economic benefit, direct or indirect,412 from the body corporate or from any 
other person.413 The trustees are further obliged to notify all the other trustees of the 
nature and extent of any direct or indirect material interest which he or she may have in 
any contract of the body corporate as soon as he or she becomes aware of such 
interest.414 An example of such a breach of statutory duty is where a trustee enriches 
him or herself at the expense of the body corporate by awarding a maintenance contract 
of the sectional title building to a firm in which he holds a share without disclosing that 
fact.415  
 
The above codification of the common law is expressly made without derogating from 
the generality of the expression “fiduciary relationship.”416 The impact of this reservation 
is that the illustrations enumerated in section 40(2) of the STA and section 8(2) of the 
STSMA are not exhaustive, and the fiduciary relationship between the body corporate 
and the trustees could have wider implications.417 The general principle is that the 
trustee must exercise the utmost good faith in the exercise of his or her powers. 
Examples of clear situations of breach of the fiduciary duty includes conflict of interests, 
exceeding the limitations on powers, failure to exercise an unfettered discretion, failure 
to exercise powers for the purpose for which they were granted and a failure to exercise 
powers honestly.418  
                                            
409 STA s 40(2)(a)(i) [STSMA s 8(2)(a)(i)].  
410 STA s 40(2)(b) [STSMA s 8(2)(b)].  
411 STA s 40(2)(b)(i) refers to an economic benefit “derived” and not “received.” 
412 This “direct or indirect” provision was added to STSMA s 8(2)(b)(i), and was not provided for in STA s 
40(2)(b)(i). 
413 STSMA s 8(2)(b)(i). The provision in STA s 40(2)(b)(i) states that: “The trustee shall not derive any personal 
economic benefit to which he is not entitled by reason of his office as trustee of the body corporate from the body 
corporate or any other person in circumstances in which the benefit is obtained in conflict with the interests of the 
body corporate.” 
414 STSMA s 8(2)(b)(ii). STA s 40(2)(b)(ii) states: “The trustee is further obliged to notify all the other trustees at 
the earliest opportunity practicable of the nature and extent of any direct or indirect material interest which he or 
she may have in any contract of the body corporate.” 
415 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-118. 
416 STSMA s 8(2). STA s 40(2) states: “without prejudice to the generality of the expression ‘fiduciary 
relationship.’” 
417 Botha (2008) Property Law Digest 6.  
418 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-118. 
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According to common law a person in a fiduciary relationship has two duties, namely a 
duty of trust and a duty of care and skill.419 The duty of trust entails that a fiduciary must 
exercise his or her capacities and powers bona fide;420 in the interest of the body 
corporate; and must not exercise them in his or her own interest or in that of another. 
The duty of care and skill entails that a fiduciary must display reasonable care and skill 
in exercising the functions and duties of his or her office. Although both these duties 
arise from the fiduciary relationship, they are usually considered fairly distinct duties 
with their own sphere of application and legal consequences. Whereas the fiduciary 
duty of trust regulates the powers that a fiduciary wields, the duty of care and skill 
pertains to the manner in which the trustee exercises the function and duties of a 
fiduciary. Furthermore, the basis of liability differs as the fiduciary duty of trust is 
considered to be sui generis, while the duty of care and skill is considered to be of a 
delictual nature.421 
 
Van der Merwe states further that section 40(3)(a) of the STA,422 if interpreted in an 
innovative manner, also draws a distinction between the consequences of a breach of 
one or the other of these duties.423 If a trustee breaches his or her duty of care and skill 
in the exercise of his or her functions and duties, he or she will be held delictually liable 
for the losses suffered by the body corporate as a result of such a breach. The duty 
required by the STA is not the care and skill which can be reasonably expected of a 
person of his or her knowledge and experience as under company law.424 On the 
contrary the STA expressly states that a trustee can only be delictually liable for losses 
suffered on account of the grossly negligent performance of his or her functions and 
duties under the STA.425 On the other hand if the trustee breaches his or her fiduciary 
duty of trust by a mala fide act or omission, he or she shall be liable to the body 
                                            
419 14-118. 
420 This means with good intentions and no hidden agenda.  
421 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-118; Botha (2008) Property Law Digest 7. 
422 STSMA s 8(3).  
423 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-118. 
424 Botha (2008) Property Law Digest 7. 
425 STA s 40(3)(a)(i). STSMA s 8(3)(a)(i) provides that that: “A trustee of a body corporate  who acts in breach of 
his or her fiduciary relationship, is liable to the body corporate for any loss suffered as a result thereof by the body 
corporate.” 
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corporate for any economic benefit derived thereof.426 Section 8(3) of the STSMA has 
omitted the words:  
 
“…whose mala fide or grossly negligent act or omission has breached any duty 
arising from his fiduciary relationship, shall be liable to the body corporate...”427  
 
and merely states:  
 
“…who acts in breach of his or her fiduciary duty is liable to the body 
corporate...”428  
 
The consequence remains the same in terms of both the STA and STSMA. The trustee 
who breaches his or her fiduciary duty is liable to the body corporate  
 
“for any loss suffered as a result thereof by the body corporate; or any economic 
benefit derived by the trustees by reason thereof.”429  
 
The STA provides that, in cases where the body corporate discovers that the trustee 
has not disclosed the nature and extent of any direct or indirect interest in a contract 
concluded by the trustees on behalf of the body corporate, that contract is voidable at 
the option of the body corporate.430 If the contract is voided by the body corporate then 
there needs to be restitution to restore the status quo. The STA expressly provides that 
where the body corporate chooses to void the contract, the court may on application of 
an interested person order that such contract should nevertheless be binding if it 
considers such order fair in the circumstances. This order may be supplemented with 
                                            
426 STA s 40(3)(a)(ii). STSMA s 8(3)(b) provides that: “A trustee of a body corporate  who acts in breach of his or 
her fiduciary relationship, is liable to the body corporate for any economic benefit received by the trustee by reason 
thereof. 
427 STA ss 40(3)(a)(i) and (ii). My emphasis added. 
428 STSMA ss 8(3)(a) and (b). My emphasis added. 
429 STA ss 40(3)(a)(i) and (ii) [STSMA s 8(3)(a) and (b)]. 
430 STA s 40(3)(b). CM Durham “Q & A with Carryn: Can transactions by the trustees be reversed?” (April 2004) 9-
4 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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further orders in respect of the contract which it deems fit.431 This is different from the 
general principle applied in contract law when a contract is deemed void where the 
contract is ab initio non-existent, but restitution must be applied to restore the status 
quo.432 This provision that any contract in breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty is 
voidable at the option of the body corporate has been omitted from the STSMA.  
 
Furthermore, except for the duty of a trustee to act honestly and in good faith and 
exercise his or her powers in terms of the Act and in the interest and for the benefit of 
the body corporate in managing and representing the body corporate, any other conduct 
of a trustee does not constitute a breach of a duty arising from his or her fiduciary 
relationship to the body corporate if such conduct were preceded or followed by the 
written approval of all the members of the body corporate where such members were or 
are cognizant of all the material facts.433  
 
An interesting question is whether there is a duty on the trustees to warrant the safety 
and security of the owners and residents of the scheme. The effect of this would be that 
the trustees would be held personally liable for the safety and security of the unit 
owners.434 This could place an unnecessary and onerous duty on trustees to such an 
extent that no one would be willing to serve as trustee. There is nothing in the Act or 
rules that specifically suggests that trustees could be held liable in such a case. The 
trustees do have the duty to maintain the common property in good repair and therefore 
safe for use. However, it is the body corporate and not the trustees that would be liable, 
unless the trustee knew of some danger and did not take steps to warn the owners or 
residents or to remedy such danger. 
 
The responsibility of the trustees to ensure the safety and security of the owners and 
residents of the scheme was dealt with in a recent case. In Du Plooy v The Cascades 
                                            
431 STA s 40 (3)(b). 
432 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 146. 
433 STA s 40(4) [STSMA s 8(4)]. 
434 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Are the trustees liable for the owners’ safety and security?” (April 2013) 
8-4 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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Body Corporate and Another435 the plaintiff was an owner of one of the units in the 
scheme, and was responsible for the cleaning and gardening in the scheme. Mr Du 
Plooy claimed damages from the body corporate for an injury sustained as a 
consequence of slipping and falling on slime and moss that had accumulated on the 
floor of the washing line area (common property) at the Cascades Sectional Title 
Scheme. He alleged that the fall was caused by the negligent breach of a legal duty 
owed to him by the body corporate to take steps to prevent him from slipping and falling 
in this area. The Judge said that one couldn’t quarrel with the following submission 
made by the plaintiff:  
 
“The body corporate is in virtually the same position as landlord, hotel owner or 
shopkeeper, who by virtue of his or her control over property, has a legal duty to 
take reasonable steps in respect of maintenance and supervision to ensure that 
the property is in a safe condition with reference to the type of person who may 
normally and reasonable make use of it.”436   
 
The trustees are in a fiduciary relationship with the body corporate and the STA 
expands on this relationship of being entrusted with this duty of care. The prescribed 
management rules are more specific to some of these powers, functions and duties. 
The trustees must keep the common property properly maintained, clean, and in 
serviceable repair.437 This could be interpreted to include the requirement that the 
common property must be kept safe for use. If an owner or occupier were to fall and 
injure him or herself as a result of a trustee or the trustees failing in this duty of care, the 
trustees could find themselves defending themselves and the body corporate in court.438 
In order to discharge its legal duty to take care that the common property at the 
development is safe, the body corporate is obliged to take no more than reasonable 
steps to guard against foreseeable harm to owners and other users of the common 
                                            
435 Case No. 275/10 [2013] ZAWCHC 62 (12 March 2013).  
436 Para 7. 
437 STA s 37(1)(j). 
438 M Addisson “Slip and fall injuries – trustees beware!” (December 2013) 8-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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property. In determining whether reasonable steps were taken by the body corporate 
the judge recited the following dictum:  
 
“Whether in any particular case the steps actually taken are to be regarded as 
reasonable or not depends upon a consideration of all the facts and 
circumstances of the case. It follows that merely because the harm which was 
foreseeable did eventuate does not mean that the steps taken were necessarily 
unreasonable. Ultimately the inquiry involves a value judgment.”439 
 
The Judge found that plaintiff had failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that 
first defendant at any stage ought to have been aware of any slippery and unsafe 
condition of the washing line area.440 
 
It can also be argued that owners must take responsibility for their own safety by 
installing security systems or taking out insurance. In normal circumstances if an owner 
or resident is attacked in the common property or his or her car is vandalized neither the 
body corporate, nor the trustees could be held liable for such loss, harm or damage 
suffered. However, the trustees must, at the first meeting of the trustees or as soon 
thereafter as is possible, take all reasonable steps to insure the owners and the trustees 
and to keep them insured against liability in respect of death, bodily injury or illness;441 
or loss of or damage to property, occurring in connection with the common property, for 
a sum of liability of not less than one hundred thousand rand, which sum may be 
increased from time to time as directed by the owners in general meeting.442 In this way 
the trustees would protect themselves and the body corporate against any possible 
liability.  
 
 
                                            
439 Pretoria City Council v De Jager 1997 (2) SA 46 (A) 55I.  
440 (275/10) [2013] ZAWCHC 62 (12 March 2013) para 29.  
441 Annexure 8 rule 29(2)(a)(i). 
442 Annexure 8 rule 29(2)(a)(ii). 
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4 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the duty of council members is also fiduciary in nature.  In Re Steel 
& Others and the Conveyancing (Strata Title) Act 1961443 the nature of the duty was 
explained by Else-Mitchell J as follows: 
 
“It is plain that the respondents [the members of the council] have failed to 
recognize that it is their duty to manage the affairs of the body corporate for the 
benefit of all the lot holders, and that the exercise of any of their powers in 
circumstances which might suggest a conflict of interest and duty requires them 
to justify their conduct, and that the onus lies on them to prove affirmatively that 
they have not acted in their own interests or for their own benefit.”444  
 
To illustrate this fiduciary duty the secretary will be held personally liable to a third party 
if his or her acts are beyond the authority conferred on him or her. The secretary can 
limit this risk. In relation to non-routine matters the owners corporation or executive 
committee should pass a specific resolution to confer authority on the secretary to 
undertake an act. It is unlikely that the owners corporation will be able to pass a 
resolution to use the owners corporations’ funds to exempt or indemnify the secretary 
against any liability for a previous breach of duty, neglect or other tort. It has therefore 
been strongly recommended that the owners corporation purchase office bearers’ 
liability insurance to protect the executive committee’s office bearers from adverse 
effects of personal liability. When signing documents on behalf of the owners 
corporation the secretary should clearly signify the representative capacity of the 
signature.445 The secretary risks being held personally liable for the debt if it is not paid 
by the executive committee and the owners corporation’s name does not appear on any 
of the relevant documents. 
 
                                            
443 (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 467. 
444 470. 
445 Ilkin NSW Strata 107. 
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Numerous provisions in the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act impose monetary 
penalties on the owners corporation if it is in default of the Act’s provisions. None of 
these provisions impose monetary penalties on an office bearer. However, an office 
bearer who continues to breach the Act’s provisions may become subject to an 
Adjudicator’s order. If the office bearer does not comply with the Adjudicator’s order, 
proceedings against the offending office bearer may be commenced at the Consumer, 
Trader and Tenancy Tribunal where, on the breach being proven, a Tribunal member 
may impose a monetary penalty on the office bearer for which he or she will be 
personally liable and cannot seek indemnity from the owners corporation.446 
 
In New South Wales candidates for executive committee elections and acting members 
must make disclosure of certain interests.447 A person who is connected with the 
original owner (developer) or caretaker of a strata scheme is not eligible to be elected 
as a member of an executive committee for the strata scheme unless the person 
discloses the connection that the person has with the original owner or caretaker, and 
the disclosure is made at the meeting of the owners corporation at which the executive 
committee is to be elected and before the election is conducted.448 A disclosure made is 
to be included in the minutes of the meeting at which the disclosure is made.449 The 
same principle applies to the eligibility of such a person for appointment to act in the 
place of a member of the executive committee.450 A person who becomes connected 
with the original owner or caretaker of a strata scheme after being appointed as, or to 
act in the place of, a member of the executive committee must disclose any connection 
that the person has with the original owner or caretaker to the secretary or, if the person 
is the secretary, to the chairperson. The disclosure must be made as soon as possible 
after the person becomes aware of the connection.451 The secretary or chairperson to 
                                            
446 108. 
447 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3A. 
448 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3A(1)(a) and (b). 
449 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3A(2). 
450 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3A(3)(a) and (b). 
451 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3A(4). 
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whom a disclosure is made must ensure that the disclosure is included on the agenda 
for the next general meeting of the owners corporation.452  
 
In Singapore a member of a council is under a duty at all times to act honestly and to 
use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office.453 A member of a 
council or any officer454 or agent455 or a managing agent of the management corporation 
is not allowed to use his or her position as such to gain, directly or indirectly, an 
advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the 
corporation.456 A person who contravenes any of these provisions is liable to the 
management corporation for any profit made by him or for any damage suffered by the 
corporation as a result of the breach of any such provision.457 Furthermore, a person 
who breaches any of these provisions is also guilty of an offence for which the penalty 
on conviction is a maximum fine of Singaporean $5,000 or imprisonment for a maximum 
term not exceeding one year or both.458 This is in addition to, and not in derogation of, 
any other written law or rule of law relating to the duty or liability of council members.459  
 
In Singapore a council member with a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any 
contract, proposed contract or other matter460 must before any meeting of the council or 
management corporation declare the nature of his or her interest and not take part in 
the consideration or discussion thereof or vote on any question with respect to that 
contract or matter.461 The purpose of this provision is to avoid abuses by the council. 
The interested member could further be asked by the chairperson or the person 
presiding over the meeting to vacate the meeting, unless asked by the council to be 
                                            
452 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3A(5). 
453 BMSMA s 61(1). 
454 An officer includes a person who at any time has been an officer of a management corporation in terms of 
BMSMA s 61(5). 
455 Any agent includes a banker, solicitor or auditor of the management corporation and any person who at any time 
has been a banker, solicitor or auditor of the corporation in terms of BMSMA s 61(5). 
456 BMSMA s 61(2). 
457 BMSMA s 61(3)(a). 
458 BMSMA s 61(3)(b). 
459 BMSMA s 61(4). 
460 Any matter would include any litigation which may result in a conflict of interest situation. 
461 BMSMA s 60(1)(a) and (b). 
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present to provide information.462 These requirements do not apply where the interest of 
the member of a council consists only of being a member or creditor of a company that 
is interested in a contract or proposed contract if the member’s interest may properly be 
regarded as not being a material interest.463 A material interest is presumably where the 
member is a majority shareholder in the company concerned. An interest of an 
immediate family member464 of a member of the council is to be treated as an interest of 
the member.465  
 
The previous statutory requirement pertaining to disclosure of interests by council 
members, which was not as elaborate as the BMSMA provision, was considered in Sum 
Lye Heng (also known as Lim Jessie) v MCSTP No 2285 and Others.466 The 
defendants, comprising the management corporation and council, had issued a private 
summons against the plaintiff for allegedly breaching the then sections 66(1) and 
67(2)467 of the LTSA. Section 66(1) reads: 
 
“Every member of a council who is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in 
a contract or proposed contract with the management corporation shall, as soon 
as practicable after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge, declare the 
nature of his interest at a meeting of the council.”  
 
The plaintiff was the former chairperson of the council and was at the same time the 
director and shareholder of SCMS, a property management company which had 
submitted a tender for the provision of managing agency services to the management 
corporation. The plaintiff had duly declared her interest as director at a council meeting 
that was subsequently held, and this was followed by another declaration two weeks 
later. Prior to that she offered to resign from the council at the next meeting, but the 
offer was not accepted. The plaintiff applied to the High Court to restrain the 
                                            
462 BMSMA s 60(1)(c). 
463 BMSMA s 60(2). 
464 This includes a spouse, a child, adopted child, step-child, sibling or parent; BMSMA s 2(1). 
465 BMSMA s 60(8). 
466 [2003] 4 SLR 553; Keang Sood Strata Title 335. 
467 Section 67(2) was replaced by section 61(2) of the BMSMA. 
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management corporation from proceeding with the private summons for alleged breach 
of the relevant provisions on the ground that it was an abuse of the process of the court. 
The judge allowed the plaintiff’s application and ordered a permanent stay of private 
summons. The judge reasoned that it was not open to the council to subsequently 
complain of the plaintiff’s conduct in respect of SCMS and the tender exercise. This was 
so especially when SCMS had been encouraged to continue with its tender. Moreover, 
all the parties had acted on the basis that the plaintiff had complied with the relevant 
provisions of the LTSA. Accordingly the council was estopped from making the 
complaint as it had acted on the basis that the plaintiff had duly made her declaration at 
a council meeting that was validly held. The judge pointed out that the real reason for 
the complaint was because the plaintiff’s relationship with the then members of the 
council had become acrimonious in light of further developments. Due to the fact that 
the new members were bound by the decisions and actions of the previous council, they 
were not entitled to take action against the plaintiff except in those instances where it 
was not too late to reverse its decision. This is because otherwise none could act with 
certainty on a decision of a previous council. The recourse was for the new council to 
look to the previous council for an explanation.  
 
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Management Corporation Strata 
Title Plan No 2285 and Others v Sum Lye Heng (alias Lim Jessie).468 It was held that 
the High Court had rightly pointed out that it was not open to the management 
corporation to make the complaint mentioned above as all parties concerned had acted 
on the basis that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of the LTSA, and the 
company had even been encouraged to tender for the management contract in 
question. There was evidence that the plaintiff declared her interest in the company on 
innumerable occasions. Apart from her declaring her interests in the company at a 
meeting of the council, which was duly noted and recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting, she did so in various emails to her fellow council members. The plaintiff also 
took it upon herself to inform the Commissioner of Buildings that she was a director and 
shareholder of the company which was tendering for the contract to provide managing 
                                            
468 [2004] 2 SLR 408. 
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agency services for the scheme and that she had declared her interest therein at the 
council meeting concerned.469  
 
A general notice given to the members of a council by a member that he or she has an 
interest in any contract with a company or firm of which the council member is an officer 
or member is deemed to be a sufficient declaration of interest in relation to that 
contract.470 The notice must specify the nature and extent of his or her interest in that 
company or firm, and the interest must not be different in nature or greater in extent 
than the nature and extent specified in the general notice at the time any contract is 
entered into.471 The notice will have no effect unless it is given at a meeting of the 
council,472 or the member concerned takes reasonable steps to ensure that it is brought 
up and read at the next meeting of the council.473 
 
Every member of a council who holds any office or possesses any property whereby, 
directly or indirectly, duties or interests might be created in conflict with his or her duties 
or interest as a member of the council is required to declare the nature, character and 
extent of the conflict at a council meeting.474 The declaration must be made at the first 
meeting of the council held after he or she becomes a member of the council475 or, if 
already a member of the council, after he or she commenced to hold the office or to 
possess the property concerned.476 The secretary of the council is required to record 
every declaration in the minutes of the meeting at which the declaration was made.477 
This statutory requirement of disclosure of interests is in addition to, and not in 
derogation of, the operation of any rule of law restricting a member of a council from 
having any interest in contracts with the management corporation, or from holding 
offices or possessing properties involving duties or interests in conflict with his duties or 
                                            
469 Keang Sood Strata Title 336. 
470 BMSMA s 60(3). 
471 BMSMA s 60(3). 
472 BMSMA s 60(4)(a). 
473 BMSMA s 60(4)(b). 
474 BMSMA s 60(5). 
475 BMSMA s 60(6)(a). 
476 BMSMA s 60(6)(b). 
477 BMSMA s 60(7). 
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interests as a council member.478 Any council member who fails to comply with the 
statutory provisions relating to disclosures of interests is guilty of an offence and is liable 
on conviction to or to imprisonment.479 This consequence serves to prevent corruption, 
malpractice and abuse by council members.  
 
The UCIOA of the United States makes it clear that the executive board appointed by 
the developer hold their office as fiduciaries. It stipulates that officers and members of 
the executive board appointed by the developer must exercise the degree of care and 
loyalty required of a trustee in the performance of their duties.480 Therefore, any 
executive board member appointed by the developer is liable as a fiduciary to any unit 
owner for his acts or omissions in such capacity.481 The rationale for this is to avert 
potential conflicts of interest between the developer and the unit owners.482 In contrast, 
the executive board members elected by unit owners do not have to comply with the 
higher standard of a fiduciary duty but are only required to take ordinary and reasonable 
care in the performance of their functions. This only requires that executive board 
members must discharge their duties in good faith, and with that diligence and care 
which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances in the 
performance of their duties.483 It seems that the UCIOA only relies on a business 
judgment rule as the basis to evaluate an executive board’s actions.484 This means that 
as long as directors of a corporation decide matters rationally, honestly and without a 
conflict of interest, the decision will not be reviewed by the courts.485  
 
 
                                            
478 BMSMA s 60(9). 
479 BMSMA s 60(10). 
480 UCIOA § 3-103(a). 
481 UCIOA § 3-103, Comment 3. 
482 UCIOA § 3-103, Comment 1. 
483 North Carolina General Statute § 47C-3-103(a). 
484 UCIOA § 3-103, Comment. 
485 Atkins v. Hibernia Corp 182F3d 320, 324 (5th cir 1999). 
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4 4 Indemnity of trustees 
4 4 1 The South African position 
 
After establishing the fiduciary duties of trustees I will now discuss how the trustees are 
indemnified by the body corporate against all costs, losses, expenses and claims which 
he or she may incur or become liable to by reason of any act in the performance of his 
or her duties, except if the costs, expenses or claims were caused by his or her mala 
fide or grossly negligent act or omission.486  
 
In South Africa trustees carry the potential risk of personal liability in the performance of 
their duties. A trustee could be held personally liable for a wrongful action, even if such 
action was done on behalf of the body corporate. Trustees can also be held liable for 
mismanagement of the sectional title scheme. The prescribed management rules 
stipulate that every trustee, agent, other officer or servant of the body corporate shall be 
indemnified by the body corporate against all costs, losses, expenses and claims which 
he or she may incur or become liable to by reason of any act in the performance of his 
or her duties. Such indemnification must be paid out of the funds of the body 
corporate.487 However, trustees will not be entitled to such indemnification if the costs, 
expenses or claims were caused by his or her mala fide or grossly negligent act or 
omission.488 The fact that the question as to whether an act or omission is grossly 
negligent is open to interpretation by the courts makes it difficult to start court 
proceedings on this ground. It is generally accepted that gross negligence is hard to 
prove and that a favourable decision by the court is more the exception than a rule.489 
This indemnification does not extend to the managing agent appointed in terms of 
prescribed management rule 46.490 I will discuss this more fully in chapter 12. 
 
                                            
486 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(a). 
487 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(b). 
488 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(a). 
489 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 35. 
490 Annexure 8 rule 12(2). 
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The rule qualifies the strict fiduciary duty imposed on a trustee by virtue of the fact that 
he or she is entrusted with the management of the affairs of another.491 Van der Merwe 
suggests that the rationale behind the indemnity is that if it were possible to sue trustees 
personally on the ground of negligent omissions then no one would be prepared to 
stand as trustees. In this way a balance is struck between encouraging those to stand 
for office as trustee and ensuring the proper management of the sceme. 492 
 
Furthermore if owner trustees or outside professional trustees are paid for their services 
then they should not be entitled to indemnification for negligent omissions in the 
performance of their duties.493 Note, however, that the indemnity is not only for claims 
which he or she may incur or become liable to by reason of any act in the performance 
of his or her duties, but also for all costs, losses, expenses incurred in the performance 
of his or her duties. Trustees who are compensated should be held liable if they do not 
exercise ordinary care and skill the day-to-day management of the scheme.494 
4 4 3 Comparative survey 
 
The New South Wales, Singapore and Malaysian legislation do not make provision for 
the indemnification of the executive members who are negligent in the performance of 
their duties. A professional indemnity insurance policy could be taken out by the 
corporation to protect office bearers from personal liability.495  
 
The UCIOA stipulates that the owners association (body corporate) can provide for the 
indemnification of the executive board members (trustees) and officers and maintain 
professional liability insurance for its directors and officers.496 Such expenses are borne 
by all the unit owners by means of their contributions to the management fund.  
 
                                            
491 J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: Trustee indemnity” (March 2010) 5-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
492 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-120.  
493 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 35. 
494 Van der Merwe Sectional Title 14-120. 
495 Keang Sood NSW Strata 319.  
496 UCIOA § 3-102(a)(13). 
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It has been suggested that a future uniform Chinese condominium statute should 
include such an indemnification clause for executive council members (trustees). The 
indemnities can serve to comfort the executive members and to encourage unit owners 
to take office on the board.497 
4 5 Transactions with third parties 
4 5 1 The South African position 
 
The body corporate is a juristic or legal person. It exercises its functions and performs 
its powers through its two main organs. The general meeting fulfills the legislative 
functions of the body corporate, while the trustees fulfill the executive and administrative 
functions of the body corporate. As I will show in this discussion it is important to draw a 
clear distinction between the role of the trustees in internal relationships with the body 
corporate, and the role of the trustees when transacting with third parties.498 When the 
trustees transact with the body corporate, and in particular the general meeting, the 
trustees act as an executive organ of the body corporate. This means that their acts as 
against the general meeting and the individual members are regarded as the acts of the 
body corporate itself. In contrast, when the trustees transact with third parties the 
trustees act in their capacity as executive and administrative organ as well as agents of 
the body corporate.499 This has the result that the body corporate is bound by all the 
acts performed by the trustees within the scope of their actual or ostensible authority.500  
 
Pienaar does not agree that the trustees act as an organ of the body corporate in 
internal matters, and as an agent of the body corporate in external matters, and is of the 
opinion that it is not clear why the distiction is made.501 He reasons that, according to 
common law principles, the executive and management organ of a juristic person acts 
as an organ in both internal and external matters. He points out that the assumption that 
trustees must act as agents in external matters stems from Von Savigny’s fiction theory 
                                            
497 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 158. 
498 Van der Merwe Sectional Tiles 14-113. 
499 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Siberberg and Schoeman’s law of property 5ed (2006) 468. 
500 469. 
501 Pienaar Sectional Titles 178. 
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that a juristic person cannot perform external juridical acts or form intent, and thus must 
act through agents and representatives. Von Savigny’s fiction theory therefore defines a 
juristic person as a legal fiction. However, Von Savigny does not explain how the 
authority to act as representative, which is also a juridical act, is bestowed on the agent. 
He goes on to explain that in company law it is an established principle that the 
directors act as agents in external contractual matters, but as a management organ in 
the case of delictual or criminal liability of the company as well as in internal affairs, due 
to the fact that the directing will and mind of the directors is regarded as the will and 
mind of the company.502 However, he indicates that the distinction is made because the 
directors are not automatically authorized to act as representatives of the company, but 
receive their authority from the Companies Act, the articles of association and the 
statutes of the company. This authority arrived from the founding documents and 
constitution of the company is, in his opinion, not the same as in the case of agency by 
representation that is derived from Von Savigny’s fiction theory.  
  
Pienaar then points out that the provisions of the Companies Act are not applicable to 
the body corporate of a sectional title scheme.503 The body corporate is not established 
or based on contract, and the trustees are regarded as the executive organ of the body 
corporate due to the fact that they were elected and hold office in terms of the 
management rules. The STA contains no provision that the trustees can bind the body 
corporate only in external matters through agency. One equivalent provision with 
company law is that the trustees cannot act in contravention of the STA, the rules of the 
scheme and the resolutions of the general meeting504 and stand in a fiduciary (and not 
contractual) relationship to the body corporate.505 He then points out that these 
measures do not mean that the trustees represent the body corporate as agents. On the 
contrary, they must be seen as corporate directives determining to what extent the 
trustees, as the executive and management organ, can bind the body corporate. 
Pienaar therefore concludes that it is unnecessary and artificial to designate the actions 
                                            
502 179. 
503 STA s 36(5) [STSMA s 2(6)]. 
504 STA s 39(1). 
505 STA s 40(1); Pienaar Sectional Titles 180. 
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of the trustees in internal matters as management functions of a management organ 
and the external contractual transactions of trustees as measures based on agency. In 
support of this conclusion he quotes Body Corporate of La Roche v Resort 
Administration Services CC506 where the court clearly distinguishes between the legal 
position of the trustees as organ of the body corporate and the managing agent 
appointed by the trustees as agent of the body corporate.507  
Although Pienaar’s argument follows a logical sequence of conclusions, I do not agree 
with his submission that the distinction is unneccesary. The distinction is important as it 
shows that trustees cannot contract with third parties and bind the body corporate 
purely on the authority of being defined as one of the two organs of the body corporate, 
but do so based on authority granted by the body corporate to represent the latter. Apart 
from pointing out that the distinction in Body Corporate of La Roche v Resort 
Administration Services CC508 concerned the managing agent and not the trustees, it 
seems to be generally accepted by the courts that trustees act as the representative of 
the body corporate in transactions with third parties.509 As I will show later in the thesis 
the managing agent also acts as agent when it, by representation, binds the body 
corporate in contracts with third parties. 
Agency has been used in a wide variety of meanings.510 In the context of trustees 
“agency” is the performance of a juristic act on behalf of or in the name of the principal 
(the body corporate) by the agent (the trustees), who is authorized by the body 
corporate to act, that creates, alters or discharges legal relations between the body 
corporate and a third party.511 It is the trustee’s position as the body corporate’s 
authorized representative in affecting the body corporate’s legal relations with third 
parties that is the essence of agency.512 The transactions with third parties are 
                                            
506 [2003] JOL 11655 (N) para 5. 
507 Pienaar Sectional Titles 180. 
508 [2003] JOL 11655 (N). 
509 Body Corporate of Albany court and 17 others v Nedbank and others [2008] JOL 21739 (W) para 12.  
510 M Dendy & JC De Wet “Agency and Representation” in LTC Harms & JA Faris LAWSA LAWSA 1 3 ed (2014) 
para 125. 
511 Totalisator Agency Board OFS v Livanos 1987 (3) SA 283 (W) at 291; Willes Bradfield G “Agency” in F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2009) 984. 
512 984. 
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transactions of the body corprorate, as principal, and are for the body corporate’s 
benefit. These transactions render the body corporate liable, without benefit or liability 
attaching to the trustees.  
 
Representation or agency is the act of one person performing a juristic act on behalf of 
another.513 A person who does not have capacity to conclude a juristic act cannot be an 
agent.514 The agent’s ability to bind the principal is derived from and determined by the 
agent’s authority to do so. An agent without authority cannot bind the principal. This 
authorization is a distinct unilateral act. It can arise out of an agreement or by operation 
of law. Where a person acts for another person without authority, that lack of authority 
may in appropriate circumstances be ratified. The principal may also be estopped515 
from denying that the agent had authority to conclude the juristic act on his or her 
behalf. 
The trustees’s actual authority can be conferred in three ways. In the first place the 
trustee can be authorized by way of express authority. A unilateral juristic act by the 
body corporate in terms of a directive or restriction in the general meeting516 will 
constitute an express authority to the trustees to enter into a contract with a third party 
on behalf of the body corporate. The minutes of the general meeting will indicate the 
body corporate’s intention to be bound by that contract. Secondly, the trustee’s actual 
authority can be by way of tacit authority. This type of authority can be inferred from the 
body corporate’s words and conduct and from other admissible evidence of surrounding 
circumstanes. The body corporate elects the trustees to do all things reasonably 
necessary for the control, management and administration of the common property,517 
and therefore intends to confer authority to enter into all such transactions as are 
reasonably incidental to the management of the scheme, even if it is not expressly 
stated. Finally the trustee’s actual authority can be by way of authority by operation of 
law. Where there is no express or implied act of authority by the body corporate, the 
                                            
513 Dendy & De Wet “Agency and Representation” LAWSA 1 para 126. 
514 129. 
515 Estoppel is also called apparent or ostensible authority. 
516 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
517 Annexure 8 rule 28(2). 
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trustee may have authority by operation of law. In this way the trustees derive their 
power to represent the body corporate from their election into office and by executing 
their statutory functions and powers.518   
It is important to construe the trustees as agents when transacting with third parties on 
behalf of the body corporate. The reason for my submission is that the trustees are then 
subject to the legal effects of agency. Certain relations are created between the body 
corporate as principal and the trustees as agent. The effect is that trustees have the 
obligation to transact on behalf of the body corporate personally in accordance with 
instructions with reasonable care, skill and diligence in good faith and must render an 
account to the body corporate and deliver any proceeds from the transaction. The body 
corporate must refund all expenses reasonably and properly incurred by the trustees in 
carrying out their functions. The body corporate must also indemnify the trustees for all 
loss or liability duly incurred in the execution of the transaction.  
The relations between the body corporate and third party vary according to whether the 
trustees acted within the scope of authority; exceeded authority; concealed their 
capacity or acted corruptly. The relations between the trustees and and third party vary 
according to whether the trustees acted within the scope of authority or exceeded 
authority. If the trustee merely acted as organ of the body corporate in transactions with 
third parties there would not be any legal basis, boundaries or effects that would attach 
to the transactions, other than those set out in the Act and rules. The provisions in the 
STA and rules that deal with trustees in transacting with third parties fit perfectly within 
the legal framework of agency. 
The trustees, in terms of their actual authority, are empowered to exercise all the 
powers and to perform all the duties of the body corporate subject to the Act, the rules 
and any restrictions imposed or directions given by the owners the general meeting.519 
Any act outside such powers would be ultra vires. The trustees may for example in 
                                            
518 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
519 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
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terms of the rules not make loans on behalf of the body corporate to sectional owners or 
to themselves.520  
All contracts entered into by the trustees on behalf of the body corporate are valid and 
binding on the body corporate where the contract concerns a matter falling within the 
functions and powers of the body corporate and the requirements imposed by the Act, 
the rules and the directions given or restrictions imposed by the general meeting have 
been complied with. Section 39 of the STA; section 7 of the STSMA521 and rule 25 in 
Annexure 8 contained in the Regulations made under the STA are similarly worded:  
 
“The functions and powers of the body corporate shall, subject to the provisions 
of this Act, the rules and any restriction imposed or direction given at a general 
meeting of the owners of sections, be performed and exercised by the trustees of 
the body corporate holding office in terms of the rules.” 
 
When a third party seeks to have a contract against the body corporate enforced which 
he or she contends was entered into by the trustees on its behalf, the third party must 
first establish that the body corporate had the capacity to enter into the contract 
because any act performed by the trustees in excess of the capacity of the body 
corporate is ultra vires and void.522 The contracts entered into by trustees which have 
nothing to do with the functions or powers of the body corporate or a specific duty 
imposed on the trustees by the Act or the rules cannot bind the body corporate, unless 
the trustees were specifically authorized by the general meeting to conclude the 
contract, or if the body corporate can be estopped from relying on the lack of authority. 
An example is where the trustees purportedly enter into a contract on behalf of the body 
corporate with a third party to arrange for holiday accommodation for themselves.523 
The third party would not be able to hold the body corporate liable on the contract as 
this does not fall within the functions and powers of the body corporate stated in the Act, 
                                            
520 Annexure 8 rule 26(2). 
521 STA s 39 [STSMA s 7(1)].  
522 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-113. 
523 H Delport “Contracting with the body corporate of a sectional title scheme” (2006) Obiter 577. 
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and therefore the trustees are not empowered by section 39 of the STA or any 
prescribed rule to enter into such a contract on behalf of the body corporate. 
 
Where the trustees enter into a contract with a third party on a matter within the 
functions and powers of the body corporate, but the relevant restrictions or prerequisites 
imposed by the Act, rules or general meeting have not been observed, then the 
question whether the contract is binding depends on whether the disregarded 
prerequisites or requirements are statutorily imposed or otherwise. For example section 
26(1) of the STA allows the body corporate to purchase land to extend the common 
property if authorized to do so by all the members. In terms of section 39(1) of the STA 
the trustees may exercise the body corporate’s powers, but the trustees are only 
entitled to purchase land to extend the common property in terms of section 26(1), 
provided the written authority of all the body corporate’s members has been obtained.  
 
Trustees are also not empowered to let the common property in terms of a long lease in 
terms of section 17(1) of the STA, unless the owners have by unanimous resolution 
directed the body corporate to do so. The trustees act outside their powers if they enter 
into contracts with a third party where the required consents are not given. Whether 
such a contract is valid or void depends on the legislature’s intention. The decisive issue 
is not whether obtaining the consent can be classified as an act of internal 
management, but whether or not the legislature intended to invalidate the contract 
entered into by the trustees where the statutorily imposed prerequisites have not been 
met. A third party dealing with the trustees on any such matter should make enquiries 
and ensure that the required prerequisites have been complied with.  
 
The third party must secondly establish that the act was not one reserved by the Act or 
the rules for the owners in the general meeting. If the management rules reserve a 
power or duty for the general meeting, then the third party will most likely be taken to 
have constructive notice of that fact because the rules, which fulfill the function of a 
constitution establishing how the body corporate functions and operates,524 must be 
                                            
524 Wiljay Investments (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate Bryanston Crescent 1984 2 SA 722 (T) 272D. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 107 
lodged in the deeds registries office, where they can be inspected by the general public, 
to be effective.525 The prescribed management rules in Annexure 8 contained in the 
Regulations made under the STA are published in the Government Gazette and are in 
fact Regulations promulgated in terms of the Act. The doctrine of constructive notice 
applies as the rules are open for public inspection. The doctrine of constructive notice 
therefore operates to protect the body corporate.526  
 
In terms of prescribed management rule 33 the trustees may effect luxurious 
improvements on the common property only with the unanimous consent of the 
members of the body corporate. Therefore, the trustees have no authority to effect such 
improvements without the unanimous consent of the members. Whether such a 
contract, where prerequisites or restrictions imposed by the management rules have not 
been met, is valid or void depends on the legislature’s intention. In terms of prescribed 
management rule 27 the legislature’s intention is clearer in that a contact signed on 
behalf of the body corporate must be signed by two trustees or by a trustee and the 
managing agent in order to be valid and binding on the body corporate. Where a rule is 
less clear, the third party should make enquiries to ensure that all the prescribed 
formalities have been met.  
 
There are also situations where prerequisites or restrictions imposed by “own rules” 
have not been met. Section 35(5)(a) of the STA527 empowers the body corporate to 
replace or amend the prescribed rules and then notify the Registrar of Deeds on the 
prescribed form.528 Changes to the rules take effect only from the date of filing of such 
notification by the Registrar.529 These rules are not published in the Government 
                                            
525 STA ss 11(3)(e) and 35(5). STA s 11(3)(e) has been amended by the substitution of the following paragraph: “a 
certificate by the Chief Ombud stating that the rules contemplated in section 10 of the Sectional Titles Schemes 
Management Act have been approved.” STA s 35(5) is now dealt with in STSMA s 10(5).  
526 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-114. 
527 STSMA s 10(5)(a) states that: “If the management or conduct rules contemplated in subsection (2) are 
substituted, added to, amended or repealed, the developer or the body corporate must lodge with the chief ombud a 
notification in the prescribed form of such substitution, addition, amendment or repeal.” 
528 Form V. 
529 STSMA s 10(5)(c) states that: “If the chief ombud approves the substitution, addition, amendment or repeal of 
the rules for filing, he or she must issue a certificate to that effect. Section 10(5)(d) states that “A substitution, 
addition, amendment or repeal of  rules contemplated in paragraph (a) comes into operation on the date of the 
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Gazette, but are public documents as they are filed with the registrar. An “own rule” can 
for example stipulate that a contract above a certain monetary limit does not bind the 
body corporate, unless it is signed by the managing agent and at least three trustees. 
The third party should not simply accept that the relevant scheme is governed by the 
prescribed management rules, and is expected to be aware of these own rule 
restrictions. The third party should be aware of this possibility and should insist on 
obtaining a copy of the relevant management rules of the scheme. The third party would 
therefore not be able to hold the body corporate liable if only two trustees signed the 
document.530  
 
If the rules provide that an act can be performed by the trustees with the authority of a 
resolution531 of the general meeting and the other party assumes in good faith that the 
trustees have the necessary authority to perform that act, he or she will be able to 
enforce the contract against the body corporate by using the so called Turquand rule,532 
otherwise known as the indoor management rule, if it should subsequently transpire that 
the necessary resolution was never passed and that the general meeting is not 
prepared to ratify the trustees’ action. The ratio for this rule, which applies to 
corporations generally, and is not restricted to commercial companies,533 is that the 
other party cannot be expected to look beyond a corporation’s public documents and to 
investigate its internal management. In Body Corporate of Albany Court and 17 others v 
Nedbank and others534 the court found that there was nothing to indicate that the body 
corporate was precluded from contending by the Act or the rules to delegate the 
function of instructing attorneys in litigation to the trustees. Gautschi AJ stated: 
 
                                                                                                                                             
issuing of a certificate contemplated in paragraph (c) or the opening of a sectional title register for the scheme, 
whichever is the latest.” 
530 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-114. 
531 The type of resolution required is usually immaterial as the Turquand rule will apply unless the resolution is 
required to be registered in the deeds registry and qualifies as a public document for purposes of the doctrine of 
constructive notice; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-114. 
532 This rule acquired its name from the decision in Royal British Bank v Turquand 1856 119 ER 886. 
533 The Mine Worker’s Union v Prinsloo 1948 3 SA 831 (A) 847. 
534 [2008] JOL 21739 (W) para 12. 
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“In transactions with third parties, the trustees act as representatives of the body 
corporate and the body corporate is bound by all actions for which the trustees 
have actual or ostensible authority. In the present case, there is no question of 
actual authority, whether express or implied, and the enquiry is limited to 
ostensible authority. The body corporate is protected by the doctrine of 
constructive notice. If any document to which the public has access would show 
that the trustees would not have the authority to conclude a particular 
transaction, then the third party cannot rely on the ostensible authority of the 
trustees. The third party must ascertain whether the contract or transaction was 
not reserved by the Act or the rules for the owners in general meeting. If, 
however, the transaction is one which the trustees may properly be authorised to 
conclude, and third party assumes in good faith that the trustees were properly 
authorised in general meeting to conclude such transaction, then, by operation of 
the Turquand rule, the body corporate would be precluded from contending that 
the trustees were not authorised. There is nothing before me to indicate that the 
body corporate was precluded by the Act or the rules to delegate the function of 
instructing attorneys in litigation to the trustees. The instructions given by the 
general meeting are not in the public domain and the doctrine of constructive 
notice will not apply. The body corporate is therefore bound by the instructions 
given by the trustees to the attorneys, albeit that the trustees were in fact 
unauthorised to do so.”535 
 
If the general meeting imposes restrictions on the powers of the trustees without 
amending the rules,536 then a person who is unaware of those restrictions will still be 
able to enforce a contract which the trustees entered into while disregarding those 
restrictions by relying on either the Turquand rule or estoppel (ostensible authority), 
depending on the particular circumstances.537 Where a third party contracts with the 
trustees of a body corporate in respect of a matter that clearly falls within the functions 
and powers of the body corporate and in respect of which there are no specific 
                                            
535 [2008] JOL 21739 (W) para 12. 
536 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
537 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-115. 
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requirements or prerequisites prescribed by the Act or in the rules, the third party is 
entitled to assume that the trustees are authorised to enter into the contract and that all 
internal requirements have been imposed by the general meeting in respect of the 
contract have been complied with.  
 
This is an application of the Turquand rule. For example if a contractor enters into a 
contract with the trustees to maintain the lifts of the sectional title scheme, the 
contractor may enforce the contract despite a resolution in a general meeting that the 
agreement must first be approved by the body corporate’s managing agent. A third 
party contracting with a body corporate is not expected to investigate whether any 
internal requirements were imposed by the general meeting and if these requirements 
were met. The protection afforded by this rule would fall away if the third party knew that 
internal formalities had not been complied with, or the circumstances surrounding the 
negotiations are of such a nature that any reasonable person would be placed on guard 
and enquire whether the prerequisites had been complied with, but the third party failed 
to make such enquiries.538  
 
Section 39(1) of the STA empowers the body of trustees, and not individual trustees, to 
perform the powers and duties of the body corporate. In terms of prescribed 
management rule 27 a contract signed on behalf of the body corporate must be signed 
by a trustee and a managing agent, or by two trustees. This does not mean that a 
trustee who signs the contract is authorized to do so as the Act empowers the body of 
trustees, and not individual trustees to perform the functions and powers of the body 
corporate.539 Prescribed management rule 26 empowers the trustees to delegate their 
powers to one or more of the trustees. A third party cannot assume that such a trustee 
has delegated authority to conclude the contract. This is true for the chairperson as 
neither the Act nor the rules give the chairperson any special contracting authority and it 
cannot be assumed there is an implied authority similar to that of a managing director of 
a company. Therefore, the third party dealing with an individual trustee and not the body 
                                            
538 Delport (2006) Obiter 580; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-115. 
539 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
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of trustees should make sure the trustee is acting in terms of a delegated authority or 
that the body of trustees have approved the contract and empowered the individual 
trustee to sign.540 
 
The body corporate or body of trustees may in appropriate circumstances ratify 
contracts entered into with a third party by trustees who did not have the necessary 
authority.541 If the contract is not ratified then the third party may still succeed in holding 
the body corporate to the contract if all the requirements of estoppel are met. A party 
contracting with the trustees of a body corporate should consider adding a clause 
whereby the trustees in question assume personal liability for due performance of the 
body corporate’s obligations in terms of the contract if the body corporate is not bound 
by the contract because the trustees had not been empowered to enter into the contract 
on the body corporate’s behalf.542  
 
These common law doctrines govern the situations where the trustees act in excess of 
their functions or powers and those of the body corporate. Furthermore, the rules make 
specific provision for the situation where one or more trustees have acted and it is 
discovered afterward that the appointment of the trustee or his continuance in office was 
defective. The prescribed management rules provide that any act performed by the 
trustees shall be valid notwithstanding that it is subsequently discovered that there was 
some defect in the appointment or continuance in office of any trustee.543 Third parties 
can therefore accept that trustees are duly appointed. However, a third party seeking to 
rely on the rule to enforce a contract against the body corporate must have acted in 
good faith when entering into the contract because the rule only applies if the defect is 
discovered subsequently, and not if it is already known.544 The third party must not have 
known that the trustee who entered into the contract was not actually a trustee at the 
time.545  
                                            
540 Delport (2006) Obiter 580-581; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-115. 
541 Delport (2006) Obiter 581.  
542 581. 
543 Annexure 8 rule 11.  
544 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-116. 
545 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 37. 
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Where the body corporate is prejudiced as a result of the other party being able to 
enforce a contract against the body corporate that the trustees have concluded in 
excess of their actual authority, the body corporate may, in principle, recover damages 
from the trustees. The claim will be based on breach of the trustees’ fiduciary duty owed 
to the body corporate. Every trustee is entitled to be indemnified out of the funds of the 
body corporate against all costs, losses, expenses and claims which he may incur or 
become liable to by reason of any act done by him in the discharge of his duties unless 
they are caused by his mala fide or grossly negligent act or omission.546 If the general 
meeting wishes to exercise its statutory power in terms of the STA to impose restrictions 
on the powers of the trustees to enter into certain contracts on the behalf of the body 
corporate, it must do so before the trustees enter into the contract.  
 
Torgos (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors Aweigh547 offers a practical example of 
the effects of trustees transacting with third parties to bind the body corporate of a 
sectional title scheme. The applicant (a property developer) and first respondent (two 
trustees of a sectional title body corporate) had concluded an agreement in terms of 
which the first respondent sold and ceded to the applicant its right to extend the 
sectional title scheme. This brought section 25 of the STA into play. Section 25(1) 
empowers a developer of a sectional title scheme to reserve the right to extend the 
scheme from time to time. Section 25(6) stipulates that if no reservation is made or a 
reservation has lapsed for any reason, the right to extend the scheme vests in the body 
corporate with the proviso that the body corporate may only exercise, alienate or 
transfer such right with the written consent of all the members of the body corporate as 
well as the written consent of the mortgagee of each unit in the scheme.  
 
When the applicant sought an order to enforce the agreement, the first respondent 
resisted the application on the ground, inter alia, of the agreement's alleged invalidity. 
The first respondent contended that the written consent of the members of the body 
corporate and mortgagees of units had not been secured prior to the conclusion of the 
                                            
546 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(a). 
547 2006 3 SA 369 (W). 
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sale agreement, as was required in terms of the first proviso to section 25(6), and that 
the agreement was consequently void ab initio. The applicant, in turn, relied on the 
second proviso to section 25(6) in contending that lack of consent did not render the 
agreement invalid as consent was required only prior to registration of transfer and not 
prior to conclusion of the agreement of cession giving rise to the transfer. In the context 
of section 25 “alienate” and “transfer” meant the same thing in that both constituted the 
same act of registration in the deeds office. A mere sale agreement cannot constitute a 
transfer of ownership and was merely the underlying contract which gave the purchaser 
the personal right to claim transfer of ownership. Therefore, the written consent need 
only be obtained before transfer, and not before entering into any agreement to transfer. 
The argument was fortified by the submission that the cession between the applicant 
and the body corporate comprised two parts. The first part created the binding 
obligation and did not require consent of all the members to be binding, while the 
second part was the transfer in the deeds office that did require such consent.  
 
The first respondent’s defence was that the requirement of section 25(6) had not been 
met in that consent had not been obtained prior to conclusion of the sale agreement. At 
a meeting the applicant’s proposed purchase of the right of extension was discussed 
and the body corporate took the decision that the trustees were to appoint a committee 
to negotiate the contract with the applicant. The minutes of a meeting of the body 
corporate showed that the applicant’s offer to purchase was unanimously accepted, but 
the members did not specifically give their written consent.  
 
The court decided that the case raises two issues: firstly the authorization or otherwise 
of those who purported to enter into the agreement on behalf of the body corporate; and 
secondly the applicability of section 25(6) to the agreement and the impact, if any, 
thereon.548 In respect of the first issue the court decided that the applicant had been 
entitled to believe that the trustees who signed the agreement had been authorized to 
do so on behalf of the body corporate. The body corporate was therefore liable on the 
contract even if the signatories had not actually been authorized by the body corporate 
                                            
548 2006 3 SA 369 (W) para 3. 
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to sign the contract since they were ostensibly authorized to do so. The court reasoned 
that the trustees had not been empowered by the body corporate to do more than to 
negotiate, and the conclusion of any resulting agreement was not within its powers. The 
trustees of the body corporate have the power to extend the scheme on behalf of the 
body corporate in terms of section 39(1) of the STA read with prescribed management 
rules 25 and 26, subject to the provisions in section 25(6). The agreement was signed 
by two trustees in compliance with prescribed management rule 27. There was no 
evidence that the powers of the trustees were restricted by any direction given at a 
general meeting of the body corporate. Therefore, the applicant could assume in good 
faith that the trustees had the necessary authority to enter into an agreement on behalf 
of the body corporate for the sale and session of the right of the body corporate to 
extend the sectional title scheme. The Turquand rule was of “equal application” in this 
instance. Third parties who deal with the body corporate cannot be expected to know of 
irregularities that take place in the internal management of the body corporate. There is 
no duty to investigate whether the preliminaries have been observed. Therefore, it could 
be assumed the acts of internal management have actually been performed. The 
applicant was entitled to believe that the trustees who signed the agreement were 
authorized on behalf of the body corporate. The result was that the body corporate was 
bound by all acts of the trustees within the scope of their actual or ostensible authority.  
 
With regard to the second issue the court held that the written consents required by 
section 25(6) must be obtained prior to the agreement constituting an act of alienation 
such as cession. As this was not done in this case the agreement was void and the 
application was dismissed. The court reasoned that the purpose of the proviso to 
section 25(6) of the STA is to protect owners from discovering that the value of their 
undivided share in the common property has been diminished or disappeared by 
cession of the right vested in the body corporate to extend the scheme. Furthermore, 
the proviso aims to protect unit owners from discovering that the number of units 
increased while the expanse of the common property decreased by reason of the 
developer exercising of the right of extension that formerly vested in the body corporate. 
The proviso is for the sole benefit of the owners and mortgagees. The owners of units 
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must be protected against a diminution in the value of their units, whether this value was 
in monetary terms or by way of enjoyment of their units. The mortgagees must be 
protected from the diminution of the value of the security upon which they relied when 
making finance available to the owners of units.  
 
It was held that there was a distinction between the words “alienate” and “transfer” as 
they appeared in the first proviso to section 25(6).549 To “alienate” included the 
dispossession of the right to extend the scheme through a sale and cession, whilst 
“transfer” referred to the formal act required by statute that publicly enacted and 
completed the disposition.550 Neither could be done without the written consent of the 
owners and mortgagees. Section 25(6) permits a body corporate to alienate its right of 
extension only with the necessary consent. It was held that the consents had to be 
provided contemporaneously with the alienation and with the transfer.551 They could not 
be given later.552 Generally speaking consent may be given ex post facto by subsequent 
ratification, but in the context of section 25(6) it is difficult to envisage that consent 
would be given by all the members of the body corporate at some stage after the 
agreement to alienate has been concluded. The court accordingly found that it 
appeared from the wording and objects of the Act and other indications that an 
agreement made contrary to the proviso to section 25(6) was a nullity.553 On the facts, 
that the first respondent had been required to secure the consents prior to conclusion of 
the agreement of cession, which was the act of alienation.554 For these reasons the 
court dismissed the application.555  
4 5 3 Comparative survey 
 
The NSW Strata Schemes Management Act also contains a number of so-called 
“restricted matters” on which the executive committee cannot act or transact without 
                                            
549 2006 3 SA 369 (W) para 84. 
550 Para 89. 
551 Para 92. 
552 Para 104. 
553 Para 101 – 102. 
554 Para 107. 
555 Para112. 
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convening a formal general meeting. These matters are reserved for the general 
meeting and cannot be acted upon by the executive committee (trustees).556 These 
matters definitely fall outside the actual authority of the trustees and would be ultra vires 
if performed by them. The NSW Strata Schemes Management Act also provides that a 
proposed executive committee decision may be vetoed by a written notice to the 
secretary of the executive committee by one or more owners, the sum of whose unit 
entitlements exceeds one-third of the aggregate unit entitlement, that they oppose a 
particular decision of the executive committee.557 The provision is apparently intended 
to enable owners to take control out of the hands of the executive committee if they are 
opposed to the executive committee handling certain matters. In view of certain 
practical difficulties, the provision is unlikely to be used much in practice. 
 
Similar to the South African provision that validates an act by a trustee where there is 
some defect in the trustees appointment,558 an act or proceeding of an executive 
committee in New South Wales done in good faith is regarded as valid if taken at a 
properly constituted executive committee meeting even though there was a vacancy in 
the executive committee, or a defect in the appointment, or disqualification of a member 
of the executive committee when the act or proceeding was done, taken or 
commenced.559 
 
In New South Wales the secretary is the chief administrative officer, but unlike the 
secretary of a company he or she has no inherent power to contractually bind the 
owners corporation. The secretary’s signature will only contractually bind the owners 
corporation if a resolution conferring such power on him or her has been passed by the 
owners corporation or its executive committee. Third parties dealing with the secretary 
must be aware whether he or she has actual or apparent authority to enter into 
contracts on the owners corporation’s behalf. The owners corporation may not be bound 
by the contract if it is entered into by a secretary who lacks this necessary authority. Any 
                                            
556 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(2)(a) and 21(2)(b). 
557 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 11(2). 
558 Annexure 8 rule 11.  
559 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 17. 
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act done by a secretary without authority may be saved from invalidity by subsequent 
ratification by the general meeting or the executive committee.560  
 
In Singapore the secretary has no inherent power to contractually bind the management 
corporation, unless a resolution has been passed by the corporation or its council 
conferring this power on the secretary. Any unauthorized act by the secretary is likely to 
be validated by subsequent ratification by the corporation or its council. Keang Sood 
recommends that the resolution be passed by the corporation or its council to confer the 
ability on the secretary to act to avoid the secretary’s personal liability to third parties in 
non-routine matters.561  
4 6 Conclusion 
 
From the above discussion I have shown that trustees are democratically elected to the 
position by the owners in the general meeting, and hold office as the executive 
functionaries and owe the body corporate a fiduciary duty. Although the trustees owe a 
fiduciary duty of care to the body corporate, the trustees will only incur liability if they 
commit mala fide or grossly negligent acts in the exercise of their powers or the 
performance of their functions and duties.562 This is far from the trustees being obliged 
to exercise the utmost good faith and a high degree of care and skill. In the United 
States the council members (trustees) who are appointed by the developer hold their 
office as fiduciaries of the owners, whereas only ordinary and reasonable care is 
required from board members elected by the owners.563 In Singapore a council member 
is under a duty at all times to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of 
his office.564 Therefore the STA, BMSMA and the UCIOA impose a lower standard of 
duty of care on the trustees, executive council and executive board. In holding the 
trustees liable only for gross negligence, South African law also purports to encourage 
unit owners to serve as trustees. In this way the legislator tried to strike a balance 
                                            
560 Ilkin NSW Strata 106. 
561 Keang Sood Strata Title 319. 
562 Annexure 8 rule 12. 
563 UCIOA § 3-103(a). 
564 BMSMA s 61(1). 
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between making the office of the trustee more attractive and ensuring the efficient 
functioning and management of the scheme by ensuring some form of liability for 
underperformance of the task.  
 
There should be a difference in the standard of care required between owner trustees 
and outsider trustees. For owner trustees a lower standard of care is suitable because 
they are probably not remunerated for the duties and powers they perform. For outside 
experienced professionals who serve as trustees an ordinary duty of care should apply 
since they are normally remunerated for their service.565 Van der Merwe agrees that 
such a lenient responsibility is appropriate for trustees of a sectional title scheme who 
perform their tasks without remuneration.566 That being said he qualifies the submission 
by stating that trustees, whether owners or outsiders, who receive remuneration for 
managing the scheme should be held liable if they do not exercise ordinary care and 
skill in conducting the affairs of the body corporate. This is also presumably the 
rationale behind the rule that determines that the indemnification does not apply to the 
managing agent that is appointed by the body corporate.567 I do not therefore advocate 
the insertion of a Singapore provision that a committee member who breaches any 
obligations is also guilty of an offence with a monetary penalty on conviction or 
imprisonment or both. This places too high a burden and would deter persons from 
standing for election. A better option would be to follow the New South Wales provisions 
that do not impose monetary penalties on an office bearer. However, an office bearer 
who continues to breach the Act’s provisions may become subject to an Adjudicator’s 
order. Failure to comply with the Adjudicator’s order could lead to proceedings being 
commenced at the Tribunal where the defaulting office member could be personally 
liable for a monetary penalty for which he or she cannot seek indemnity from the owners 
corporation.568 I suggest that in South Africa, if a trustee continues to breach his or her 
obligations under the STA or the STSMA, an ombudsman under the CSOS should order 
that he or she should be personally liable for a monetary penalty. 
                                            
565 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 147. 
566 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-120. 
567 Annexure 8 rule 12(2); Botha (2008) Property Law Digest 7. 
568 Ilkin NSW Strata 108. 
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This fiduciary relationship does require that the trustee must act honestly and in good 
faith towards the body corporate; must act positively in the interest and for the benefit of 
the body corporate and must not act without or exceed his or her powers of 
management and representation.569 Furthermore, a trustee must avoid any material 
conflict between his or her own interests and the interests of the body corporate. The 
trustee must not receive any personal economic benefit, direct or indirect, from the body 
corporate or from any other person. Trustees are further obliged to notify all the other 
trustees of the nature and extent of any direct or indirect material interest which he or 
she may have in any contract of the body corporate as soon as such trustee becomes 
aware of such interest. This is supplemented by the rule that a trustee is disqualified 
from voting in respect of any contract, or any litigation or proposed itigation with the 
body corporate, by virtue of any interest he may have therein.570 Where the trustee 
breaches the fiduciary duty he or she will then be liable to the body corporate for any 
loss suffered or economic benefit received.  
 
When the trustees transact with third parties the trustees act in their capacity as 
executive organ of the body corporate and as agents of the body corporate. This has 
the result that the body corporate is bound by all the acts performed by the trustees 
within the scope of their actual or ostensible authority. When a third party seeks to have 
a contract against the body corporate enforced which he or she contends was entered 
into by the trustees on its behalf, the third party must first establish that the body 
corporate had the capacity to enter into the contract because any act performed by the 
trustees in excess of the capacity of the body corporate is ultra vires and void. The third 
party must secondly establish that the act was not one reserved by the Act or the rules 
for the owners in the general meeting. The body corporate may, by means of a 
resolution passed at a general meeting, confer the power to sign any contract or 
document on behalf of the body corporate. I recommend that the body corporate pass a 
resolution to give the trustee contractual power to enter into contracts with third parties 
as is done in New South Wales and Singapore. The resolution can set out the names of 
                                            
569 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Liability of trustees” (January 2011) 6-1 Paddocks Press Newsletter 6.  
570 Annexure 8 rule 23. 
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trustees who may contractually bind the body corporate; how many trustees are 
required to sign the contract; whether the managing agent is also required to sign the 
contract; what preliminaries are required; any monetary restrictions and the types of 
contracts that the trustee may not enter into. In this way the third party is protected from 
entering into contracts with unauthorized trustees simply by checking the resolution. 
The trustees will also be protected from being held personally liable on the contract with 
the third party as their authorization will be based on the resolution passed by the body 
corporate. The third party will be taken to have constructive notice of that fact as the 
resolution will be open for public inspection. The doctrine of constructive notice 
therefore operates to protect the body corporate. This will avoid the necessity for third 
parties to inspect the management rules or the scheme’s own rules. The actual 
authority of the trustee will be held in one place, namely the resolution adopted by the 
body corporate. The third party will then not need to rely on the Turquand rule to 
enforce the contract as the resolution granting the trustee actual authority to bind the 
body corporate will serve as proof of authorization. The third party will then not have to 
look beyond a corporation’s public documents and to investigate its internal 
management. The third party will then know which trustee has authority to bind the body 
corporate.  
 
The body corporate or body of trustees may still in appropriate circumstances ratify 
contracts entered into with a third party by trustees who did not have the necessary 
authority, or the third party may succeed in holding the body corporate to the contract if 
all the requirements of estoppel are met. A party contracting with the trustees of a body 
corporate should consider adding a clause whereby the trustees in question assume 
personal liability for due performance of the body corporate’s obligations in terms of the 
contract if the body corporate is not bound by the contract because the trustees had not 
been empowered to enter into the contract on the body corporate’s behalf.571 
Furthermore, the prescribed management rules in Annexure 8 provide that any act 
performed by the trustees shall be valid notwithstanding that it is subsequently 
discovered that there was some defect in the appointment or continuance in office of 
                                            
571 Delport (2006) Obiter 581. 
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any trustee.572 Third parties can therefore accept that trustees are duly appointed. The 
third party must not have known that the trustee who entered into the contract was not 
actually a trustee at the time.573 Where the body corporate is prejudiced as a result of 
the other party being able to enforce a contract against the body corporate that the 
trustees have concluded in excess of their actual authority, the body corporate may, in 
principle, recover damages from the trustees based on the breach of the trustees’ 
fiduciary duty. However, this is negated by the fact that every trustee is entitled to be 
indemnified out of the funds of the body corporate against all costs, losses, expenses 
and claims which he may incur or become liable to by reason of any act done by him in 
the discharge of his duties, unless they are caused by his mala fide or grossly negligent 
act or omission.574  
 
Torgos (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors Aweigh575 concerned the situation where 
the STA and the rules empowered the trustees to bind the body corporate of a sectional 
title scheme, provided that certain preliminaries were complied with. The court decided 
that in such a case, the third party dealing with the trustees is not obliged to investigate 
if the preliminaries have actually been observed, and can assume that they have in fact 
been complied with. The third party may hold the body corporate to the contract even 
though the preliminaries were not met.576 However, a third party who entered into a 
contract with the trustees to purchase the body corporate’s right to extend the sectional 
title scheme could not assume that all the written consents required for the sale in terms 
of section 25 of the STA had in fact been obtained. If these written consents had not 
been obtained the sale agreement entered into by the trustees is void. This created 
confusion and the question was raised as to why the third parties could not assume that 
the preliminaries referred to in section 25 had been observed.  
 
This confusion could be avoided if an ordinary resolution, by majority vote of the body 
corporate, is passed at the annual general meeting where the trustees are elected. This 
                                            
572 Annexure 8 rule 11.  
573 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 37. 
574 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(a). 
575 2006 3 SA 369 (W). 
576 Delport (2006) Obiter 571. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 122 
ordinary resolution should set out which trustee will have actual authorization to bind the 
body corporate, and that the trustee who has such authorization will observe the 
required preliminaries in entering the contract. The preliminaries include the 
requirement that two trustees or one trustee and the managing agent must sign the 
contract;577 and that the trustees will not bind the body corporate in a contract with a 
financial responsibility that will exceed the amount approved by the body corporate; and 
that the trustees have not exceeded their powers by entering into a contract that is in 
conflict with a direction or restriction of the body corporate578 and that the trustees have 
not entered into a contract that is prohibited in terms of the legislation or rules, such as 
making a loan on behalf of the body corporate to owners or to themselves579 and that 
the trustee has declared the nature and extent of any direct or indirect material interest 
in the contract to the trustees.580 It is important that trustees understand that they make 
decisions as a board, and that no single trustee will bind the body corporate in a 
contract with a third party until such time that the board of trustees have discuseed it 
and decided to enter into the contract by majority vote.581 A trustee is disqualified from 
voting in respect of any contract or proposed contract with the body corporate by virtue 
of any interest he may have therein. The trustee with a direct or indirect interest should 
excuse themself from the room while the trustees vote on the contract. The trustees 
must keep minutes of their proceedings and of all meetings of the body corporate,582 
and must include all resolutions in this minute book.583 Any third party contracting with 
the body corporate can then request the ordinary resolution of the body corporate as 
well as the trustee resolution as evidence of the trustees’ authority to bind the body 
corporate. 
 
 
                                            
577 Annexure 8 rule 27. 
578 STA s 39(1). 
579 Annexure 8 rule 26(2). 
580 STA s 40(2)(b)(ii) and Annexure 8 rule 23. 
581 Annexure 8 rule 22. 
582 Annexure 8 rules 34(1)(a) and (b). 
583 Annexure 8 rules 34(1)(c). 
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Chapter 5: Powers and duties of the trustees 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will focus on the division of powers between the trustees and the 
general meeting. I will then outline the specific powers and duties granted to trustees in 
terms of the Act and the prescribed management rules. Once again each topic will 
contain comparative material on how other jurisdictions deal with the particular matter 
concerned.  
5 2 Division of powers between the trustees and the general meeting 
5 2 1 The South African position 
 
In the attempt to define the division of powers between the trustees and the body 
corporate acting through its main organ, the general meeting, I will examine the effect of 
section 39 of the STA. This provision confers the powers and duties of the body 
corporate on the trustees subject to the provisions of the Act, the rules and any 
restriction imposed or direction given at a general meeting of the owners.584 In what 
follows I will consider each of these restrictions in turn. 
 
In the first place the Act confers the powers and duties of the body corporate on the 
trustees subject, in the first place, to the provisions of the Act. The STA reserves certain 
matters that fundamentally affect the scheme for the general meeting. Examples include 
the alienation and letting of common property;585 the extension of sections and the 
scheme586 and changes to owners’ voting rights or to the basis on which they contribute 
to expenditure.587 Decisions regarding the termination of the scheme must be taken 
either by the general meeting or by the court.588 Finally, only the general meeting can 
                                            
584 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]; also expressly incorporated in Annexure 8 rule 25. 
585 STA s 17.  
586 STA ss 24-26. 
587 STA s 32(4) [STSMA s 11(2)]. 
588 STA ss 48 and 49 [STSMA s 17]. 
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substitute, add to, amend, repeal or supplement the prescribed management and 
conduct rules of Annexure 8 or 9 respectively.589 It is for this reason that the general 
meeting is seen as the legislative organ of the body corporate. 
 
Secondly, the prescribed management rules in Annexure 8 contained in the Regulations 
made under the STA give certain powers to the general meeting, and also place 
restrictions on the powers of the trustees.590 For example the general meeting has the 
power to elect trustees, to remove them from office and to replace trustees who cease 
to hold office.591 The general meeting may also impose restrictions on the ability of the 
trustees to delegate their powers and functions to one or more of their number.592 The 
trustees are expressly forbidden from making loans on behalf of the body corporate to 
themselves or to sectional owners.593 The trustees must also account for their 
administration of the scheme to the general meeting of the body corporate.594 
 
Finally, the powers of the trustees are also subject to any restriction imposed or 
direction given at a general meeting. The members of the body corporate, by majority 
vote, at the general meeting can therefore place restrictions on or direct the actions of 
the trustees. These decisions must be minuted and kept on permanent record.595 The 
imposing of restrictions or giving of directions is a compulsory item of business that 
must be dealt with at each annual general meeting.596 The restrictions and directions 
can be given or imposed at any general meeting, but must be considered at each 
annual general meeting.  
 
An example of a restriction is where the owners in the general meeting resolve that the 
trustees may not borrow or spend more than a specified amount of money without first 
consulting with and obtaining the approval of the body corporate. An example of a 
                                            
589 STA s 35(2)(a) and (b) [STSMA s 10(2)(a) and (b)]. 
590 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-68. 
591 Annexure 8 rules 6, 13(e) and 14. 
592 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
593 Annexure 8 rule 26(2). 
594 Annexure 8 rule 36-38. 
595 Annexure 8 rule 34. 
596 Annexure 8 rule 56(g). 
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direction is where the owners in the general meeting instruct the trustees to display 
copies of draft minutes of their meetings on the scheme’s notice board as soon as they 
are prepared.597  
 
North Global Properties (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of the Sunrise Beach Scheme598 
provides an example of a scheme rule that prohibited the trustees from spending more 
than R50 000 without first obtaining the prior consent of the body corporate. The 
scheme’s developer disputed the competence of the trustees to bring an appeal against 
a previous order for the appointment of an administrator, as the trustees needed a 
resolution to spend more than R50 000. The developer invoked High Court rule 7(1)599 
to dispute the authority of the attorneys acting for the trustees, and requested the 
trustees deliver a power of attorney supported by a resolution of the body corporate. 
The trustees filed a power of attorney of the body corporate, but it was only supported 
by a resolution of the trustees. The court found that the court costs would definitely 
exceed the trustees’ spending limit of R50 000, and therefore decided that the trustees 
did not have authority to bind the members of the body corporate without their express 
mandate to incur expenses.600 To do so would have meant that the trustees would have 
acted ultra vires.601 
 
The body corporate may therefore decide that certain matters or classes of matters can 
only be decided by the general meeting.602 An important question is whether a simple 
majority at a general meeting of owners can or cannot give binding directives to the 
trustees as to how they must exercise powers vested in them by the Act or the rules. 
The management of the scheme is vested in the trustees, and they cannot perform that 
task effectively if they must submit to the directives by a simple majority at a general 
meeting. However, there is clear wording in both these sections that the trustees are 
                                            
597 J Paddock “Section 39(1) – The imposition of owner directions and restrictions on trustees” (January 2010) 5-1 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
598 Case no.12465/2011 KZD. 
599 The aim of this rule is to prevent a litigant from repudiating the outcome of legal procceedings by denying its 
authority to initiate the legal proceedings; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 17-70. 
600 Case no.12465/2011 KZD para 14. 
601 Paras 11-13. 
602 J Van der Walt “The powers of trustees” (January 2008) 3-1 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 126 
subject to directives at the general meeting. Van der Merwe explains that a resolution 
adopted by a simple majority at a general meeting binds the trustees due to the fact that 
the body corporate’s task is to manage the scheme on behalf of the owners. Therefore, 
the majority of those owners should be entitled to give binding directives as to how the 
scheme should be managed. Furthermore, although not expressly stated in section 
39(1), it is evident that the majority of the owners cannot give binding directives to the 
trustees that are contrary to the Act or the rules of the scheme.603 
 
In terms of section 39(1) of the STA604 the trustees have all the powers not allocated to 
the general meeting. The general meeting also has certain inherent or residual powers. 
If the trustees refuse or are unable to exercise powers conferred on them then the 
general meeting may exercise those powers.605 As I have already discussed in chapter 
4 the general meeting can ratify an action by trustees who exceed their powers in 
performing any act, provided that such an act is within the competence of the body 
corporate itself.606  
 
The general meeting retains control over the trustees because it alone can perform 
certain functions reserved by the Act and rules; it retains residual functions; it can elect 
and remove the trustees from office and give them binding directives and restrictions as 
to how they must exercise their powers. The general meeting sets the policy and the 
trustees carry out the policy. Only the owners in the general meeting can make or 
amend the rules for the scheme. The management rules can be amended by a 
uninamous resolution of the body corporate, while the conduct rules can be amended 
by a special resolution of the body corporate.607 Since the owners in the general 
meeting have the final say in any disagreement with the trustees, the owners are the 
“masters” of the body corporate while the trustees are the “servants” of the body 
corporate in this context.608  
                                            
603 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-71. 
604 STSMA s 7(1). 
605 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-72. 
606 14-72. 
607 STA s 35(2). 
608 G Paddock “Meetings in sectional title schemes” (March 2009) 4-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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The trustees, on the other hand, have the executive function and, subject to all the 
restrictions listed already, have wide powers to perform the daily management tasks 
necessary to keep the scheme going during the period between annual general 
meetings. The trustees may also delegate some of their powers, subject to restrictions 
imposed by the rules and the general meeting.609 
5 3 2 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales an owners corporation has the principal responsibility for the 
management of the scheme.610 The general meeting may continue to exercise all or any 
of its powers, authorities, duties and functions as conferred or imposed by the Act or by-
laws, despite the existence of the executive committee, and presumably despite any 
decision made by the executive committee.611  
 
The executive committee can exercise all the powers of the owners corporation not 
reserved to the owners corporation in general meeting. In Jacklin v The Proprietors – 
Strata Plan No 2795612 the Supreme Court stated:  
 
“Subject to certain restrictions, the duties and powers of the owners corporation 
in relation to the administration, maintenance and repair of the common property 
may, under both Acts, be exercised by the Council of the owners corporation.”613  
 
The restrictions on the wide powers of the executive committee pertain to matters that 
fall into three restricted classes. The classes are restricted matters;614 removal of 
executive power by resolution of the owners corporation615 and veto of a proposed 
executive committee decision.616  
 
                                            
609 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-72. 
610 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 8(2). 
611 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(3). 
612 [1975] 1 NSWLR 15; (1975) NSW Titles Cases 30-014 at 50,172. 
613 Ilkin NSW Strata 118. 
614 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(2)(a).  
615 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(2)(b). 
616 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 11(2). 
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Executive committee decisions made in respect of matters not within these three 
restricted classes have the same status as decisions of the owners corporation.617 
Decisions on any matter within any of these three restricted classes, are unenforceable 
or ultra vires, by or against the owners corporation. If the executive committee attempts 
to execute a decision on a matter within any of the above three restricted classes, it 
may be restrained by an order issued by an Adjudicator618 or by the Supreme Court. 
 
The term “restricted matter” commonly refers to any matter that requires either a 
unanimous, special or ordinary resolution under the Act or by-laws to be effective and 
matters that are taken out of the competence of the executive committee by a resolution 
reserving those matters for decision by the general meeting. To prevent an executive 
committee from making a decision on a restricted matter, the veto procedure could be 
followed or an injunctive type of relief could be sought.  
 
The second restricted class relates to the removal of the executive committee’s power 
to make certain decisions. Section 21(2)(b) allows the owners corporation to pass an 
ordinary resolution to remove the executive committee’s power to make decisions on 
specific matters or classes of matters. Once such a resolution has been passed, it 
remains effective until rescinded or altered by the owners corporation passing an 
ordinary resolution to that effect. The difficulty in locating such resolutions undermines 
the usefulness and application of this restriction. Minute books may be lost or 
destroyed, and if they exist, a meticulous and lengthy search may be required to find the 
resolution in question. Furthermore, minute books are required to be kept for only five 
years. Regrettably the relevant provision619 does not require the strata roll to record 
such resolutions as in the case of by-laws. A further complication is that whereas by-
laws are adopted by special resolution, these section 21(2)(b) resolutions are scattered 
amongst the numerous resolutions adopted by mere majority vote. Be that as it may, 
the same veto procedure and injunctive type of relief are available to prevent an 
executive committee from making a decision on a matter removed in terms of a section 
                                            
617 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(1). 
618 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 138, 153 or 170. 
619 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 96. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 129 
21(2)(b) resolution. Although this restricted class is a mechanism to limit the powers of 
the executive committee, it has been warned that an over-reliance thereon would risk 
defeating the function of the executive committee in assisting the owners corporation in 
the management of the scheme.620  
 
The third restricted class relates to the owners’ power to veto a proposed decision of the 
executive committee on a particular matter. Clause 11(2) of schedule 3 enables the 
owners to take a proposed decision out of the executive committee’s hands and render 
it of no force and effect. In terms of the schedule to the Act owners whose unit 
entitlements exceed one-third of the aggregate unit entitlement of the scheme may, 
without any justification for their action,621 personally hand over a written notice 
registering their opposition to the proposed decision to the secretary prior to an 
executive committee meeting.622 The owners do not need to justify their use of this veto. 
Once received, details of the veto notice, including the time and date of delivery, must 
be recorded by the secretary.623 The handing over of a valid notice does not mean that 
the matter must automatically be referred to a general meeting or that the secretary 
must convene one. If the executive committee, despite the opposing veto notice, still 
goes ahead with taking the decision, an eligible applicant can seek an interim order 
from an Adjudicator to quash the decision, or an owner may requisition an extraordinary 
general meeting to pass a resolution to rescind the committee resolution. Some owners 
misuse these veto notices to prohibit all future executive committee decisions, even 
where specific matters are yet to arise for consideration. However, veto notices should 
be only be used after meeting notices have been affixed to noticeboards or given to 
owners and executive committee members.624  
 
In addition to the three classes of restrictions on the powers of the executive committee, 
the owners corporation’s prevailing management powers entitles it in general meeting to 
overrule any decision of the executive committee by rescinding, varying or adopting a 
                                            
620 Ilkin NSW Strata 113. 
621 114. 
622 NSW Strata Management Act, sch 3, cl 11(2). 
623 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 101(a). 
624 Ilkin NSW Strata 114. 
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resolution inconsistent with the executive committee’s decision.625 The only exception is 
when work has been undertaken, an article has been purchased or another person to 
whom the decision has been communicated has acted on the basis of the executive 
committee’s decision. That decision cannot be revoked by the owners corporation in 
general meeting. If the executive committee has already implemented the decision 
when the owners corporation passes the rescinding resolution an Adjudicator 
possesses some overriding power to make an order,626 which is deemed to be a 
resolution of the owners corporation.627  
 
On the analogy of company law cases it is likely that the owners corporation in a 
general meeting can validate an executive committee’s procedural irregularities628 such 
as a lack of quorum or an improperly appointed committee member, provided the 
validation is not beyond the owner corporation’s power.629 It can further retrospectively 
ratify decisions of the executive committee if the decisions are beyond the executive 
committee’s power, but within the owners corporation’s competence.630 If a section of 
the Act expressly confers a power specifically on the executive committee, then the 
owners corporation in the general meeting cannot exercise that power.631 If the 
executive committee fails to exercise the power expressly conferred on it then the 
owners corporation in the general meeting could pass an ordinary resolution requiring 
the executive committee to exercise the power, or it could seek an order from an 
Adjudicator directing the executive committee to exercise the power.632 
 
In Singapore the management corporation may, in a general meeting, continue to 
exercise or perform all or any of the powers, duties and functions conferred or imposed 
on the management corporation by the Act or the by-laws, even though a council holds 
                                            
625 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 21(4). 
626 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 142 and s 143. 
627 NSW Wales Strata Schemes Management Act s 207. 
628 Bamford v Bamford [1970] 1 Ch 212. 
629 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 17. 
630 Grant v United Kingdom Switcback Railways Co (1889) 40 Ch D 135; Irvine v Union Bank of Australia (1877) 2 
App Cas 366. 
631 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 32(2) and 105. 
632 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138. 
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office.633 In principle all decisions of the council are regarded as the decision of the 
management corporation, except for decisions on so-called “restricted matters.”634 A 
restricted matter is any matter on which a decision, in terms of the BMSMA or the by-
laws, may only be made by the management corporation in general meeting by a 
unanimous, special, 90% or comprehensive resolution, or by consensus or in a general 
meeting, and any matter which falls within the sole competence of the management 
corporation to determine in a general meeting and which is so specified in a resolution 
of the corporation passed for such purpose.635 The only exception is that the council is 
competent to make a decision on a restricted matter if the general meeting has 
determined that a particular restricted matter must be decided at a council meeting.636  
 
In addition to the limitation placed on the council to make decisions on restricted 
matters, the management corporation may in general meeting remove from their council 
the power to make decisions on other specific matters or class of matters by reserving 
these matters to the corporation in a general meeting.637 The BMSMA furthermore 
contains the same veto procedure that we encountered in the New South Wales 
legislation. Thus if the secretary, prior to a decision being taken by the council, receives 
a written notice from proprietors (owners) representing a one third majority of the share 
values in the scheme, opposing a particular proposed decision, any decision on this 
matter made by the council has no force and effect, and cannot be enforced against the 
management corporation. 638   
 
The effect of such a notice was considered in Lark Lounge & Nite Club Pte Ltd v MCST 
Plan No 1420 (Balestier Point).639 The relevant provision in this case was section 63(3) 
of the LTSA, which is materially similar to section 58(3) of the BMSMA. The plaintiff had 
purchased four lots in the strata development from the management corporation 
(defendant) to be used as a showroom and amusement centre. The plaintiff sought the 
                                            
633 BMSMA s 58(2). 
634 BMSMA s 58(1). 
635 BMSMA ss 58(4)(a) and (b) and 59. 
636 BMSMA s 58(4)(a). 
637 BMSMA s 59. 
638 BMSMA s 58(3). 
639 [1998] 2 SLR 222. 
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defendant’s approval to use the lots instead as a karaoke and music lounge before 
submitting an application to the Urban and Redevelopment Authority for the proposed 
change of use. In view of the history of violence, gang clashes and vandalism prevalent 
in existing karaoke lounges in the same scheme, well over one third of the proprietors of 
the lots served the defendant’s council with a written notice opposing the plaintiff’s 
application for a change of use. The plaintiff commenced proceedings for a declaration 
that the said notice amounted to obstructive and oppressive conduct on the part of the 
proprietors concerned towards another proprietor and was an abuse of the law and 
accordingly null and void. In deciding against the plaintiff, the judge observed that 
section 63(3) of the LTSA was clear on the effect of such a notice. He reasoned that 
since the notice has been served on the council, the council was not competent to make 
any decision on the plaintiff’s application. The notice had the effect of taking the matter 
out of the hands of the council. The judge also remarked that the opposition of the 
proprietors concerned to another karaoke lounge being set up was not without good 
reason.640 Implicit in the court’s decision is that service of such notice must be for a 
good reason having regard to the particular circumstances of the development in 
question. This is especially the case where the interest of another subsidiary proprietor 
would be affected. It is likely that a notice served mala fide or in bad faith will be ruled 
null and void and of no effect by the court. 
 
In Malaysia the council is also not entitled to make a decision that may only be made by 
the management corporation pursuant to a unanimous, special or ordinary resolution 
passed at a general meeting of proprietors. The council is also subject to any restriction 
imposed or direction given by the management corporation at a general meeting.641 
Although the management corporation in a general meeting can overrule a properly 
made decision of the council by rescinding or varying it, it would appear that such a 
council decision may not be revoked after it has been put into effect, such as where an 
item has been purchased or the work has been undertaken.  
                                            
640 [1998] 2 SLR 222 230. 
641 Strata Titles Act s 39(4); Sarawak Ordinance s 23(3); Sabah Enactment s 14(3). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 133 
Under the UCIOA of the United States the executive board is entitled in principle to 
exercise all the powers and functions of the condominium association subject to various 
restrictions. The executive board may always act on behalf of the association except 
when prevented from doing so in the declaration, the by-laws or in other provisions of 
the Act.642 An executive board is expressly restricted from amending a declaration or 
determining the board members’ qualifications, powers, duties and terms of office and 
from dealing with the winding down of a condominium.643 
5 3 Specific powers and duties (functions) of trustees 
5 3 1 Introduction 
 
As I have already explained, the trustees make the day-to-day decisions on behalf of all 
owners, and do not have to meet with the owners for every decision that has to be 
taken. They do not need to consult with the owners before raising a special levy to fund 
unbudgeted repairs of the common property.644 The trustees are also entitled to enter 
into short-term rental agreements with owners to rent out a part of the common property 
for up to ten years.645 Trustees can furthermore appoint employees, for example a 
gardener, caretaker646 or managing agent.647 The trustees may also initiate a process to 
obtain approval of non-luxurious improvements to the common property, such as the 
installation of security fences, but if any owner asks for a meeting to discuss the issues 
then the trustees can only proceed if the meeting approves the proposals by special 
resolution.648 In what follows I will examine some of the most important powers and 
duties of the trustees. 
 
                                            
642 UCIOA § 3-103(a). 
643 UCIOA § 3-103(b). 
644 Annexure 8 rule 31. 
645 STA s 38. 
646 Annexure 8 rule 26. 
647 Annexure 8 rule 46. 
648 Annexure 8 rule 33; Van der Walt (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
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5 3 2 The South African position 
5 3 2 1 Specific powers conferred on trustees 
 
Subject to any restriction imposed or direction given by the general meeting of the body 
corporate, the prescribed management rules confer four powers specifically on the 
trustees. The first is the power to appoint for and on behalf of the body corporate such 
agents and employees as they deem fit in connection with the control, management and 
administration of the common property,649 and the exercise and performance of any or 
all of the powers and duties of the body corporate.650 The second is the power to 
delegate to one or more of the trustees such of their powers and duties as they deem fit, 
including the power to revoke that delegation at any time.651 The third is the power to 
sign instruments on behalf of the body corporate.652 The final power is to give written 
consent for certain activities concerning sections or the common property.653 In what 
follows I shall discuss each of these powers in turn. 
 
The trustees’ power to appoint agents and employees includes the appointment of all 
kinds of agents and employees including cleaning staff and maintenance firms and even 
managing agents. The last part of the rule empowers the trustees to appoint an 
employee or managing agent in connection with the exercise and performance of any or 
all powers and duties of the body corporate.654  
 
Applied to a managing agent, this seems to imply that all duties, functions and powers 
of the body corporate may be delegated to a managing agent. This interpretation is 
obviously too wide and must be interpreted and applied restrictively.655 The legislation 
makes it clear that the power to appoint a managing agent, determine the levies of the 
scheme or to take a unanimous resolution may not be delegated to the managing agent. 
                                            
649 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(a)(i). 
650 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(a)(ii). 
651 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
652 Annexure 8 rule 27. 
653 Pienaar Sectional Titles 181. 
654 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(a)(ii).  
655 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-138; T Maree “Managing agents: some do’s and don’ts” (December 2010) 38 
MCS Courier 3. 
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The trustees can further not delegate powers that they do not possess themselves. The 
managing agent can be delegated the power to sign the levy clearance certificate.656 All 
of the functions and powers should be assessed according to their own nature before it 
can be determined whether they are capable of being delegated or not. 
 
The trustees’ power to delegate includes the power to appoint one of their members as 
treasurer or secretary or some similar position in the internal management of the board 
of trustees. It may also involve designating one of their members to represent the body 
corporate in instituting or defending a court action; settling an insurance claim; 
negotiating with the local authority; negotiating and signing a contract or in some other 
role involving dealings with outsiders.657 
 
The body corporate is a legal entity and not a natural person capable of signing 
instruments and documents and must rely on a duly authorized representative in this 
regard. Prescribed management rule 27 sets out who is authorized to sign instruments 
on the body corporate’s behalf. The rule provides that no instrument signed on behalf of 
the body corporate, shall be valid and binding unless it is signed by a trustee and the 
managing agent or by two trustees or, in the case of a certificate issued in terms of 
section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the STA, by two trustees or the managing agent.658 In Torgos 
(Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors Aweigh and Another659 it was shown that a 
cheque must be signed by a trustee and the managing agent or by two trustees. The 
legislative rationale for making it compulsory for two natural persons to sign body 
corporate instruments or documents is referred to as the four eyes principle by Van der 
Merwe.660 The introduction of the four-eyes principle avoids abuse by a single trustee 
signing a document to the detriment of the body corporate. It imposes a check on each 
trustees’ motivation for signing a particular instrument or document.661 
 
                                            
656 STA s 15B(3)(i)(aa). 
657 Van der Merwe 14-138. 
658 Annexure 8 rule 27. 
659 2006 3 SA 369 (W) paras 64 and 65. 
660 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-139.  
661 14-139. 
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A certificate that all money due to the body corporate by the transferor in respect of a 
unit which is to be transferred has been paid, or that provision has been made to the 
satisfaction of the body corporate for the payment thereof, must be signed by two 
trustees or the managing agent.662 The purpose of this provision is to prevent a trustee 
who wants to sell his unit from acting in bad faith and signing the certificate even though 
levies on his or her unit are still outstanding. The reason why managing agents are 
allowed to sign levy clearance certificates on their own is probably because they are 
generally independent professionals with no personal interest in the scheme.663 
However, the amended prescribed management rule 5 has made it possible for a 
managing agent to own a unit in a scheme and to act as trustee for that scheme. This 
creates the possibility for such a managing agent to act in bad faith and to sign his own 
levy clearance certificate despite outstanding levies on his or her own unit. When 
prescribed management rule 5 was amended the legislature should have amended 
prescribed management rule 27 to disallow a managing agent from signing a clearance 
certificate for his or her own unit.  
 
The heading of prescribed management rule 27 refers to the signing of “instruments.” 
The rule is interpreted widely to include negotiable instruments, legal instruments and 
other less formal documents. The word “instrument” presumably includes negotiable 
instruments such as bills of exchange, promissory notes, insurance claims,664 cheques, 
as well as powers of attorney, contracts of employment and other legal documents. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that although the headnote of prescribed 
management rule 27 refers to the signing of instruments, the wording of the actual rule 
refers to the signing of documents.  
 
A commentator has stated that fact that the managing agent is not authorized to sign a 
cheque drawn on the banking account of the body corporate without being co-signed by 
a trustee is incomplete in view of the provision of prescribed management rule 42 which 
stipulates that the trustees may authorize the managing agent to administer and operate 
                                            
662 Annexure 8 rule 27 read with STA s 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa). 
663 J Paddock “Signing body corporate documents” (December 2010) 5-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
664 M Adisson “Dealing with insurance claims” (January 2011) 6-1 Paddocks Press Newsletter2. 
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the bank account of the body corporate.665 The administration and operating of the bank 
account of the body corporate should include the signing of cheques. However, it does 
not mean that the managing agent is automatically authorized to sign cheques on the 
basis of this provision only. A managing agent will thus be allowed to sign such a 
cheque if the trustees specifically delegate such power to the managing agent.  
 
An interpretation that all documents and not only formal (legal) documents usually 
designated by the word “instruments,” must be signed by the trustees is obviously too 
wide. In actual fact only documents that bind the body corporate, or are required to be 
signed by the trustees under the Act or the rules, need to be signed in the above 
manner.666 The prescribed management rules contain specific provisions about the 
signing of documents by trustees.667 Prescribed management rule 15 allows one trustee 
to give notice of a meeting of trustees in writing. Prescribed management rule 38 
stipulates that the annual report by trustees must be signed by the chairperson. 
Prescribed management rules 53 and 54 require a decision by trustees and written 
notice to owners for the calling of a special and annual general meeting. Although such 
a notice has all the features of a document, it is not normally signed by the trustees or 
by the managing agent in practice. It is an open question whether the non-compliance 
with the signature requirement of prescribed management rule 27 would invalidate the 
proceedings and the resolutions taken at the meeting. The crucial question is how such 
a procedural defect impacts on the due process that must be followed by the trustees in 
deciding to call the meetings and setting the agenda, as well as on any owner who was 
materially prejudiced by the defect.668  
 
Finally the Act and the rules confer powers on the trustees by requiring their written 
consent for certain legal acts or activities involving sections and the common property. 
Examples are that the consent of the trustees is required for the subdivision of a section 
                                            
665 Maree (December 2010) MCS Courier 2. 
666 2. 
667 Paddock (December 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
668 Van der Merwe 14-139. 
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and the consolidation of two or more sections;669 the attendance by the managing agent 
of trustee meetings;670 the construction or placement of any structure or building 
improvement on an exclusive use area;671 the keeping of pets within a section or on the 
common property;672 the maintenance of a receptacle for refuse in a section, exclusive 
use area or the common property;673 the parking of any vehicle on the common 
property;674 the marking, painting, driving nails or screws into or otherwise damaging or 
altering any part of the common property;675 the approval of the nature and design and 
the manner of installation of any safety devices and screens to prevent the entry of 
animals or insects;676 the placement of any sign, notice, billboard or advertisement on 
any part of the common property or section in a residential scheme;677 and the erection 
of a washing line or the hanging of washing or laundry on any part of the building or the 
common property.678 The body corporate can confer the power on the trustees to effect 
or remove luxurious improvements on the common property,679 and to effect or remove 
non-luxurious improvements on the common property.680  
 
Van der Merwe submits that the body corporate can confer the power on the trustees to 
make house rules dealing with the finer details concerning the health, safety, control, 
use and cleanliness of the common property.681 Schedule 1 rules made under the 1971 
Act often contained a provision entitling the trustees to make house rules.682 An 
important issue is whether these house rules683 made by trustees (also referred to as 
                                            
669 STA s 21(1) [STSMA s 7(2)]. 
670 Annexure 8 rule 49(1). 
671 Annexure 8 rule 68(1)(vi). 
672 Annexure 9 rule 1(1). 
673 Annexure 9 rule 2(1)(a). 
674 Annexure 9 rule 3(1). 
675 Annexure 9 rule 4(1). 
676 Annexure 9 rule 4(2). 
677 Annexure 9 rule 6. 
678 Annexure 9 rule 8. 
679 Annexure 8 rule 33(1). 
680 Annexure 8 rule 33(2). 
681 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-140. 
682 J Van de Walt “Management, Conduct and House Rules” (August 2008) 3-8 Paddocks Press 7. 
683 I must note that people often refer to house rules when they actually mean the conduct rules that are filed at the 
Deeds Office in terms of section 35(2)(b) of the Act, and which are enforceable. This mistake in terminology could 
be due to the fact that section 5(8) of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 requires that the landlord must ensure that a 
copy of any House Rules applicable to a dwelling must be attached as an annexure to the lease. Section 1 of the 
Rental Housing Act defines “House Rules” to mean the rules in relation to the control, management, administration, 
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“trustee directives”), and not filed at the Deeds Office, are valid and enforceable in 
sectional title schemes.684  
 
Van der Merwe is of view is that these rules did not become part of a scheme's 
management rules when the Regulations under the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 
came into operation on 1 June 1988.685 He gives various arguments against trustee-
made house rules being enforceable. Section 35 of the STA and Regulation 30 sets out 
a strict procedures for when management and conduct rules may be substituted, added 
to, amended or repealed.686 These provisions governing management and conduct 
rules have created a system of checks and balances that precludes the circumvention 
of these rules by allowing the trustees to make rules for the control and management of 
the scheme.687 Furthermore, the body corporate exists and the trustees hold office 
under the Act, and their powers are derived either expressly or by necessary implication 
from the provisions of the Act, Regulations and the rules. Since there is no provision in 
the Act, Regulations or rules that gives the body corporate or the trustees the power to 
make house rules, they do not have such power.688 Thirdly the fact that the rules 
prescribed under the 1971 Act only remain in force to the extent that they are not 
incompatible with those prescribed under the 1986 Act suggests that the legislature 
wanted to create a template for scheme rules which could not be deviated from 
easily.689  
 
There are two final considerations that Van der Merwe points out with regard to 
enforcement of the rules. Sections 35(4) and 38(j) of the STA both state that the body 
corporate are responsible for the enforcement of the management and conduct rules 
and for the control, administration and management of the common property for the 
                                                                                                                                             
use and enjoyment of the rental housing property. In the context of sectional titles this will include the management 
and conduct rules in terms of section 35(2) of the Act; CM Durham “Are tenants subject to the sectional title 
scheme’s rules?” (November 2014) 9-11 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
684 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-33. 
685 13-34. 
686 STA s 35(2) and Regulations 30(1) – 30(7). 
687 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-34; Pienaar Sectional Titles 203-204. 
688 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-34. 
689 13-34. 
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benefit of all owners. The trustees cannot make and enforce rules regulating the use of 
a section. Furthermore, the body corporate is expressly empowered to enforce the 
management and conduct rules, and is allowed reasonable access to the sections and 
exclusive use areas to ensure that the rules are being observed.690 This cannot be 
construed to confer similar powers in respect of house rules.691 Van der Merwe is also 
of the opinion that a management or conduct rule empowering trustee-made rules will 
not validate them. He is of the view that such a rule could be in conflict with the maxim 
delegatus non potest delegare.692 
 
Wood-Bodley693 has suggested that there are two instances where house rules may be 
valid. The first instance is where it is proper to construe the house rule as an exercise 
by the trustees of their power to control the common property.694 For example a rule that 
provides that no person under a certain age may swim in a pool unless supervised by 
an adult. The second instance is where the trustee rule seeks to grant consent in terms 
of the rules. Since certain prescribed rules prohibit certain actions by owners except 
with the written consent of the trustees, this type of house rule will merely function to 
grant such written consent of the trustees. For example prescribed conduct rule 4(2) 
sets out that an owner may not install any locking device, safety gate, burglar bars or 
other safety device for the protection of his section or any screen or other device to 
prevent the entry of animals or insects, provided that the trustees have first approved in 
writing the nature and design of the device and the manner of its installation. If the 
trustees made a rule that set out what type of safety gate would be approved would 
serve as granting of consent in terms of the relevant prescribed conduct rule, and would 
be enforceable.  
 
Although I am aware that it may be more expedient that trustees make such rules, I 
have concerns that by doing so they will be failing to apply their mind to each individual 
request for consent, and will not be taking the circumstances of the case into 
                                            
690 STA s 44(1)(a). 
691 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-34 – 13-35. 
692 13-35. 
693 MC Wood-Bodley “'House rules’ in sectional title schemes - are they ultra vires?” (2003) 120 SALJ 605-606. 
694 606. 
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consideration. In Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme No 152/1987 v Dorse695 
the court stated that the trustees must consider each request for permission to keep a 
pet and to base their permission on the fact and circumstances of the particular case. 
The trustees were not allowed to refuse permission on the basis of creating a 
precedent. The judge decided that the trustees had failed to apply their minds when 
they refused permission for an elderly lady to keep her small dog. Furthermore, trustees 
do not remain in office indefinitely, and the mood, feeling and tastes of the board of 
trustees will change from one set of trustees to another.696 
 
It is often argued that these house rules shall only provide directions as to the practical 
application of a conduct rule. It is my view that trustee directives or house rules will 
often be regulatory or restrictive in their nature, and should be therefore only be dealt 
with in the management or conduct rules passed by the body corporate. The process of 
adopting rules by unanimous or special resolution means that the owners are included 
in the decisions as to how the scheme is governed.697 The obligation to file 
management and conduct rules means that they are publically available. If trustees 
make rules that are not filed there will be a lack of transparency, which could lead to 
confusion as to what rules are applicable to the scheme. All rules must be reasonable 
and must not be in conflict with the Act and must apply equally to all owners of units put 
to substantially the same purpose.698 It is for these reasons that I am of the opinion that 
house rules made by trustees are not enforceable. 
 
The trustees are therefore invested with certain powers. These powers are 
circumscribed and the trustees have no authority or power to act outside the ambit of 
the powers as conferred in terms of the Act or the rules.699  
 
                                            
695 1999 (2) SA512 (D). 
696 CM Durham “House rules in sectional title schemes” (21-05-2015) Paddocks Blog 
http://paddocksblog.com/2015/05/21/house-rules-in-sectional-title-schemes/ (accessed 21-09-2015). 
697 Van de Walt (August 2008) 3-8 Paddocks Press 7. 
698 STA s 35(3) [STSMA s 10(3)]. 
699 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-140. 
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5 3 2 2 Specific duties conferred on trustees 
 
With regard to the specific duties (functions) of the trustees, the rules require the 
trustees to perform the functions entrusted to them by sections 37700 and 39701 of the 
STA.702 The other general duties imposed on the trustees are to do all things 
reasonably necessary for the control, management, and administration of the common 
property in terms of the powers conferred upon the body corporate by section 38703 of 
the STA704 and to do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the rules in 
force from time to time.705  
 
In Body Corporate Montpark Drakens and Others v Smuts706 the court stated that the 
STA not only imposes duties upon trustees, but also by necessary implication confers 
upon trustees the clear right in law to perform those functions without unnecessary or 
improper interference from meddlesome owners. In this sense the trustees have the 
duty to maintain the sections of owners who do not comply with their duty to maintain 
their sections in a state of good repair.707 Owners are required to repair and maintain 
their sections in a good state of repair and, in respect of exclusive use area, keep it in a 
clean and neat condition.708 In the event that owners fail to comply with their duties in 
this regard, and if such failure persists for a period of 30 days, trustees may affect the 
necessary repairs and maintenance on the owner’s behalf and at his expense.709  
 
Besides these general duties certain specific duties are imposed on the trustees in the 
management rules in Annexure 8 of the Regulations. The trustees must keep minutes of 
their own proceedings710 and must also cause minutes to be kept of all general 
                                            
700 STA s 37 [STSMA s 3]. 
701 STA s 39 [STSMA ss 7(1) and (3)].  
702 Annexure 8 rule 28(1). 
703 STA s 38 [STSMA s 4].  
704 Annexure 8 rule 28(2). 
705 Annexure 8 rule 28(3). 
706 [2207] JOL 19484 (W) para 7. 
707 T Maree “Do trustees have the duty to maintain sections?” (June 2007) 24 MCS Courier 1. 
708 STA s 44(1)(c) [STSMA s 13(1)(c)]. 
709 Annexure 8 rule 70. 
710 Annexure 8 rule 34(1)(a). 
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meetings of the body corporate711 in a special minute book.712 Any unanimous, special 
and other resolution of the body corporate must be recorded in the minute book.713 
Although minutes of meetings of the trustees are not expressly required to be kept in a 
minute book, this ought to be done in practice. The minute books for general meetings 
and meetings of the trustees should be bound in a way that will prevent falsification.714 
The trustees must keep all minute books in perpetuity.715 The trustees are also obliged 
to make all minutes of the body corporate available for inspection on the written 
application of any owner or sectional mortgagee.716 
 
The trustees must cause proper books of account and financial records to be kept717 so 
as fairly to explain the transactions and financial position of the body corporate.718 
Paying attention to accurate accounting and financial recording is important for the 
financial well-being of the sectional title scheme.719  Records must be kept of the assets 
and liabilities of the body corporate720 and of all sums of money received and expended 
by the body corporate and the matters in respect of which such receipt and expenditure 
occur.721  
 
Furthermore, a register of the sectional owners, of sectional mortgagees and of all other 
persons with real rights in units must also be kept.722 These persons are obliged to 
inform the trustees in writing of their interests. Individual ledger accounts must be kept 
for each owner.723 The books could either be kept by one of the trustees, for example 
the treasurer, or by the bookkeeper appointed for that purpose. On application, the 
trustees must make the books of account and the records available for inspection by an 
                                            
711 Annexure 8 rule 34(1)(b). 
712 Annexure 8 rule 34(1)(b). 
713 Annexure 8 rule 34(1)(c). 
714 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-142. 
715 Annexure 8 rule 34(2). 
716 Annexure 8 rule 34(3). 
717 Annexure 8 rule 35(1).  
718 Annexure 8 rule 35(1). 
719 C Ridden “Financial planning in tough times” (December 2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
720 Annexure 8 rule 35(1)(a). 
721 Annexure 8 rule 35(1)(b). 
722 Annexure 8 rule 35(1)(c). 
723 Annexure 8 rule 35(1)(d). 
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owner, a registered mortgagee or the managing agent.724 This means that an owner can 
obtain information on levies that have not been paid by his fellow sectional owners. The 
trustees, on behalf of the body corporate, must supply the information.725 The 
substitution of this rule would probably conflict with the provisions of the Promotion of 
Access of Information Act 2 of 2000.726 These books of account and records must be 
retained by the trustees for a period of six years after completion of the transactions, 
acts or operations to which they relate. However, the minute books must be retained for 
as long as the scheme remains registered.727 
 
The trustees must cause certain documents to be prepared and submitted to every 
annual general meeting for consideration.728 The trustees must firstly prepare, prior to 
the commencement of every financial year, an itemized estimate of the anticipated 
income and expenses of the body corporate, including reasonable provision for 
contingencies and maintenance of the common property729 for the ensuing year.730 The 
budget must be made for the financial year and not from one annual general meeting to 
the next.731 The budgets must be prepared in the format that would be submitted to the 
annual general meeting for consideration prior to the start of the financial year. For 
example where the financial year of a scheme runs until the end of February 2015, the 
budget must be prepared prior to March 2014.732 This suggests that trustees are given 
the instruments to ensure that the scheme has the financial resources to operate 
effectively.  
 
                                            
724 Annexure 8 rule 35(2). 
725 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-142; J Maree “Access to information held by the managing agent” (March 
2007) 22 MCS Courier 9.   
726 T Maree “Bestuursagente se pligte ten opsigte van trustees se optrede” (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 8. 
727 Annexure 8 rule 35(3). 
728 Annexure 8 rule 36-38 read with rule 56. 
729 Annexure 8 rule 36(2).  
730 Annexure 8 rule 36(1); T Maree “Meer oor begrootings” (March 2007) 22 MCS Courier 7-8. The incorrect 
reference to rule 56(b) in rule 37(1) was corrected in 6(e) of GN R1264 in GG 31626 of 28-11-2008.  
731 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-143. 
732 C Ridden “Revised rules for levies and budgets” (December 2011) 6- 12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2.  
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A recent amendment to the Regulations included the insertion of prescribed 
management rule 31(4Aa)733 which states that:  
 
“After the expiry of a financial year and until they become liable for contributions 
in respect of the ensuing financial year, owners are liable for contributions in the 
same amounts and payable in the same instalments as were due and payable by 
them during the expired financial year: Provided that the trustees may, if they 
consider it necessary and by written notice to the owners, increase the 
contributions due by owners by a maximum of 10 per cent excluding capital 
expenditure to take account of the anticipated increased liabilities of the body 
corporate. Such increase shall be ratified or changed after the Annual General 
Meeting by the trustees once the body corporate has approved or amended the 
schedule of income and expenditure.” 
 
Prescribed management rule 31(4Aa) has been critisized by commentators, as being 
badly phrased.734 The last sentence gives the impression that the trustees have a 
discretion to ratify or change the increase after the budget had been approved, and on 
an interim basis. Trustees have no such discretion and must only determine and 
allocate levies according to the amount of the approved budget. This could lead to 
confusion and disputes. This provision should be interpreted to mean that the trustees 
must adjust the interim levy amounts in accordance with the budgets approved by 
owners at the annual general meeting, as is required by section 37 of the STA.  
 
Where the financial year-end and the annual meeting do not coincide, the budget must 
coincide with the financial year of the scheme.735 It has been long recognised in 
                                            
733 Sub-rule 31(4A) was inserted by rule 6 (b) of GN R1264 in GG 31626 of 28-11-2008 and was deleted by mistake 
by GN R196 in GG 36421 of 14-03-2013. Annexure 8 rule 31(4A) stated that: “After the expiry of a financial year 
and until they become liable for contributions in respect of the ensuing financial year, owners are liable for 
contributions in the same amounts and payable in the same instalments as were due and payable by them during the 
expired financial year: provided that the trustees may, if they consider it necessary and by written notice to the 
owners, increase the contributions due by the owners by a maximum of 10 per cent to take account of the anticipated 
increased liabilities of the body corporate.” This error was rectified by the insertion of rule 31(4Aa) by GN R548 in 
GG 38923 of 30-06-2015 which took effect on 30 July 2015. 
734 Maree “Latest rule amendments – Trustees take note!” (July 2015) 50 MCS Courier 3. 
735 Annexure 8 rule 31(2A). 
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sectional title financial practice that levies set at the level necessary to meet the 
operating and financial needs of the body corporate should be the same for the budget 
and the financial year and that the levies should be in place from day one.736 The 
insertion of rule 31(2A)737 gives effect to this idea, unless the levy is more than 10% 
higher than the previous year. Recently an Amendment Regulation inserted into rule 31 
after sub-rule (4A) a new sub-rule (4B)738 which states that:  
 
“The trustees may from time to time, when necessary, make special levies upon 
the owners or call upon them to make special contributions in respect of all such 
expenses as are mentioned in rule 31(1) above (which are not included in any 
estimates made in rule 31(2) above), and such levies and contributions may be 
made payable in one sum or by such instalments and at such time or times as 
the trustees shall think fit.”  
 
In view of the fact that the trustees are elected to run the scheme and have the power of 
raising special levies, they should have the power to set the levy from day one, 
irrespective of the required increase. The item on the agenda of annual meetings can 
still remain to give the owners a form of supervision where necessary. This will provide 
the trustees with an important tool to operate the scheme effectively.739 
 
The trustees must secondly prepare an audited financial statement in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting practice, which fairly presents the state of affairs of the 
body corporate and its finances and transactions at the end of the financial year 
concerned.740 This must include information and notes pertaining to the proper 
management by the body corporate and must contain analyses of the periods of debts 
and amounts due in respect of levies, special levies and other contributions;741 the 
                                            
736 Ridden (December 2011) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
737 Annexure 8 rule 31(2A) states: “Where the financial year-end and the annual general meeting of a body corporate 
do not coincide, the budget shall coincide with the financial year of the scheme.” 
738 Published in GN R 196 in GG 36421 of 14-03-2013. 
739 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-143. 
740 Annexure 8 rule 37(1); C Ridden “Will it still balance?” (August 2009) 4-8 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1; C 
Ridden “Fringe benefits tax of supervisor’s accommodation” (June 2010) 5-6 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1.  
741 Annexure 8 rule 37(2)(a). 
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periods of debts and amounts due in respect of amounts owing by the body corporate to 
the creditors and in particular to any public or local authority in respect of rates, taxes 
and charges for consumption of services, including, but not limited to, water, electricity, 
gas, sewerage and refuse removal742 as well as the expiry dates of all insurance 
policies.743  
 
Apart from the generally accepted principles associated with drafting financial 
statements the auditors who draft financial statements under International Financial 
Reporting Standards often fail to see that the financial statement must comply with 
prescribed management rule 37(2)(a)-(c). A few other specific aspects that need to be 
checked, complied with or reported are that the auditor firm’s appointment is reflected in 
the minutes of the annual general meeting and that a suitable engagement letter is in 
place; that the amended management or conduct rule to reflect his or her appointment 
has been filed with the registrar to enable the auditor to give confirmation required by 
prescribed management rule 56(i); that any restrictions imposed or directions given to 
trustees at a general meeting have been complied with; that all contracts have been 
properly signed by at least two trustees or a trustee and a managing agent and 
supported by a resolution formally and correctly minuted; that levies have been 
determined correctly; that all the required minutes have been kept and that they record 
the transactions that form the basis for example the budget at the annual general 
meeting and the raising of levies by the trustees and that the accounting complies with 
the Act and the rules of the scheme.744  
 
All of the above considerations must be kept in mind when professionals are appointed 
to prepare the annual financial statements on behalf of the trustees. Ultimately this 
responsibility rests with the trustees and it is therefore vital that the trustees work 
closely with the professional firms who specialise in sectional title matters. Higher 
                                            
742 Annexure 8 rule 37(2)(b). 
743 Annexure 8 rule 37(2)(c).  
744 C Ridden “The trustees’ responsibilities relative to the audited financial statements” (March 2011) 6-3 Paddocks 
Press Newsletter 3. 
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accounting and auditing fees may have to be expended.745 The trustees must lay the 
audited financial statements before every annual general meeting for consideration in 
terms of prescribed management rule 56(a).746 The rule refers to the trustees and not to 
the body corporate or managing agent. Therefore, the trustees must take full 
responsibility for these statements and cannot shift the final responsibility to the 
managing agent or even the accounting officer or auditor for any failure or defect in 
these statements.747 
 
The trustees must finally prepare a report signed by a chairperson reviewing the affairs 
of the body corporate during the past year and must lay it before every annual general 
meeting for consideration in terms of prescribed management rule 56(a).748 
 
Owners and mortgagees who have notified the body corporate of their interests must be 
furnished with copies of the estimate of income and expenditure;749 audited750 financial 
statement;751 signed report of the chairperson;752 as well as schedules reflecting the 
replacement value of the buildings and all improvements to the common property 
comprised in the scheme and the replacement value of every individual unit,753 at least 
fourteen days before the annual general meeting at which they are to be considered.754 
These documents must be sent by prepaid post addressed to the owner at his 
domicilium and to the mortgagee at his address as reflected in the records of the body 
corporate.755 Delivery is also deemed to be effected on the owner if the documents are 
                                            
745 3. 
746 Annexure 8 rule 37(1).  
747 Ridden (March 2011) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
748 Annexure 8 rule 38. The incorrect reference to rule 56(b) in rule 38 was corrected rule 56(a) in section 6(f) of GN 
R 1264 in GG 31626 of 28-11-2008. Annexure 8 rule 56(a) states: “The following business shall be transacted at an 
annual general meeting: The consideration of the financial statement and report referred to in rules 37 and 38.” 
749 Annexure 8 rule 36. 
750 Under Annexure 8 rule 40 the body corporate is obliged to appoint an auditor or an accounting officer for 
schemes consisting of fewer than ten units at every general meeting for the ensuing year to audit and sign the 
financial statement prepared by the trustees. Auditors should check on the debts of the body corporate and advice the 
owners to introduce special levies to pay off the debt. This is part of an auditor’s function in signing the financial 
statements of the body corporate. 
751 Annexure 8 rule 37. 
752 Annexure 8 rule 38. 
753 Annexure 8 rule 29(1)(c). 
754 Annexure 8 rule 39(1). 
755 Annexure 8 rule 39(2) read with rule 3(2).  
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transmitted by facsimile or electronic mail to the number or address specified by such 
owner in writing for the purpose of receiving such documentation. This specification is 
only effective once the body corporate receives it at its domicilium.756 This makes the 
receipt of this documentation cheaper, more effective and more convenient. Inadvertent 
failure to deliver the documentation to the persons concerned or the non-receipt of the 
documentation by such persons does not invalidate the proceedings at such meeting.757 
This applies except in the case of holders of sectional mortgage bonds who have 
advised the body corporate of their interest. 
 
Section 32 of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 and supplemented by the Promotion of Access of Information Act 2 
of 2000 guarantees the making available of information. The principle is that a person is 
entitled to be furnished with all available information that affects his interest whether 
from the state, private persons or organizations, and so-called “sensitive information” 
may not be excluded. An interesting question is whether the owners are entitled to the 
scheme’s debtors age analysis reports that sets out which owners are in arrears with 
their levies and for what period of time they have been in arrears. Prescribed 
management rule 35 requires that the trustees keep books and records that fairly 
explain the financial position of the body corporate, and owners are entitled to inspect 
these records. Furthermore prescribed management rule 48 requires that the managing 
agent keep full records of his or her administration and report to the body corporate and 
to all holders of registered sectional mortgage bonds who have notified the body 
corporate of their interest of all matters which in his or her opinion detrimentally affect 
the value or amenity of the common property and any of the sections. It is for these 
reasons that I am of the opinion that all the members of the body corporate are entitled 
to information regarding any owner who is in arrears with their levies. 
 
Not only owners, but also prospective owners need bona fide information regarding all 
aspects of the scheme in which they live or in which they want to purchase. Examples 
                                            
756 Annexure 8 rule 39(2). 
757 Annexure 1 rule 54(5). 
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of information that should be made available to owners, prospective owners, banks and 
estate agents include the names of trustees and the managing agent; the yearly income 
and expenditure of the body corporate; the number of owners who are in arrears with 
their levies and the total amount of arrears; the financial state of the reserve fund; the 
frequency of and the reason for raising special levies in the past; whether the body 
corporate is engaged in litigation or arbitration proceedings; the minutes of trustee and 
annual general meetings; what percentage of the sections are occupied by tenants; 
whether there are illegal extensions and how the trustees propose to deal with these; 
whether the insurance cover of the building is adequate and whether the budget is 
sufficient for the maintenance and administration of the scheme.758 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (the “POPI Act”) could have an 
affect on the access to information in sectional title schemes.759 The POPI Act gives 
effect to the constitutional right to privacy while protecting the free-flow of information 
and advancing the right of access to information.760 It regulates the manner in which 
personal information is processed by public and private bodies by establishing 
conditions; provides Codes of Conduct; provides rights and remedies for non-
compliance and creates measures, including the establishment of an Information 
Regulator, to promote and enforce the protection of personal information. Personal 
information has a wide definition in section 1 and includes, among other information, 
any identifying number, email address, physical address, telephone number, location, 
and confidential correspondence.  
 
Trustees have the responsibility in terms of various provisions in the STA to process 
owner’s personal information, thus making them the “responsible party” and the owners, 
to whom the personal information will relate, will be the “data subject.”761 The POPI Act 
that the trustees must process the personal information of the members of the body 
                                            
758 T Maree “Deeltitelskemas vereis oop kaarte” (August 2008) 32 MCS Courier 7. 
759 The President will determine commencement of POPI by proclamation in a Gazette. The provisions relating to 
definitions, establishment of the office of the Information Regulator and the making of the regulations came into 
force on 11 April 2014. The processing of personal information taking place on the date on which POPI Act comes 
into force must be brought into compliance within one year.   
760 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 s 2. 
761 POPI Act s 1. 
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corporate in a way that does not intrude on the privacy of the owner to an unreasonable 
extent. All the information must be collected for a specific, defined and legitimate 
purpose and it cannot be further processed for a different purpose. The body corporate 
must maintain the quality of information in that it must be accurate and complete and 
not misleading and must be updated where necessary. Furthermore the body corporate 
must have approporiate technical and organizational security safeguards for the 
information. The owner must have access to the personal information and must be able 
to correct it. Therefore once the POPI Act comes into force trustees, on behalf of bodies 
corporate, will have to consider what data they keep, how it is stored, secured, used 
and made available to others.  
 
A practical example of the application of POPI to sectional title schemes is the body 
corporate’s access to the contact details of owners.762 Section 37(1)(l) of the STA 
requires that the body corporate comply with any reasonable request for the names and 
addresses of the persons who are the trustees or the members of the body corporate. 
Prescribed management rule 35(2) provides that on the application of any owner, 
registered mortgagee or of the managing agent the trustees must make all or any of the 
books of account and records available for inspection by such owner, mortgagee or 
managing agent. Prescribed management rule 3(2) provides that the domicilium citandi 
et executandi of each owner shall be the address of the section registered in his name. 
The owner is entitled at any time to change the domicilium on condition that any new 
domicilium selected must be situated in South Africa. The change shall only be effective 
on receipt of written notice thereof by the body corporate at its domicilium. This rule 
implies an obligation on the body corporate to keep a list of owners and their addresses, 
while section 37(1)(l) of the STA requires that the body corporate must comply with any 
reasonable request for the names and addresses of its members. Whether or not the 
trustees must make the names or addresses available will depend on the 
reasonableness of the request.  
 
                                            
762 CM Durham “Wake up and smell the POPI” (23-02-2015) Paddocks Blog 
http://paddocksblog.com/2015/02/23/wake-up-and-smell-the-popi/ (accessed 15-08-2014). 
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The very nature of communal living requires that the inhabitants have reasonable 
access to each other’s contact details. The POPI Act cannot be used as an excuse not 
to give this personal information, as the STA provides legitimation to the fact that 
owners are entitled to this information. On the other hand it also does not mean that the 
trustees must give all the contact information, but merely the name and domicilium as is 
required in terms of rule 3(2).  
 
Once the CSOS comes into operation it will provide a mechanism to ensure compliance 
with the right to access to information. The CSOSA provides, as one of the prayers for 
relief, an order declaring that the applicant has been wrongfully denied access to 
information or documents, and requiring the association (body corporate) to make such 
information or documents available within a specified time.763 
 
An important function conferred on trustees concerns insurance policies to be entered 
into against risks encountered in sectional title schemes. At the first meeting of trustees, 
or as soon thereafter as possible, and annually thereafter, the trustees must insure the 
building and all improvements to the common property to the full replacement value 
thereof against fire and other risks.764 The trustees are mandated to negotiate the most 
beneficial excess, premiums and insurance rate.765 The trustees must further take out 
public liability cover, procure a fidelity guarantee against dishonesty on the part of the 
trustees or employees or agents of the body corporate and insure against other risks as 
directed by a special resolution of the general meeting.766 The trustees should ensure 
that the professionals they deal with like insurance brokers, property valuers, auditors, 
                                            
763 CSOSA s 39(7)(a). 
764 Annexure 8 rule 29(1)(a). 
765 Annexure 8 rule 29(1)(a)(i)-(x); Addison (January 2011) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2; M Addison “Sectional 
title insurance – a look at trustee responsibility” (October 2009) 4-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
766 Annexure 8 Rule 29(2)(b) which states: “At the first meeting of the trustees or as soon thereafter as is possible, 
the trustees shall take all reasonable steps to procure to the extent, if any, as determined by the members of the body 
corporate in a general meeting, a fidelity guarantee in terms of which shall be refunded any loss of moneys 
belonging to the body corporate or for which it is responsible, sustained as a result of any act of fraud or dishonesty 
committed by any insured person being any person in the service of the body corporate and all trustees and persons 
acting in the capacity of managing agents of the body corporate.” M Addison “Trustees need to take a closer look at 
fidelity cover” (August 2008) 3-8 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1.  
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attorneys, and managing agents have appropriate professional indemnity cover.767 One 
of the duties of the trustees under the old prescribed management rule 29 was to 
procure a cash policy for loss of money in the course of business up to an amount 
equivalent to the total levies due and payable in one month, or such lesser amount as 
the trustees may determine as well as for loss and damage to any receptacle for which 
the body corporate is responsible resulting from the theft or attempted theft of money. 
This rule refers to cash immediately required for day-to-day disbursement, for example 
the purchase of cleaning materials or the salary of employees of the body corporate. By 
deleting the reference to this type of insurance in the old rule 29(2)(c), the legislator 
shortened the list of compulsory insurance that has to be taken out by the trustees. In 
comparison with the German Wohnungseigentumsgesetz which obliges the manager to 
take out liability insurance and to insure the building against fire,768 the South African list 
of compulsory insurance is unnecessarily detailed and complicated. If the sectional 
owners nevertheless want to be insured against loss not mentioned above, the owners 
may in terms of prescribed management rule 29(3) by special resolution direct the 
trustees to insure against such risk.  
 
A commentator has listed the trustees’ functions with regard to insurance.769 In 
summary the trustees must insure the building(s) to their replacement value against fire 
and other risks as may be prescribed and keep the building(s) insured to their 
replacement value. They must insure the buildings against any other risk as determined 
by special resolution. They must use any insurance policy payments received as a 
result of damage to the building to rebuild or repair it. The trustees must pay the 
premium on any insurance policy taken out by the trustees. Trustees must determine 
the replacement value of the building and update the replacement schedule; deal with 
the difference between body corporate and traditional commercial policies; check on the 
credentials of the insurance broker and insurance adviser appointed by the body 
                                            
767 M Addison “Sectional title insurance - the role of the trustees” (October 2010) 5-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 
2.  
768 WEG § 21 V 3. 
769 M Addison “Trustees responsibilities regarding sectional title insurance” (April 2009) 4-4 Paddocks Press 1; 
Addison (October 2009) 4-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2; Addison (October 2010) 5- 10 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 2. 
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corporate; check whether the adviser has professional indemnity cover; check on fidelity 
cover and whether the body corporate is covered by the Fidelity Fund of the Estate 
Agents Affairs Board; check whether other professionals with whom the body corporate 
deals have appropriate professional indemnity cover and whether a contractor has 
appropriate all-risk cover before he starts any work on the common property.770  
 
Another important duty conferred on the trustees is to levy and collect contributions as 
estimated at the annual general meeting from the owners in accordance with their 
participation quotas771 in instalments as determined by them. The trustees must 
determine the amount of the contributions payable by owners,772 advise each owner in 
writing of the amount payable as levy within fourteen days after each annual general 
meeting773 and collect the contributions in instalments from the owners.774 The trustees 
may from time to time, when necessary, impose special levies upon the owners or call 
upon them to make special contributions in respect of all such expenses as are 
mentioned in prescribed management rule 31(1),775 which are not included in any 
estimates made in terms of rule 31(2).776 Such levies and contributions may be made 
payable in one sum or by such instalments and at such time or times as the trustees 
shall think fit.777 The trustees shall be entitled to charge interest on arrear amounts at 
such rate as they may from time to time determine.778 
 
A further duty of trustees is to keep a complete record of all rules and house rules in 
force from time to time and to ensure that any amendment, substitution, addition or 
                                            
770 2. 
771 Determination of every owner’s participation quota in terms of STA s 32(2) and (4). 
772 STA s 37(1) [STSMA s 3(1)]. 
773 Annexure 8 rule 31(3). 
774 Annexure 8 rules 30 and 31. 
775 Annexure 8 rule 31(1) states: “The liability of owners to make contributions, and the proportions in which the 
owners shall make contributions for the purposes of section 37(1) of the Act, or may in terms of section 47 of the 
Act be held liable for the payment of a judgment debt of the body corporate, shall with effect from the date upon 
which the body corporate comes into being, be borne by the owners in accordance with a determination made in 
terms of section 32(4) of the Act, or in the absence of such determination, in accordance with the participation 
quotas attaching to their respective sections.” 
776 Annexure 8 rule 31(2) states: “At every annual general meeting the body corporate shall approve, with or without 
amendment, the estimate of income and expenditure referred to in rule 36, and shall determine the amount estimated 
to be required to be levied upon the owners during the ensuing financial year.” 
777 Annexure 8 rule 31(4B). 
778 Annexure 8 rule 31(6). 
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repeal of such rules779 is submitted forthwith to the Registrar of Deeds for filing.780 In 
terms of the STSMA any amendment, substitution, addition or repeal of such rules will 
need to be submitted to the chief ombud.781 In order to monitor compliance one of the 
matters to be dealt with at the annual general meeting is a confirmation by the auditor or 
accounting officer that any amendment, substitution or repeal of the rules782 has been 
submitted to the Registrar of Deeds for filing.783 The trustees are obliged to supply a 
copy of the rules on application to sectional owners, occupants of sections, prospective 
purchasers, sectional mortgagees, the managing agent and the auditor or the 
accounting officer.784 The applicant may be required to pay a reasonable charge for the 
copy.785 The trustees must also do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement 
of the rules.786 
 
If so required in writing by a majority of owners, the trustees must arrange for separate 
meters to be installed at the body corporate’s cost to record the consumption of 
electricity, water and gas in respect of each individual section and the common 
property.787 
 
The trustees are also responsible for depositing and investing funds received by the 
body corporate in an account in the name of the body corporate at a commercial bank 
or building society and use such money, subject to any direction given or restriction 
imposed at a general meeting, for the expenses of the body corporate or for investment 
in terms of prescribed management rule 43.788 Trustees are expressly prohibited from 
the making of loans on behalf of the body corporate to sectional owners or to 
themselves.789 Any funds not immediately required for disbursements may be invested 
                                            
779 STA s 35(5) [STSMA s 10(5)]. 
780 Annexure 8 rule 32(1).  
781 STSMA s 10(5). 
782 As contemplated in STA s 35(5) [STSMA s 10(5)]. 
783 Annexure 8 rule 56(i). 
784 Annexure 8 rule 32(2)(a)-(f). 
785 Annexure 8 rule 32(2). 
786 Annexure 8 rule 28(3). 
787 Annexure 8 rule 33(3). 
788 Annexure 8 rule 41. 
789 Annexure 8 rule 26(2). 
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in a savings or similar account with any registered building society or bank approved by 
the trustees from time to time.790 The possibility to invest the money with any other 
registered deposit-receiving institution was deleted by amendment of rule 43 in 1997. 
Since most building societies have been converted into banks, the investment-receiving 
institution will mostly be a registered bank.791 The trustees can either invest in a savings 
or similar account (not in a money market or unit trust account in one of the institutions 
mentioned above); or it should be kept deposited in a commercial bank in accordance 
with rule 41. Interest on money invested must be used by the body corporate for any 
lawful purpose.792  
 
One of the functions (duties) of the body corporate to be performed by the trustees in 
terms of the STA is to comply with a reasonable request for the names and addresses 
of the persons who are trustees of the body corporate or who are members of the body 
corporate.793 
 
The trustees will usually divide their duties among themselves. The financial duties 
could be delegated to the trustee who is appointed as treasurer. The administrative 
duties could be delegated to the trustee who is appointed as the secretary. Another 
trustee could be delegated the task of being responsible for supervising the 
maintenance of the buildings and garden. The importance of these office bearers in 
exercising the duties in the management of the sectional title scheme is clear. I will 
discuss these office bearers in more detail in chapter 7. 
5 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
The provisions relating to powers and duties of the executive committee or council in 
Singapore and Malaysia are similar to the provisions in South Africa. In Singapore and 
Malaysia the council is empowered to employ for and on behalf of the management 
corporation such agents or employees as it thinks necessary in connection with or to 
                                            
790 Annexure 8 rule 43. 
791 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-148. 
792 Annexure 8 rule 44. 
793 STA s 37(1)(l) [STSMA s 3(1)(n)]. 
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facilitate the exercise of powers and the performance of the duties and functions of the 
corporation.794 In Malaysia the council is empowered to delegate to one or more of its 
members such of its powers and duties and revoke the delegation at any time, subject 
to any restrictions imposed or directions given by the management corporation at a 
general meeting.795 Therefore the council could appoint one of its members as a 
secretary or a treasurer or as both and delegate certain powers to him or her.  
 
The South African management and conduct rules make the exercise of certain 
activities on the common property subject to the written consent of the trustees. 
Likewise a Singapore by-law validly made by the management corporation may confer 
authority on the executive council to decide on certain matters. Thus an application to 
the competent authorities to change the use of lots (units) in a strata development must 
be accompanied by the council’s prior written approval. The council has the discretion to 
withhold its approval albeit only for good reason notwithstanding that the application for 
change of use has been approved by the competent authorities.796  
 
The council also has the power to convene an extraordinary general meeting.797 The 
council is required to immediately proceed to convene an extraordinary general meeting 
of the management corporation to be held as soon as practicable, but not later than six 
weeks after the receipt by the secretary of the corporation of a requisition for such a 
meeting signed by one or more persons entitled to vote in respect of one or more lots, 
the share value or the total share value of which is at least 20 percent of the aggregate 
share value of all the lots whose subsidiary proprietors comprise the management 
corporation; or not less than 25% of the total number of subsidiary proprietors of the lots 
whose subsidiary proprietors comprise the management corporation.798 Any reasonable 
expenses incurred by reason of the failure of the council to convene a meeting shall be 
                                            
794 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (S 192/2005), reg 12; Strata Titles Act and 
Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 6; Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 7.  
795 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 5(a) and (b); Sarawak Ordinance and Sabah Enactment, Second 
Schedule, para 5.  
796 Keang Sood Strata Title 325. 
797 BMSMA s 27(2). 
798 BMSMA, First Schedule, para 14(1)(a) and (b). 
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paid to the former by the management corporation.799 The Singapore case of MCST 
Plan No 460 v Goldhill Properties (Pty) Ltd & Others800 made it clear that an 
extraordinary general meeting in any organization enjoys the same status as an annual 
general meeting. Accordingly it is permissible for council members also to be elected at 
an extraordinary general meeting.801 
 
In Malaysia the council may convene an extraordinary general meeting whenever it 
thinks fit.802 It shall do so either upon the requisition in writing made by proprietors who 
are together entitled to at least one-quarter of the aggregate share units, or upon 
receiving a direction in writing from the Commissioner of Buildings for the transaction of 
such business as the Commissioner may direct.803 
 
The Singapore and Malaysian legislation impose similar duties and functions on the 
executive council as their South African counterpart. The council must keep minutes of 
its proceedings and of general meetings.804 In addition in Singapore the council must 
keep a record of its decisions, any notices given to its secretary805 and full and accurate 
minutes of its meetings.806 If a management corporation is required in its by-laws to 
maintain a notice board, the council is required to display on the notice board a copy of 
the minutes of a council meeting within seven days after the meeting.807 A copy of a 
minute of any resolution of its meeting or of the management corporation passed in 
accordance with the BMSMA must be displayed on the notice board808 for at least 14 
days.809 These provisions pertaining to the display of all minutes of council and 
                                            
799 Para 14(4). 
800 [1991] 3 MLJ 247; Keang Sood Strata Title 330. 
801 [1991] 3 MLJ 247 250. 
802 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, paras 9(2)(c) and 9(2)(b); Sabah Enactment, Second 
Schedule, para 10(2)(b). 
803 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 9(2)(a) and (b); Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 9(2)(a); 
Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 10(2)(a). 
804 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(1); Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 7(1); 
Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 8(1). 
805 BMSMA s 60(3). 
806 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(4). 
807 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(2)(a). 
808 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(2)(b). 
809 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(3). 
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executive committee meetings are based on clause 16 in schedule 3 of the NSW Strata 
Schemes Management Act. 
 
In Singapore the secretary must within 30 days of his or her appointment furnish the 
Commissioner of Buildings in writing with the particulars of all persons elected or 
appointed to an office or as a member of the council. These particulars include their 
names; their NRIC or passport numbers; their residential addresses and the lots in 
respect of which they are subsidiary proprietors.810 Failure to comply is an offence and 
the penalty on conviction is a maximum fine of Singaporean $3,000.811  
 
Furthermore, in Singapore the relevant member in the council is required to furnish to 
the Commissioner of Buildings812 or any person authorized by him, within such 
reasonable time as is specified in the notice, such information or explanation relating to 
the management of the management corporation which the Commissioner or any such 
duly authorized person may reasonably require for the purposes of the carrying out of 
his functions under the BMSMA. Failure to do so is an offence and the penalty on 
conviction is a maximum fine of Singaporean $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum 
term of three months or both.813  
 
In Singapore and Malaysia the council is required to keep proper books of account in 
respect of all sums of money received and expended by it, specifying matters in relation 
to which receipts and expenditure took place.814 The nature and scope of the duty to 
keep proper books of account was considered in Re Steel & Others and the 
Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act 1961.815 In this case evidence was given of 
irregularities in the conduct of the affairs of the body corporate and of the refusal of the 
council to make full disclosure of the records of the body corporate. The judge 
considered the statutory obligation to keep proper books of account as provided for in 
                                            
810 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (S 192/2005), regs 9(1)(a)-(d) and 2(a)-(d). 
811 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (S 192/2005), reg 9(3). 
812 Appointed under BMSMA s 3(1). 
813 BMSMA s 126(6)(b). 
814 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(5)(a); Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 
7(2)(a); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 8(2)(a). 
815 (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) 467. 
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the bylaw 12(c) of the First Schedule to the previous New South Wales Conveyancing 
(Strata Titles) Act 1961. He explained his view that the statute required a separate set 
of books of account to be kept for the affairs of the body corporate as follows:  
 
“There has never been any attempt to maintain a separate set of books of 
account or a separate bank account for the body corporate’s affairs. The 
statutory obligation to keep ‘proper books of account’ in the by-laws in my view 
required a separate set of books to be kept for the affairs of the body corporate… 
It should be added that the books kept were not in fact ‘proper’ on any basis but 
were… ‘a simplified method of accountancy easily understood by laymen.’ In fact 
their simplicity was deceptive, for, as was conceded by the respondents during 
the hearing, various small sums seem to have been untraceable and the burden 
of charges has not been thrown with accurate equity on the various lot holders; 
so too the accounts of the former company, Carrington Pty, Ltd, have been 
confused with those of the body corporate. These matters may have been 
confused with those of the body corporate. These matters may not represent vast 
sums of money but they illustrate the deficiencies in the books of account. 
Another aspect of the keeping of accounts is that there was no annual audit and 
no separate bank account was kept for the body corporate’s financial affairs, 
despite the resolutions passed at an early meeting of the body corporate in 1963 
when the respondents were the only members. Not only, therefore, have the 
respondents failed to comply with the statutory by-laws but they have not 
complied with the procedure they devised themselves for the conduct of the body 
corporate’s affairs.816 
 
Apart from the duty to keep proper books of account,817 the council is also required to 
make the books of account available for inspection at all reasonable times on the 
application of a proprietor or a mortgagee or chargee of a lot or parcel or a proprietor of 
                                            
816 (1968) 88 WN (Pt 1) 467 470. 
817 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(5)(a); Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 
7(2)(a); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 8(2)(a). 
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a provisional block (or any person authorized in writing by him).818 Under the New South 
Wales Strata Schemes Management Act819 the owners corporation is required to keep 
and retain such books of accounts for a period of five years or such other period as may 
be required by the regulations.820 In Singapore the corporation must retain all its 
records, books of account and such other documents relating to any of its transactions 
or operations to which those documents relate are completed.821 There is no equivalent 
provision in Malaysia. The rules of the Malaysian STA should require that the 
accounting records to be retained by the council for a reasonable number of years or 
until the winding up of the management corporation. This would enable easy access to 
the financial situation of the scheme in previous years.822 
 
In Malaysia the council is required to prepare, for each annual general meeting proper 
accounts relating to all moneys and the income and expenditure of the corporation.823 In 
Singapore such accounts must be audited in respect of each financial year by a public 
accountant appointed by the council824 within 90 days after the annual general meeting 
if no auditor was appointed at the meeting.825 In Malaysia such accounts are to be 
audited annually by auditors appointed by the council.826 The fact that the accounts are 
audited would help to protect members of the management corporation and the council 
against any allegations pertaining to the accounts that may be made against them. 
 
In Singapore the council must within 30 days after the annual general meeting serve the 
Commissioner of Buildings with a written statement signed by a member of the council 
containing information including the date and agenda of the last annual general 
meeting; the names and addresses of the persons appointed or elected to the council at 
                                            
818 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(5)(b); Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 
7(2)(b); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 8(2)(c). 
819 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 103 and 104(a). 
820 NSW Schemes Management Regulation 2005, cls 5 and 6. 
821 BMSMA s 48(2). 
822 Keang Sood Strata Titles 329. 
823 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 7(3); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 
8(3).  
824 BMSMA ss 45(1) and (2).  
825 BMSMA s 45(3)(b). 
826 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 7(4) and (b); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 8(2)(b). There is 
no such requirement under the Sarawak Ordinance. 
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the last annual general meeting; the name and address of the auditor appointed by the 
corporation;827 the name and address of any managing agent appointed828 at the last 
annual general meeting; the amount of the regular periodic contributions levied in 
respect of each lot by the corporation;829 and the rate of interest determined by the 
corporation830 in respect of any unpaid contribution.831  
 
Where an auditor is appointed it must submit to the Commissioner the name and 
address of the auditor within 14 days of the appointment.832 Where this is not served on 
the Commissioner within the time stipulated all the members of the council will be guilty 
of an offence and the penalty on conviction is a maximum fine of $3,000.833 It is also an 
offence with the same penalty if the written statement or submission does not comply 
with the requirements as regards the information to be contained therein.834 A person 
charged with such an offence may prove that he or she took all reasonable steps and 
exercised all due diligence to ensure that any requirements as regards to preparation or 
serving of the written statement or submission have been complied with.835  
 
In Malaysia the council is required to file within 28 days with the Commissioner of 
Buildings certified true copies of the audited accounts of the corporation which have 
been presented to the general meeting, the resolutions passed at the general meeting 
and the minutes of the general meeting.836 The council is required to, within 21 days 
from holding the annual general meeting, extend copies of the minutes of the meeting to 
all proprietors or display the minutes of the meeting on the notice board of the 
corporation.837  
 
                                            
827 In accordance with BMSMA s 45(3)(a). 
828 BMSMA s 66(1). 
829 BMSMA s 39(4). 
830 BMSMA s 40(6)(b).  
831 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (s192/2005), regs 10(1) and (2) made under the 
BMSMA s 136. 
832 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (s192/2005), regs 10(3) and (4). 
833 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (s192/2005), reg 10(5). 
834 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (s192/2005), reg 10(6). 
835 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (s192/2005), reg 10(7). 
836 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 7(5). 
837 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 7(5A). 
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In Singapore and Malaysia the council must permit the Commissioner of Buildings or 
persons authorized by him full and free access to accounting and other records of the 
corporation and to make copies of, take extracts from any such accounting or other 
records of the corporation.838 Failure to do so is an offence in both Singapore and 
Malaysia.839 
 
Under the UCIOA of the United States the executive board is entitled in principle to 
exercise all the powers and functions of the condominium association subject to various 
restrictions. The executive board may always act on behalf of the association except 
when prevented from doing so in the declaration, the by-laws or in other provisions of 
the Act.840 An executive board is expressly restricted from amending a declaration or 
determining the board members’ qualifications, powers, duties and terms of office.841 
The executive board is also prevented from dealing with the winding down of a 
condominium.  
5 4 Conclusion 
 
It important not to follow the common misconception amongst sectional title owners that 
the trustees are more important than the ordinary members of the body corporate, with 
the chairperson being the most important of them all. This could lead to errors in the 
decision-making process. The trustees are seen to have the power to make certain 
decisions affecting the entire scheme without consulting or taking the views of the other 
members of the scheme into account.842 The main risk attached to this notion is that 
sectional owners often feel powerless to act in the face of opposition from the trustees. 
The trustees are not the body corporate. The body corporate comprises all the owners 
in the scheme, while the trustees are elected by the body corporate to represent the 
body corporate as the executive committee. If every decision relating to the 
                                            
838 BMSMA s 126; Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 7(6). 
839 In Singapore the penalty on conviction is a maximum fine of $2,000 or imprisonment for a maximum term of 
three months or both (BMSMA, s 126(6)). In Malaysia the penalty on conviction is a maximum fine of RM10,000 
(Strata Titles Act s 55(1) read with s 39(5) and the Second Schedule, para 7(6)). 
840 UCIOA § 3-103(a). 
841 UCIOA § 3-103(b). 
842 Van der Walt (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
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management of the scheme had to be taken in the general meeting then management 
would be highly inefficient and ineffective. The general meeting makes the policies 
relating to management and the trustees execute the actual management acts. The 
trustees are obliged to act on the instructions of the owners, provided that the 
instructions are legal and do not contravene the provisions of the Act or the rules. The 
trustees should consult with the members of the body corporate before making 
decisions on matters that significantly affect the finances of the scheme or the use on 
the common property. At each annual general meeting the owners should give the 
trustees financial instructions by approving a particular budget. The two organs 
complement one another and should function together to ensure the scheme is 
managed and administered properly. Where the trustees act within the scope of the 
provisions of the Act, the rules, and any restriction imposed or direction given by the 
members of the body corporate the management of the scheme is in capable hands.  
 
It has been questioned how long restrictions on the trustees should last and whether 
they are in effect until the next annual general meeting or indefinitely. In my opinion any 
monetary restriction involving the spending or borrowing of money given in general 
terms should last until the next annual general meeting. The rationale for this is that the 
restriction is made in the context of a specific budget that has been approved by the 
owners for a particular year. It is therefore given in a particular financial context based 
on a particular budget that is replaced at the next annual general meeting. There is 
nothing stopping the owners from restricting the trustees’ power to make a majority 
decision to let the common property to an owner for less than ten years843 by imposing 
a direction that they shall not do so unless and until there has been a prior decision 
made by special resolution of owners approving a lease.844 
 
From the discussion it is clear that trustees have numerous responsibilities, and 
therefore the responsibility of being a trustee is an onerous one. The South African 
legislation makes it possible for trustees to deal with the day-to-day management of the 
                                            
843 Annexure 8 rule 38(i) read with STA s 39 [STSMA s 7]. 
844 Paddock (January 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
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scheme by giving them certain powers and duties, subject to certain restrictions. This 
facilitates the trustees in the exercise of their powers and duties, while ensuring that the 
trustees do not act outside their mandate. In this way provisions are in place for the 
efficient management of the scheme. 
 
Regarding their powers the trustees can appoint such agents and employees such as 
managing agents, gardeners, cleaners, and caretakers as they think fit to assist them in 
the daily management of the scheme. Their power to delegate entitles them to delegate 
the financial accounting and recording duties to the treasurer. Their power to sign 
instruments on behalf of the body corporate ensures that these instruments can be used 
as proof in a court of law and their power to give written consent for certain activities 
concerning sections or the common property, ensures harmony in the sectional title 
community. This links up with the general duty of trustees to do all things reasonably 
necessary for the control, management, and administration of the common property in 
terms of the powers conferred upon the body corporate and to do all things reasonably 
necessary for the enforcement of the rules in force from time to time.  
 
Besides these general powers, certain specific duties are imposed on the trustees in the 
prescribed management rules. This includes duties regarding the keeping of minutes; 
the preparation of proper books of account and records to be kept so as fairly to explain 
the transactions and financial position of the body corporate; the keeping of a register of 
the names and addresses of sectional owners, mortgagees and of all other persons with 
real rights to the units; the causing of certain documents to be prepared and submitted 
to every annual general meeting for consideration which includes an itemized estimate 
of the anticipated income and expenses of the body corporate, an audited financial 
statement, and a report signed by a chairperson reviewing the affairs of the body 
corporate during the past year; the duty to furnish these documents to owners and 
mortgagees; the duty to insure the building, negotiate the most beneficial excess, 
premiums and insurance rate, and take out public liability cover; the duty to levy and 
collect contributions; the making, keeping, supplying and enforcing of the rules; 
arranging for separate meters to be installed at the body corporate’s cost to record the 
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consumption of electricity, water and gas in respect of each individual section and the 
common property; and the responsibility for depositing and investing funds received by 
the body corporate in an account in the name of the body corporate at a commercial 
bank.  
 
Once the trustees have been elected there should be some form of publicity, other than 
the minutes of the general meeting at which the trustees were elected, that the trustees 
have been appointed and there should be some duty to account on all the matters 
relating to the management of the scheme by the trustees as is the case in Singapore. 
In South Africa once the CSOS is in operation the body corporate could furnish the 
ombudsman in writing the particulars of all persons elected or appointed to an office 
within 30 days of their appointment. This information could include the names of the 
trustees; identification numbers of the trustees; whether they are unit owners or 
outsiders; and the physical address of the trustees. Furthermore, the trustees should be 
required to furnish to the ombudsman within such reasonable time as is specified in the 
notice, such information or explanation relating to the management of the body 
corporate which the ombudsman may reasonably require.  
 
The exercise and performance of these functions and duties are subject to the 
provisions of the Act; the provisions of the rules and finally to any restriction imposed or 
direction given at a general meeting of the owners of sections. The trustees’ actions are 
therefore limited. The body corporate would not, for example, be bound by a resolution 
adopted at a meeting of trustees that the caretaker of the scheme should be paid a 
farewell gift of over R50 000 for many years of service.845 In this example the managing 
agent stopped the payment and it was put on the agenda for the annual general 
meeting. The owners were against the payment and the body corporate did not have 
the money to make the payment. The body corporate was not bound by the trustee’s 
resolution. The owners approve the budget for anticipated expenses each year, and this 
expense was not approved. When it was put on the agenda at the annual general 
meeting the owners were aggressively against it. The body corporate is not a charitable 
                                            
845 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor” (September 2010) 5-9 Paddocks Press Newsletter 7. 
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institution with money to spend as the trustees deem appropriate. The expenses 
detailed in the STA and the rules, and the fiduciary obligation of trustees to the owners 
oblige the trustees to hold the body corporate funds in trust and to spend money in 
ways that would benefit the whole scheme. The action of the trustees to award the 
caretaker money will only be valid if approved in the general meeting. In this way the 
trustees are not the masters, but the servants of the body corporate.846 They 
nevertheless deserve the respect, appreciation and co-operation of the members who 
elected them to undertake the difficult task of management of the sectional title scheme 
without remuneration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
846 Paddock The Sectional Title Handbook 101. 
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Chapter 6: Meetings of the trustees 
 
6 1 Introduction 
 
An important management and operating function of trustees is to make various 
management decisions at meetings held by them. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the procedures used to convene trustee meetings and the methods by which 
trustees make decisions. The trustees can only exercise the powers and perform the 
duties entrusted to them in the STA, in the rules and by directions given to them by 
owners in a general meeting by means of resolutions taken at a duly constituted 
meeting of the board of trustees, unless something else is provided for in the rules.847  
 
There are two main methods by which the prescribed management rules authorize a 
departure from this principle. First a rule that empowers the trustees to delegate their 
powers and duties to one or more of their number;848 and secondly a rule providing that 
a written resolution signed by all the trustees present in the Republic and at least 
constituting a quorum, is as valid as a resolution passed at a formal meeting of the 
board of trustees.849  
 
In what follows I shall discuss when, how often and where trustee meetings are held. I 
will then examine how trustee meetings are convened, dealing specifically with who 
convenes the meeting and what type of notice is required to convene such a meeting. 
Following this I shall set out who may attend, speak and vote at trustee meetings. I will 
then examine the quorum requirements for the meetings. The method by which the 
trustees make decisions is an important topic. In this regard the voting procedure and 
the applicable requirements are discussed. I will also set out the procedure for how 
decisions can be taken by the trustees without holding a formal trustee meeting. The 
                                            
847 Pienaar Sectional Titles 175. 
848 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
849 Annexure 8 rule 24; Torgos (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors Aweigh and another 2006 (3) SA 369 (W) 
para 11. 
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discussion is concluded with the requirement that the trustees must keep minutes of 
their proceedings, and make these minutes available for inspection on request. 
6 2 South African position 
 
It is not practical that all the owners should meet everytime any financial and 
management issues arise in the day-to-day administration of the scheme. It is for this 
reason that the trustees should arrange their meetings for a fixed place, date and time 
each month so that they can deal regularly and efficiently with their routine management 
decisions. The STA and rules do not require that the meetings be held at any specific 
time or at regular intervals. Trustee meetings will accordingly be convened when 
trustees think fit.850 There will be fewer trustee meetings in smaller schemes, or in 
schemes that have a managing agent, and more trustee meetings in larger or mixed-
use sectional title schemes. With regard to the venue of the meeting the prescribed 
management rules do not stipulate a place where the meeting should be held. The 
venue can be determined in the rules of the particular scheme if the trustees so wish. 
The venue should be a place that is convenient for all the trustees. Trustee meetings 
are often held at the managing agent's offices.  
 
The convening of and proceedings at meetings of the trustees are regulated by the 
prescribed management rules.851 The rules provide that the trustees may give notice 
convening meetings, meet together for the dispatch of business, adjourn and otherwise 
regulate their meetings as they think fit.852 The trustees can conduct their meetings 
more informally than general meetings of the body corporate because there are few 
trustees. The chairperson has the discretion as to what degree of formality is required in 
trustee meetings. 
 
Any trustee may at any time convene a meeting of the trustees by giving not less than 
seven days’ written notice. This is subject to the proviso that in cases of urgency such 
                                            
850 Annexure 8 rule 15(1). 
851 Annexure 8 rule 15 – 24. 
852 Annexure 8 rule 15(1). 
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shorter notice as is reasonable in the circumstances may be given.853 The written notice 
must specify the reason for calling such a meeting.854 This notice must be given to all 
the trustees, but it is not necessary to give notice of a meeting to a trustee who is 
absent from the Republic.855 This is subject to the proviso that if the trustee had 
appointed an alternate trustee who is in the Republic then such notice of the meeting 
shall be given to the alternate trustee.856 It is important to note that the rules provide for 
the appointment of alternate trustees, but do not sanction the appointment of a proxy to 
vote on behalf of an alternate trustee at a trustee meeting. I agree with this as the 
alternate trustee is meant to replace or stand in for an absent trustee. To have a proxy 
stand in for an alternate takes it too far. The notice must also be given to all first 
mortgagees, who have requested in writing to receive reasonable notice of all meetings 
of the trustees.857 The trustees must give reasonable prior notice of their meetings to 
any managing agent employed by the body corporate who may, with the consent of the 
trustees, be present at the meeting.858 There is no explicit requirement that the owners 
be given notice of trustee meetings.859  
 
There are certain rules concerning the attendance at trustee meetings. All trustees are 
entitled to be present, speak and vote at any meeting of the trustees.860 While a trustee 
is absent or unable to act, his alternate may attend, speak and vote at meetings of the 
trustees in his place. The managing agent may attend and speak at the trustee meeting 
with the majority consent of the trustees.861 The managing agent employed by the body 
corporate handles most of the trustees' administrative duties, and plays a leading role in 
meetings, drafting and dispatching notices including suitable agendas, drawing their 
attention to matters requiring their attention, taking minutes and advising them on 
proper procedures in terms of the Act and the rules.862 The nominee of the first 
                                            
853 Annexure 8 rule 15(2). 
854 Annexure 8 rule 15(2). 
855 Annexure 8 rule 15(1). 
856 Annexure 8 rule 15(1). 
857 Annexure 8 rule 15(2) read with rule 15(3). 
858 Annexure 8 rule 49(1). 
859 Annexure 8 rule 15(5). 
860 Annexure 8 rule 15(2). 
861 Annexure 8 rule 49(1). 
862 Paddock G Sectional Title Survival Manual 7ed (2013) 106. 
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mortgagee who has received notice of a trustees’ meeting shall be entitled to attend and 
speak at the meeting of the trustees, but shall not in such capacity be entitled to vote at 
such meeting.863  
 
Until recently this was also the case for any owner who wanted to attend a trustee 
meeting.864 Prescribed management rule 15(5) was recently amended865 to state:  
 
“An owner shall be entitled to attend, on invitation, any meeting of the trustee,866 
but shall not in his or her capacity as such be entitled to vote thereat.”  
 
The right of owners to attend meetings of the trustees was given recognition in 1997.867 
This 2015 amendment has removed the right of owners to attend meetings of the 
trustees, and also their right to speak at such meetings. Therefore, an owner may only 
attend a meeting if invited to attend by the trustees and, due to the explicit removal of 
the words “and speak at” may not even speak, if so invited.868  
 
In my view this is a serious restriction on the proprietory rights of owners. This rule is 
not conductive to open and transparent decision making by the trustees. In practice 
there are owners who are disruptive at trustee meetings, and in this way the attendance 
and opportunity of owners to speak at trustee meetings can restrict the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the meeting if owners primarily misuse this opportunity to air their 
grievances. To place a blanket-ban on the attendance of all owners is an unfair 
limitation. What is required is a strong chairperson to manage these disruptive owners, 
and to censure discussion by the owners on topics that are irrelevant and not on the 
agenda. I will discuss the role of the chairperson in more detail in chapter 7. Van der 
Merwe suggests that a restriction by which owners are only entitled to speak on topics 
                                            
863 Annexure 8 rule 15(4). 
864 Annexure 8 rule 15(5). 
865 Annexure 8 rule 15(5) was amended by GN R548 in GG 38923 of 30-06-2015. 
866 Maree points out that the word “trustee” should be plural “trustees,” and is probably a printing error in the 
Government Gazette; Maree (July 2015) 50 MCS Courier 2. 
867 Inserted by GN R1422 in GG 18387 of 31-10-1997. 
868 Maree (July 2015) 50 MCS Courier 2.  
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as determined by the chairperson should possibly be added.869 This restriction could be 
difficult to enforce in practice and would add an unnecessary extra burden on the 
chairperson.  
 
I am of the opinion that all boards of trustees should extend an invitation to owners to 
attend their meetings. An owner should be given the opportunity to attend, speak at, 
and to request information from the trustees to clear up misunderstandings. If sensitive 
or private matters, such as discussions over owners in arrears with their levies, or the 
decision to impose a fine on an owner or occupier, need to be discussed at the trustee 
meeting, the chairperson could leave those matters until the end of the meeting. After all 
the other agenda items have been discussed and decided upon the chairperson could 
excuse the owners present so that the trustees have the opportunity to discuss the 
private issues. Since every owner has a personal and financial interest in the scheme, 
he or she should be able to speak not only at general meetings, but also at the 
meetings of trustees where the day-to-day management of the scheme is conducted. 
The aim of my submission is to create transparency in the acts and decisions of 
trustees. This would have the effect of preventing autocratic trustees from sidelining an 
owner with a genuine grievance.  
 
It has been suggested that trustees should notify owners of their meetings,870 but the 
trustees are not obliged in terms of the prescribed management rules to send notice of 
the date, time and agenda of the meeting or to invite the owners to such meeting. It is 
important to note that nothing prevents the owners from making enquiries from the 
secretary as to when the next meeting of the trustees will take place, and to request an 
invitation. A balance must be struck between the transparency of trustees’ actions and 
the trustees’ efficient executive actions and decisions. Furthermore, the trustees can 
agree by majority vote to have any person present if they are of the opinion that the 
person could be useful in giving valuable information or be of assistance with the 
trustees’ business. Examples of such persons are contractors who come to the meeting 
                                            
869 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-133. 
870 Proposals to the Sectional Titles Regulation Board (March 2003) 2.4.2.1. 
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to give a presentation of their product or service. One trustee cannot demand that his or 
her advocate be present at a trustee meeting.871 It is important to note that only trustees 
can vote on resolutions taken at trustee meetings.  
 
There are requirements regarding the quorum for the trustee meeting. A “quorum” is the 
minimum number of people who must be present at a meeting in order for that 
meeting’s proceedings to be valid. The rules stipulate that 50% of the number of 
trustees, but not less than two is a quorum for a meeting of trustees.872 A valid trustee 
meeting cannot be held with only one trustee.  Trustees must be present in person and 
are not allowed to appoint a proxy to represent an absent trustee. An alternate trustee, 
who does not represent but replaces an absent trustee, is counted for the purposes of 
establishing a quorum. If a trustee offers an apology for not attending the meeting he or 
she is not counted for constituting a quorum. 
 
If 50% of the trustees resign or are otherwise disqualified from office the number of 
trustees will fall below the number necessary for a quorum. In such a situation the 
remaining trustee or trustees may not continue to do business. The rules allow the 
remaining trustee or trustees to continue to act, but only for the purpose of appointing or 
co-opting additional trustees to make up a quorum, or for the purpose of convening a 
general meeting of owners.873 Owners at a general meeting can replace any trustee 
who has resigned, been removed or otherwise disqualified from office. The rule allows 
the remaining trustee to co-opt their spouse or others who will act with them. However, 
the co-opting of trustees is not regulated in the rules. The fear is that a remaining 
trustee would co-opt his or her spouse and other persons who supports him or her in 
order to form a quorum so that the remaining trustees can impose their own ideas and 
decisions upon the unit owners. However, a trustee may only co-opt these persons for 
the purpose of forming a quorum, and not for the purpose of taking resolutions.  
 
                                            
871 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Can a trustee demand his advocate be present at a trustees’ meeting?” 
(July 2011) 6-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
872 Annexure 8 rule 16(1). 
873 Annexure 8 rule 16(2). 
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If at any meetings of the trustees a quorum is not present within thirty minutes of the 
time appointed for the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the next business 
day at the same time. The trustees then present, who shall not be less than two, shall 
form the quorum.874 All trustees should, if reasonably possible, receive fresh notice to 
re-convene the adjourned meeting if the decisions taken at the meeting are to be valid 
and to complete the business on the agenda.875 The justification for this rule is 
presumably to prevent the trustees from becoming paralyzed, and to avoid any tactical 
move by the trustees to block important decisions. Trustees favouring the status quo 
would use this obstructive strategy.876 If a significant number of members choose not to 
be present, the meeting will fail due to a lack of a quorum and the status quo will 
remain.  
 
All matters at a meeting of trustees are determined by a simple majority of the votes of 
the trustees present and voting.877 A proxy or agent cannot vote for an absent trustee. 
An alternate trustee votes in his or her own name. Each trustee has one deliberative 
vote. The trustee can vote for or against any motion. If the votes are evenly divided then 
the chairperson has a casting vote, except where there are only two trustees.878 Any 
trustee having any interest in any contract or proposed contract, litigation or proposed 
litigation with the body corporate is disqualified from voting in respect of such contract or 
litigation.879 This is by virtue of the fact that the trustee may have an interest therin. 
 
In situations where the trustees wish to decide on a matter, but find it inconvenient to 
hold a meeting they may make use of the procedure set out in prescribed management 
rule 24. This rule provides that a written resolution signed by all the trustees present in 
the Republic, if sufficient in number to constitute a quorum, shall be valid and effective 
as if it had been passed at a meeting of trustees duly convened and held.880 This 
procedure allows a meeting to take place without a formal meeting. This type of 
                                            
874 Annexure 8 rule 17. 
875 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Loss of quorum” (March 2009) 4-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 9. 
876 Chen Condominium Law 155. 
877 Annexure 8 rule 22. 
878 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
879 Annexure 8 rule 23. 
880 Annexure 8 rule 24. 
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resolution is called a “round robin” resolution.881 It is often used where an urgent matter 
arises, where there are only a limited number of trivial matters to be determined where 
no discussion or debate is required and it is not considered worthwhile to convene a 
meeting. The proposed resolution to be circulated must specify the exact terms of the 
resolution and must be accompanied by a full motivation that gives the background 
information trustees need to consider the resolution. It must then be signed and 
returned to the chairperson.  
 
The trustees must keep minutes of their proceedings882 and must make the minutes 
available for inspection on the written application of any owner or registered mortgagee 
of a unit.883 The trustees must from time to time furnish to the managing agent copies of 
the minutes of all meetings of the trustees and of the body corporate.884  
 
It is important to note that the decisions made by trustees in these meetings must be 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 33 of the Bill of Rights incorporated 
into the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 affords everyone the right to 
just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.885 Anyone 
whose rights that have been adversely affected by an administrative action has the right 
to be given written reasons.886 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(“PAJA”) was enacted to give effect to these rights, and to provide for the review of 
administrative action by a court or where appropriate by an independent and impartial 
tribunal; to impose a duty on the state to give effect to these rights and to promote 
efficient administration.887 In terms of section 1 of PAJA “administrative action” means: 
 
                                            
881 Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 108. 
882 Annexure 8 rule 34(1)(a) 
883 Annexure 8 rule 34(1)(3). 
884 Annexure 8 rule 49(2). 
885 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 chapter 2 s 33(1). 
886 S 33(2). 
887 S 33(3). 
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“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision by a natural person or 
juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision.”888  
 
Maree is of the opinion that trustees should bear in mind that an application for review 
under the PAJA relates not only to decisions of state departments and municipalities, 
but also to decisions of natural persons such as trustees and the general meeting, and 
could affect the rights of members of the scheme negatively.889 Hoexter asserts that 
there is room for argument made in the English case R v Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc890 that some private juristic bodies are exercising public 
functions. In my view whether or not PAJA will apply to trustees’ administrative actions 
on behalf of bodies corporate depends on whether it is exercising a public power or 
performing a public function. I am of the view that private powers and functions come 
into play in the administration and management of sectional title schemes. Therefore, 
the actions or decisions by trustees are not subject to review under PAJA.  
 
The next important consideration is how administarive actions taken by trustees on 
behalf of bodies corporate can be reviewed. Hoexter891 argues that the reviewability of a 
private power in administrative law lies in section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 that contemplates the direct application of constitutional rights and 
states that:  
 
“[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right.” 
 
Hoexter is of the opinion that reviewing administrative action in terms of section 33 of 
the Bill of Rights is, by virtue of its nature and the nature of the duties they impose, tied 
                                            
888 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 s 1. 
889 T Maree “How does our national Constitution affect sectional title administration?” (December 2010) 38 MCS 
Courier 10-11. 
890 [1987] 1 All ER 564 CA; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 193. 
891 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 128. 
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to the use of public rather than private powers.892 It is further argued that it does not rule 
out the indirect application of section 33 by virtue of section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights 
which requires that, when interpreting legislation and when developing common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. Courts have shown a preference for indirect application 
instead of direct application.893 In this way the trustees acting on behalf of the body 
corporate will need to ensure that their administrative actions are lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair in order to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.894 
 
I submit that these actions are still subject to the rules of natural justice and legality in 
terms of common law. In Klein v Dainfern College895 Claasen J stated: 
 
“…No rational reason exists to exclude individuals from the protection of judicial 
review in the case of coercive actions by private tribunals not exercising any 
public power. To my mind the Constitution makes no pronuncements in respect 
of this branch of private administrative law. Thus continuing to apply the 
principles of natural justice to the coercive actions of private tribunals exercising 
no public powers will in no way be abhorrent to the spirit and purport of the 
Constitution.” 
 
An illustration of review of a decision of the trustees based on common law principles 
can be found in Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme No. 152/1987 v Dorse.896 
In this case the parties agreed to have the decision, based on an application in terms of 
Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court, to review and set aside the decision of the 
trustees not to allow the owner’s application to keep her Yorkshire terrier in the scheme. 
The trustees ignored the most relevant considerations relating to the particular dog 
including that the dog’s presence did not cause any nuisance, and took into account 
                                            
892 127-128. 
893 128. 
894 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 chapter 2 ss 33(1). 
895 2006 (3) SA 73(T) para 54; Hoexter Administrative Law 128. 
896 1999 (2) SA 512 (D); Hoexter Administrative Law 127. 
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irrelevant considerations such as the creation of precedent. The judge set aside the 
decision on the basis that it was so grossly unreasonable as to warrant an inference 
that the trustees had failed to apply their minds to the matter.  
 
If, for example the trustees wanted to incorporate a fining or penalty rule into the rules of 
the scheme, the validity of the rule and its implementation would depend on whether the 
rule is both substantively and procedurally reasonable and fair.897 The rule needs to be 
reasonable and apply equally to all owners put to substantially the same purpose and 
would need to have a legitimate purpose, for example to prevent the transgressions of 
the rules.898 It follows that due process must be followed in collecting the fine. This 
process must also be reasonably, fairly and equally applied.  
 
It is important to note that once the CSOS is operational it will be the correct forum for 
reviewing the administrative actions taken by trustees on behalf of bodies corporate. 
The CSOSA sets out provisions for making applications in section 38. Furthermore, the 
CSOSA sets out various prayers for relief in section 39 in respect of financial issues;899 
behavioural issues;900 governance issues;901 meetings;902 management services;903 
works pertaining to private and common areas904 and also in respect of general or other 
issues.905 These orders will ensure that all management and administrative decisions or 
                                            
897 CM Durham “The validity of a penalty rule and the enforceability of the fine implementation” (August 2014) 9-8 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
898 STA s 35(3); Van der Merwe Z Constitutionality of the rules governing sectional titles LLM thesis (2010) 129. 
899 CSOSA s 39(1)(c) provides a prayer for an order declaring that a contribution levied on owners or occupiers, or 
the way it is paid, is incorrectly determined or unreasonable, and an order for the adjustment of the contribution to a 
correct or reasonable amount or an order for its payment in a different way. 
900 CSOSA s 39(2)(c) provides a prayer for an order declaring that an animal is being kept in a community scheme 
contrary to the scheme governance documentation, and requiring the owner or occupier in charge of the animal to 
remove it. 
901 CSOSA s 39(3)(c) provides a prayer for an order declaring that a scheme governance provision is invalid and 
requiring the association to approve and record a new scheme governance provision to remove the invalid provision.  
902 CSOSA s 39(4)(e) provides a prayer for an order declaring that a particular resolution passed at a meeting is void 
on the ground that it unreasonably interferes with the rights of an individual owner or occupier or the rights of a 
group of owners or occupiers.  
903 CSOSA s 39(5)(b) provides a prayer for an order declaring that the association does or does not have the right to 
terminate the appointment of a managing agent, and that the appointment is or is not terminated.  
904 CSOSA s 39(6)(a) provides a prayer for an order requiring the association to have repairs and maintenance 
carried out. 
905 CSOSA s 39(7)(a) provides a prayer for an order declaring that the applicant has been wrongfully denied access 
to information or documents, and requiring the association to make these available within a specified time. 
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actions will need to be in conformity with common law and constitutional principles 
relating to natural justice.   
6 3 Comparative survey 
 
The NSW Schemes Management Act does not require executive committee meetings to 
be held at any specified time or at regular intervals during the year. In larger schemes 
meetings may be held monthly, while the meetings will be less frequent in smaller 
schemes, especially if a managing agent has been appointed. The executive committee 
will usually determine when the next meeting can be held. 
 
There are four different methods by which executive committee meetings may be 
convened. In the firstl place an executive committee meeting can be convened by a 
request of one-third of the executive committee members.906 The request need not be in 
writing, but must be addressed to the secretary, or if he or she is absent, another 
committee member.907 Not less than one-third of all executive members must have 
requested the meeting. The owners may not request a meeting but can instead 
persuade the members of the executive committee to issue the secretary with a 
requisition notice including those motions that the owners want considered.908 The 
request must also propose certain motions for consideration.909 In practice it is usually 
the secretary who advises the other executive committee members that there is 
outstanding business that requires consideration and that a committee meeting will be 
convened for a suitable date, time and venue. This is the most common manner used 
for convening executive committee meetings. 
 
The second method to convene an executive committee meeting is to include a motion 
that sets a date, time and venue for holding the next executive committee member 
                                            
906 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 7(1) which states that: “the secretary of an owners corporation or, in 
the secretary’s absence, any member of the executive committee must convene a meeting of the executive 
committee if requested to do so by not less than one-third of the members of the executive committee, within the 
period of time, if any, specified in the request.”  
907 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 7(2). 
908 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 31(3). 
909 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cls 6(2) and 10(1)(b). 
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meeting at a previous executive committee meeting. This is usually done when there 
are matters that require some inquiry or investigation before a formal resolution can be 
passed at the next meeting.  
 
The third method is where the general meeting passes an ordinary resolution requiring 
the executive committee to convene and hold a meeting on a specified date to consider 
particular motions.910 The resolution should deal with those few matters specified in the 
Act that can be decided upon only by the executive committee. The other types of 
motions must be dealt with by the owners corporation in the general meeting. 
 
The final method to convene an executive committee meeting is by order of an 
Adjudicator. If the executive committee fails or refuses to hold a meeting following a 
valid request,911 or a direction given by the general meeting, an order may be sought 
from an Adjudicator912 requiring the executive committee to hold the meeting within a 
specified time. There are penalties for failure to comply with such an order. The ultimate 
sanction for an un-cooperative executive committee is for the owners corporation to 
pass a special resolution to remove every executive committee member from office. 
 
Having determined the date, time and venue of the meeting,913 the secretary must ask 
the executive committee members to submit any matters proposed for consideration by 
the meeting including matters referred to them by owners, mortgagees and tenants. The 
notice of the meeting must then be given to each owner and executive committee 
member in large schemes, and displayed on the notice board914 at least 72 hours before 
the time fixed for the meeting. In smaller schemes it is not necessary to notify the 
owners and each member of the executive council if the notice can be displayed on the 
notice board of the scheme at least 72 hours before the meeting.915 If the by-laws do not 
require the owners corporation to have a noticeboard the notice must be given to each 
                                            
910 The power of the owners corporation to impose this requirement is contained in NSW Strata Schemes 
Management Act s 21(3). 
911 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 7(1). 
912 In terms of NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138. 
913 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl11. 
914 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6(1). 
915 It is best to do personal service as it is the least contestable method: Ilkin NSW Strata 123. 
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lot owner and each executive committee member at least 72 hours before the time fixed 
for the meeting. The notice must specify when and where the meeting is to be held and 
must contain a detailed agenda, but need not specify the exact wording of any motion 
proposed for resolution.916 The notice may be sent to a person by electronic means only 
if the person has given the owners corporation an e-mail address for the service of 
notices under the Act.917 
 
Any owner or company nominee of a corporate owner may attend an executive 
committee meeting, but may not address the meeting unless authorized by ordinary 
resolution of the executive committee.918 A tenant occupying a lot in the scheme has no 
automatic right to attend the meeting, unless he or she also holds the office of a 
committee member. A specific power of attorney authorizing attendance would be 
sufficient to secure admittance to the meeting by other persons.919  
 
In terms of the NSW Schemes Management Act the quorum for considering and voting 
on a motion submitted at a meeting of an executive committee that has two or more 
members is at least one-half of the total number of members,920 last elected by the 
owners corporation.921 If the executive committee has only one member that one 
member will constitute the quorum.922 If the meeting is not quorate, then the members 
who are present cannot consider any motions or elect any office bearers.923 The waiting 
and adjournment procedures for general meetings do not apply to executive committee 
meetings. The chairperson must fix a time and date for the next meeting and the 
secretary must give 72 hours’ notice of that meeting. A new executive committee 
meeting must then be held, and the meeting must still be quorate before decisions can 
be made and business conducted.924 
                                            
916 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6(3). 
917 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6(4). 
918 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 14. 
919 Ilkin NSW Strata 124. 
920 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 9(3). 
921 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 9(5). 
922 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 9(2). 
923 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 9(1). 
924 Ilkin NSW Strata 122. 
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The chairperson presides over the meeting and must ensure that a quorum is present to 
consider motions.925 The Act does not contain rules for conducting business and 
proceedings at the meeting. Therefore, the meeting must be conducted according to 
procedures prescribed in the by-laws of the scheme registered at the Registrar 
General’s office. If no such by-laws exist it is recommended that the general meetings’ 
procedures be used, with suitable modifications, as it largely follows the common law 
position. The executive committee is restricted to motions that require the passing of an 
ordinary resolution. Motions are adopted at executive committee meetings by simple 
majority vote.926 Subject to the Act, such a decision on any matter is the decision of the 
executive committee at any meeting at which a quorum is present.927 
 
An executive council member has only one vote, except if a member also holds the 
position of a substitute committee member928 in which case the member may cast two 
votes. The chairperson does not have a casting vote,929 but may cast two votes if he 
also acts as a substitute committee member.930 Calling for a poll or a proxy vote does 
not feature in executive committee meetings. Motions cannot be amended if they are 
adopted at a meeting conducted by approval in writing,931 but amendments will be valid 
if approved at a conventional meeting of the executive.932 
 
The committee may resolve to adjourn the meeting for any reason.933 An example is 
where more information is required or more quotes are required for a resolution 
concerning the appointment of a company. Notice of the time and venue of the 
adjourned meeting must be given at least one day prior to the meeting by displaying a 
notice on the noticeboard and by giving notice to each owner where the scheme is not 
                                            
925 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 8(1). 
926 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 11(1). A simple majority is approval by 51% of the executive 
council members. 
927 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 11(1). 
928 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3(1). 
929 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 8(2). 
930 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 8(2). 
931 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 10. 
932 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 11. 
933 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 13(1). 
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required to have a noticeboard.934 If there are two meetings held at the same time then 
both meetings are invalid.935 
 
As in South Africa, executive committee members do not have to meet physically at a 
specific venue and time, but may instead submit written votes.936 This method is usually 
employed when notice of a meeting has already been given and the secretary then 
decides that the matters are so trivial that a physical meeting to debate the motion is not 
considered necessary. A resolution is then taken to have been validly passed if notice 
was given of the intended meeting, a copy of the motion for the resolution was served 
on each member of the executive committee and the resolution was approved in writing 
by a majority of members of the executive committee.937 Here again a time and date 
must be set, the matters for consideration must be determined and notice must be 
given.938 When the secretary has counted the votes and received a majority of voting 
notices indicating approval of a proposed resolution, the resolution is deemed to be 
passed. Motions cannot be amended if they are passed at a meeting conducted by 
approval in writing.939 This procedure produces the same overall result as a 
conventional meeting, but it should not be characterized as a meeting as it merely gives 
the appearance of one.940 The preparation and display of minutes requirement is the 
same as when a meeting is held by members physically attending a meeting.941 
 
After the meeting the secretary must prepare, record and display complete and accurate 
minutes of the decisions reached at the meeting including notices given to the 
secretary942 and a record of all resolutions adopted at the meeting.943 In large schemes 
each owner and executive committee member must be given a copy of the minutes and 
a copy must be displayed on the notice board within seven days of the meeting date for 
                                            
934 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 13(2). 
935 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 9(4). 
936 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 10. 
937 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 10(1). 
938 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 36(2)-(4). 
939 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 10. 
940 Ilkin NSW Strata 126. 
941 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 16. 
942 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 12. 
943 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 15. 
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at least fourteen days.944 In small schemes the minutes must be displayed on the 
noticeboard within seven days of the meeting and remain on display on the noticeboard 
for not less than fourteen days after first being affixed; or if the by-laws do not require a 
noticeboard the minutes must be given to each lot owner and executive committee 
member within seven days of the meeting.945  
 
In Singapore the council is required to give notice of its intention to hold a meeting at 
least three days before the meeting by displaying the notice on the notice board of the 
management corporation,946 and by serving the notice on each member of the 
council.947 The notice must specify when and where the meeting is to be held and must 
contain the detailed agenda for the meeting.948  
 
As in South Africa, a proprietor (owner) is entitled to attend a meeting of the 
management council, but may not address the meeting except with the permission of 
the council.949  
 
A quorum at any meeting of a council consists of only one member if he or she is the 
only member950 or, where there are two or more members of a council, of the majority of 
the members of the council.951 For the purpose of determining whether there is a 
quorum, a council member is to be treated as being present at a meeting 
notwithstanding the fact that he or she cannot vote or has withdrawn from the meeting 
due to the fact that he or she has a pecuniary interest in a matter before the council.952 
This will alleviate any difficulty in forming a quorum in such a situation.  
 
                                            
944 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 16. 
945 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 16. 
946 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 4(1)(a). 
947 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 4(1)(b). 
948 BMSMA, Second Schedule, Para 4(2). 
949 BMSMA, Second Schedule, paras 5(1) and 5(2). 
950 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(1)(a) 
951 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(1)(b). 
952 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(2); see also BMSMA s 60 
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The chairperson must preside over the meeting of the council. In his absence, the 
members of the council who are present shall appoint one of their own to preside over 
the meeting.953 The decision on any matter, where there is only one member of a 
council, of that member,954 or where there are two or more members of a council, of the 
majority of the members voting on a specific matter shall be the decision of the council 
at any meeting at which a quorum is present.955  
 
As in New South Wales a council must prepare, keep and display full and accurate 
minutes of its resolutions and of any notice given to its secretary.956 If the management 
corporation is required by its by-laws to maintain a notice board, a copy of the minutes 
of a council meeting must be displayed on the notice board within seven days after the 
meeting957 for a period of not less than fourteen days.958 If there is no notice board, the 
council concerned shall give each proprietor a copy of the minutes within that period.959 
 
As in South Africa and in New South Wales a council resolution may also be adopted 
without a meeting where all members are physically present. A resolution of a council 
shall be taken to have been validly passed even though the meeting at which the motion 
for the resolution was proposed to be submitted was not held960 if notice was given961 of 
the intended meeting of the council;962 a copy of the motion was served on each 
member of the council;963 the resolution was approved in writing by a majority of 
members of the council;964 and the motion does not concern any matter that the 
management corporation determines965 may only be decided upon by its council at a 
                                            
953 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 1. 
954 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(3)(a). 
955 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(3)(b). 
956 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 2(4). 
957 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(2)(a). 
958 Para 3(3). 
959 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 3(4). 
960 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 7. 
961 In accordance with the Second Schedule to the BMSMA. 
962 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 7(a). 
963 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 7(b). 
964 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 7(c). 
965 BMSMA s 59. 
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physical meeting.966 The members therefore vote in writing instead of a having a council 
meeting that facilitates decision-making on cases where it is difficult to meet regularly.  
 
In Malaysia the council shall meet at such times and places and at such intervals as it 
thinks fit, provided that any member of the council may convene a meeting by 
appointing a date for the meeting and giving the other members not less than seven 
days’ notice of the date appointed.967 At the commencement of each meeting, the 
council elects a chairperson for the meeting who shall have a casting as well as an 
original vote.968 The council may regulate its own procedure at meetings subject to the 
Second Schedule to the Strata Titles Act.969 Except where there is only one proprietor, 
the quorum at the meeting of a council is two, where there are more than four members; 
three where there are five or six members; four where there are seven or eight 
members; five where there are nine or ten members; six where there are eleven or 
twelve members and seven where there are thirteen or fourteen members.970 All 
decisions are taken by a simple majority vote.971 
 
Singapore and Malaysia do not allow for a member of the council to be represented at a 
council meeting by another proprietor. Members may not be able to attend a meeting 
and this non-representation may prevent the attainment of a quorum at a meeting, 
which could be detrimental to the scheme. It could therefore be recommended that 
there should be a provision allowing for representation. This representative should be 
able to vote in his or her capacity as a member of the council and also on behalf of the 
member in whose place he or she has been appointed to act. However, it is my opinion 
that a representative that is not a duly elected executive member should not be entitled 
to vote. A better solution is to adopt the New South Wales provision that makes one of 
the other executive members a substitute executive member holding two votes.  
 
                                            
966 BMSMA, Second Schedule, para 7(d). 
967 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 3; Sabah Second Schedule, para 3 requires the 
council to meet at least once a year. 
968 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 4(3). 
969 Strata Titles Act and Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 4(4). 
970 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 4(1). 
971 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 4(2). 
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The UCIOA of the United States does not specify how often executive board meetings 
must be held. These meetings are held from time to time as the need arises. The 
UCIOA does not make an express provision on how to convene the executive board 
meeting. Unless the by-laws specify otherwise, a quorum is present for any executive 
board meeting if board members entitled to cast 50% of the votes are present at the 
beginning of the meeting.972 The UCIOA allows the by-laws to regulate the voting 
procedure for council meetings. 
 
In China the executive council meetings are held from time to time as the need 
arises.973 More than one-third of the council members can request the chairperson of 
the executive council to convene a council meeting.974 The chairperson is then 
responsible for summoning and chairing the council meeting. If the chairperson is away, 
the sub-district office must designate another council member to summon and chair the 
meeting. There is no provision concerning notice of council meetings, but there is a 
presumption that proper notice should be served by the chairperson on each and every 
council member beforehand. In China a local property management regulation specifies 
that more than half of the council members should be present at any council meeting for 
a quorum to be present.975 In China the number council members must be an odd 
number, which makes it unnecessary to give the chairman a casting vote. As in 
Singapore a member who has a pecuniary interest in a matter before the council, 
should be disqualified from voting on the matter.  
6 4 Conclusion 
 
The trustees make the day-to-day decisions on behalf of all owners, but they do not 
have to have a meeting with the owners for every decision that has to be taken. The 
trustees can hold trustee meetings, which is an easier and faster way to make 
decisions. They should attend all meetings at which their presence is required. The 
trustees can only exercise the powers and perform the duties entrusted to them in the 
                                            
972 UCIOA § 3-109(b). 
973 Regulation of the Owners’ General Meetings of 2003 art 25. 
974 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 art 29. 
975 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 art 29(5). 
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STA and in the prescribed management rules by means of resolutions taken at a duly 
constituted meeting of the board of trustees. It is therefore important that trustees know 
and understand the procedures for convening and holding trustee meetings which 
includes matters such as when, how often and where the meetings should be held; who 
convenes the meeting; what type of notice is required to convene such a meeting; who 
may attend, speak and vote at the trustee meetings; the quorum requirements for the 
meetings; the method by which the trustees make decisions; the voting procedure and 
requirements and the keeping and making available for inspection the minutes of the 
meeting. The trustees should also understand the procedure involved when they make 
a decision without holding a formal trustee meeting.  
 
The trustee meetings should be held when and where the trustees think fit. The venue, 
date and time of the meeting should be convenient to all those who attend it. The size 
and nature of the scheme determines how often trustee meetings should be held. In 
larger schemes meetings may be held monthly, while the meetings will be less frequent 
in smaller schemes, especially if a managing agent has been appointed. 
 
In South Africa a single trustee can convene a trustee meeting, whereas in New South 
Wales and China only one-third of the executive committee or council can convene a 
meeting. It can be argued that if only a single council member could propose a meeting 
at any time the council’s workload would increase significantly and there would be the 
risk of being overwhelmed by trivial matters.976 However, I submit that the South African 
provision is adequate, as I do not think that the trustees, who often have little time 
available and are not remunerated, would convene a meeting for trivial matters. 
 
With regard to the time of notice it is sound that shorter notice must be allowed in cases 
of urgency if it is reasonable to do so. Although it is not expressly provided, the notice 
must specify the time and place of the meeting and also the reason for calling the 
meeting. This seems inadequate in the light of the more detailed provisions of the New 
South Wales and Singapore statutes. In terms of these statutes the members of the 
                                            
976 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 153. 
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committee or council must propose matters for consideration to the secretary including 
matters proposed by mortgagees and owners and eventually a detailed agenda must be 
attached to the notice without having to specify the exact wording of any motion 
proposed for resolution. I submit that the notice in South Africa should contain more 
than just a reason for calling the meeting, and should contain the agenda for the 
meeting. 
 
In South Africa prescribed management rule 15 requires that written notice of a meeting 
must be given to each trustee and to first mortgagees who have requested that he or 
she be given notice at least seven days in advance. It further stipulates that notice need 
not be given to trustees that are absent from the country provided that notice be given 
to his or her alternate if so appointed and in the country. Since the trustees may give 
(written) notice as they deem fit, it seems best to do personal service of the notice by 
hand as it is the least contestable method. Notice may also be served by post or in a 
more practical way by electronic means if the trustee concerned has given the body 
corporate an email address for the service of notices. Since the notice must be in writing 
it is improbable that notice by telephone call would suffice.  
 
In addition I suggest that the trustees should also post a notice on the scheme’s public 
notice board seven days before the meeting is held inviting all interested owners to 
attend as is done in New South Wales and Singapore. Since the first mortgagee who is 
entitled to attend and speak at the meeting, is entitled to reasonable notice I submit that 
all owners should have the same entitlement and should receive invitations to attend the 
meetings with reasonable notice.  
 
Trustee meetings should be open to all owners and nominees of first mortgagees as is 
the case in New South Wales. This grants owners the right to information regarding the 
day-to-day management of the scheme, and fosters open and transparent 
management. Owners who wish to attend the meeting should give the secretary at least 
three days’ notice before the meeting. It has been argued that the owners and 
nominees of first mortgagees should not be able to speak at the meetings as it causes 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 190 
disruptions. If all owners attend and speak at trustee meetings then these meetings 
would start to function much like a general meeting and this would defeat the object and 
purpose of trustee meetings. Therefore, a balance needs to be struck between the 
owner’s right to information and the efficiency of trustee meetings. In New South Wales 
and Singapore an owner or may attend an executive committee meeting, but may not 
address the meeting unless authorized by ordinary resolution of the executive 
committee. I submit that owners should be entitled to attend trustee meetings as 
observers with the right to speak, but that the chairperson must be able to censure 
discussion by the owners on topics that are not on the agenda or irrelevant.  
 
A tenant occupying a unit in the scheme has no automatic right to attend the meeting, 
unless he or she is also a trustee. In New South Wales the executive members can 
agree by majority vote to have any person present if they are of the opinion that the 
person could be useful in giving valuable information or be of assistance with the 
trustees’ business. This opportunity must also be given to South African tenants.  
 
The South African rule that the presence at least 50% of the trustees, but not less than 
two, is sufficient for a quorum, is sound. The South African rule that a meeting which 
lacks the required quorum within 30 minutes of the appointed time must stand 
adjourned to the next business day at the same time and that the trustees then present 
who must not be less than two, needs consideration. The New South Wales provision 
does not provide for such an adjournment, but requires that a new meeting should be 
scheduled and that the new meeting must be quorate to proceed with business. It is 
debatable whether an inquorate South African adjourned meeting should be allowed to 
take important decisions. Trustees are appointed to fulfill an important task and should 
therefore be forced to attend trustee meetings. 
 
Regarding the conduct at the meeting, the chairperson must preside over the meeting 
and ensure that a quorum is present to consider motions. The STA does not contain 
rules for conducting business and proceedings at the meeting. If the management rules 
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of a particular scheme do not have provisions in this regard, it is recommended that the 
procedures employed at general meetings, with suitable modifications, must be used. 
 
In South Africa all matters at a meeting of trustees are determined by a simple majority 
of the votes of the trustees present and voting.977 If the votes are evenly divided then 
the chairperson has a casting vote.978 The fact that there are an odd number of council 
members in China means that the chairman’s casting vote is not required. In contrast in 
New South Wales legislation contains the interesting provision that a member of the 
executive committee or the chairperson may be granted the position of substitute 
committee member in which case he is allowed to cast two votes. This implies that the 
chairperson or another member may act as representative for a member who for some 
reason or other cannot attend the meeting. Therefore, the chairperson does not have a 
casting vote in executive council meetings, but the chairperson who acts as a substitute 
committee member can cast two votes. Since the authority is delegated by another 
elected member this seems a sensible provision to avoid an impasse in the voting 
procedure. 
 
It flows from the fiduciary status of a trustee that he or she should not take part in 
decisions on matters in which he or she has a personal pecuniary interest. This is 
confirmed in prescribed management rule 23, which reads that a trustee shall be 
disqualified from voting in respect of any contract or proposed contract, or any litigation 
or proposed litigation with the body corporate by virtue of any interest he may have 
therein. An important provision that should be included in all statutes is that a member 
having an interest conflict with the motion should be disqualified from voting.  
 
In South Africa, New South Wales, and Singapore trustees are allowed to take 
decisions by submitting written votes without having to meet physically. In South Africa 
a resolution in writing signed by all the trustees for the time being present in the 
Republic, and being not less than are sufficient to form a quorum, shall be as valid and 
                                            
977 Annexure 8 rule 22. 
978 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
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effective as if it had been passed at a meeting of the trustees duly convened and held. 
In New South Wales and Singapore this appears to be only possible in cases where a 
meeting has already been convened and it was considered unnecessary to hold the 
meeting. Then the copies of the motions of the resolutions already sent to the members 
of the executive committee, must only be approved by a majority of written votes sent to 
the secretary. This is sensible as it deals with trivial matters or matters that do not 
require debate for which it is not worthwhile to convene and hold a meeting. It may also 
prove to be convenient in cases where it is difficult to meet regularly. When such a 
meeting is carried out in writing a notice should be placed on a public notice board and 
given to each trustee beforehand in a timely manner. The notice to be circulated should 
specify the exact terms of the resolution, and when it is signed it must be returned to the 
chairperson. The trustees can therefore act by unanimous consent as documented in a 
resolution signed by all its members in lieu of a meeting. 
 
The question arises whether trustees may conclude the resolution by email. The 
advancement in technology has led to trustees holding meetings by proposing 
resolutions in an e-mail and then an email conversation pursues resulting in a resolution 
being passed. Maree is of the opinion that such a round robin meeting by email would 
not qualify as a proper meeting.979 He suggests that having concluded the email 
discussions the chairperson should send a formal written resolution to all trustees for 
their signatures. The signed resolutions should then be returned to the body corporate’s 
domicilium address to place them on record in compliance with the management 
rules.980 I agree with this submission. 
 
In South Africa the trustees have to keep minutes of their proceedings and make the 
minutes available for inspection on the written application of any owner or registered 
mortgagee of a unit. I recommend, taking from the New South Wales provision, that 
each first mortgagee, owner and trustee must be given a copy of the minutes, or that a 
copy must be displayed on the notice board within seven days of the meeting date for 
                                            
979 T Maree “May trustees conclude resolutions by e-mail?” (December 2012) 42 MCS Courier 4.  
980 Annexure 8 rule 24. 
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not less than fourteen days thereafter. Where the board of trustees can act by 
unanimous consent as documented in a written resolution signed by all their members, 
the decision should be put in the minutes and be made available for inspection by first 
mortgagees, owners and trustees, and should also be paced on the central notice board 
if the scheme has one. 
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Chapter 7: Office bearers, remuneration and 
reimbursement of the trustees 
 
7 1 Introduction 
 
Related to the topic of meetings are the various office bearers that are appointed to 
assist in the management of the sectional title scheme. Although the only office bearer 
expressly mentioned in the prescribed management rules is the chairperson, I shall 
show that foreign jurisdictions also cater for the appointment of a secretary and a 
treasurer. Further important matters such as the remuneration and the reimbursement 
of expenses to trustees will also be dealt with in this chapter.  
7 2 Office bearers 
7 2 1 Introduction 
 
We have seen that there is an obvious need for trustees to be elected as the executive 
and administrative organ of the body corporate. The prescribed management rules 
provide that, subject to the restrictions imposed or directions given at a general meeting, 
the trustees may delegate such of their powers and duties as they deem fit to one or 
more of their number, and may at any time revoke such delegation.981 Therefore, once 
appointed, they can divide the numerous tasks of management amongst themselves by 
the appointment of at least a chairperson, secretary and treasurer. Without a division of 
tasks between office bearers, the trustees will in practice find it hard to function 
efficiently as a board, especially in large schemes. The South African prescribed 
management rules do not expressly provide for the election of officers among the 
trustees, apart from the election of the chairperson. In what follows I will discuss the 
position and duties of the chairperson in South Africa and conclude with the 
arrangement made in foreign jurisdictions for the election of office bearers. 
                                            
981 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
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7 2 2 South African position 
 
In terms of the prescribed management rules the developer or his nominee is the 
chairperson of the trustees from the establishment of the body corporate until the 
inaugural general meeting.982 Thereafter the body corporate is obliged to elect trustees 
for the ensuing year at each annual general meeting. At their first meeting, the newly 
elected trustees must elect a chairperson from amongst their number to hold office until 
the end of the next annual general meeting.983 The chairperson is not elected as such at 
the annual general meeting, as it is left to the trustees to make decisions regarding their 
leadership.984 The election of the chairperson could take place by a ballot or on a show 
of hands. The chairperson remains in office until the end of the next annual general 
meeting, unless the chairperson dies, resigns or is removed from office in the interim.  
 
In the same way as a director of a company need not be a shareholder, the chairperson 
need not be an owner. In trustee meetings such a non-owner chairperson exercises his 
or her vote in his or her capacity as a trustee and not as owner. If the non-owner 
chairperson of the trustees were also the chairperson of the general meeting then he or 
she would not be able to vote, but could still be appointed as a proxy.985 
 
The prescribed management rules provide that the chairperson of the trustees must 
preside over every general meeting of the body corporate, unless otherwise resolved by 
the members of the body corporate at such meeting.986 The chairperson will usually 
preside over every annual and special general meeting, but the general meeting can 
decide by majority vote to pass his or her task to another trustee or a representative of 
the managing agent. Only in cases where the trustees have not yet elected a 
chairperson; or where at any annual general meeting the chairperson of the trustees is 
not present within fifteen minutes from the time appointed for any annual general 
                                            
982 Annexure 8 rule 4(3). 
983 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
984 Woudberg Basic Sectional title book 1 72. 
985 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Non-owner chairperson” (October 2008) 3-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 
10. 
986 Annexure 8 rule 59(1). 
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meeting or where he or she is unwilling or unable to act as chairperson, are the 
members present obliged to elect a another chairperson.987 An acting chairperson at a 
general meeting need not be a member, but could be an outsider such as a managing 
agent or any other suitable person elected by the general meeting.988 Graham Paddock 
is of the view that, although in practice it is not unusual for the owners to allow the 
managing agent to act as chairperson of a meeting, the managing agent is not a 
suitable person to chair general meetings because he or she is employed by the body 
corporate.989 A managing agent’s proper role is to assist the chairperson with the 
support and technical details needed to run the meeting and the voting procedures.  
 
The chairperson’s primary function is to preside over and chair every general meeting 
and trustee meeting. A chairperson must maintain order, regulate the orderly expression 
of opinions and guide the meeting through its agenda to its conclusion.  
 
In the general meeting this involves the chairperson being an impartial referee.990 The 
chairperson should exercise this power in the utmost good faith and for the benefit of 
the body corporate. Every owner should be given a chance to speak on a matter under 
consideration, but no one should be allowed to dominate the discussion or delay the 
decision by repetition of arguments. The chairperson should not express his personal 
opinion on the matter under discussion or manipulate, influence or persuade the owners 
into seeing his or her view, except by way of his vote, unless he or she temporarily 
vacates the chair for that specific purpose. Therefore, if the owners believe that the 
chairperson of the trustees will not be impartial in dealing with the business of the 
meeting then they should appoint another chairperson. In contrast the chairperson of 
the trustees can openly play an active role in the debate in a trustee meeting. 
 
The chairperson normally convenes the general meetings, draws up the agenda for 
each meeting and conducts the meetings in accordance with the general rules for 
                                            
987 Annexure 8 rule 59(2). 
988 Proposals to the Sectional Titles Regulation Board (March 2003) 3.2.5; T Maree “Notes on the latest 
amendments” (September 2005) 18 MCS Courier 13.  
989 Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 138. 
990 138. 
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meetings and associations. The chairperson should declare the meeting open and 
welcome those present. He or she is obliged to declare the meeting “properly 
constituted” if proper notice has been given and “duly constituted” if the required 
quorum is present. He should give details on the proxies and representatives present. 
He must ensure that the members present sign the attendance register. The 
chairperson can then move to the first item on the agenda. He must read and explain, 
without personal interpretation, each motion and allow discussion to take place without 
digressing from the issue at hand. He must ensure that consideration is given to each 
item on the agenda, and then put each motion to the vote. If voting is done by a show of 
hands, the chairperson has the discretion to change the manner of voting to one by 
poll.991 He responsible to control, count and record the vote and declare the result of the 
vote. Once all the motions have been dealt with he must adjourn the meeting. He or she 
is obliged to adjourn the meeting at the request of a member backed by a majority of the 
persons attending the meeting. If the chairperson exceeds his or her powers by 
attempting to arbitrarily adjourn the meeting, the members present can elect a new 
chairperson in his place and continue the meeting.  
 
The chairman does not have any additional voting power at a general meeting of the 
body corporate. At trustee meetings the chairperson has the casting as well as a 
deliberative vote, provided that there are more than two trustees.992 The chairperson 
uses his or her deliberative vote in his or her capacity as trustee. The casting vote is 
used only to break a deadlock after all the trustees, including the chairperson, have cast 
their deliberative vote, and the votes are tied. If, for example, there are four trustees and 
there are equal votes for and against a particular motion then the chairperson can 
resolve the voting deadlock by exercising his or her casting vote in the direction that he 
or she favours. Jennifer Paddock has the view that the chairperson’s casting vote is to 
maintain the status quo. Her view is that the chairperson has the duty to remain neutral 
and therefore the casting vote should not be used to alter the existing position. 
Therefore if there are not sufficient votes to change the existing position, the 
                                            
991 Annexure 8 rule 62. 
992 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
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chairperson’s casting vote should be used to maintain the existing position.993 I do not 
believe that one person should be given the deciding vote to alter a position, but it is 
necessary that a decision be taken. The fact that the management rules provide that 
there should be at least two trustees,994 had the result that a casting vote had to be 
accorded to the chairperson. I am of the opinion that this confusion as to how the 
casting vote can be exercised could be solved by ensuring that there is always an 
uneven number of trustees as in China. In this way there will always be a majority vote.  
 
The chairperson can be removed from office by the body corporate by a resolution 
passed at a special general meeting, and also by the trustees by resolution of removal 
at a trustee meeting. In both cases this can only be done after due notice of the 
intended removal from office of the chairperson has been given.995 This new power 
given to the trustees to remove an inefficient or unpopular chairperson can be seen as a 
logical corollary to their power to elect a chairperson.996 It is also a much speedier 
procedure than having to convene a special general meeting for this purpose, and 
avoids having to get a majority vote of the body corporate, which could be cumbersome. 
This prevents the chairperson from abusing his or her position and is conductive to 
efficient administration of the scheme.997 The prior notification keeps the chairperson, 
trustees and the owner informed of the matter, and allows them to prepare for the 
meeting. It is also important to note that reasons do not have to be given for the removal 
of the chairperson.  
 
If the chairperson is removed from office as a trustee, he or she will also cease to be 
chairperson. However, the removal of a chairperson does not entail his dismissal as a 
trustee. If someone wishes to remove the chairperson from the office of chairperson and 
trustee it can be done by the body corporate in the general meeting taking an ordinary 
                                            
993 J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: Trustees voting deadlock” (September 2009) 4-9 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 5. 
994 Annexure 8 rule 4(1). 
995 Annexure 8 rule 19; J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: Removal of a chairperson” (March 2010) 5-3 
Paddocks Press Newsleter 6. 
996 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
997 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-136. 
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resolution to that effect.998 The intention to vote on the removal of the chairperson from 
both offices would have to be disclosed in the notice convening the meeting. The 
trustees can call a special general meeting for this purpose, or owners holding 25% of 
the quotas can request the trustees in writing to call such a meeting. If the trustees fail 
to do so within fourteen days of the request then the owners are entitled to convene the 
meeting themselves. If the chairperson is disqualified as a trustee in terms of 
management rule 13, he or she is automatically disqualified from the office of 
chairperson.999 If the chairperson vacates (resigns) or is removed from his or her office 
or is disqualified, the rules provide for the replacement of that chairperson. The trustees 
including the ex-chairperson must elect another chairperson from amongst their number 
for the remainder of the period of office of his or her predecessor.1000 This chairperson 
has the same voting rights.1001 
 
If a chairperson vacates the chair during the course of a trustee meeting or is not 
present or is unable, for whatever reason, to preside at any meeting, the trustees 
present at the meeting must choose a substitute and temporary chairperson for such 
meeting who shall have the same voting rights as the substituted chairperson.1002  
 
Although the chairperson may have more responsibility than the rest of the trustees, he 
or she alone does not have individual executive powers, and may not take decisions 
relating to the management of the scheme on his or her own. This task falls on the 
trustees as a collective group.1003 The chairperson should always consult with the 
trustees before making decisions to avoid any conflicts.  
7 2 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the members of an executive committee must, at their first meeting 
after they assume office, appoint a chairperson, secretary and treasurer of the executive 
                                            
998 Paddock (March 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
999 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-136. 
1000 Annexure 8 rule 20. 
1001 Annexure 8 rule 20. 
1002 Annexure 8 rule 21. 
1003 Maree (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 7-8. 
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committee.1004 There is no deadline as to when the executive committee must hold their 
first meeting after the committee members are appointed. However, the Adjudicator has 
the power to order a meeting. In practice the first election of the executive committee 
members is held at the first annual general meeting, but sometimes an extraordinary 
general meeting is held prior to the first annual general meeting in order to elect an 
executive committee.1005 It is permissible to appoint one person to more than one of 
these offices.1006  
 
There is no provision in the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act on the procedure 
governing the office bearers’ appointment and the appointment is usually by a simple 
vote on a show of hands. Once the chairperson, secretary and treasurer of the 
executive committee are appointed they also hold the respective offices of chairperson, 
secretary and treasurer in the owners corporation.1007 The original owner (developer) 
shall exercise the powers, authorities, duties and functions of the three office bearers 
until the expiration of the first annual general meeting or until those office bearers are 
appointed whichever happens first.1008 
 
The only requirement for eligibility for appointment to any of these offices is that a 
person must be a member of the executive committee. The powers and duties 
pertaining to these offices may still be delegated to a managing agent by the agency 
agreement.1009 In this way the owners corporation may delegate all the office bearers’ 
duties to the managing agent. The office bearers are often appointed simply to satisfy 
the Act’s requirements. In practice the office bearers act as communication links 
between the managing agent and the owners corporation.1010 
 
                                            
1004 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 18(1). 
1005 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3(c) and s 16(2). 
1006 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 18(3). 
1007 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 18(2). 
1008 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 24. 
1009 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 5(1) and s 29. 
1010 Ilkin NSW Strata 104. 
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The office bearers cease to hold office where they cease to be executive members;1011 
where the owners corporation receives written notice of their resignation from office1012 
or where another person is appointed by the executive committee to hold that office,1013 
whichever happens first. The executive committee may pass a majority resolution 
appointing another person to a particular office where that office bearer is not fulfilling 
his or her functions properly. 
 
The chairperson’s primary duty is to preside at all meetings of the executive committee 
and owners corporation.1014 This ensures the successful and lawful functioning of those 
meetings. The chairperson’s functions are treated separately when presiding over 
executive committee meetings and general meetings. At executive committee meetings 
the chairperson’s only duty is to preside.1015 If the chairperson is absent from the 
meeting then the executive committee members present at the meeting must appoint 
one of their number to preside over the meeting. The chairperson does not have a 
casting vote in relation to any motion, but may vote in his or her own right as a member 
of the executive committee.1016  
 
Schedule 2 of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act and regulations 17 and 18 
refer to the chairperson’s powers, authorities, duties and functions at general meetings 
of the owners corporation. The chairperson is allowed to declare out of order any 
motions or amendments that conflict with the Act or by-laws or that would be otherwise 
unlawful or unenforceable, or motions not mentioned in the meeting’s written 
agenda.1017 The chairperson is required to preside if present,1018 and if he or she is 
absent the people present and entitled to vote are required to elect a replacement for 
the meeting.1019 The chairperson does not have a casting vote in relation to any motion, 
                                            
1011 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 5(3)(a). 
1012 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 5(3)(b). 
1013 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 5(3)(c). 
1014 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 18 and sch 2, cl 15. 
1015 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 8(1). 
1016 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 8(2). 
1017 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 14. 
1018 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 15(1) 
1019 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 15(2). 
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but may vote in his or her own right if otherwise entitled.1020 The chairperson is required 
to announce the names of people entitled to vote on a motion, or the election of the 
executive committee members, before submitting the motion to the meeting, or holding 
the election only if requested to do so by a person present and entitled to vote.1021 The 
chairperson’s declaration of the result of a vote on any motion is final, unless a poll is 
requested.1022 A poll can be requested even after the chairperson has declared the 
result of the vote.1023 A valid general meeting of an owners corporation is held even if 
the chairperson is the only person present at the meeting, providing that the quorum 
provisions in clause 12 are satisfied.1024 For example if sufficient people entitled to vote 
give their proxy votes to the chairperson, who is the only person who attends, a quorum 
will still be formed. This is also the case where a general meeting is conducted by a 
chairperson who is also still the original owner of all the lots. Despite the above 
provisions the Act, regulations and by-laws are silent on many of the procedures a 
chairperson should follow.1025 
 
The secretary is the chief administrative officer and his or her specific powers and 
duties are primarily of a clerical nature as set out in the Act.1026 The secretary must 
prepare and distribute minutes of meetings of the owners corporation,1027 including a 
motion for confirmation of the minutes of the last general meeting.1028 Such a motion is 
not required in respect of minutes of executive committee meetings, although in practice 
it is often listed on the agenda notice. The secretary must give on behalf of the owners 
corporation and executive committee the notices required under the Act.1029 This 
includes notices of executive committee meetings, notices to convene general meetings 
                                            
1020 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 15(3). 
1021 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 16. 
1022 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 20. 
1023 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 19. 
1024 NSW Strata Schemes Management, Act sch 3, cl 21. 
1025 Ilkin NSW Strata 105. 
1026 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22. 
1027 S 22(a). Minutes of general meetings are distributed according to clause 33, schedule 2 while executive 
committee minute distribution duty is dealt with according to clause 12, schedule 3. 
1028 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 35(1)(a) and s 22(a). 
1029 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(b). 
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and levy contribution notices. The secretary must properly maintain the strata roll;1030 
make certain documents available for inspection1031 and answer all communication 
addressed to the owners corporation.1032 The secretary should retain copies of all 
correspondence for five years from the date of the correspondence.1033 The secretary 
must convene meetings of the executive committee and general meetings of the owners 
corporation1034 and attend to all administrative and secretarial tasks of the owners 
corporation and executive committee.1035 Where a duty has not been performed, the 
secretary will be bound to implement the task even without a resolution specifically 
nominating the secretary to do so. Examples of these duties are ensuring that the 
owners corporation’s tax returns are lodged; that all compulsory insurance policies are 
effected; that quotes are obtained for work to be done and that residents are given 
copies of the by-laws.  
 
Furthermore, the secretary must normally cause a noticeboard to be affixed to some 
part of the common property where one has not already been affixed by the developer. 
The secretary must give at least 72 hours’ notice of an executive committee 
meeting,1036 and must convene an executive committee meeting if requested to do so 
by not less than one-third of the executive committee members.1037 The secretary must 
ensure that the minutes of the executive committee meeting are complete and accurate 
and that they contain all the resolutions passed,1038 and either circulate these minutes 
or display them on the noticeboard.1039 The secretary must, with the treasurer, advise 
the chairperson, and is entitled to move a motion, nominate a person for election as an 
executive committee member or vote at an owners corporation meeting.1040 He or she 
                                            
1030 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 22(c) and 96. 
1031 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(d). 
1032 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(e). 
1033 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 104. 
1034 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(f). 
1035 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(g). 
1036 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6. 
1037 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6. 7(1). 
1038 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6. 12. 
1039 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6. NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6.16. 
1040 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6.l 9. 
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must include on the agenda of owners corporation meetings any motions received1041 
and bring to all owners corporation meetings the minute book, all necessary 
correspondence, the strata roll, any other relevant records and files and have the 
treasurer bring the levy register. The secretary has custody of all the scheme’s records 
apart from the accounting records and financial statements kept by the treasurer. The 
duties enumerated above are not exhaustive and the secretary may be required to 
perform numerous other duties. However, nothing in the Act precludes the secretary 
from seeking assistance from another committee member to help fulfill these duties.  
 
Most of the treasurer’s powers and duties are found in the NSW Strata Schemes 
Management Act.1042 The treasurer must notify the owners of any contributions levied 
pursuant to the Act1043 and must acknowledge receipt, bank and account for any 
moneys paid to the owners corporation1044 and prepare certain certificates requested 
from him.1045 The treasurer must keep the prescribed accounting records and prepare 
the prescribed financial statements as required in terms of the Act.1046 The treasurer 
must check the secretary list on the agenda of proposed executive committee and 
owners corporation meetings, for instance where the owner’s contributions are in 
arrears, in order to decide whether court recovery proceedings should be instituted and 
by whom and advise the chairperson at owners corporation meetings of these 
instances, by checking the levy register. This will enable the chairperson to announce 
the names of persons who are entitled to vote on a motion or elect executive committee 
members.1047  
 
Since the nature of maintaining the accounting and financial records is so complicated, 
and due to the desire to minimize the number of people who handle the owners 
corporation’s money, only six categories of persons may receive, expend, or account for 
                                            
1041 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 6.36. 
1042 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(1). 
1043 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(1)(a). 
1044 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(1)(b). 
1045 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(1)(c). 
1046 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(1)(d). 
1047 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 16. 
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moneys and keep books of account for the owners corporation.1048 One of these 
categories is a person who is a member of the owners corporation or the executive 
committee and is the treasurer of the owners corporation or the executive committee. 
The treasurer of an owners corporation may delegate the exercise of any of the 
treasurer’s functions (other than this power of delegation) to another member of the 
executive committee if the delegation is specifically approved by the executive 
committee of the owners corporation,1049 and the executive committee specifically 
approves of the function being delegated to that member of the executive 
committee,1050 and the delegation is subject to such limitations as to time or otherwise 
as the executive committee requires.1051 All or part of the treasurer’s duties, powers, 
authorities and functions can be assigned and may be subject to limitations such as 
deadlines approved by the executive committee. Whilst a delegate is so acting he or 
she is deemed to be the treasurer.1052  
 
The NSW Strata Schemes Management Act Act imposes numerous duties on those 
appointed by the executive committee to the positions of chairperson, secretary and 
treasurer. If there is not an executive committee the general meeting would not be in a 
position to delegate the day-to-day administration of the scheme to select persons, and 
the central administration of the scheme would be in disarray. The community of owners 
in general meeting would have to perform these duties, and undertake the numerous 
obligations imposed by the Act, regulations and by-laws for the benefit of the 
owners.1053 For example if there is no office of secretary, the general meeting will have 
to issue relevant notices to convene the meetings.1054 Section 19 provides a partial 
solution where a chairperson, secretary and treasurer are not appointed. An Adjudicator 
may, on application, make an order appointing a person nominated by the applicant 
(and who has consented to that nomination) to convene a meeting of the executive 
committee of the owners corporation if there is not a chairperson, secretary or treasurer 
                                            
1048 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 23 and 24. 
1049 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(2)(a). 
1050 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(2)(b). 
1051 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(2)(c). 
1052 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 23(3). 
1053 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 18(1); Ilkin NSW Strata 92, 98. 
1054 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 22(b); Ilkin NSW Strata 98. 
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of the executive committee of the owners corporation after the first meeting of the 
executive committee has been held.1055 The meeting is to be convened and held within 
such time as is specified in the order.1056 A meeting held under this section is taken to 
have been held by the executive committee of the owners corporation.1057 An order 
made under this section may include such ancillary or consequential provisions as the 
Adjudicator thinks fit.1058 If an order made under this section so provides, notice of the 
meeting may be given in the manner specified in the order.1059 An application under this 
section may be made only by an owner, mortgagee or covenant chargee of a lot in the 
relevant strata scheme.1060 This section has limited scope as it makes no provision for 
fulfilling the other duties that must be performed by the office bearers such as the 
preparation of minutes of meetings; maintaining of the strata roll; provision of section 
109 certificates;1061 answering of communications addressed to the owners corporation; 
notifying the owners of contributions due and payable and performing various other 
accounting and financial duties.  
 
In Singapore there are elaborate provisions regarding the chairperson, secretary and 
treasurer.1062 The members of the council must at the first meeting of the council after 
they assume office, appoint the office bearers where they were not appointed by the 
management corporation at its annual general meeting.1063 They must be natural 
persons.1064 An office bearer must be a member of the council,1065 and can be 
appointed to one or more of the offices.1066 An individual cannot be elected or appointed 
to hold office as the treasurer of a management corporation or that of a council for more 
                                            
1055 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19(1). 
1056 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19(2). 
1057 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19(3). 
1058 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19(4). 
1059 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19(5). 
1060 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19(6). 
1061 A section 109 certificate is a certificate by the owners corporation as to financial and other matters relating to the 
lot. 
1062 BMSMA s 55(1). 
1063 BMSMA s 55(2). 
1064 BMSMA s 53(1). 
1065 BMSMA s 55(3)(a) 
1066 BMSMA s 55(3)(b). 
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than two terms,1067 except in respect of a management corporation with ten or fewer lots 
if, and only if, the management corporation, by a resolution by consensus, concurs with 
the individual’s election or appointment as treasurer for each further executive term.1068  
 
As in New South Wales an office bearer shall hold office until he or she ceases to be a 
member of the council;1069 the management corporation receives from him a written 
notice of resignation1070 or another person is appointed by the council or by the general 
meeting to hold that office, whichever happens first.1071 In MCST Plan No 460 v Goldhill 
Properties (Pty) Ltd & Others1072 a resolution proposed by a proprietor (owner) at an 
extraordinary general meeting of the management corporation to remove the secretary 
of the council and to replace him with one of his own nominees was ruled out of order 
by the chairperson. The High Court held that the chairperson was not entitled to do so. 
The matter could also properly be dealt with at an extraordinary general meeting and 
not necessarily at an annual general meeting.1073 In Jayasooriah v MST Plan No 9831074 
a proprietor challenged his removal from the post of secretary of the council on the 
ground that his removal and replacement could not be done by the adoption of a motion 
of an extraordinary general meeting. The Strata Titles Board noted that although office 
bearers are normally elected at an annual general meeting, there was nothing to 
indicate that they could not be validly elected at an extraordinary general meeting. 
Given that office bearers could resign between annual general meetings soon after their 
election, it would be unworkable for a management corporation to have to wait for at 
least 12 months before having another election of office bearers. The extraordinary 
general meeting was convened to resolve all outstanding issues arising from the 
problems between the parties. The Board ruled that the extraordinary general meeting 
                                            
1067 BMSMA s 55(7). 
1068 Building Maintenance and Strata Management (Exempt Treasurers) Order 2005 (S 197/2005). 
1069 BMSMA s 55(4)(a). 
1070 BMSMA s 55(4)(b). 
1071 BMSMA s 55(4)(c). 
1072 [1991] 3 MLJ 247; Keang Sood Strata Title 311 - 312. 
1073 [1991] 3 MLJ 247 250; Keang Sood Strata Title 315 - 316. 
1074 STB Nos 9 & 10 of 1989, reported in Strata Titles Boards Decisions Singapore: FT Law & Tax 245; Keang 
Sood Strata Title 316. 
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was properly convened to elect the new office bearers so as to give life and meaning to 
the management corporation.1075  
 
An office bearer cannot resign until a meeting of the council is first convened for the 
purpose of appointing another person to fill his vacancy1076 or a general meeting is first 
convened for the purpose of electing another person to fill his vacancy.1077 Any 
purported resignation or vacation is deemed to be invalid.1078 In terms of the previous 
provision office bearers were not permitted to resign unless replacements were 
found.1079 This was unfair and punished those who were prepared to serve as office 
bearers and discouraged many subsidiary proprietors from serving as they could be 
held hostage by the apathy of other subsidiary proprietors. Presently, before the office 
bearer is allowed to resign a general meeting must first be convened to try to find a 
replacement. This serves the purpose to give notice to the general body that an office 
bearer is resigning and there is no one stepping forward to serve. The management 
corporation will have to bear liability incurred by the management corporation due to 
their general apathy. A proprietor may apply to the Strata Titles Board to compel the 
election and appointment of new office bearers. Office bearers are now allowed to 
resign even if it results in no members being left in the council. Therefore individual 
proprietors must bear the consequences for this possibility. If a management 
corporation carries on business without office bearers for more than six months every 
person who, for the whole or any part of that period, is a proprietor and knows that the 
management corporation is carrying on business in that manner is jointly and severally 
liable for the payment of all debts of the management corporation contracted during that 
period after those six months as the case may be, and may be sued for those debts.1080 
This acts as a deterrent for the management corporation to go without office bearers for 
too long. 
 
                                            
1075 STB Nos 9 & 10 of 1989, reported in Strata Titles Boards Decisions Singapore: FT Law & Tax 245 at 261. 
1076 BMSMA s 55(5)(a) 
1077 BMSMA s 55(5)(b). 
1078 BMSMA s 55. 
1079 LTSA s 62(4). 
1080 BMSMA s 55(6)(a) and (b).  
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In Singapore and Malaysia the chairperson’s primary function is to preside at all 
meetings of the council and at any general meetings of the management 
corporation.1081 In his or her absence at any such meeting the members present will 
appoint one of their number to preside at that meeting.1082 In Malaysia the chairperson 
has a casting and original vote.1083 In Singapore the chairperson is empowered to rule 
that a motion submitted at a general meeting is out of order if he or she considers that it 
would conflict with the BMSMA or the by-laws, or would otherwise be unlawful or 
unenforceable.1084 The chairperson’s declaration of the result of the voting on any 
proposal submitted at a general meeting, otherwise than on a poll, is conclusive without 
proof of the votes recorded for or against the proposal. 1085 
 
In Singapore the powers and duties of the secretary of the council include the 
preparation and distribution of minutes of meetings of the management corporation and 
the submission of a motion for the confirmation of the minutes of any meeting of the 
management corporation at the next meeting;1086 the giving of the required notices on 
behalf of the corporation and the council;1087 the maintenance of the strata roll;1088 
making documents available for inspection;1089 responding to communications 
addressed to the corporation;1090 the convening of meetings of the council and the 
management corporation1091 and the attending of matters of an administrative or 
secretarial nature in connection with the exercise of its functions.1092 The secretary must 
furthermore within 30 days of his or her appointment furnish the Commissioner of 
Buildings with written particulars of all persons elected or appointed to an office or as a 
                                            
1081 BMSMA s 55(1), First Schedule, para 6 and Second Schedule, para 1; Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, 
Second Schedule, para 4(3); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 4(3). 
1082 BMSMA, First Schedule, para 6 and Second Schedule, para 1; Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para13. 
1083 Strata Titles Act; Sarawak Ordinance and Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 4(3). 
1084 BMSMA, First Schedule, para 4. 
1085 BMSMA, First Schedule, para 10; Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para13(2); and Sabah Enactment, 
Second Schedule, para 14(2). 
1086 BMSMA s 56(a). 
1087 BMSMA s 56(b). 
1088 BMSMA s 56(c). 
1089 BMSMA s 56(d). 
1090 BMSMA s 56(e). 
1091 BMSMA s 56(f). 
1092 BMSMA s 56(g). 
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member of the council.1093 Failure to comply is an offence and the penalty on conviction 
is a maximum fine of Singaporean $3,000.1094 The secretary has no inherent power to 
contractually bind the management corporation, unless a resolution has been passed by 
the corporation or its council conferring this power. Any unauthorized act by the 
secretary is likely to be validated by subsequent ratification by the corporation or its 
council. Keang Sood recommends that the resolution be passed by the corporation or 
its council to confer the ability on the secretary to act to avoid the secretary’s personal 
liability to third parties in non-routine matters.1095 Alternatively a professional indemnity 
insurance policy can be taken out by the corporation to protect office bearers from 
personal liability.  
 
In Singapore the treasurer has powers and duties corresponding to those of his New 
South Wales counterpart. These include notifying of proprietors of any contributions 
levied pursuant to the BMSMA;1096 the receipt, acknowledgement and banking of, and 
accounting for any money paid to the corporation;1097 the preparation of certain 
certificates;1098 the keeping of the accounting records and the preparation of the 
financial statements of the corporation.1099 A person cannot exercise or perform the 
powers relating to the receipt or expenditure of, or accounting for moneys or the 
keeping of the books of account of the corporation unless he or she is a proprietor or a 
member of the council and is the treasurer of the corporation or council;1100 a managing 
agent who is empowered to exercise or perform those powers, duties and functions;1101 
or a person required by an order of the council to exercise or perform jointly with the 
treasurer of the management corporation those powers, duties or functions and who 
enables the treasurer to comply with the order.1102 
 
                                            
1093 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (S 192/2005), regs 9(1)(a)-(d) and 2(a)-(d). 
1094 Building Maintenance (Strata Management) Regulations 2005 (S 192/2005), reg 9(3). 
1095 Keang Sood Strata Title 319. 
1096 BMSMA s 57(1)(a). 
1097 BMSMA s 57(1)(b).  
1098 BMSMA s 57(1)(c). 
1099 BMSMA s 57(1)(d). 
1100 BMSMA s 57(2)(a). 
1101 BMSMA s 57(2)(b). 
1102 BMSMA s 57(2)(c).  
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In Re Robin Lane (Strata Titles Plan No 281)1103 the applicants as co-proprietors had 
alleged that the respondent was not authorised to sign cheques of the management 
corporation and sought reimbursement from him in respect of certain cheques that he 
had signed. As the expenditure was authorized by the management corporation, the 
Strata Titles Board was of the view that the respondent had not acted wrongly as a 
council member under the instruction of the council. The fact that there was no evidence 
to show that the respondent was one of the authorized signatories for the issuance of 
cheques was found not to be conclusive. The Board reasoned that even if the 
respondent was not the designated treasurer, he may be required by order of the 
council to exercise the powers and functions with the treasurer jointly.1104 Although such 
an order was not recorded in confused recording of the minutes of the council and 
general meetings, the Board concluded that such a decision might have been made as 
the respondent was also one of the authorized signatories for the management 
corporation’s bank.  
 
The council may by notice in writing served on the treasurer of the corporation order 
that he shall not exercise or perform any of the powers, duties or functions that are 
specified in the notice unless he does so jointly with another person who is so 
specified.1105 For example the treasurer may be ordered not to sign any cheques drawn 
on the management corporation’s bank accounts unless signed jointly with the 
secretary. The treasurer is empowered to delegate any of his powers duties or functions 
to another member of the council.1106  
 
The proprietors can apply to the Strata Titles Board to compel the election and 
appointment of new office bearers.1107 This might not solve the problem though, given 
the fact that the situation could have arisen due to owner apathy where proprietors did 
not want to be on the council. The fact that the powers, duties and functions of the office 
                                            
1103 [2005] SGSTB 2. 
1104 [2005] SGSTB 2 at 24. Under LTSA s 62(6)(c) which is materially the same as the BMSMA s 57(2)(c). 
1105 BMSMA s 57(5). 
1106 BMSMA s 57(3) and (4). 
1107 BMSMA s 102. 
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bearers may be exercised or performed by a managing agent on adoption of an 
ordinary resolution of the management corporation, is a way out of the impasse1108 
 
The UCIOA of the United States stipulates that an association’s by-laws require the 
election of the executive board members including a president, a treasurer, a secretary 
and any other officers.1109 The executive committee appoints standing committees to 
ease the board’s workload and to facilitate communication between the board and 
owners.1110 
7 3 Remuneration and reimbursement of expenses 
7 3 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows I will discuss the remuneration of trustees for rendering the services 
involved in the day-to-day management of the sectional title scheme. Important related 
topics are the amount of remuneration the trustee would be entitled to, and who would 
decide on the amount the trustee is entitled to be paid. I will also discuss the benefits 
and possible advantages of remunerating trustees. Following this I will set out whether 
trustees are entitled to be reimbursed for disbursements and expenses incurred in 
carrying out their duties and exercising their powers.  
7 3 2 The South African position 
 
The position of trustees is a voluntary one, and they often give their time and effort for 
free. Prescribed management rule 10 deals with trustee remuneration. It divides 
trustees into two categories, namely owner and non-owner trustees, and treats 
remuneration for each category differently.  
 
Trustees who are owners are not entitled to any remuneration for their services, unless 
otherwise determined by a special resolution of the body corporate.1111 This is probably 
                                            
1108 BMSMA s 67(3). 
1109 UCIOA § 3-106(a)(2). 
1110 Chen Chinese Condominium 144. 
1111 Annexure 8 rule 10(1). 
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based on the assumption that owners are willing to invest their free time and effort in 
order to ensure that the scheme is properly managed, and to give them a greater say in 
the decision making of the scheme’s management than the average owner.1112 The 
rules permit non-owner trustees to remuneration at an amount that is agreed on by the 
body corporate and the trustee.1113 Nominees of owners who are juristic persons may 
also be remunerated as these nominees are presumably in the same position as 
owners.1114 An alternate trustee who is not an owner must claim his remuneration, if 
any, from the trustee who he or she replaced and not from the body corporate, unless 
the body corporate has been instructed in writing by such trustee to pay any portion of 
his remuneration to the alternate trustee.1115  
 
An employee of the body corporate may be a trustee if he or she is an owner.1116 If such 
an owner employee, who is remunerated by the body corporate as such, is elected as a 
trustee it is still necessary to pass a special resolution to authorize payment to this 
professional owner trustee. This could cause problems though as such person now has 
a fiduciary duty to supervise his or her own work. These two positions are now 
inextricably linked.1117  
 
The body corporate is responsible for deciding how much a trustee should be paid. The 
remuneration of owner trustees could potentially be different in each case. This would 
be an expense that forms part of the body corporate's budget, and would have to be 
agreed to by owners at an annual general meeting. The remuneration of non-owner 
trustees will be at a rate as they have agreed upon with the body corporate. Whether 
the trustees are paid hourly, weekly, or monthly will also be something that is agreed 
upon between the trustees concerned and the body corporate.1118 
 
                                            
1112 J Paddock “Trustee remuneration – what’s the deal?” (March 2010) 5-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 3.  
1113 Annexure 8 rule 10(2). 
1114 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-130. 
1115 Annexure 8 rule 10(2).  
1116 Annexure 8 rule 5(b). 
1117 G Paddock “Q&A with the Professor: Remuneration of owner, trustee, employee” (December 2011) 6-12 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. 
1118 J Paddock (March 2010) 5-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
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Where owner apathy is a problem and owners do not want to stand as trustees, 
remuneration could be used as an incentive to induce owners to stand for election. This 
could have the effect of possibly removing any temptation on the part of the trustee to 
benefit from his or her position at the expense of the body corporate. The owners can 
pass a special resolution that the trustee must be remunerated. The owners should also 
specify the level of remuneration for the trustees at each annual general meeting. If no 
owner is prepared to stand as trustee, the body corporate may have to consider passing 
a resolution to authorize the payment to a professional and accountable person to act 
as trustee. In this way a person, other than the managing agent, is elected and the body 
corporate can hold that person to a detailed performance standard.1119 If none of the 
owners are willing to act as trustees, then an owner who is for example a retired person 
with administrative skills but who is not prepared to work for free, could perhaps be 
persuaded to act as a trustee for a lower amount of remuneration than would have to be 
paid to a skilled person in the open market.1120 The nature of the work will often allow 
such a person to continue to enjoy his or her retirement, in addition to spending a few 
hours a day or a few days a week giving the body corporate’s administration his or her 
full attention. Furthermore, the body corporate could pay owners to work part-time to 
help trustees in very busy periods for example when major repairs are being 
undertaken. This would be of particular application in schemes that do not employ 
managing agents.  
 
Both owner and non-owner trustees are entitled to be reimbursed for all disbursements 
and expenses actually and reasonably incurred by them in carrying out their duties and 
exercising their powers.1121 Examples of such expenses include phonecalls, petrol for 
travelling to meetings and stationery. Reimbursement should be given for attending 
training courses and professional body meetings. An interesting question is whether the 
cost of flight tickets for attending trustee meetings is considered reasonable. Different 
factors would need to be considered to answer this question. These factors include 
whether the issues dealt with a the meeting were such that the owners generally agree 
                                            
1119 G Paddocks (July 2009) 4-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 10. 
1120 J Paddock (March 2010) 5-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 3.  
1121 Annexure 8 rule 10(1) and (2). 
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could not have been dealt with without incurring the travelling expenses; whether the 
body corporate paid these expenses in the past; whether the trustees asked the owners 
in advance if they could spend the money; whether the expenses were budgeted for at 
the last annual general meeting and whether the trustees also enjoy some holiday time 
with their friends and family other than the meeting. If there is a genuine need or a clear 
understanding that the body corporate would cover the costs then the expense is 
reasonable. However, if the trustees derive personal benefit then the expense is not 
reasonable and is unrecoverable. If the owners in general meeting, by majority vote 
resolve to pay, then the body corporate can specifically budget for the expense.1122 
7 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the owners corporation is allowed to pay the chairperson, 
secretary, treasurer and any other member of the executive committee a sum of money 
in recognition of services performed in the period since the last annual general meeting, 
regardless of whether these persons are owners or non-owners of a lot (section).1123 
The amount is determined at the annual general meeting followed by a resolution 
authorizing the payment.  
 
The NSW Strata Schemes Management Act and Regulations do not set out the amount 
of the remuneration. If the services rendered are equivalent to those of the managing 
agent then the sum paid may be comparable. This would not carry a threat of the 
executive committee member being charged with a breach of section 20 of the Agents 
Act, which prohibits a person from acting or carrying on business of a managing agent 
unless he or she is licensed. There can be no payment in advance or for services 
performed prior to the last annual general meeting.1124  
 
                                            
1122 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Limit on trustee expenses” (January 2009) 4-1 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 9. 
1123 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 25. 
1124 Ilkin NSW Strata 111. 
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There is no provision on reimbursing a committee member for expenses incurred while 
rendering services. It could be that term “services” include both remuneration and 
reimbursements. This could have been indicated more clearly in the Act.  
7 4 Conclusion 
 
The South African prescribed management rules provide for the election of a 
chairperson at the first trustee meeting after their election as trustees.1125 The rules do 
not specifically provide for the appointment of any other office bearers such as a 
secretary or treasurer. However, the rules provide that, subject to the restrictions 
imposed or directions given at a general meeting, the trustees may delegate such of 
their powers and duties as they deem fit to one or more of their number and may at any 
time revoke such delegation.1126 The division of the trustees’ functions between a 
chairperson, secretary and treasurer will facilitate more efficient management, 
especially in larger schemes. Secretarial duties could be delegated to a secretary and 
financial duties to a treasurer from amongst their number.  
 
On the model of the New South Wales and Singapore legislation the powers and duties 
of the secretary could include among others the preparation and distribution of minutes 
of meetings; the dispatch of notices on behalf of the body corporate and the trustees; 
maintaining a list of all the members of the body corporate; the answering of letters 
addressed to the body corporate; the convening of meetings of the trustees and the 
body corporate and the attendance to all matters of an administrative and secretarial 
matters.  
 
The powers and duties of the treasurer could include among others, the notification of 
owners of any contributions levied under the Act; the receipt, acknowledgement and 
banking of and the accounting for any money paid to the body corporate; the keeping of 
the required accounting records and the preparation of the required financial 
statements.  
                                            
1125 Annexure 8 rule 18. 
1126 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
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It would facilitate better management if each trustee were delegated a specific portfolio. 
In this way each trustee would be responsible for a particular set of duties. For example 
a maintenance trustee could oversee any alterations or improvements and could 
regularily inspect the common property. A liason trustee could be responsible for all 
communications between owners, trustees and the managing agent. A division of 
functions, powers and duties along these lines amongst the trustees would facilitate 
more efficient administration, especially larger sectional title developments.1127 
 
The crucial question is, however, whether the South African industry would like to 
entrust these functions to the trustees in view of the fact that most of the trustees are 
unqualified owners or spouses of owners. Furthermore, the sectional title industry 
regards the role of trustees as essentially supervisory. The actual performance of these 
functions especially the financial functions are, in practice, dealt with by the managing 
agent, the auditor and the accounting officer. The lack of a specific rule to cater for the 
appointment of a secretary and a treasurer in the South African management rules is 
therefore not necessarily a shortcoming as South African sectional title practice has 
shown that these functions of the trustees are in actual fact delegated in most instances 
to more professional managing agents.  
 
Generally the trustees are expected to manage the scheme without any remuneration. 
This position is less than satisfactory. Trustees do not have an easy job. They must 
convene, attend, and chair various meetings; deal with and address correspondence 
from owners and various other persons; handle the finances and accounting records of 
the scheme and amend and enforce the scheme’s rules. In larger sectional title 
schemes the trustees should be remunerated for their time, effort and possible 
expertise. Trustees that have a genuine interest in the good management of the 
scheme deserve remuneration. The payment of remuneration to trustees may change 
the dynamics in a sectional title community. Trustees, who are paid for their services, 
would be more enthusiastic and could be held accountable for a more professional 
                                            
1127 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-132. 
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performance. They would also have to exercise a higher standard of care could and run 
the risk of being dismissed if they do not live up to the higher standard.  
 
The South African approach in letting owners decide on payment for services by 
trustees is best. This type of flexibility is a reflection of unit owner autonomy. 
Furthermore, allowing non-owner trustees to be remunerated is an effective measure to 
attract skillful and experienced outsider professionals to serve as trustees. Paying 
owner trustees can be included as a budget item in the agenda for general meetings 
and be approved at an annual or special general meeting by special resolution. 
 
Finally, it makes sence that the trustees should be reimbursed for all expenses 
reasonably and properly incurred in the exercise of their duties. Genuine expenses such 
as telephone calls, stamps, photocopies and the cost of stationery should be paid out of 
the administrative fund. Reimbursing the member who incurred reasonable expenses in 
rendering management services should be budgeted for as contributions to the 
administrative fund. 
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Chapter 8: Term of office of trustees 
 
8 1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I shall focus on the term of office of trustees. I will commence with a 
general discussion on the duration of the office of trustees. Then I will consider the 
question whether the trustees are competent to fill any vacancy in their number that 
arises during their period of office. This will be followed by a discussion of the necessity 
for alternate trustees to be appointed for a trustee who is absent or unable to act. The 
possibility of introducing a rotation system to rejuvenate the management structure will 
then be explored. Finally, I will discuss the instances that disqualify trustees from 
continuing in the office, and the circumstances under which a trustees’ office is 
terminated.  
8 2 Duration of office of trustees 
8 2 1 South African position 
 
The trustees, once elected, hold office until the next annual general meeting, at which 
time they are eligible for re-election if properly nominated.1128 The body corporate can 
adopt rules that provide that in the event of no nominations being received the existing 
trustees are deemed to have been re-elected. This presupposes that none of the 
existing trustees have handed in their resignation. This alternative procedure avoids the 
need for annual elections that are time-consuming and require nominations.1129 
8 2 2 Comparative survey 
 
The position in New South Wales, Singapore and Malaysia is similar to the South 
African position. The executive committee or council (trustees) holds office until the next 
annual general meeting. In New South Wales a member of executive committee 
vacates office at the end of the next annual meeting at which time a new executive 
                                            
1128 Annexure 8 rule 6. 
1129 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-128. 
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committee is elected by the owners corporation.1130 In Singapore the members of the 
council retire from office at the conclusion of the next annual general meeting, but a 
retiring member of the council is eligible for re-election.1131 Furthermore, a member of 
the council vacates office at the end of the next annual general meeting where a new 
council is elected by the management corporation or upon the election at a general 
meeting of another person to that office, if earlier.1132 In Malaysia a member of the 
council ceases to hold office at the next annual general meeting where he is not re-
elected.1133 
 
Although Chinese national law law is silent on the term of office of a council member, a 
local property management regulation states that the term of office for the executive 
council is three years to five years,1134 while another regulation states that a council 
member’s term of office is three years.1135 
8 3 Filling of vacancies 
8 3 1 South African position 
 
In South Africa the trustees may fill any vacancy in their number that arises during their 
period of office. Any trustee appointed to fill a vacancy holds office until the next annual 
general meeting when he or she retires, and be eligible for re-election as though he or 
she had been elected at the previous annual general meeting.1136  
 
In Williams v Nathan and others1137 the court stated that “vacancy in number” refers to a 
vacancy brought about if one of the elected trustees for any reason ceases to act as 
such. The court further stated that the relevant rule does not entitle existing trustees in 
                                            
1130 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(d). 
1131 BMSMA s 53(5). 
1132 BMSMA s 54(1)(e).  
1133 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 2(1). 
1134 Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004 art 14. 
1135 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 2007 art 14.  
1136 Annexure 8 rule 8. 
1137 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-128; [2006] JOL 18414 (W) para 33. 
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effect to elect additional trustees. Under prescribed management rule 6 the election of 
additional trustees is the prerogative of the body corporate.1138  
8 3 2 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales where a vacancy occurs in the office of a member of an executive 
committee the owners corporation must seek to appoint an eligible person to fill the 
vacancy.1139 A vacancy can occur when an owner ceases to be an owner in the 
scheme; where the nominating owner ceases to be an owner in the scheme; where 
there is loss of support by the nominator; where the executive committee member 
resigns from office or where the executive committee member vacates office after the 
owners corporation passed a special resolution requiring such termination. If this 
vacancy is caused by the fact that all the existing committee members automatically 
ceased to hold office at the end of the next annual general meeting, when a new 
executive committee is elected by the owners corporation,1140 then the provisions on 
how a vacancy should be filled are not applicable.  
 
The vacancy can be filled in the following three ways: the owners corporation can by 
ordinary resolution appoint a replacement;1141 the executive committee with the required 
competence can by majority resolution appoint a replacement1142 and the managing 
agent, duly authorized in the agency agreement or resolution of appointment, can 
record a decision in the owners corporation’s minute book that a replacement has been 
appointed. If the appointment is made by the latter two methods the cumbersome 
nomination and election procedures in regulations 17 and 181143 need not be followed, 
and the procedure can be replaced by any other convenient method on condition that 
the eligible person must consent to the nomination either verbally or in writing. This 
person will hold office for the balance of the predecessor’s term.1144 
                                            
1138 Para 34. 
1139 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 4(2); Ilkin NSW Strata 102. 
1140 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 4(1)(d). 
1141 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 4(2). 
1142 NSW Strata Schemes Management, sch 3, cl 4(2). 
1143 I discuss the procedures of regulations 17 and 18 at chapter 3 4 3. 
1144 Ilkin NSW Strata 102-103. 
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In Singapore a vacancy in the office of the chairperson, secretary or treasurer or other 
member of the council may be filled by the remaining members of the council appointing 
a person eligible for election to fill the vacancy. The remaining council members will 
constitute a quorum at a meeting of the council for the purpose only of appointing a 
person to fill a vacancy in the office of the chairperson, secretary, treasurer or other 
member of council, or for convening a general meeting of the management corporation 
for that purpose.1145 Any person appointed to fill a vacancy, will hold the office for the 
balance of his predecessor’s term of office.1146   
 
In Malaysia a member of the council may also resign his or her office at any time by 
giving the management corporation a notice in writing of his resignation as member.1147 
For such a vacancy, the remaining members may appoint another proprietor to be a 
member until the next annual general meeting.1148  
 
The UCIOA states that an executive board may fill any board vacancies for the 
remaining period of any term.1149 
8 4 Alternate trustees 
8 4 1 South African position 
 
In South Africa owners can appoint another person as a proxy to attend general 
meetings. In contrast trustees cannot appoint a proxy to attend trustee meetings on their 
behalf. The trustees may, however, appoint an alternate trustee in the place of a trustee 
who is absent or unable to act as a trustee.1150 This alternate can then protect the 
interests of the trustee, or those of the owners whom the trustee represents. Examples 
of situations where trustees are absent or unable to act as trustee are where they plan 
                                            
1145 BMSMA s 54(4)(a) and (b). 
1146 BMSMA s 54(3). 
1147 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 2(4); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 
2(5). 
1148 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 2(5); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 
2(6). 
1149 UCIOA § 3-106(b). 
1150 Annexure 8 rule 9. 
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to go overseas or on a holiday or have another commitment. An alternate trustee need 
not be an owner.1151 Once appointed, an alternate trustee has the powers and is subject 
to the duties of a trustee.1152 An alternate trustee ceases to hold office if the trustee, 
whom he or she replaces, ceases to be a trustee or if the trustees revoke the alternate 
trustee’s appointment.1153  
8 3 2 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales an executive committee member may suggest a substitute 
(alternate) if he or she anticipates being unable to attend one or more committee 
meetings.1154 The appointment as substitute must then be confirmed by a formal 
resolution passed by the executive committee. A committee member anticipating an 
absence and seeking an appointment of a substitute would have to contact the 
secretary to arrange for an appropriate motion to be added to the agenda of the next 
executive committee meeting, where a majority vote is needed for the motion to be 
successful. A substitute can only be an owner, co-owner1155 or a company nominee of a 
corporation that is an owner. Furthermore, a substitute can be an existing committee 
member, provided that the appointee is also an owner or the company nominee of a 
corporate owner.1156 The substitute committee member will then receive two votes on 
any motion or agenda item.1157 The substitute can vote according to his or her own 
discretion, unless the absent committee member has directed the substitute on how to 
vote on certain specific or all matters. When the substitute acts in the place of a 
member then he or she is deemed to be a committee member.1158 The committee 
member is still a committee member during their absence. That could mean that the 
total number of committee members could exceed the usual maximum of nine or 
                                            
1151 Annexure 8 rule 9(1). 
1152 Annexure 8 rule 9(2). 
1153 Annexure 8 rule 9(3). 
1154 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3(1); Ilkin NSW Strata 101. 
1155 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(5)(a). 
1156 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3(3). 
1157 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3(4). 
1158 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 3(2). 
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whichever number had been resolved upon at a previous meeting of the owners 
corporation.1159  
8 5 Rotation of trustees 
 
The prescribed management rules do not provide for the rotation of trustees. This leads 
to a tendency to re-elect existing trustees. Van der Merwe suggests that a system of 
rotation needs to be introduced to ensure continuity and the opportunity for an infusion 
of new blood.1160 A body corporate could, for example, adopt a rule whereby one third of 
the existing trustees should resign or retire at each annual general meeting. This will 
rejuvenate the management structure and avoid the risk of incompetent council 
members being retained in office for too long, and of trustees, who remain in office for 
too long, abusing their position.  
 
Alternatively, a rule could set out a maximum term which any trustee may serve before 
becoming ineligible for re-election. Such a rule will prevent trustees from being re-
elected indefinitely. In this way the trusteess who retire or resign by rotation are those 
who have served on the board the longest. Such a system of rotation will maintain a 
majority of experienced trustees in office, while providing for an infusion of new 
members.  
 
However, the fact that many schemes struggle to find owners willing to act as trustees 
militates against the introduction of a system of rotation. To limit the number of terms a 
willing trustee may be re-elected might hinder the effective management of the scheme. 
These two sides must be considered carefully before introducing a system of rotation of 
trustees in a sectional title scheme. Providing adequate provisions for the removal of 
incompetent trustees can mitigate these concerns.  
 
The Memorandum of Incorporation of a company generally provides that a certain 
number or percentage of directors resigns every year and offer themselves for re-
                                            
1159 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(2). 
1160 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-131. 
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appointment. The purpose of such a provision is that the shareholders will actively 
consider whether the director is performing according to their expectations, and refuse 
to appoint directors whose performance is not up to standard. Any re-appointment is 
only valid once the director has provided written consent to serve as a director. 
8 6 Disqualification of trustees to continue in office  
8 6 1 The South African position 
 
The South African management rules stipulate seven instances in which an existing 
trustee is disqualified from continuing in office. In six of these instances he or she is 
automatically disqualified from continuing in office. In the seventh instance a resolution 
of the general meeting is required to remove him or her from office, provided that the 
intention to vote upon the removal from office has been specified in the notice 
convening the meeting. The first five instances where the trustee automatically ceases 
to hold office are where he or she resigns in the form of a written notice to the body 
corporate;1161 where he or she becomes of unsound mind;1162 where he or she 
surrenders his or her estate as insolvent or his or her estate is sequestrated;1163 where 
if he or she is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty1164 or where he or she 
becomes disqualified from being appointed or acting as a director of a company in 
terms of sections 218 and 2191165 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.1166 
 
The prescribed management rule dealing with trustee disqualification has recently been 
amended by the Amendment Regulation of 2013,1167 to add a sixth instance of 
automatic disqualification to continue in office. Prescribed management rule 13(g) has 
been inserted to read as follows:  
 
                                            
1161 Annexure 8 rule 13(a). 
1162 Annexure 8 rule 13(b).  
1163 Annexure 8 rule 13(c).  
1164 Annexure 8 rule 13(d).  
1165 Now section 69 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Briefly these provisions are general principles to disqualify a 
person being a director of a company such as minority, un-rehabilitated insolvency, and removal from office of trust 
on account of misconduct. 
1166 Annexures 8 rule 13(f). This provision should be amended to make reference to the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
1167 Published in GN R 196 in GG 36421 of 14-03-2013. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 226 
“A trustee shall now cease to hold office as such if he is in arrears for more than 
60 days with any levies and contributions payable by him in respect of his unit or 
exclusive use area (if any) and he fails to bring such arrears up to date within 
seven days of being notified in writing to do so.”1168 
 
Therefore, if a duly appointed trustee later defaults in levy payments his or her 
appointment will automatically lapse if he defaults and fails to comply with the notice. 
This complements and tightens up the embargo on the nomination and election of 
trustees who are in arrears in the new prescribed management rule 7.1169  
 
The final and last instance where a trustee ceases to hold office is where he or she is 
removed by a resolution passed by a simple majority at a special general meeting of a 
body corporate.1170 The resolution would have to be passed at a special general 
meeting since the trustee holds office until the next annual general meeting. The 
intention to vote upon the removal of a particular trustee from office must be specified in 
the notice convening the meeting. Any person entitled to vote at a general meeting can 
presumably submit a motion to the trustees to have that person removed as trustee if 
that trustee, for example, regularly fails to attend trustee meetings, or fails to perform 
any functions conferred on him or her. A non-owner trustee who is entitled to 
remuneration for his services in terms of a contract with the body corporate may have a 
claim for damages if the body corporate breaches that contract by removing him or her 
from office without sufficient cause.1171 
 
At a general meeting the body corporate may appoint another trustee in the place of any 
trustee who has ceased to hold office in terms of prescribed management rule 13, for 
the unexpired part of the term of office of the trustee so replaced.1172 
 
                                            
1168 Annexure 8 rule 13(g). 
1169 Maree (April 2013) MSC Courier 2; Maree (July 2015) MSC Courier 1-2. 
1170 Annexure 8 rule 13(e). This option is set out in paragraph 8 of Body Corporate of Fish Eagle v Group Twelve 
Investments 2003 (5) SA 414 (W). 
1171 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-129. 
1172 Annexure 8 rule 14. 
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8 6 2 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales there are seven instances where an executive committee member 
automatically ceases to be a member of the committee.1173 These instances include 
where an owner committee member ceases to be an owner for instance by selling his 
lot;1174 where the nominator of a committee member or a corporation whose nominee is 
a committee member ceases to be the owner of a lot in the scheme; 1175 where the 
nominator of a non-owner committee member or the corporation whose nominee is a 
committee member notifies the owners corporation in writing that the committee 
member’s office is terminated;1176 where a committee member sends a written notice of 
his or her resignation to the owners corporation;1177 where all existing executive 
committee members automatically cease to hold office at the end of the next annual 
general meeting and a new executive committee is elected;1178 where the owners 
corporation passes a special resolution requiring that an executive committee member 
vacates his or her position1179 and finally where another person is elected as a 
committee member at a general meeting in the place of an executive committee 
member who was elected before the first annual general meeting.1180  
 
In the second last instance all or any of the existing committee members can be 
removed from office by a special resolution of the owners corporation.1181 Due to the 
fact that this is a restricted matter, neither the executive committee itself nor a managing 
agent has the power to terminate a member’s office. The reasons for termination could 
be the committee member’s bankruptcy, mental ill-health, irregular attendance of 
committee meetings or performance of tasks or conviction of embezzlement.  
                                            
1173 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cls 2(7)(d) and 4(1); Ilkin NSW Strata 101. 
1174 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(a). 
1175 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(b). 
1176 Cl 4(1)(b). No reasons for terminating the member’s office need to be supplied. The loss of support could be on 
account of the committee member’s bankruptcy, mental ill-health, irregular attendance of committee meetings or 
performance of tasks, or conviction of embezzlement. 
1177 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(c). 
1178 Cl 4(1)(d). 
1179 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(e); NSW Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973 s 72(1)(f) also 
required a special resolution for the trustee to be removed from office. 
1180 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 2(7)(d). 
1181 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(3). 
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In Singapore the BMSMA specifies twelve instances where the chairperson, secretary 
or treasurer or another member of a council must vacate their office. Many of the 
instances are the same as under the New South Wales Act. A member will vacate office 
if he or she was a proprietor at the time of appointment or election and he or she ceases 
to be a proprietor;1182 where he or she was nominated by a proprietor, and that 
proprietor ceases to be a proprietor;1183 or notifies the management corporation in 
writing that a member’s office is terminated;1184 where a member fails to attend three 
consecutive meetings of the council without having first obtained the council’s 
permission to be or to remain absent therefrom;1185 where the management corporation 
receives a written letter of resignation from a council member1186 or where a new 
council is elected by the management corporation at an annual general meeting or upon 
the election at a general meeting of another person to that office, if earlier. 1187 Finally, a 
member will no longer be a member if the management corporation removes him or her 
from office;1188 he or she dies;1189 or becomes mentally disordered in terms of the 
Mental Disorders and Treatment Act1190 or is convicted by a court in Singapore or 
elsewhere of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty.1191   
 
Furthermore, a management corporation may remove a council member from office 
without a general meeting where the member is proprietor and is in arrears for more 
than three months with the payment of all or any part of his contributions or any other 
moneys levied or recoverable by the management corporation in respect of his or her 
lot.1192 The same applies in a case of a nominee of a company that is in arrears to the 
same extent in respect of the lot.1193 In any other case a management corporation may 
remove a member from office by ordinary resolution at a general meeting, on grounds 
                                            
1182 BMSMA s 54(1)(a). See Kwang Sood Strata Title 337. 
1183 BMSMA s 54(1)(b)(i). 
1184 BMSMA s 54(1)(b)(ii). 
1185 BMSMA s 54(1)(c). The granting of permission cannot be withheld unreasonably. 
1186 BMSMA s 54(1)(d). 
1187 BMSMA s 54(1)(e). 
1188 BMSMA s 54(1)(g). 
1189 BMSMA s 54(1)(h). 
1190 BMSMA s 54(1)(i). 
1191 BMSMA s 54(1)(j). 
1192 BMSMA s 54(2)(a)(i). 
1193 BMSMA s 54(2)(a)(ii). 
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that include misconduct, neglect of duty, incapacity or failure satisfactorily to carry out 
the duties of his office.1194  
 
Under the Malaysian Strata Titles Act a member of the council ceases to hold office at 
the next annual general meeting.1195 Except where the council consists of all the 
proprietors, the management corporation may by resolution at an extraordinary general 
meeting remove a member of the council before the expiration of his or her term of 
office and appoint another proprietor in his or her place until the next annual general 
meeting.1196 A member of the council may also resign from office at any time by giving 
the management corporation a written notice of his resignation as member.1197  
 
Under Chinese law the existing council members can be removed from office when the 
member is no longer a unit owner due to the fact that the unit has been sold or 
demolished; is absent from three or more consecutive council meetings without good 
cause; is not capable of performing his or her duties due to a serious physical or mental 
disease; has been convicted of a criminal offence; resigns from office by written notice 
or refuses to comply with his or her responsibilities as an owner such as paying  
contributions.1198  
8 7 Recovery of books and records from previous trustees 
 
Some sectional title schemes have experienced problems in recovering the books, 
records and property of the body corporate from a trustee or secretary once he or she is 
no longer in office. This problem can stem from the fact that the body corporate may 
refuse to reimburse the trustee for out of pocket expenses incurred while in office. 
Trustees owe the body corporate a fiduciary duty, and should not leave the body 
corporate in a position where they do not have access to the books and records.  
                                            
1194 BMSMA s 54(2)(b)(i)-(iii). 
1195 Strata Titles Act, Second Schedule, para 2(1). 
1196 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 2(3); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 
2(4). 
1197 Strata Titles Act and Sarawak Ordinance, Second Schedule, para 2(4); Sabah Enactment, Second Schedule, para 
2(5). 
1198 Regulation of the Owners’ General Meetings of 2003 art 30; Chen Chinese Condominium Law 151. 
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In New South Wales there is a provision that contains a comprehensive procedure in 
situations where the owners corporation has difficulties in recovering books, records, 
accounts and other property from former officers.1199 The executive committee must 
give notice to a person who has possession or control of the property of the owners 
corporation requiring the person to deliver the property to the executive committee. The 
person must then, within seven days after receiving the notice, deliver that property to a 
member of the executive committee specified in the notice.1200 Such a defaulter may be 
prosecuted and can be fined on conviction. The records and property can be recovered 
amongst others from the chairperson, secretary, treasurer, a committee member, the 
original owner (developer), an owner, a tenant, a caretaker, the accountant, auditor, 
surveyor, valuer, bank officer, or solicitor.1201 Caution must be exercised before serving 
such a notice on the original owner prior to the holding of the first annual general 
meeting due to the fact that the legislation does not require the original owner to deliver 
various documents until the holding of the first annual general meeting. It is therefore 
debatable if these records are “property” of the owners corporation before the first 
annual general meeting.1202  
 
To recover the property the executive committee must adopt a resolution to this effect 
and prepare a notice of the resolution. If the notice is sent by personal service the first 
seven days is computed from the day after service has been effected and if the seventh 
day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday delivery of the property or records may be 
done on the first day thereafter that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday.1203 In Wuff v 
Hudson1204 the Court held that the offence will be committed if the property is not 
returned by midnight on the seventh day after the notice was served. The court 
reasoned that the offence was neither a form of strict liability nor an offence based on 
                                            
1199 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 105. 
1200 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 105(1). 
1201 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 105(1) confers an identical power on the executive committee in 
respect of strata managing agents. 
1202 Ilkin NSW Strata 117. 
1203 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 36; Ilkin NSW Strata 108. 
1204 Unreported, Penrith Local Court, 14 November 1991, sc no 21; Ilkin NSW Strata 117-118. 
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intention, but rather based on carelessness or recklessness.1205 If the property or 
records have not been delivered within this time frame the owners corporation should 
pass a resolution to instruct the secretary to request the local court to commence 
prosecution proceedings in the name of the owners corporation.1206 
 
In Singapore the BMSMA contains a similar provision. A person who has possession or 
control of any records, books of account or keys belonging to a management 
corporation,1207 or the strata roll kept by a management corporation,1208 or any other 
property of a management corporation1209 must within seven days after service to him of 
notice of a resolution of the council requiring him to do so deliver those records or books 
of account or keys or strata roll and other property to the member of the council 
specified in the notice.1210 Every management corporation retains all its records, books 
of account and such other documents relating to any of its transactions or operations for 
a period of not less than five years from the end of the financial year in which the 
transactions or operations to which those documents relate are completed.1211  
8 8 Conclusion 
 
Regarding the duration of office of trustees most of the selected jurisdictions provide 
that the trustees, once elected, hold office until the next annual general meeting. I 
suggest that, for the sake of continuity in management, a longer term may be 
considered, especially in large or mixed-use schemes.1212 Naturally a trustee can still be 
removed from office by a resolution of the general meeting before the end of his or her 
term of office on account of non-performance of his or her duties to the standard 
required by the body corporate.  
                                            
1205 Under section 73(6) of the 1973 Act (being the equivalent of section 105(1) of the New South Wales Strata 
Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996.) 
1206 This provision does not take away or affect any claim or lien or other rights that a person has against the 
property: NSW Schemes Management Act s 105(3). 
1207 BMSMA s 48(1)(a). 
1208 BMSMA s 48(1)(b). 
1209 BMSMA s 48(1)(c). 
1210 BMSMA s 48(1). 
1211 BMSMA s 48(2). Any management corporation which, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with this 
shall be guilty of an offence in terms of section 48(3). 
1212 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 151 suggests a three year term. 
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In South Africa it is assumed that a vacancy in the number of trustees must be filled by 
the body corporate. This is confirmed in Williams v Nathan and others1213 which relies 
on prescribed management rule 6, dealing with the election of the trustees, that the 
election of trustees is the prerogative of the body corporate. This debars existing 
trustees to appoint additional trustees to fill a vacancy. I do not agree with this view. 
Prescribed management rule 8 stipulates: 
 
“The trustees may fill any vacancy in their number. Any trustees so appointed 
shall hold office until the next annual general meeting when he shall retire and be 
eligible for re-election as though he had been elected at the previous annual 
general meeting.” (My emphasis added.) 
 
In my opinion prescribed management rule 8 clearly and unambiguously states that the 
trustees may fill the vacancy in their number. The fact that the rule refers to such a 
trustee being “appointed” and not “elected,” and that he will be eligible to be “re-elected 
as if he had been elected” implies that the trustee is not nominated and elected 
according to prescribed management rule 6 in the usual manner by the body corporate. 
In my view the trustees can appoint the trustee to fill the vacancy.  
 
This is also the position in the foreign jurisdictions that I examined. In New South Wales 
the executive committee is competent to pass a resolution to appoint a new committee 
member, provided that the general meeting has not removed this power from the 
committee.1214 Furthermore, the managing agent, who has been conferred the required 
power in the agency agreement or resolution of appointment, can appoint the new 
committee member by recording the replacement in the minute book of the owners 
corporation. This is also the case in Singapore and Malaysia. Therefore, I submit that 
these additional trustees be appointed by the existing trustees, and not by the body 
corporate in general meeting. 
 
                                            
1213 [2006] JOL 18414 (W) para [34]. 
1214 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(2). 
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There is also confusion as to whether an alternate trustee must be appointed by the 
trustees collectively or by the trustee who would not be able to attend meetings for a 
certain period.1215 Prescribed management rule 9(1) states:  
 
“The trustees may appoint another person, whether or not he be the owner of a 
unit, to act as an alternate trustee during the absence or inability to act as a 
trustee.” (My emphasis added.) 
 
From this it appears that it is the trustees collectively that must appoint the alternate. 
This is not always fair as the trustees are often divided into two camps representing 
different groups of owners. The trustees can then collectively choose an alternate who 
is sympathetic to the opposing camp’s views, without the consent of the absent trustee. 
Another argument is that an alternate trustee, who is not an owner, must claim his or 
her remuneration, if any, from the trustee who he or she replaced and not from the body 
corporate, unless the body corporate has been instructed in writing by such trustee to 
pay any portion of his remuneration to the alternate trustee.1216 The absent trustee 
could thus be hit with a bill for services rendered by an alternate trustee in whose 
appointment he or she had no say. It is suggested that the individual trustee should be 
allowed to appoint his or her own alternate especially if he or she was elected to serve a 
certain section of the sectional title community. It should not be left to the trustees 
collectively to appoint the trustee alone, as it could lead to inequitable results.1217  
 
Further incidental support for this view is found in prescribed management rule 15(1) 
which stipulates:  
 
“It shall not be necessary to give notice of a meeting of trustees to any trustee for 
the time being absent from the Republic, but notice of any such meeting shall be 
given to his alternate, if he has appointed one, where such an alternate is in the 
Republic.” (My emphysis added.) 
                                            
1215 T Maree “Appointment of alternate trustees – an alternate view” (April 2010) 36 MCS Courier 13. 
1216 Annexure 8 Rule 10(2). 
1217 Maree (April 2010) MCS Courier 14. 
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I submit that the individual trustee who is absent or unable to act as such must appoint 
the alternate trustee. In this way the alternate trustee will represent the interests of the 
trustee that he or she is replacing. I further submit that individual trustees should 
appoint alternates at the first trustee meeting after the annual general meeting to act in 
their absence or inability to act. The proposed alternates could then be voted upon and 
approved by the trustees collectively, when the occasion arises.1218  
 
It has been argued that bodies corporate should adopt a rotation system of trustees in 
terms of which one-third of the trustees resign or retire at every subsequent annual 
general meeting. In this way a majority of experienced trustees will remain in office, 
while providing for an infusion of new members. Another rule could set out a maximum 
term which any trustee may serve before becoming ineligible for re-election, which 
prevents trustees from being re-elected indefinitely. In view of the practical difficulty in 
finding persons willing to act as trustees, a limit on the number of terms a willing trustee 
may be re-elected might jeopardize the effective management of the scheme. Providing 
adequate provisions for the removal of incompetent trustees can mitigate this concern. 
 
With regard to the disqualification of trustees to continue in office, I have shown that the 
foreign jurisdictions discussed provide, similar to the South African legislation, a few 
instances where trustees are automatically disqualified from continuing in office, as well 
as a provision that the general meeting may pass a resolution to remove a trustee from 
office. 
 
From my comparative survey I have shown that one of the instances where an existing 
trustee automatically ceases to hold office is when he or she is no longer owner of a 
unit. This ground for removal only seems appropriate in jurisdictions that require that all 
trustees must be owners or spouses of owners. By contrast, the South African 
management rules only require that the majority of trustees must be owners or spouses 
of owners.1219 To introduce a provision that existing trustees will cease to trustees if 
                                            
1218 Maree (April 2010) MCS Courier 14.  
1219 Annexure 8 rule 5(a). 
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they are no longer owners of their units would involve a deletion of the above 
requirement and, with it, the opportunity to elect professional outsiders to serve on the 
board of trustees. The inclusion of this rule into the South African model rules does not 
merit any consideration.  
 
Most of the other instances of automatic disqualification to continue in the office of 
trustee, mentioned in the South African management rules, correspond more of less 
with the instances mentioned in the foreign jurisdictions. One difference is that the 
Chinese provision sets out that council member automatically ceases to hold office 
where he or she has been convicted of any crime, while the South African approach is 
that trustees only automatically cease to hold office when they have been convicted of 
an offence involving dishonesty.1220 The Chinese approach to the circumstances under 
which a trustee is removed from office is therefore a more stringent approach than the 
South African position on the removal of trustees. The reason why Chinese law needs 
to be strict regarding the council member’s dismissal is to maintain a balance between 
the continuity of the member’s office and the timely removal of incompetent council 
members.1221 The reason why the South African legislation is not as strict regarding 
trustees removal is due to the fact that sectional title unit owners struggle to get 
members willing to serve as trustees. I prefer the South African approach. If, for 
example, a Chinese council member is convicted of drunken driving he or she will 
automatically cease to hold the office as trustee despite the fact that the criminal 
conviction of drunken driving would not affect a trustee’s ability to manage the scheme. 
It should therefore not lead to the automatic disqualification for holding the office as 
trustee. An offence involving fraud or dishonesty does however affect the trustee’s 
suitability to continue to hold a position of trust in the scheme and to manage the 
scheme in the best interests and for the benefit of the body corporate. A trustee’s 
competence to handle the funds of the scheme honestly and in good faith could be 
called into question when he or she has been convicted of an offence involving 
dishonesty his or her. A commentator notes that trustees are automatically disqualified 
                                            
1220 Annexure 8 rule 13(d).  
1221 Chen Chinese Condominium Law152. 
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from holding office only when they are convicted of an offence involving dishonesty 
while serving as trustee, and not if they have been convicted of such an offence before 
they became trustees.1222 
 
An instance of automatic disqualification to continue in the office of trustee worth 
considering for adoption as a management rule in South Africa is the provision in the 
respective Singapore and Chinese legislation that a trustee must automatically cease to 
hold office on failure to attend three consecutive meetings of the board of trustees 
without the board’s permission, which may not be withheld unreasonably. Furthermore, I 
suggest the adoption of the Singaporean provision where a body corporate may so 
remove a member from office by ordinary resolution at a general meeting, including on 
the grounds of misconduct, neglect of duty or incapacity or failure to carry out 
satisfactorily the duties of his office.1223 I suggest that a provision that requires a trustee 
to vacate office for reason of his or her dereliction of duty should be included in the 
management rules of South Africa. Such cavalier and blatant disregard for the office of 
trustee and dereliction of the interest of the community should not entitle the trustee 
concerned to continue in office. 
 
In terms of the amended prescribed management rule 13 a trustee must cease to hold 
office as such if he or she is in arrears for more than 60 days with any levies and 
contributions payable by him in respect of his unit or exclusive use area (if any) and he 
fails to bring such arrears up to date within seven days of being notified in writing to do 
so.1224 This is a splendid addition to the provisions relating to the automatic 
disqualification of existing trustees to continue in office as it ensures that responsible 
trustees who lead by example are maintained in office, while financially irresponsible 
trustees are removed. A commentator has suggested that there should be a distinction 
between trustees who have short term financial difficulties and chronic defaulters1225 on 
                                            
1222 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Disqualification of a trustee” (March 2009) 4-3 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 8. 
1223 BMSMA s 54(2)(b)(i)-(iii). 
1224 Annexure 8 rule 13(g). 
1225 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Trustee in arrears with levies” (August 2012) 7-8 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 237 
the ground that it is unlikely that chronic defaulters would be prepared to raise levies 
when necessary as it would place them in a worse financial position. For this reason the 
longer period of grace of three months in the Singapore legislation is perhaps 
preferable.  
 
Apart from the number of instances where existing trustees are disqualified to continue 
in office, the South African provisions provide that a trustee may be removed from office 
before the expiry of the trustee’s term of office by a resolution passed by a simple 
majority at a special general meeting of the body corporate on condition that the 
intention to vote upon the removal from office has been specified in the notification of 
the meeting.1226 Since trustees hold office until the next annual meeting, it stands to 
reason that this resolution must be adopted at a special general meeting. Without being 
specified as a special resolution one must also accept that the resolution required is an 
ordinary majority resolution. Whereas the Singapore legislation also allows the general 
meeting to remove a member of the executive council by a majority resolution, the New 
South Wales legislation requires a special resolution to remove a member of an 
executive committee.1227 The Singaporean provisions give a non-exhaustive list of 
grounds for such removal namely misconduct, neglect of duty or incapacity or failure to 
carry out satisfactorily the duties of his office.1228  
 
It can be argued that in view of the fact that it is a serious step to remove an office 
bearer from his or her position before the expiration of his or her term of office, the 
South African rules should require a special resolution to be passed in order for a 
trustee to be removed from office. However, I am of the view that an ordinary resolution 
is sufficient to discontinue the office of a trustee. Trustees are elected by the body 
corporate by ordinary resolution, and it follows that they should be disqualified by 
ordinary resolution. In the interest of the sectional title community as a whole, and the 
difficulty of proving specific causes, I do not think that the South African legislation 
                                            
1226 Annexure 8 rule 13(e). This option is set out in paragraph 8 of Body Corporate of Fish Eagle v Group Twelve 
Investments 2003 (5) SA 414 (W). 
1227 BMSMA s 54(2)(b) and NSW Strata Management Act, sch 3, cl 4(1)(e). 
1228 BMSMA s 54(2)(b)(i)-(iii). 
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should in any way limit the grounds on which the office of trustees could be terminated 
by a resolution of the general meeting. Such a resolution would still stabilize the 
member’s term in office.  
 
After comparing the disqualification provisions in foreign jurisdictions I conclude that 
prescribed management rule 13 should be amended to include new circumstances 
under which a trustee ceases to hold office, and should now read (my italics): 
 
A trustee shall cease to hold office as such 
(a) at the end of the next annual general meeting where a new board of trustees 
is elected by the body corporate, or upon the election at a special general 
meeting of another person to that office, if earlier; 
(b) if by notice in writing to the body corporate he or she resigns his office; 
(c) if he or she is or becomes not capable of performing his or her duties due to a 
serious physical disability or becomes of unsound mind within the meaning of 
the Mental Health Care Act no 17 of 2002; 
(d) if he or she dies; 
(e) if he or she surrenders his estate as insolvent, or his or her estate is 
sequestrated; 
(f) if he or she is convicted of an offence which involves fraud or dishonesty; 
(g) if he or she is or becomes disqualified in terms of section 69 of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 from being appointed or acting as a director of a 
company; 
(h) if he or she is in arrears for more than 60 days with any levies and 
contributions payable by him in respect of his unit or exclusive use area (if 
any) and he fails to bring such arrears up to date within seven days of being 
notified in writing to do so; 
(i) if by ordinary majority resolution of a general meeting of the body corporate, 
he or she is removed from his office, provided that the intention to vote upon 
the removal from office has been specified in the notice convening the 
meeting; 
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(j) if he or she fails to attend three consecutive meetings of the council without 
having first obtained the council’s permission to be or to remain absent 
therefrom. The granting of permission cannot be unreasonably withheld.  
 
There is no equivalent provision in South Africa which would cater for a situation where 
records, books of account, keys, register or other property needs to be recovered from a 
trustee once he or she is no longer in office. The provision in New South Wales for the 
recovery of books, records and other property of the scheme from trustees should be 
adopted in South Africa. This provision should provide a comprehensive procedure 
where the trustees give notice to the person who has possession or control of property 
of the body corporate requiring him or her to deliver the property to the trustees. The 
provision could require that the trustee must, within seven days after receiving the 
notice, deliver that property to another member of the trustees specified in the notice. 
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Chapter 9: Reasons for the appointment of a 
managing agent 
 
9 1 Introduction  
 
In European countries such as France, Germany and Italy a professional manager must 
by law be appointed to perform the executive functions of the body corporate.1229 In 
South Africa, New South Wales, Singapore and China the executive powers are placed 
in the hands of the trustees, the members of the executive committee, and the 
executive council respectively. However, in these countries a managing agent can be 
appointed to assist with the day-to-day management of the scheme.1230  
 
Even though the appointment of a managing agent is not mandatory in South Africa,1231 
the trustees are empowered to appoint a managing agent to whom some or all of the 
duties of the body corporate are delegated, not by virtue of an office as such, but in 
terms of a written contract.1232 The scope of the managing agent’s functions and powers 
will depend on the terms of his or her contract of appointment.1233 The managing agent 
is not usually entrusted with decision or policy-making functions, but is mostly appointed 
to perform the administrative, secretarial and financial tasks usually performed by the 
trustees. Although the appointment of a managing agent is optional, prescribed 
management rule 46(1) may not be substituted, amended, added to or withdrawn by a 
developer when submitting an application for the opening of a sectional title register.1234  
 
                                            
1229 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) 1 TSAR 22. 
1230 STA ss 36(4) and 37 [STSMA ss 2(5) and 3]; NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 27; BMSMA ss 66(1), 
79(3) and 80(3); Property Code of 2007 s 76(4); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 22. 
1231 Annexure 8 rule 42 and rule 46(1); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 22. 
1232 Annexure 8 rule 46(1) provides that a managing agent must be appointed by a written contract. See below 
whether this contract is a contract of employment or a contract with an independent contractor for services. 
1233 CG van der Merwe “The role of a managing agent in the administration of a sectional title scheme” (1994) 5 
Stellenbosch Law Review 314. 
1234 Regulation 30(1) made under the STA. 
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Since at least half of the trustees of a sectional title scheme must be owners or spouses 
of owners1235 it is common practice in South African sectional title schemes to appoint a 
managing agent as many trustees have limited time at their disposal and lack the 
required experience, knowledge, qualifications and skills to manage the scheme 
themselves. The nature and size of the scheme will determine whether the trustees 
require assistance in the performance of their powers and duties. In my opinion it is 
better to appoint a managing agent to manage the larger sectional title schemes rather 
than to leave this task to the trustees. Through comparative analysis, I will propose 
suggestions for improvements in the sectional title legislation regulating all the aspects 
relating to the appointment of managing agents. Most importantly I will propose 
suggestions on how the South African sectional title legislation can be improved by the 
appointment of a professional manager as the executive organ of the body corporate in 
the place of the trustees.  
 
I will start the discussion by explaining the need for the appointment of a managing 
agent to assist in the management of a sectional title scheme. The reasons for the 
appointment of the managing agent; the advantages and disadvantages of appointing a 
managing agent and the type of scheme that could benefit from the appointment a 
managing agent will be set out. Difficulties with regard to collecting arrear levies and 
organizing annual general meetings will be discussed in detail to show how complex 
and cumbersome the task of administering and managing a sectional title scheme can 
be, and how the appointment of a managing agent would make the functions of trustees 
less burdensome. As I have previously done, a comparative survey of the position in 
foreign jurisdictions will be presented. 
9 2 Reasons for the appointment of a managing agent  
9 2 1 Introduction 
 
The trustees, who are responsible for the management of a sectional title scheme, are 
faced with a choice as to how they plan to manage the scheme. The trustees can opt to 
                                            
1235 Annexure 8 rule 5(a). 
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manage the scheme themselves. This option saves the cost of appointing a managing 
agent, and ensures “hands-on” management, but has many other drawbacks.1236 The 
disadvantages of self-management by the trustees go directly toward promoting the 
appointment of a managing agent.1237  
 
The trustees may opt to employ a managing agent on a full-time basis. This is the best 
option for larger mixed-use schemes, owner-investment schemes and holiday resort 
schemes that require specialized financial training and a multitude of complex 
administrative tasks to be conducted successfully. Advantages of this type of 
management are the instant availability of the books and records of the scheme and the 
managing agent’s services. The cost of this service should be affordable as the monthly 
fee charged by the managing agent is divided by the number of units in the scheme. 
Furthermore, expensive legal costs for arbitration for disputes can be avoided if the 
owners are willing to accept the decisions of the managing agent.  
 
Instead of a single professional managing agent, the trustees can opt to appoint a 
professional management company that will bring a high degree of skill in the required 
areas of property law, labour law, electronic accountancy, maintenance matters and 
conflict management. If the trustees were to ask for independent advice from specialists 
in these areas it would be far more costly.1238 This is a good option even if the scheme 
is small. The fee charged by a managing company is often less than the fee to employ a 
full-time managing agent and a support department made up of secretaries, 
accountants and computer operators. 
9 2 2 Advantages and disadvantages of appointing a managing agent 
 
Several arguments may be advanced in favour of the appointment of a professional 
managing agent. The first argument relates to the continuity of the management 
structure. Trustees, who are usually owners of units, are nominated and elected on a 
                                            
1236 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One (1999) 45. 
1237 47. 
1238 45. 
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year-to-year basis at the annual general meeting. They are free to sell their unit at any 
time and leave the remaining trustees and owners to continue the management of the 
scheme. Management companies provide continuity, regardless of changes in their staff 
or changes within the board of trustees.  
 
Trustees, who are drawn mainly from the sectional owners,1239 are more often than not, 
ill-equipped to perform complex tasks of management and administration of the 
scheme, and do not have the required knowledge and expertise regarding sectional 
titles legislation; precedents from case law or legal opinions where an ambiguity exists 
in the interpretation of the law.1240 There is limited time at their disposal to manage the 
scheme, and even less time to study the intricacies of the applicable legislation and the 
manner of enforcement of the rules and regulations1241 as most trustees also have their 
own carreers to consider.1242 Unskilled trustees postpone difficult and complicated 
decisions with which they cannot cope.1243 Furthermore the trustees might use manual 
accounting systems that could make record keeping a time-consuming and 
cumbersome task. Managing agents, unlike trustees, usually have the required training, 
skill, knowledge, experience, and the necessary facilities and staff at their disposal to 
manage the scheme. In this way professional management is preferable as managing 
agents govern the scheme more effectively, efficiently and economically. 
 
Trustees are not automatically entitled to remuneration1244 for their time spent doing 
tasks related to the management of the scheme. Consequentially they would usually 
tend to do the bare minimum. The multitude of tasks that a managing agent must 
undertake includes dealing with illegal parking on the common property; unauthorized 
changes to the building or the common property; tenants who do not adhere to the rules 
of the scheme; bugeting, collecting and spending of body corporate money and the 
                                            
1239 Annexure 8 rule 5(a) requires that the majority of the trustees have to be sectional owners or spouses of owners.  
1240 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 315; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
1241 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3.  
1242 J Van der Walt “Why Knowledge Really is Power” (May 2008) 3-5 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1243 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 42. 
1244 Annexure 8 rule 10(1); van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 315.  
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enforcement and implementation of rules.1245 Trustees are usually only willing to collect 
levies and make disbursements, and therefore usually put off dealing with potentially 
complicated problems until these problems develop into a crisis.1246 It often occurs in 
practice that trustees fail to establish of an adequate reserve fund for the future 
maintenance, and are then forced to raise a special levy when unexpected expenses 
arise. 
 
Trustees could be tempted to accept incentives from contractors for maintenance jobs 
that could lead to owners paying more than is necessary. It does occur that trustees 
sometimes act in their own interest to the detriment of the other owners, or the body 
corporate in general, despite their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of all the 
members of the body corporate. Even though it is compulsory to appoint auditors to sign 
the financial statements,1247 it is not the mandate of the auditor to detect bribery or 
report incidences of power abuse.  
 
Trustees are indemnified against liability for negligence,1248 and are therefore not 
entirely accountable to the body corporate. They are only held liable for damage caused 
on account of their mala fides or gross negligence. In all other cases the trustees must 
be indemnified out of funds of the body corporate. The body corporate will only have a 
claim against the trustees for damages in very limited circumstances. This indemnity 
does not extend to the managing agent.1249 I suggest that a professional managing 
agent should be appointed as the sole executive arm of the body corporate. In this way 
the legislation would set out that the managing agent would owe a fiduciary duty to the 
body corporate which would render him or her liable for a breach of trust or a failure to 
exercise a reasonable duty of care and skill.  
 
                                            
1245 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-4; Van der Walt (May 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1246 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 315.  
1247 Annexure 8 rule 40. 
1248 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(a); Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
1249 Annexure 8 rule 12(2). 
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One of the most important tasks of the body corporate is the efficient collection of 
levies.1250 The managing agent removes the onerous and often embarrassing duty of 
trustees to ask defaulting neighbours to pay their outstanding levies or to stop breaching 
the scheme rules. If the levies are not timeously collected the body corporate will not be 
able to pay its expenses such as water accounts, insurance premiums and salaries to 
the various body corporate employees. Levy payments are usually made monthly, and 
every owner then receives a levy statement indicating the payments made and the 
amounts still due to the body corporate. All the administration involved in the calculation 
and collection of levies is time-consuming and labour intensive. This alone is a 
compelling enough reason to appoint a managing agent.1251 The difficulties experienced 
in the collection of levies results in regular levy payers having to subsidize non-paying 
sectional owners. In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, van Rooyen v Stolz and Others1252 
the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutional principle that each citizen has the right 
of access to a home (also in the form of a sectional title unit). It required that due 
process be followed before a debtor’s home can be sold in execution to satisfy arrear 
levies. The issue with the case was that many magistrates have since used the case as 
a blunt weapon to frustrate trustees in their efforts to collect arrear levies.1253  For these 
reasons it is suggested that the trustees should entrust their levy collections to an 
attorney or managing agent who has experience in debt collection.1254  
 
Another time-consuming function is the preparation for the annual general meeting.1255 
All the owners must receive an agenda for the meeting; a copy of the minutes for the 
previous meeting; the scheme’s audited financial statements; insurance schedules 
reflecting the replacement values of each section; a trustee’s report and various other 
documents. These documents need to be sent either fourteen (where only ordinary 
resolutions are on the agenda) or 30 days (if a unanimous or special resolution is on the 
agenda) before the annual general meeting. It makes sense that the trustees should 
                                            
1250 Van der Walt (October 2007) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1251 J Van der Walt “Does a body corporate need a managing agent?” (October 2007) 2-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 
4. 
1252 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
1253 Maree (September 2009) MCS Courier 5. 
1254  6. 
1255 Van der Walt (October 2007) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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delegate this cumbersome, primarily secretarial work, to a managing agent or a 
management agency firm. 
 
The appointment of a managing agent also renders management more business-like as 
it removes the possibility of infighting based on personal considerations and animosity 
amongst the owners in the scheme, which is an inherent risk of internal management. A 
good managing agent employing financially sound and legally correct management 
procedures would timeously avoid problems, and in this way prevent any crisis.1256 
Moreover, institutional lenders will be more inclined to lend money and do business with 
bodies corporate that have employed a professional managing agent due to the fact that 
such schemes are more insulated against financial risks.1257 
 
The arguments against the appointment of a managing agent are two-fold. In the first 
place the appointment of professional managers can be expensive compared to self-
management by trustees without any remuneration. The rate that managing agents 
charge bodies corporate differs depending on the managing agent and the nature and 
size of the scheme. However, in many ways having professional management can save 
the body corporate money. Inadequate management can lead to mistakes being made 
that are expensive to remedy. Arbitration or litigation fees in cases where disputes 
based on animosity and self-centeredness amongst the trustees or between trustees 
and other owners, can be solved and settled by a suitably qualified managing agent.  
 
The second argument against appointing managing agents is that there is a loss of 
personal control of the body corporate. However, due to the fact that the trustees 
remain the executive organ of the management body, they still have the ultimate 
responsibility for the wellbeing and success of the scheme. If the trustees are, by 
legislation, replaced by a professional manager as the executive organ, it is 
recommended that the owners should retain some kind of personal involvement in the 
scheme. I recommend that the general meeting should still be empowered to appoint an 
                                            
1256 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 315.  
1257 Chen & van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 36. 
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advisory board without any executive authority from amongst the owners to assist the 
managing agent in the management of the scheme.1258 From this discussion it clear that 
the advantages of appointing a professional managing agent by far outweigh the 
disadvantages. 
9 2 3 The type of scheme that could benefit by the appointment of a managing 
agent 
 
The nature and size of the scheme usually determines whether the trustees would 
require assistance in the performance of their duties.1259 The trustees could efficiently 
manage the body corporate of a smaller scheme, consisting of less than fifteen units, 
provided that they have the necessary accounting and legal knowledge and expertise. 
The trustees could merely employ an accountant or auditor to handle the more 
complicated financial matters. The prescribed management rules set out a duty on the 
body corporate to appoint an auditor at each annual general meeting for the following 
year.1260 However, the auditors could only audit the annual financial statements each 
year if the owners furnish them with proper financial records that comply with generally 
accepted accounting principles. Added to this the body corporate would be unable to 
make decisions relating to maintenance and management if they do not have timeous 
financial information. If the accounting records are inadequate the auditors will have to 
reconstruct them at great expense to the body corporate. Consequently, it would be 
more economical to employ a managing agent in such circumstances.1261  
 
Furthermore, difficulties can arise in smaller schemes trying to cope without a managing 
agent where the finances are in order, but the bigger picture of management is ignored. 
This can occur in the event that none of the trustees have sufficient knowledge of the 
legislation or rules that relate to the daily management of the building.1262 Trustees of 
larger mixed-use schemes, consisting of both residential and commercial units; 
                                            
1258 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-25. 
1259 Van der Walt (October 2007) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4; Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 
314.  
1260 Annexure 8 rule 40; van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
1261 T Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 2 ed (1999) 117. 
1262 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 42. 
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schemes which are predominantly occupied by tenants and holiday resort schemes that 
require specialized financial training1263 will usually require a managing agent to handle 
the manifold tasks associated with managing such schemes.1264 The failure to appoint 
an efficient, capable and qualified managing agent could lead to poor service delivery of 
basic and essential services and amenities ultimately causing a decline in the value of 
the units.1265 It is for this reason that the Sectional Titles Regulation Board proposed 
that schemes consisting of more than fifty units should be obliged to appoint a 
managing agent, unless they employ a full-time manager.1266 
 
South African sectional title legislation is based on the principle that the average owner 
knows and understands the relevant legislation and knows how to manage the scheme 
in the best interests of all the owners. It is for this reason that the owners have been 
tasked with the responsibility of managing the scheme into which they purchase a unit. 
The owners manage the scheme through the general meeting and the trustees that they 
elect. The legislature was far too optimistic in this regard. Problems could start as early 
as when the developer overlooks construction faults and does not set up a workable 
management structure from the beginning. The problems mount when the 
inexperienced owners are confronted with complicated property and management 
issues. Maree lists four different management scenarios that schemes can fall 
under.1267 Grade A schemes have excellent management that complies with all the 
requirements of the Act, and which protects and promotes the owners’ investments. 
Grade B schemes have non-fatal defects of which the trustees are aware, for which 
they gather advice, and put solutions in place. Grade C schemes have non-fatal defects 
of which the trustees are not aware, for which they gather no advice, and put no 
solutions in place. Grade X schemes have fatal management problems. Grade A and B 
schemes offer a safe option of investment for owners and banks offering mortgage 
bonds to potential owners. Grade C schemes are not considered good investment 
                                            
1263 Annexure 8 rule 42 provides that managing agents may be appointed to operate current and savings accounts of 
the body corporate; Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 22-23. 
1264 Van der Walt (October 2007) 2-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1265 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 314.  
1266 Poposals to the Sectional Titles Regulation Board (March 2003) 3.2.2; Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 23; 
Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
1267 T Maree “Goeie Bestuur deur Middel van Dwang” (August 2005) 17 MCS Courier 7. 
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potential as they would normally degenerate to Grade X status if no serious 
preventative steps are taken. Grade B schemes would be the best candidates for the 
appointment of a managing agent before the scheme degenerated into a Grade C 
scheme that can only be rehabilitated by the appointment of an administrator.1268 The 
appointment of an efficient managing agent can do much to prevent the deterioration of 
management, but a managing agent is in no better position than the trustees when 
dealing with a body corporate that already has serious problems. This discussion 
illustrates that schemes are doomed to failure if they are not adequately managed. 
Professional management should no longer be optional, but should be made 
compulsory, especially in larger schemes or in schemes where the owners require initial 
assistance and training in the governance and management of the scheme. 
9 3 Comparative survey 
 
Due to the complexity of the management provisions of the NSW Strata Schemes 
Management Act and the serious repercussions of non-compliance with these 
provisions, most schemes opt to appoint a managing agent to assist the executive 
committee. A managing agent is a licensed person, whether an individual, a partnership 
or a company appointed by the owners corporation voluntarily at a general meeting in 
terms of section 27 of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act to deal with as many 
of the management and administrative matters of the strata scheme as are delegated to 
the person or body concerned by the owners corporation subject to the limitations and 
conditions imposed.1269 This managing agent is comparable to a managing agent 
appointed in terms of prescribed management rule 46 and, as in South Africa, it is not 
mandatory for the owners corporation to appoint a managing agent. It is assumed that 
the owners corporation and its executive committee will have the required knowledge, 
experience and infrastructure to administer, control, manage the common property for 
the benefit of all the owners.1270 This is unfortunately not always the case. Since owners 
corporations are subject to increasingly more complex and onerous duties imposed by 
                                            
1268 STA s 46 [STSMA s 16]. 
1269 Ilkin NSW Strata 146. 
1270 148. 
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the strata titles legislation in New South Wales, it has become preferable to engage the 
services of a managing agent to perform most of these duties.1271 The appointment of a 
managing agent helps resolve disputes that displaces and avoids the personal 
animosity that often occurs between participants in the scheme.1272  
 
There are certain factors that an owners corporation needs to consider when deciding 
whether or not to appoint a managing agent.1273 The first factor is whether the executive 
committee has the time to be educated in the intricacies of the applicable legislation and 
its methods of implementation. Then it needs to be considered whether the executive 
committee has the time, knowledge and experience to handle the daily management of 
the scheme. The history of animosity between the participants in the scheme and the 
likelihood of further disputes should be factored in. Another factor is whether the owners 
mostly reside in the scheme, or if most of the sections are rented out to tenants as 
managing a scheme of non-resident owners can be more difficult. It must be considered 
whether the managing agent is needed to perform all or only some of the functions, 
powers and duties of the owners corporation, its executive committee, and the 
secretary, treasurer and chairperson. The final factor is whether the appointment of a 
managing agent will reduce the risk of owners being held personally liable for negligent 
acts or omissions of the owners corporation.  
 
In Singapore there are three procedures whereby a management agent can be 
appointed. One of these appointments can be equated to the appointment of a 
managing agent in terms of the South African management rules.1274 As is the case in 
South Africa and New South Wales, the appointment of a managing agent by the 
management corporation is not compulsory. However, problems can result from the 
proprietor’s inability to organize the scheme’s management in a business-like manner 
due to the increasing complexities and onerous duties imposed by the BMSMA. Where 
the participants do not have the time, knowledge and experience to manage and 
                                            
1271 146. 
1272 146. 
1273 147. 
1274 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(a). 
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administer the scheme then the management corporation may voluntarily appoint a 
managing agent to perform all or only some of the functions of the management 
corporation, its office bearers and that of the executive council by ordinary resolution at 
the general meeting.1275 The managing agent could serve as mediator and resolve any 
disputes based on animosity between scheme participants. The management 
corporation may voluntarily appoint a managing agent by ordinary resolution at the 
general meeting.1276 The general meeting is the proper organ to appoint a managing 
agent due to the fact that the appointment affects all subsidiary owners and ensures 
that every proprietor would be aware of the decision and thus avoids possible abuses. A 
managing agent can also be voluntarily appointed by its executive council1277 without a 
general meeting if duly authorized to do so by the proprietors at the last preceding 
general meeting of the corporation.1278  
 
As I discussed in chapter two, the executive organ of the German community of owners 
(Gemeinschaft der Wohnungseigentümer) is not an elected group of owners, but an 
appointed single professional manager (Verwalter),1279 who may be assisted by an 
advisory council (Verwaltungsbeirat),1280 consisting of unit owners. The Verwalter is not 
merely an agent or appointee of the community of owners as is the case of the 
managing agent of South Africa, New South Wales, Singapore and China but an 
executive organ appointed by the general meeting by majority vote in terms of section 
26 of the WEG. He is then appointed contractually (Verwaltersvertrag) and his functions 
and duties are determined largely by the provisions of the WEG,1281 and not only by the 
terms of his or her contract of appointment and the resolutions of the Gemeinschaft der 
Wohnungseigentumer (body corporate), as is the case with the South African managing 
agent. The professional manager remains accountable to the general meeting who may 
                                            
1275 BMSMA s ss 66(1)(a) and 79(3); Keang Sood Strata Title 545. 
1276 BMSMA s ss 66(1)(a) and 79(3). 
1277 BMSMA s 80(3). 
1278 BMSMA s 66(1)(b). 
1279 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs (2012) 31. 
1280 WEG § 29; Pienaar Sectional Titles (2010) 173.  
1281 WEG § 27; Pienaar Sectional Titles 174; Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management 
organs 31. 
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dismiss the manager if he or it does not fulfill his or her executive functions in a 
professional manner.  
 
While nothing prevents a skilled owner from being appointed as manager, a non-owner 
with knowledge and experience of sectional title administration or indeed a professional 
managing firm is almost invariably appointed in practice as manager of a scheme. This 
lack of personal interest is counteracted by the fact that the professional manager may 
be assisted by an advisory council consisting of unit owners. This ensures that the body 
corporate appoints a person with the necessary knowledge and expertise on a 
continuous basis. Although the Verwalter is basically in the same executive and 
management position as the trustees in the South African scheme, the difference is that 
he normally receives substantial remuneration for the proper performance of his 
executive functions and duties, and can be dismissed if he or she does not act in a 
professional manner. The Verwalter normally has the same knowledge and experience 
as the South African managing agent.  
9 4 Conclusion  
 
There is still regrettably a large degree of skepticism surrounding the appointment of a 
professional managing agent. This is perhaps due to the fact that some bodies 
corporate might have had negative experiences with a managing agent, and that others 
might have heard horror stories about managing agents running away with body 
corporate funds.1282 As in any industry there are always the select few that give 
managing agents a bad reputation.  
 
However, it is for all the reasons enumerated in this chapter that I recommend that a 
professional manager should be appointed for larger sectional title schemes to assist 
the trustees in the executive governance of the scheme. The appointment of a 
professional manager reduces the risks and responsibilities faced by the trustees in 
managing the scheme.1283 A good managing agent will not only avoid many problems, 
                                            
1282 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 43. 
1283 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 117. 
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but will address them timeously in order to prevent a management catastrophe.1284 It 
stands to reason that a managing agent must be properly appointed in accordance with 
correct procedures; must be suitably qualified and experienced to fulfill the tasks 
involved in managing the particular scheme; must be accountable and trustworthy and 
should have the competence and facilities required to manage the scheme. Where 
these provisos are met and financially sound and legally correct management 
procedures are followed, the sectional title scheme will be managed more effectively, 
efficiently and economically. 
 
Managing agents are becoming increasingly qualified and experienced in a manifold of 
sectional title matters.1285 A well trained professional managing agent can provide a 
wide range of additional services such arranging, preparing and attending meetings; 
preparing budgets; attending to complaints; dealing with transgressions of rules; 
maintenance issues; unauthorized structures; chronic levy defaulters; assisting in 
dispute resolution in the scheme; project managing maintenance and repairs; attending 
trustees and owner meetings and the handling of all financial and secretarial 
matters.1286 Most managing agents will serve the customized needs of a particular 
scheme, and will tailor their services and charges to suit the needs of the scheme. In 
the end it is the trustees that must decide whether they will need any assistance in the 
management of the scheme. The trustees should realize that the value of the scheme is 
more often than not determined by the quality of its management. Consequently, the 
trustees should opt for the appointment of professional managing agents to secure 
sectional owners’ investment in the scheme and the enhancement of the economic 
value of the scheme.1287 
 
An advantage of a management by owners is their personal involvement. The owners 
will have a vested interest in the scheme, more so than an outsider. Often the owners of 
a scheme will be in a better position to know and understand the needs of the residents 
                                            
1284 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-4. 
1285 Van der Walt (October 2007) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1286 Maree (September 2009) MCS Courier 5. 
1287 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 51. 
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and what management and maintenance measures have to be taken to ensure that the 
scheme runs efficiently. This can have the disadvantage of infighting between owners 
which could negatively influence the management.1288 Being a trustee will require a 
significant amount of time. Owners might not have the necessary time at their disposal 
to volunteer for the office of a trustee due to the demands of their own jobs.1289  
 
The crucial issue with regard to the status of South African managing agents is whether 
the legislation should be amended to follow the German position by making provision for 
the appointment of professional manager to replace the trustees as executive organ of 
the scheme. The STA makes provision for the trustees to act as the executive organ of 
the sectional title scheme to perform the day-to-day management of the scheme. The 
trustees may, in terms of the prescribed management rules, supplement their expertise 
by appointing a managing agent to assist them in if need be. The majority of the 
trustees must be owners who often do not have any knowledge or experience of the 
administration and management responsibilities relating to sectional titles. It is my 
opinion the German system of appointing an experienced and knowledgeable 
professional single manager or managing agency firm as the executive organ of the 
body corporate (who is assisted by an advisory council) is preferable to the position in 
South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1288 45. 
1289 44. 
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Chapter 10: Appointment and terms of 
appointment of a managing agent 
 
10 1 Introduction 
 
As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the managing agent should be properly 
appointed according to the correct procedures. This chapter will focus on the 
procedures and requirements for the appointment of the managing agent. I will start with 
a discussion on how the managing agent is appointed in the initial period before the first 
general meeting. I will then set out the parties who can be appointed as managing 
agents; the parties who can appoint the managing agent and the requirements for the 
appointment itself. Special attention will be given to the managing agent’s contract of 
appointment, which plays a fundamental role in the appointment of a managing agent.  
10 2 Appointment of the managing agent in the initial period   
10 2 1 Introduction 
 
There are two situations under which a managing agent may be appointed. In the first 
place a managing agent may be appointed to manage the scheme during the initial 
period before the first general meeting is held. In the second place a managing agent 
may be appointed after the first general meeting by concluding a management contract 
with the body corporate or trustees.1290 In what follows I will discuss the appointment of 
a managing agent in the initial period, and also examine how this is dealt with in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
10 2 2 South African position 
 
The responsibility for the management of the scheme during the initial period is in the 
hands of the developer and the original owners. Due to the fact that certain services, for 
                                            
1290 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 28. 
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example security and gardening services, will need to be established in these initial 
stages the developer would have to enter into contracts with certain service providers.  
 
The developer can choose to appoint a managing agent in the initial phase. It is 
important to note that the contracts entered into by the developer with a managing 
agent for the continued management, control and administration of the scheme must be 
submitted to the first general meeting for consideration.1291 This creates the impression 
that such contracts need only be disclosed at the meeting and voted upon with the 
result that the stronger voting power of the developer would result in their automatic 
adoption or ratification at the first general meeting. However, this is not the case as it is 
not possible to conclude a contract on behalf of a non-existent entity. No debt or 
obligation arising from any agreement between the developer and any other person is 
enforceable against the body corporate.1292 A contract entered into by the developer in 
his or her name must be submitted to the first general meeting, and if it is approved it 
may be ceded to the body corporate. The agenda for the first general meeting must 
include the taking of cession of such contracts relating to the management, control and 
administration of the building as may have been entered into by the developer for the 
continual management, control and administration of the building and the common 
property. Contracts concluded by the developer on behalf of the body corporate before 
the latter came into being and concluded before the first general meeting are null and 
void and cannot be ceded. They can only continue if a new contract is concluded 
between the body corporate and the managing agent.1293  
10 2 3 Comparative survey 
In New South Wales the managing agent can also be appointed during the initial period 
before the first general meeting. The same requirements for such appointment apply 
whether the engagement is done during the initial period or after its expiry. The only 
qualification is that during the initial period the appointment and delegation must not 
                                            
1291 Annexure 8 rule 50(2)(iv). 
1292 STA s 47(2) [STSMA s 15(2)]; Chen & van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 29. 
1293 T Maree “Are bodies corporate bound by the pre-incorporation agreements entered into by developers?” (2007) 
3 De Rebus 45 46. 
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extend beyond the conclusion of the first general meeting. An owners corporation must 
not, during the initial period, appoint a managing agent, a caretaker or other person to 
assist it in the management for a period extending beyond the holding of the first 
general meeting, unless the owners corporation is authorised to do so by an order of the 
Strata Title Tribunal under section 182 of the NSW Strata Schemes Management 
Act.1294 Without this provision the owners corporation, which consists solely of the 
developer, could have appointed a managing agent for the developer’s benefit and for 
an indefinite period extending beyond the first general meeting. By contrast, one of the 
compulsory items on the agenda of the first general meeting, which must be held within 
two months after expiry of the initial period,1295 is whether a managing agent must be 
appointed.1296 If so appointed the termination of the initial managing agent will coincide 
with the appointment of the succeeding managing agent, who may be the same 
managing agent. Although the indefinite appointment of a managing would end as soon 
as the first general meeting is concluded, a Court of Appeal decision indicates that the 
agreement between the owners corporation and a caretaker is still binding on the 
owners corporation.  
In Bondlake Pty Ltd v The Owners – Strata Plan No 602851297 the Supreme Court 
decided that an agreement entered into between the owners corporation and a 
caretaker during the initial period was valid and enforceable for a debt incurred by the 
owners corporation for the caretaker’s fees that was in excess of the credit balance in 
its administrative and sinking funds.1298 The Supreme Court’s reasons were that the 
applicable section does not state that the agreement is unenforceable or that the 
caretaker cannot recover the fees due; the owners corporation is still liable to pay fees; 
the owners corporation can sue the developer for the debt, expenses or damages1299 
which acts as a penalty for the developer’s debt; it would be a draconian step to declare 
the contract void; the innocent caretaker would be forced to suffer unfair consequences 
                                            
1294 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 113(1)(c); Ilkin NSW Strata 131, 149. 
1295 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 2(1). 
1296 Ilkin NSW Strata 132. 
1297 (2005) 62 NSWLR 158; Ilkin NSW Strata 141. 
1298 This is a contravention of NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 113(1)(b). 
1299 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 113(2). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 258 
if the agreement is declared void and would be placed in a worse position than the 
developer; it is unlikely that someone entering into a contract with the owners 
corporation would check if the initial period had expired or if the debt would exceed the 
money in the owners corporation’s administrative or sinking fund and there is no public 
policy reason to declare the agreement void. 
In Singapore, similar to New South Wales and South Africa, the appointment of a 
managing agent by the management corporation or its executive council can be made 
during or after the expiry of the initial period. However, where the managing agent is 
appointed during the initial period the appointment must not extend beyond the 
expiration of the initial period, unless authorized by an order of the Commissioner of 
Buildings1300 if he is satisfied that it will serve the interests of the subsidiary proprietors 
interests or those having equitable interests in the lots.1301 The rationale for this is to 
ensure that the developer does not make decisions detrimental to minority proprietors. If 
the management corporation contravenes this then the managing agent forfeits his or 
her entitlement to fees and disbursements incurred since the expiration of the initial 
period, regardless of whether the latter knew of the breach.1302  
 
Instead of appointing a managing agent during the initial period the developer may 
alternatively appoint someone as his or her agent to exercise and perform the powers, 
duties and functions of chairperson, secretary and treasurer until a council is elected at 
the first annual general meeting of the corporation.1303 Such an appointment made 
before the council is elected is more limited in its scope, but may extend beyond the 
expiration of the initial period as it is not subject to the abovementioned restriction that 
applies only if a managing agent is appointed.1304 
 
                                            
1300 BMSMA ss 49(1)(g) and 51(1). 
1301 BMSMA s 51(4). 
1302 In Re Mahmoud and Ispahani [1921] 2 KB 716 at 729 the English Court of Appeal held that if a contract is 
illegal in its inception by statute, neither party thereto may enforce any rights that were intended to be created by it. 
Keang Sood Strata Title 549. 
1303 BMSMA s 23(3). 
1304 Keang Sood Strata Title 550. 
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In China a developer may also, in the initial period prior to the sale of condominium 
units, choose and appoint a managing agent to manage the scheme.1305 The common 
Chinese practice, before the promulgation of the Property Management Regulation of 
2003, for the initial period of management was that the developer managed the scheme. 
The developers would then sign “sweetheart” contracts with managing agents with 
whom the developer was affiliated. The problem was that these managing agents did 
not put the owners’ interests first. This could then result in considerably higher 
management costs with lower standards of service. These developer management 
contracts would also bind future owners for a long period of time.  
 
The Property Management Regulation resolved this problem by providing that a 
developer has to select a qualified managing agent through a public bidding 
process.1306 The developer is only allowed to choose a managing agent by agreement 
where there are three or less managing agents bidding for the position.1307 Furthermore, 
the appointment is subject to the approval of the local real estate authority.1308 Finally, 
the appointment has to be concluded in a written contract.1309 The managing agent is 
under legal obligation to disclose any prior direct or indirect relationship with the 
developers in bidding for the job. It is generally thought that a developer owned 
managing company should be disqualified from bidding in order to avoid any 
undisclosed conflicts of interest and to better protect owner’s interests.1310 Under 
Chinese legislation the managing agent’s appointment is transitional until the first 
general meeting and cannot extend beyond the initial period, unless an extension is 
authorized at the first general meeting.1311 When the executive council, created at the 
first general meeting, signs a formal management agreement with another managing 
agent, the transitional management contract is automatically terminated even if it has 
not expired yet.1312  
                                            
1305 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 162. 
1306 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 24(1); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 29. 
1307 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 24(2). 
1308 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 7. 
1309 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 21. 
1310 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 29. 
1311 Property Management Regulation art 29(2); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 30. 
1312 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 26. 
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10 3 Who may be appointed as a managing agent 
10 3 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows I will discuss which parties can be appointed as managing agents. 
Important issues here are whether individuals or management companies can be 
appointed as managing agents; whether the body corporate should employ estate 
agents as managing agents and whether the chairperson or a trustee can act as a 
managing agent. An important question that is brought to light by doing a comparative 
survey is whether the managing agent needs to have a license to be appointed. I will 
touch on this topic in what follows, but discuss it in more detail in chapter 11. 
10 3 2 South African position 
 
It is possible to appoint either a natural person or a managing agency company as a 
managing agent. A natural person includes a sectional owner and a trustee, but only if 
the trustee is also an owner.1313 Due to the extensive powers and functions exercised 
by the managing agent as well as the administrative infrastructure needed, an estate 
agent or a firm of estate agents is normally appointed.1314 Van der Merwe advocates 
that a firm of estate agents, a close corporation or a trust company with proven 
experience to manage the affairs of a sectional title scheme should be appointed as a 
managing agent due to the enormity of the job and the degree of expertise needed in 
the performance of a huge variety of tasks.1315 A management firm will be able to supply 
a management package that combines an on-site resident manager or caretaker 
together with off-site services such as bookkeeping facilities.1316 
 
The most important question is whether the chairperson or trustee can act as a 
managing agent to his or her own body corporate. The prescribed management rules 
allow a trustee or chairperson to act as both a trustee and managing agent to the same 
                                            
1313 Annexure 8 rule 5(b). 
1314 Pienaar Sectional Titles 186. 
1315 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 316.  
1316 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-5. 
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scheme on the condition that the chairperson or trustee is also an owner.1317 There are 
possible objections to such a situation though.1318 A fiduciary relationship exists 
between the trustees and the body corporate, and no action may be taken by a 
managing agent, who is a trustee, that is in conflict with this relationship of trust. There 
is also the fear that if a trustee or chairperson was to become a managing agent that the 
owners would lose control of the affairs of the body corporate. However, it should 
always be remembered that the decisions in the management of the scheme are made 
by majority vote of the body corporate in general meetings. The advantage of having a 
managing agent at the helm is that he or she offers professional expertise in the daily 
management of the scheme and in the holding of meetings.1319  
10 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the managing agent has a similar meaning to its South African 
counterpart.1320 A managing agent is:  
 
“A licensed person (whether an individual, a partnership or a company) 
appointed by an owners corporation voluntarily at a general meeting in terms of 
section 27 of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act to undertake as many 
of the management and administrative matters of the strata scheme as are 
                                            
1317 Annexure 8 rule 5(b); G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Can a trustee also be a managing agent?” 
(November 2012) 7-11 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1318 AB Kenyon-Thompson “Chairman and Managing Agent – Can the chairman act as managing agent to his own 
body corporate?” (February 1987) 3.6 Juta’s South African Journal of Property 42. 
1319 AB Kenyon-Thompson (February 1987) Juta’s South African Journal of Property 42. 
1320 Ilkin NSW Strata 146; In terms of the Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 s 3(1) the managing agent 
is defined to mean: “…a person (whether or not such person carries on any other business) who, for reward (whether 
monetary or otherwise), exercises or performs any function of an owners corporation within the meaning of the 
Strata Schemes Management Act 1996, not being: (a) a person who: (i) is the owner of a lot to which the strata 
scheme for which the owners corporation is constituted relates; or (ii) is the lessee of a lot to which the leasehold 
strata scheme for which the owners corporation is constituted relates; or is the secretary or treasurer of the executive 
committee of the owners corporation, and who exercises or performs only functions of the owners corporation 
required, by the bylaws in force in respect of the strata scheme or leasehold strata scheme for which the owners 
corporation is constituted, to be exercised or performed by the secretary or treasurer of that executive committee or 
by the owners corporation; or (b) a person who maintains or repairs any property for the maintenance or repair of 
which the owners corporation is responsible.”  
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delegated to the person by the owners corporation, subject to the limitations and 
conditions imposed by the section.”1321  
 
However, unlike the South African position, there are persons who are excluded from 
being appointed as a managing agent. These include the owner of a lot (section) to 
which the strata scheme for which the owners corporation is constituted relates;1322 the 
lessee of a lot to which the leasehold strata scheme for which the owners corporation is 
constituted relates1323 or the secretary or treasurer of the executive committee of the 
owners corporation.1324 
 
Since 1 October 1981 all managing agents who are appointed to manage a scheme 
must hold a strata managing agent’s license referred to in sections 8 and 9 of the 
Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 (the “Agents Act”). If an unlicensed 
managing agent is appointed the appointment is invalid and may not be enforced by the 
managing agent against the owners corporation.1325 
 
In Singapore it is a statutory requirement that a managing agent that is either directly or 
indirectly related to any proprietor of a lot must declare the nature of the relationship in 
writing prior to his or her appointment.1326 The rationale for this requirement is that the 
managing agent will then act in the interest of the whole corporation and not in the 
interest of a few of the proprietors or the council. In this way it will prevent abuse, 
malpractice and corruption.1327 Where, for example, the managing agent is related to 
any proprietor or is a company in which the proprietor has an interest it is possible that 
the managing agent could manage the scheme at a higher cost. If this is a possibility 
the council can be restricted from appointing such a managing agent by making it a 
restricted matter.1328 
                                            
1321 Ilkin NSW Strata 146. 
1322 Agents Act s 3(1)(a)(i); Ilkin NSW Strata 146. 
1323 Agents Act s 3(1)(a)(ii). 
1324 Agents Act s 3(1)(a)(iii). 
1325 Agents Act s 26. 
1326 BMSMA s 66(4).  
1327 Keang Sood Strata Title 548. 
1328 BMSMA ss 58(1) and 4(b) and 59. 
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Chinese law only allows management companies with legal personality to be appointed 
as a managing agent.1329 The exclusion of a natural person from being a managing 
agent is meant to distinguish a professional managing agent from an in-house self-
managing team.1330 
10 4 Who may appoint the managing agent  
10 4 1 Introduction 
 
This discussion will focus on the three parties that have the power to request the 
appointment and to appoint a managing agent in South Africa. An interesting discussion 
in this regard is whether or not the trustees, executive committee, executive council or 
executive board is entitled to appoint the managing agent. 
10 4 2 South African position 
 
There are three parties that are involved in the appointment of a managing agent in 
South Africa. In the first place the trustees may, in their own discretion and without 
referring to a general meeting, appoint an agent after a resolution to that effect is taken 
at a trustees’ meeting. In the second place a bank or any other registered mortgagee 
holding 25% of the units may instruct the trustees to appoint a managing agent. In the 
third place the members of the body corporate, on the strength of a normal resolution by 
a majority vote taken at a general meeting, may instruct the trustees to appoint a 
managing agent.1331In the last two instances the trustees must appoint a managing 
agent.1332  
10 4 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the owners corporation can voluntarily appoint a managing 
agent1333 by means of an ordinary resolution in a general meeting.1334 The power of an 
                                            
1329 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 32; Chen & van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26. 
1330 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26. 
1331 Pienaar Sectional Titles 186. 
1332 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(a). 
1333 Ilkin NSW Strata 149. 
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executive committee (trustees) to appoint a managing agent in terms of the NSW Strata 
Titles Act 68 of 1973 was abolished in January 1980.1335 A managing agent can only be 
appointed by an ordinary resolution in the general meeting.1336 Furthermore, the owners 
corporation cannot delegate the power to appoint a managing agent to the executive 
committee, even if all the owners agree to such a delegation.1337 
 
In Singapore the management corporation may voluntarily appoint a managing agent by 
ordinary resolution at the general meeting.1338 The appointment must be decided on at 
the general meeting because it affects all the proprietors and ensures that every one of 
them would be aware of the decision, which avoids abuses. A managing agent can also 
be voluntarily appointed by its council (trustees)1339 without a general meeting if duly 
authorized to do so by the proprietors at the last preceding general meeting of the 
corporation.1340 This is the only exception to appointing the managing agent at general 
meetings. 
 
Chinese law stipulates that the executive council enters into a written contract with a 
managing agent chosen by the managing body.1341 At national level the Chinese 
legislation does not say much on the procedures to appoint the managing agent. Since 
many members of the executive council may be inexperienced, the Chinese Property 
Code provides that the final say on employing a managing company should rest with the 
management body at a general meeting.1342  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
1334 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 27. 
1335 Ilkin NSW Strata 149.  
1336 NSW Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973 s 78(1); Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 320.  
1337 Ilkin NSW Strata 149. 
1338 BMSMA s ss 66(1)(a) and 79(3). 
1339 BMSMA s 80(3). 
1340 BMSMA s 66(1)(b). 
1341 Property Management Regulation art 35.  
1342 Chinese Propery Code art 76(1)-(4). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 265 
10 5 Requirements for the appointment of a managing agent 
10 5 1 Introduction 
 
Now that I have established who may be appointed as a managing agent and who may 
appoint the managing agent, I will focus on the appointment procedure itself. The 
requirements for the appointment will be set out and the contract of appointment, which 
is a fundamental requirement, will be discussed in detail.  
10 5 2 South African position 
 
Prescribed management rule 46(1) governs the appointment of the managing agent. 
This cannot be substituted by the developer when submitting an application for the 
opening of a sectional title register,1343 and may only be substituted by a unanimous 
resolution of the body corporate once at least 30% of the units in the scheme have been 
transferred.1344  
 
The trustees may from time to time, and must if required by a registered mortgagee of 
25% of the units, or by the members of the body corporate in a general meeting, appoint 
a managing agent in terms of a written contract.1345 There are therefore two 
requirements that must be met in appointing a managing agent. The first requirement is 
that there must be a resolution by the trustees or general meeting, or a request by 
registered mortgagees of 25% of the units that a managing agent be appointed. The 
second requirement is that the managing agent must actually be appointed in the form 
of a written contract. I will discuss the nature of this contract in chapter 12. 
 
The draft resolution for the meeting of trustees and the general meeting should be 
carefully prepared to ensure that the managing agent is both appointed, and that the 
necessary powers and functions are properly delegated.1346 The resolution must 
indicate that an appointment had been made; the duration of the appointment; specify 
                                            
1343 Regulation 30(1) made under the STA. 
1344 Regulation 30(4) made under the STA. 
1345 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(a). 
1346 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 320-321.  
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the extent to which the powers, functions and duties of the body corporate and trustees 
are delegated to the managing agent and authorize a written agreement of appointment 
between the trustees and the managing agent.1347  
 
In 1997 a proviso was added to prescribed management rule 46(1) dealing with the 
appointment of the managing agents via a management contract. It stated that the 
agreement must be reduced to writing within thirty days of conclusion, failing which the 
contract is voidable at the instance of either party. This proviso was vague as it was not 
easy to define when the contract was “concluded” which made it difficult to apply in 
practice. It could be the date of the general meeting or trustees’ meeting at which the 
decision was taken; or the date upon which the appointment was confirmed in writing to 
the managing agent or the date upon which the managing agent is to commence his or 
her duties. It was unfair that the contract can be voidable simply because one of the 
parties forgot to sign it, or because one of the parties was unable to sign it within thirty 
days for a legitimate reason. The legislature’s intention was to encourage the swift 
conclusion of the contract between the body corporate and the trustees. A more 
practical provision would of been one that allows the managing agent at least ninety 
days from the commencement of his duties to have the contract concluded.1348 The 
second proviso to rule 46(1) that the initial agreement between the trustees and the 
managing agent is voidable, unless reduced to writing within 30 days of conclusion, was 
deleted in an amendment to rule 46 in 2005.1349 Now the appointment of the managing 
agent is only valid if the agreement reached between the parties is reduced to 
writing.1350 
 
A written agreement of appointment must be entered into between the trustees and the 
managing agent. The agreement must appoint the managing agent to the position, and 
all or some of the body corporate’s powers, functions and duties must be delegated to 
the managing agent. The implication here is that the managing agent should not merely 
                                            
1347 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-15. 
1348 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 50. 
1349 GN R 1109 in GG 28217 of 18-11-2005. 
1350 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-17. 
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be appointed, but that some powers and functions of the body corporate should be 
delegated or entrusted to him. The nature and basis of the relationship between the 
body corporate and managing agent must be clearly set out to avoid uncertainty and 
possible future disputes. The full services to be supplied by the managing agent should 
be listed under the headings administration, secretarial, accounting and ancillary. There 
should be a detailed breakdown of fees to be charged for the services to be rendered. 
The managing agent should include all additional costs in the contract to avoid any 
disputes at a later stage. He or she must also include the maximum amount that he will 
charge for the collection of special levies1351 that involves additional work, collection of 
these funds and exercising credit control.1352 Furthermore, the agent can charge a take-
on fee to cover all the additional work required to install all the new information in the 
management agent’s computer when he is employed by a scheme for the first time.1353 
Services that are supplied by the managing agent free of charge like stationery must 
also be included in the agreement so that the body corporate is assured that they will 
not be charged for these sundry items.1354 The contract must also provide for annual 
adjustments to fees in order to hedge inflation. Adequate notice must be given so that 
these changes in the fee structure can be discussed before they are implemented.1355 
The managing agent is entitled to include an indemnity clause protecting him against 
any actions of the body corporate or a third party to recover losses or claim damages 
from the managing agent where he has been the cause of any financial losses provided 
that they are not as a result of gross negligence or fraud on the part of the managing 
agent.1356  
 
Apart from a description of services to be rendered by the managing agent, the content 
of which is solely within the discretion of the contracting parties, the rules also require 
the trustees to include specific matters in the contract relating to the tenure of the 
contract that includes how the contract can be terminated by either of the parties and 
                                            
1351 A special levy is usually charged where the trustees need to raise additional funds for capital expenditure. 
1352 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 121. 
1353 122. 
1354 122. 
1355 122. 
1356 Woudberg Basic Sectional Titles Book Two 123. 
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the notice period that must be given. The first is a provision that the managing agent is 
appointed for an initial period of one year, and thereafter such appointment shall 
automatically renewed from year to year unless the body corporate notifies the 
managing agent to the contrary.1357 Therefore, the date on which the managing agent is 
to commence his or her services must be also be included in the contract as the 
managing agent is usually appointed for a period of twelve months and the 
commencement date becomes the anniversary date for reappointment purposes.1358 
Subject to section 39(1) of the STA no special resolution is needed to revoke the 
appointment of the managing agent, as a decision by the trustees is sufficient. This 
ensures a measure of continuity while leaving the option to the trustees to remove an 
inefficient managing agent if necessary.1359  
 
The second matter that must be included in the contract is a provision that the trustees 
may, without notice, cancel the contract of appointment under certain circumstances. 
These circumstances include situations where the managing agent is in breach of any 
provision in his contract, or if the managing agent is guilty of any conduct that would 
justify the cancellation of the contract of appointment in terms of common law. This 
clause must also provide that the managing agent may not have any claim against the 
body corporate or any of the owners in such a cancellation.1360 The third matter that the 
contract must provide is a clause that the management agent’s contract can be revoked 
and he shall cease to hold office in certain circumstances. These circumstances include 
the situation where the managing agent is under provisional liquidation or insolvent or 
placed under judicial management; where the managing agent is convicted of an 
offence involving fraud or dishonesty or if a special resolution of the body corporate is 
passed to that effect.1361 Where the managing agent’s contract of appointment is 
revoked by the passing of a special resolution of the body corporate, the managing 
agent should not be deprived of his right to claim compensation or damages due to 
                                            
1357 Annexure 8 rule 46(1). 
1358 Woudberg Basic Sectional Titles Book Two 120. 
1359 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-17. 
1360 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(a). 
1361 Annexure 8 rule 47. 
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breach of contract.1362 The trustees’ omission to include these provisions in the contract 
of appointment would not invalidate the contract, but it would be unwise to do so.1363 
 
Certain other items must be incorporated into the contract in order to deal with all 
pertinent matters inherent in the relationship between the body corporate and the 
managing agent. For example, there needs to be a full description of the parties 
involved, as well as an inclusion of the domocilium citandi et executandi of the body 
corporate and the managing agent. This is important and must be disclosed fully for 
proper identification should it becomes necessary for a summons to be issued aginst 
either party to commence litigation.1364 Both parties should sign the contract together 
with two witnesses. 
10 5 3 Comparative survey 
 
When a managing agent is voluntarily appointed by the owners corporation in New 
South Wales, both parties must fulfill a number of requirements in order to have a valid 
and enforceable agreement.1365 The owners corporation must pass an ordinary 
resolution in a general meeting which must comprise both an appointment of the 
managing agent1366 and a delegation of various powers, authorities, duties and 
functions.1367 An instrument must then be completed in writing which both appoints and 
delegates various powers, authorities, duties and functions to the managing agent.  
 
In terms of the Agents Act a written agency agreement containing any prescribed terms 
must be signed by, or on behalf of the managing agent and by, or on behalf of the 
owners corporation.1368 The agreement must contain the prescribed terms.1369 It 
requires that the agreement specify the extent to which the agent will be involved in the 
twelve tasks that the agent agrees to perform. The agency agreement must not contain 
                                            
1362 Annexure 8 rule 47(iii); Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-17. 
1363 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-17. 
1364 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 120. 
1365 Ilkin NSW Strata 149. 
1366 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 27. 
1367 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28. 
1368 Agents Act ss 27; 28; and 109. 
1369 Found in Schedules 7 and 14; Ilkin NSW Strata 152. 
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a term, condition or other provision that is inconsistent with Schedules 7 and 14.1370 The 
managing agent must sign and serve a copy of the agency agreement on the owners 
corporation within 48 hours of the agreement being signed by the owners corporation in 
order to recover remuneration or reimbursement for expenses or charges.1371 
 
Neither the written instrument of appointment and delegation, nor the agency 
agreements are prescribed documents.1372 A written instrument must exist for the 
appointment and delegation.1373 However, for the last 30 years the managing agents 
have been incorporating the instrument of appointment and delegation in the agency 
agreement.1374 The Real Estate Institute of New South Wales has recommended a 
standard form agency agreement that lets the owners corporation and the managing 
agent select the extent of delegation conferred to the agent. The two options 
correspond with section 28(1)(a) of the Agents Act which confers a complete delegation, 
                                            
1370 Agents Regulations reg 13(3); Ilkin NSW Strata 152. 
1371 Agents Act s 55; Ilkin NSW Strata 153. 
1372 Ilkin NSW Strata 151. 
1373 Agents Act ss 27; 28; and 109. 
1374 There are five requirements for a valid and legally enforceable agency agreement. It must be in writing, but it 
need not be expressed in the terms of a deed. It must be made between the correct parties, namely the licensed strata 
manager and the owners corporation. The managing agent can be an individual, a partnership or a company, but 
must be licensed. The executive committee cannot enter into the agreement or be a party to it. Furthermore the 
agreement must be signed by, or on behalf of, the licensed managing agent and the owners corporation. The owners 
corporation usually signs the agreement under its common seal, but it can authorize an individual to sign it. Ilkin 
(Ilkin NSW Strata 152) describes the best practice to adopt is where the managing agent attaches a complete agency 
agreement to the notice of the general meeting where the decision is being made to appoint the managing agent, and 
if approved the agreement should be signed with the seal and any alterations must be initialed by both parties. The 
agreement must contain the prescribed terms found in Schedules 7 and 14. It requires that the agreement specify the 
extent to which the agent will be involved in the twelve tasks that the agent agrees to perform. The agency 
agreement must not contain a term, condition or other provision that is inconsistent with the schedule 7 and 14 in 
terms of Agents Regulations reg 13(3). The managing agent must sign and serve a copy of the agency agreement on 
the owners corporation within 48 hours of the agreement being signed by the owners corporation in order to recover 
remuneration or reimbursement for expenses or charges in terms of Agents Act s 55. If the agreement is handed to 
the chairperson or secretary at the general meeting then this action must be noted in the minutes to satisfy the service 
requirement. Service by handing it over in person and obtaining a proof of receipt is the best option as proof of 
service is critical in contested cases as to whether the managing agent is entitled to commission and expenses. 
Where service does not occur within 48 hours the managing agent can recover commission and expenses if the 
Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal is satisfied that the failure was due to an oversight or other cause beyond 
the managing agent’s control; it is fair and reasonable, considering all the circumstances, that the managing agent 
receives the commission; or failure to make the order would be unjust. If a provision in the agency agreement 
entered into since 24 April 1980 is unjust then the owners corporation may apply to the Supreme Court or District 
Court of New South Wales to review or vary such term pursuant to the powers conferred on the Court by the New 
South Wales Contracts review Act of 1980. Agency agreements are not liable to stamp duty because the New South 
Wales Duties Act of 1997 does not expressly impose any duty on agency agreements, and an unstamped agreement 
remains admissible in court proceedings. 
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and section 28(1)(b) which confers a partial delegation of powers, authorities, duties 
and functions.  
 
The consequences of not having a valid agency agreement are two-fold1375 and cannot 
be avoided. First, the managing agent is not entitled to any remuneration or 
reimbursement for expenses incurred. Secondly, if the agent had already been 
remunerated and reimbursed the owners corporation can recover the money by bringing 
proceedings against a managing agent in a court of competent jurisdiction if the 
managing agent refuses to return the money. It is unlikely that the managing agent 
could maintain a claim in quantum meruit against the owners corporation for reasonable 
remuneration or succeed with a defense of estoppel or ratification.1376 
10 7 Conclusion 
 
Before the first general meeting has been held there are certain management and 
maintenance acts that need to be performed. Since the developer and initial owners are 
not ideally suited to perform these acts, managing agents are usually appointed in the 
initial period for this purpose. In order to prevent abuses by the developer, these 
contracts are usually not concluded for a period of time extending beyond the 
conclusion of the first annual general meeting. This seems to be a satisfactory position 
as it would not be desirable to have a managing agent that has not been selected or at 
least approved by the body corporate in the first general meeting.  
 
In South Africa the appointment cannot extend beyond the initial period, unless at the 
inaugural meeting the contract is ceded to the body corporate.1377 The Chinese 
legislation achieves the same result by providing that the managing agent’s 
appointment cannot extend beyond the initial period, unless an extension is authorized 
at the first general meeting.1378  Perhaps the South African legislation can benefit from 
the position in New South Wales and Singapore where the appointment can extend 
                                            
1375 Agents Act s 55. 
1376 Ilkin NSW Strata 153. 
1377 Annexure 8 rule 50(2)(iv). 
1378 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 30. 
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beyond the initial period if so authorised by the Tribunal or Commissioner of Buildings 
respectively. In South Africa such an extension could then be authorised if the CSOS 
(once in operation) is satisfied that it will serve the interests of the sectional owners to 
continue with the services of the existing managing agent. This would still ensure that 
the owner developer would act in the best interests of the minority sectional owners.  
 
South African legislation can certainly learn from the Chinese position where a 
developer has to select a qualified managing agent through a public bidding process; 
ehere the appointment is subject to the approval of the local real estate authority and 
has to be concluded in a written contract. The managing agent is under a legal 
obligation to disclose any prior direct or indirect relationship with the developers in 
bidding for the job. A developer owned managing company is disqualified from bidding 
in order to avoid any undisclosed conflicts of interest and to better protect owner’s 
interests. These measures increase the transparency of the management contract and 
avoid self-dealing transactions entered into by developers.1379  
 
The position in South Africa where both a natural person (where a natural person 
includes a sectional owner and a trustee who is also an owner) and a managing 
company can be appointed as a managing agent seems satisfactory to me.1380 
However, a managing agency firm with proven experience to manage the affairs of a 
sectional title scheme should be appointed due to the complexity of the job and the 
administrative infrastructure and the degree of expertise needed in the performance of a 
huge variety of tasks. However, the trend where estate agents secure a contract from 
the developer to manage the scheme in which they also act as selling agents should be 
avoided, as the estate agents are not focused on efficient management, but rather on 
retaining the position that they handle all future sales.1381 A high degree of expertise 
and experience is required in each field, and not only in one field. 
 
                                            
1379 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 29. 
1380 Annexure 8 rule 5(b). 
1381 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 49. 
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Regarding the issue of who may appoint the managing agent it can be argued that if the 
body corporate in the general meeting alone could appoint the managing agent then the 
owners might avoid the appointment of a managing agent as it could mean increased 
levies for them. In New South Wales a managing agent can only be appointed by the 
owners corporation, who cannot delegate the power to appoint a managing agent to the 
executive committee, even if all the owners agree to such a delegation. In contrast in 
Singapore a managing agent can also be voluntarily appointed by its executive council if 
duly authorized to do so by the proprietors at the last preceding general meeting.  
 
Van der Merwe states that the managing agent is in reality appointed to act on behalf of 
the body corporate. It is for this reason that the managing agent should be appointed by 
the body corporate in the general meeting and not by the trustees.1382 Since every 
owner has a real and vested interest in the appointment of an efficient managing agent, 
the trustees should not be able to make the decision to appoint a managing agent 
unilaterally.1383 This makes sense, as the trustees cannot terminate the appointment of 
a managing agent on their own, so it follows logically that they should not be able to 
appoint one on their own. The law as it stands on the subject does not require owner 
involvement other than the trustees. This position should be altered to include owner 
involvement. A direction might be presumably passed at a general meeting that the 
trustees may not appoint a managing agent by a trustees’ resolution, but only by a 
resolution of the general meeting.1384  
 
After considering the position in foreign jurisdictions I believe that the managing agent 
should be appointed either at the general meeting by an ordinary resolution or by the 
trustees if it has been authorized at a previous general meeting. It is my opinion that the 
trustees should be in a position to encourage the owners to appoint a managing agent 
where they feel they are not in the best position to handle the day-to-day management 
of the scheme. The trustees are required to enter into a written contract with a 
managing agent, but the final say on employing the managing agent should be vested in 
                                            
1382 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 329; van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-25. 
1383 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 44. 
1384 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-12. 
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the body corporate at a general meeting. In this way the trustees have the responsibility 
of selecting a suitable managing agent and then explaining the selection procedure at 
the next general meeting. 
 
In South Africa and New South Wales the managing agent must actually be appointed 
in form of a written contract as the appointment of the managing agent is only valid if the 
agreement reached between the parties is reduced to writing. In New South Wales the 
written agency agreement containing any prescribed terms must be signed by the 
managing agent and the owners corporation which must be served on the owners 
corporation within 48 hours of the agreement being signed by the owners corporation in 
order to recover remuneration or reimbursement for expenses or charges. In my opinion 
South Africa should adopt such a provision as it serves to tighten up and enforce the 
requirement that the managing agent be appointed in terms of a signed written contract.  
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Chapter 11: Qualities and qualifications of a 
managing agent 
 
11 1 Introduction 
 
The appointment of a professional managing agent assumes that the managing agent 
has some qualification, the necessary experience and is capable of performing the 
management tasks that he or she is appointed for.1385 Unfortunately the legislative 
provisions regulating the qualities and qualifications required to become a managing 
agent are highly unsatisfactory.  
 
I will start this chapter with a discussion of the qualities and qualifications that managing 
agents must have in order to be appointed as such in South Africa and in foreign 
jurisdictions. Since managing agents are required to register with the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board for a Fidelity Fund Certificate and have an obligation to open a trust 
account, I will review the relationship between managing agents and estate agents. I will 
then examine whether managing agents are considered “debt collectors” in terms of the 
Debt Collectors Act 114 of 1998 (the “Debt Collectors Act”) for the purposes of 
collecting levies. I will follow this up with an in depth discussion of the relevancy and 
purpose of the National Association of Managing Agents (“NAMA”). This will lead to the 
important topic of whether the Community Scheme Ombud Service (“CSOS”) 
established by the Community Scheme Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (“CSOSA”) 
should regulate managing agents once it is in operation. Finally I will consider how the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (the “CPA”) will affect the manner in which 
managing agents are required to perform their management services for the body 
corporate. 
 
 
                                            
1385 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26. 
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11 2 Qualities and qualifications required to be a managing agent 
11 2 1 Introduction 
 
One of the most problematic aspects regarding the appointment of managing agents in 
South Africa is that there is no requirement for the managing agent to possess any 
particular qualification or license. In what follows, I will discuss the qualities and 
qualifications that managing agents should have to conduct a professional managing 
agency service. I shall look to the position in foreign jurisdictions to find possible 
solutions to this shortcoming in South African sectional title legislation. 
11 2 2 South African position 
 
The managing agent should be capable of exercising and performing all the powers and 
duties that the trustees are required to deal with on behalf of the body corporate in the 
day-to-day management of the scheme. These powers and duties will be examined in 
more detail in chapter thirteen. For now it is important to know that managing agents 
could have all or some of the managerial, secretarial and financial duties. The managing 
agent must have a good understanding of the relevant legislation, regulations, and the 
rules in general and the specific rules applicable to the scheme.1386  
 
There is an extensive clerical function in managing a sectional title scheme. It is for this 
reason that the managing agent will have to have sound secretarial and administrative 
experience together with the necessary staff and office equipment to deal with the huge 
volume of notices, agendas, minutes, correspondence, and circulars generated by this 
aspect of management. Managing agents are members of a service industry that is 
highly labour-orientated that involves high overheads for staff and office facilities. The 
services offered, staff requirements and overhead expenses would depend on the 
individual scheme and the capacity of the body corporate to pay.1387  
 
                                            
1386 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-5. 
1387 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 317. 
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The managing agent should furthermore have a high level of accounting and financial 
knowledge and experience to enable him or her to interpret and understand financial 
statements and to compile balanced budgets. If the managing agent does not have 
these financial qualifications he or she should have staff qualified to do so.1388 Added to 
this the managing agent should have the correct infrastructure to effectively perform all 
the financial and accounting tasks involved in the management of the scheme which 
includes the system of accounting that suits the scheme’s needs. As I have mentioned 
the trustees cannot expect the auditors to audit the annual financial statements without 
being provided with the proper financial records that must comply with generally 
accepted accounting principles. There needs to be monthly financial reports so that 
trustees can acquire timeous information in order to make relevant financial decisions. 
These reports should include budget comparisons of monthly expenses, income and 
year to date figures, as well as cash flow and fully aged debtors’ reports. If the 
accounting records are inadequate the auditors may have to reconstruct the records at 
a high cost to the body corporate.1389  
 
Managing agents are also required to have skills with regard to general maintenance 
problems such as gardening, plumbing, electrical, waterproofing, and structural and 
security matters. If he or she lacks any knowledge in these matters outside contractors 
would have to be employed to troubleshoot and do the job that would incur unnecessary 
expenditure for the body corporate.1390 The managing agent should have a 
maintenance and repair inspection and service division to monitor the physical condition 
of the buildings in the scheme. The managing agent must be in regular contact with the 
trustees, and where there are problems, the agent should initiate repairs and 
maintenance at a relatively low cost before the problem spirals out of control and 
becomes too expensive to effect without an increase in levy contributions or the raising 
of a special levy.  
 
                                            
1388 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26-28. 
1389 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 117. 
1390 118. 
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The managing agent should have a good reputation in the industry and a proven track 
record in property management.1391 Furthermore, the managing agent is required to 
continually deal with people of different racial, intellectual, educational, and cultural 
backgrounds. This requires an acquired humanistic and diplomatic skill.1392 The 
managing agent should also be in constant contact with the trustees so that 
communication is open, transparent and honest. 
 
Each managing agent could have at least ten buildings that it manages, and this figure 
could be as high as fifty buildings. Sectional title schemes can have as many as five 
hundred units, and in some cases even more than that.1393 The managing agent has to 
generate levy statements; ensure the utilities are read and charged for on time and 
deliver or post the levy statements. He or she has to capture receipts; deal with levy 
account queries; generate reminder letters for the late payers; hand over defaulters for 
collection; attend to daily complaints and issues; issue general correspondence to 
owners; attend to emails; settle invoices to council and suppliers once they have the 
signatures of two trustees approving payment; co‐ordinate all maintenance issues for 
the complex; handle insurance claims via the appointed broker; attend monthly trustees 
meetings; arrange for special general meetings where necessary and prepare the 
complex for year-end audit and keep the trustees up to date with information and 
correspondence, whilst simultaneously dealing with the numerous municipal account 
queries. The managing agent must also ensure that the correct procedures are followed 
for those owners who wish to change or extend their sections.1394 
 
From this discussion alone it is clear that the management of a sectional title scheme 
requires the performance of a massive variety of tasks and that a high degree of 
expertise is required in not only a single field, but in a variety of fields. These various 
tasks require a diverse set of skills. It has been said that: 
 
                                            
1391 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26; Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 43. 
1392 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 118. 
1393 L Lenhof  “A day in the life of a managing agent” (October 2008) 3-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1,3. 
1394 1. 
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 “There can be very few professions which require such a wide range of skill 
sets.”1395  
 
A successful managing agent will have to plan, council, organize, delegate and 
negotiate. Effectively a managing agent must have a proven record of property 
administration; hiring and letting and selling of property; property valuation and 
knowledge of insurance procedures, policies and replacement values. Furthermore, he 
or she is required to have experience, skills and training in diplomacy, secretarial work, 
estate agency, insurance, accounting and financial functions, painting, plumbing, 
electrician, building contractor, and human resources.1396 The specialist qualifications 
need to be backed up with infrastructure such as offices equipped with computers, 
accounting programs, stationery and support staff. 
 
It is therefore evident that the single most problematic aspect relating to the managing 
agent industry in South Africa is the lack of any requirement that the managing agent 
have any form of qualification or experience to act as such. Since the South African 
legislation does not prescribe any qualifications, the managing agent profession in 
South Africa remains largely self-regulatory.1397 As a result many managing agents lack 
the required expertise, experience, skills, specialization, qualities and qualifications to 
provide a professional management service to manage a sectional title scheme 
effectively and efficiently. It is for this reason that trustees, who need to be prudent in 
their selection of a managing agent, often face a tough task in finding a suitably 
qualified and experienced managing agent with a proven track record of expertise and 
experience. Often the trustees are forced to appoint a less qualified agent because 
suitably qualified managing agents charge a high price for their service. Like 
accountants, attorneys, architects, engineers and doctors, the managing agents provide 
a professional service, which is valuable to the sectional title community and industry as 
a whole. Legislation should be adopted in South Africa to create a professional body to 
                                            
1395 G Paddock “Understanding the functions of sectional title property managers” (November 2007) 2-8 Paddocks 
Press Newsletter 6. 
1396 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 320.  
1397 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26. 
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stipulate qualifications needed to act as managing agents; to provide for their training 
and to regulate and oversee managing agent’s actions to create and maintain a high 
degree of professionalism in the industry.  
11 2 3 Comparative survey 
 
For the last thirty years all managing agents appointed to manage a strata scheme in 
New South Wales are required to have a strata managing agent’s license referred to in 
Agents Act.1398 The appointment of an unlicensed managing agent is invalid and may 
not be enforced by the managing agent against the owners corporation.1399 All 
managing agents must comply with the obligations contained in the Agents Act. Van der 
Merwe states that this specialization in the field of managing agents has led to the 
appointments of managing agents that are better qualified, and has prevented many 
financial and legal problems which could arise if strata schemes are managed by 
unskilled, inefficient and inexperienced managing agents.1400 The modern trend is to 
appoint specialist sectional title managing agents rather than estate agents, 
accountants and attorneys.1401 
 
Where the owners corporation decides to appoint a managing agent a resolution is 
passed that the secretary invite a managing agents to interview with an executive 
committee member. The managing agent must answer certain queries in person during 
the interview or must address these queries in a letter. These matters include requiring 
a copy of the draft agency agreement proposed by the managing agent; the managing 
agent’s license number; whether the managing agent is an individual, a partnership or a 
company; whether the managing agent requires a complete or partial delegation of 
powers, authorities, duties and functions of the owners corporation; the duration of the 
appointment and delegation including any extension period; whether the proposed 
agreement allows for rescission by either party if either party is not fulfilling its duties; 
what services will be specifically listed in the agency agreement; the management fee, 
                                            
1398 Agents Act ss 8 and 9; Ilkin NSW Strata 147. 
1399 Agents Act s 26. 
1400 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-6. 
1401 15-6. 
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expenses and charges for services provided, and a clear definition of what services are 
not included in the fees and the fees payable for these extra services if they should be 
required; the time when all fees, expenses and charges are payable; confirmation of the 
managing agents professional indemnity insurance which would be essential in the 
possible event of the managing agent’s negligence; evidence of the managing agent’s 
experience in managing schemes; the number of other schemes managed by the 
managing agent; the number of staff the managing agent has and who will be available 
to answer questions about the scheme; the likely compatibility of the managing agent 
and its staff with the scheme participants and contact details for the schemes that the 
managing agent can recommend as reference to the managing agent’s reputation, 
services, compliance with the legislation, reliability and efficiency. If the executive 
committee recommends the appointment of a particular managing agent then a motion 
must be listed in the agenda of the general meeting where the final decision is to be 
made.1402 
 
In Singapore, similar to South Africa, the approach followed is not to legislate on the 
matter of the qualifications and accreditation of managing agents. The industry is 
encouraged to self-regulate with the assistance from relevant government authorities 
such as the Building and Construction Authority1403 and SPRING Singapore, which is 
the national standards and conformance body. Ultimately the management corporations 
must make informed decisions, and be responsible for the decisions that they make.1404 
There is now a set of guidelines called the “Specification for Performance of Managing 
Agents for Strata Residential Properties” published by SPRING Singapore for the role 
that managing agents play in managing condominium schemes. There are also 
accreditation schemes for managing agents managed by various organizations and 
professional bodies such as the Association of Management Corporations in Singapore; 
the Association of Property and Facility Managers; and the Singapore Institute of 
Surveyors and Valuers.1405 
                                            
1402 Ilkin NSW Strata 147-148. 
1403 Established by the Building and Construction Authority Act of 2000. 
1404 Keang Sood Strata Title 546. 
1405 547. 
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South Africa could also learn from Chinese law in the area of qualifications of managing 
agents. The Chinese Property Management Regulation stipulates that the management 
companies should be qualified and licensed before being employed.1406 In order for the 
managing agent to obtain a license a certain degree of education, training, familiarity 
with relevant legislation and financial qualifications are required. Chinese law empowers 
the local real estate authority to order a management company that employs a person 
without a license to rectify the position and impose a fine.1407 The shortcoming in this 
piece of legislation is that there is no provision that deals with the misconduct of a 
licensed agent. In such cases the local real estate authority should be empowered to 
revoke the license of the agent for continued misconduct and gross incompetence.1408  
 
There are accreditation systems which assure that the management company adheres 
to a certain standard and quality of service for managing agents under special 
departmental rule.1409 The Property Management Regulation creates three classes of 
management companies.1410 The first class management company must have at least 
30 licensed professionals in the fields of engineering and accounting with a registered 
capital of five million Yuan and must be accredited by the ministry of construction.1411 
The second-class management company must have at least twenty licensed 
professionals with a registered capital of three million Yuan and must be accredited by 
the ministry of construction.1412 The third class has to have at least ten licensed 
professionals with a registered capital of five hundred thousand Yuan and must be 
accredited by the local real estate authority.1413 The level of accreditation determines 
the scope of business of the management agent. To illustrate this, the third class 
management agent cannot provide services for a project with 200,000 or more gross 
square meters in floor area.1414 All newly created management companies are originally 
                                            
1406 Property Management Regulation of 2003 arts 32(2) and 33; Chen & van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 27. 
1407 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 61. 
1408 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 27. 
1409 See the Measure Governing the Property Managing Agent’s Accreditation of 2004 issued by the ministry of 
construction on 17 March 2004; Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 27. 
1410 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 5. 
1411 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 5(1). 
1412 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 5(2). 
1413 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 5(3). 
1414 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 8. 
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categorized as the third class and are re-evaluated by a real estate authority for one 
year.1415 The management company must provide full disclosure of its accreditation and 
experience when it tenders for a job. The accreditation ensures that the management 
body employs a properly qualified and experienced agent, and that the client will have 
professional management services of a high standard for its condominium community.  
11 3 Are managing agents also estate agents? 
 
The shortcoming in South Africa that no qualifications are required to enable a person to 
be appointed as a managing agent can only be remedied by legislation which would 
establish a body of Professional Sectional Title Managing Agents to ensure that the 
managing agents and their staff have some kind of minimum qualification and training to 
practice.1416 Such a body could function under the auspices of the Institute of Estate 
Agents. It could have its own qualifying examination, code of conduct, rules and ethics 
and a constitution in order to practice as a professional managing agent, as is the case 
for estate agents who are registered as such in terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act 
112 of 1976 (the “Estate Agency Affairs Act”) and who function under the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board. The activities, qualifications and training of the managing agents can then 
be monitored and controlled by the Estate Agency Affairs Board.1417  
 
It is in the trustee’s best interests to appoint managing agents that are primarily involved 
in the property industry such as estate agents. Since 1981 managing agents who collect 
or receive levies for a body corporate have been defined as estate agents, with the 
result that the Estate Agency Affairs Act applies to the managing agent.1418 Managing 
agents are therefore, by definition, also estate agents. For this reason the managing 
agent will have to comply with all the applicable provisions of the Estate Agency Affairs 
Board Act and existing code of conduct for estate agents. The Estate Agency Affairs 
                                            
1415 Property Management Regulation of 2003 art 7. 
1416 Constas & Bleijs Demysifying Sectional Title 43. 
1417 AB Kenyon-Thompson “The body corporate and the managing agent” (1983) Juta’s SA Journal of Property 42. 
Van der Merwe (1994) 316; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-5. 
1418 G Jooste “Trust Money, Trust Accounts and Managing Agents – What are the Best Rules” (January 2008) 3-1 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 1-2. 
1418 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-7. 
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Board is in the process of promulgating a special code of conduct for management 
agents.1419 The proposed code contains specific provisions relating to managing agents. 
The duties imposed on managing agents by the proposed code are in favour of the 
managing body and not the individual owners. This means that only the managing body 
can lodge complaints with the Estate Agency Affairs Board for alleged contravention of 
the code.1420 Unit owners with complaints would have to act through their management 
body. The proposed code also has a provision that the managing agent would be held 
vicariously liable for the acts or omissions by his or her employees.1421  
 
As I have mentioned persons whose professional duties include the collection or receipt 
of levies for the sectional title body corporate falls under the jurisdiction of the Estate 
Agency Affairs Board because the Estate Agency Affairs Act defines an estate agent as: 
 
“Any person who renders any such other service as the Minister on the 
recommendation of the board may specify from time to time by notice in the 
Gazette.”1422  
 
One of these services specified by the Minister is the collecting or receiving money 
payable by any person or on behalf of a developer or a body corporate in respect of a 
sectional title unit. It is for this reason that all managing agents are under a legal 
obligation to register as an estate agent with the Estate Agency Affairs Board before he 
or she can collect or receive any levies, and should be in possession of a valid Fidelity 
Fund Certificate.1423 Estate agents are required to take out fidelity insurance in the 
event that the agent misappropriates body corporate funds. It is very important for a 
managing agent to register with the Estate Agency Affairs Board because all amounts 
paid to the managing agent into its trust account is then protected by the Estate Agent’s 
                                            
1419 Proposals to the Sectional Titles Regulation Board (March 2003) 3.1.1.12; Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 
26. 
1420 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-7. 
1421 15-7. 
1422 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 1(a)(iv). 
1423 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 28; J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock: Registering managing agents” 
(January 2010) 5-5 Paddocks Press Newsletter 6; J Van der Walt “Registration of managing agents with Estate 
Agency Affairs Board” (April 2008) 3-4 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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Fidelity Fund. In order for the managing agent to operate a trust account he or she must 
be in possession of a valid Fidelity Fund Certificate, which protects the body corporate 
from financial losses, which could be caused by his or her staff’s negligence or 
fraudulent activities.1424  
 
The managing agents must also manage trust money in accordance with the 
stipulations of the Estate Agency Affairs Act.1425 Trust money is defined in the Estate 
Agency Affairs Act as: 
 
“Money or other property entrusted to an estate agent in his or her capacity as an 
estate agent.”1426  
 
Managing agents often argue that if the money is deposited directly into the client’s 
account then they are not “collecting or receiving” trust monies, and therefore they do 
not need to adhere to the Estate Agency Affairs Act. However, the word “collect” should 
be understood in both its narrow and wide meaning. The wider meaning includes all 
steps routinely taken to gather payments from persons normally willing to pay such as 
sending invoices, and reminder letters. Therefore, the managing agent does fall within 
the sphere of the Estate Agency Affairs Act in this regard. The Estate Agency Affairs Act 
stipulates that the managing agent must keep a record of the trust money received and 
must ensure that an audit is done within four months after the end of the financial year 
of the managing agent.1427 All trust money, including individual accounts for each body 
corporate or a collective account (also known as a “bucket account”) for all bodies 
corporate must be included in the report that the auditor of the managing agent sends to 
the Estate Agency Affairs Board annually.  
 
                                            
1424 Woudberg Basic Sectional Titles Book Two 118. 
1425 Jooste (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1426 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 1. 
1427 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 29. 
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The managing agent is obliged to open a trust account or accounts with a bank for the 
purpose of depositing monies received from clients.1428 Only once money has been 
deposited into the current account1429 may it be transferred into a savings or interest 
bearing account.1430 Both accounts must be in the name of the managing agent and 
must contain a reference to section 32(1) or 31(2) of the Estate Agency Affairs Act as 
the case may be. All the accounts must be reconciled after every 30 days. The 
managing agent can therefore open a trust account for all of his clients collectively or 
separate accounts for each client. The managing agent must notify the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board of the details of the current account including the bank name and account 
number. There is no such requirement for the savings or interest bearing account, as 
the trust funds may not be deposited directly into a savings account.1431 In a letter to 
NAMA the Estate Agency Affairs Board stated that trustees may not have signing 
powers on the managing agent’s accounts and the managing agents may not have 
signing powers on the body corporate’s accounts.1432  
 
It is most important to note that the managing agent is not entitled to payment for any 
services rendered as an estate agent if he or she is not registered with the Estate 
Agency Affairs Board and is in possession of a valid Fidelity Fund Certificate.1433 
Managing agents must apply to the Estate Agency Affairs Board on an annual basis for 
the renewal of their Fidelity Fund Certificate. The Estate Agency Affairs Board will fine 
the managing agent if he or she does not apply for the renewal timeously and the 
Certificate will not be issued until the fine and all other prescribed fees have been paid.  
 
If the managing agent steals from a body corporate’s trust money the body corporate 
will be able to submit a claim to the Estate Agency Affairs Board against the Fidelity 
Fund and recover its losses from the Fidelity Fund. The Estate Agency Affairs Act refers 
specifically to theft of trust monies. The body corporate will not be entitled to claim from 
                                            
1428 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 32. 
1429 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 32(1). 
1430 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 32(2).   
1431 Jooste (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1432 2. 
1433 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-8. 
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the Fidelity Fund if it cannot actually be proved that the managing agent stole from the 
body corporate. All claims against the Fund must be submitted within three months of 
the claimant becoming aware of the theft. Failure to do this within the allotted time can 
result in the claim being rejected. Although recovery is not guaranteed the claimant 
should always report the theft as soon as he or she become aware of the theft. 
 
Despite the requirement that the managing agent register with the Estate Agency Affairs 
Board, there are still many managing agents that have not registered and who are not in 
possession of a valid Fidelity Fund Certificate. In cases where the managing agent is 
not registered with the Estate Agency Affairs Board or not in possession of a valid 
Fidelity Fund Certificate, commentators in the field of sectional titles are of the opinion 
that the Fidelity Fund will still entertain the possibility of repaying the claim.1434 In such a 
case the Estate Agency Affairs Board will require the body corporate to exhaust all 
avenues of recovery for the loss such as liquidation of the managing agency business 
and the personal sequestration of the managing agent who committed the theft.  
 
It is also important to note that the mere fact that a managing agent is registered as an 
estate agent does not guarantee that the members of staff chosen by the managing 
agent are also properly qualified.1435 Trustees who self-administer the scheme will place 
the scheme at risk as they do not have the same protection. The trustees will have to 
obtain fidelity insurance, but in practice the body corporate seldom makes claims for 
such policies because insurance companies require the body corporate to lay criminal 
charges against the trustees in charge of the funds. The body corporate seldom does 
due to the implications for the trustee’s employment and constraints in life that 
accompany a criminal record. The bodies corporate are more inclined to lay charges 
against the management agent as a third party.1436 
 
                                            
1434 Van der Walt (April 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1435 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 124. 
1436 118. 
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11 4 Are managing agents also debt collectors? 
 
There has been uncertainty as to whether a managing agent should be considered a 
“debt collector” for the purpose of the Debt Collectors Act”. If this is the case the 
managing agent will be required to register with the Council for Debt Collectors and 
open and operate a separate trust account for this purpose under the Debt Collector’s 
Act, in addition to the trust account the managing agent must operate under section 32 
of the Estate Agents Affairs Act.  
 
A “debt collector” for the purposes of the Debt Collector’s Act is:  
 
“A person, other than an attorney or his employee or a party to a factoring 
arrangement, who for reward collects debts owed to another on the latter’s 
behalf…”1437  
 
This definition is clearly wide enough to cover the levy collection activities carried out by 
managing agents. The National Credit Regulator has made an argument for managing 
agents being registered as a debt collector, having found a number of managing agents 
guilty of contravening the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the “National Credit Act”) 
because they charged more than the prescribed charges for debt collection activities. 
NAMA had also suggested that registration as a debt collector is not too onerous a task, 
and the hassle of registration may be offset by the profits that can be earned from this 
activity.1438  
 
Therefore, the trustees must confirm with the Council of Debt Collectors that the 
managing agent is a member of this compulsory body and is registered as a “debt 
collector” in terms of the Debt Collectors Act. Without such membership the managing 
agent would not be legally entitled to send statements or collect monies.1439 
                                            
1437 Debt Collectors Act s 1(a).  
1438 G Paddock “Looking Back at 2009 - a Sectional Title Retrospective” (December 2009) 4-12 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 1. 
1439 G Moore-Barnes “Steps to becoming a managing agent” (June 2013) 8-6 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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Both the Debt Collectors Act and Estate Agents Affairs Act could regulate the levy 
collecting activities. This creates an impractical situation where a managing agent has a 
statutory obligation to open trust accounts under both Acts. The management agent 
would then be limited to the prescribed charges for various debt collection activities.1440  
 
The uncertainty has now been cleared up. Dr. Gerhard Jooste from NAMA has reported 
that after extended negotiations with the Debt Collector’s Council it has been formally 
confirmed that managing agents who collect levies do not need to open a separate 
account under the Debt Collectors Act.1441 The managing agent need not operate two 
separate trust accounts. A managing agent must credit all levies received to an estate 
agency trust account. The managing agent's use of a trust account opened under 
section 32 of the Estate Agents Affairs Act for levy receipts is considered compliance 
with the requirements of the Debt Collector's Act.   
11 5 National Association of Managing Agents 
 
In South Africa the National Association of Managing Agents (“NAMA”) was formed in 
2001.1442 It is interesting to note that this only occurred twenty years after a similar 
association was established in New South Wales. The lesson to be learnt from this is 
that comparative studies do help countries to develop their own legislation. Following 
the New South Wales model sooner could have prevented many of the management 
problems experienced in South Africa due to the lack of legislation requiring managing 
agents to have membership to a national management association. NAMA represents a 
number of managing agents in the Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, Gauteng North, 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, with its offices in Pretoria and secretaries in 
Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. The latest statistics available reveal that NAMA 
has 274 member firms who together manage 13 000 sectional title schemes. There are 
approximately 3500 property managers in South Africa who manage approximately ten 
                                            
1440 Paddock (December 2009) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-8. 
1441 G Paddock “Application of the Debt Collectors Act to managing agency” (February 2014) 9 – 1 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 2. 
1442 The chairperson of NAMA for the first twelve years was Dr Gerhard Jooste, who was then replaced by Koos 
Croukamp; G Paddock “Tribute to Gerhard Jooste” (May 2013) 9-5 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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schemes each. Specialist sectional title property managers do manage approximately 
thirty sectional title schemes each, but have been known to manage up to fifty schemes 
each.1443  
 
It is important to note that these statistics are not accurate as not all managing agents 
are members of NAMA. The numbers of persons working as managing agents is far 
greater than the numbers enumerated above. What is clear is that the demand for 
sectional ownership is constantly increasing. When the first Sectional Titles Act1444 
came into operation in 1973 only 2 sectional title schemes were registered. According to 
the Chief Directorate of the Deeds Registration the statistics for schemes registered in 
the period from January 2008 to December 2011 totaled 8415 schemes over all the 
provinces in South Africa. During the same period the various registration offices issued 
113945 certificates of registered sectional title, and 280171 transfers of sectional title 
units were registered.1445 The increase in demand for sectional titles and all forms 
community schemes such as homeowners’ associations, share block and retirement 
schemes have resulted in an increased need for professional property management. 
Community schemes, by their very nature, create more intensified relationships and 
responsibilities for the individual owners. Professional managing agents play a vital role 
in not only assisting in the management of these schemes, but also in the education of 
executive boards tasked with management responsibility. It stands to reason that these 
managing agents would therefore need to be qualified and experienced.  
 
NAMA initiated a formal training course at the University of Cape Town by Adjunct 
Professor Graham Paddock, which rewards managing agents who pass the 
examination, with a Certificate in Sectional Title Scheme Management. The University 
of Cape Town Sectional Title Scheme Management Certificate Course which is offered 
under the auspies of the Faculty of Law was first presented in December 2005 and has 
been presented twice a year since that time. This course is structured to assist 
                                            
1443 G Paddock “State of Sectional Title Nation” (November 2008) 3-11 Paddocks Press Newsletter 3; Van der 
Merwe Sectional Titles 16-6. 
1444 66 of 1971. 
1445 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(2). 
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managing agents to use their learning to properly interpret and apply the provisions of 
the STA and the prescribed management rules in practice.1446  
 
NAMA directors also organize regular training seminars across the country to keep 
managing agents abreast with current and fresh training. NAMA published a standard 
scheme managing agreement to be used by all managing agents.1447 It 
comprehensively covers all the STA requirements and other related statutory 
regulations. It identifies which persons are entitled to use the agreement as members of 
NAMA and encourages all its members to make use of the agreement. Setting ethical 
standards and ensuring transparency improves the professionalism of the managing 
agent. The Agreement includes Annexures that have been issued in a format that 
ensures that any amendment thereto must be identifiable and acknowledged by all the 
parties which protects the originality of the Agreement. The Annexures also allow the 
parties to the Agreement to tailor the terms to suit the individual needs, which makes it a 
broad based user-friendly contract. Adjunt Professor Paddock has also advised that the 
Agreement be included in the syllabus for the University of Cape Town Sectional Title 
Management Course, which ensures that all students who are certified in this training 
course have become familiar with this document.1448  
 
NAMA has organized Professor Henk Delport from the Mercantile Department at the 
University of Port Elizabeth1449 to draft a code of conduct for managing agents. The 
                                            
1446 The framwork of the course enables learners to use the frame of reference in the exercising of their management 
tasks. The course starts with an introduction into the South African legal system with a focus on real property rights 
and management agency which gives the learner a basic knowledge and understanding of the system in which 
sectional titles operates. The learner is then given a definition and explanation of the specialised sectional title terms 
and basic concepts. The next step is for the learner to obtain a high-level overview of the sectiona;l title body 
corporate dealing with the laws and rules that apply to these bodies. The learner is then in position to study the role 
of the managing agent. There is a focus on the contract between the managing agent and the trustees as well as the 
best practices applicable to managing agents as reflected in the NAMA Code of Conduct. From this the learner is 
taught the legal relationship between all the roleplayers; what the managing agent could be expected to do; the 
context in which these services are rendered. The course then goes on to deal with the administrative, physical and 
financial duties of the managing agent. The relevant provisions of the STA and rules are focussed on here. Finally 
the four princple methologies applied to the resolution of disputes in sectional title schemes are introduced; G 
Paddock “Spotlight on Sectional Title Certifications” (May 2009) 4-5 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1447 G Moore-Barnes “NAMA publishes a standard scheme management agreement” (July 2008) 3-7 Paddocks 
Press Newsletter 1. 
1448 Moore-Barnes (July 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1449 T Maree “NAMA makes progress” (November 2003) 11MCS Courier 7. 
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Estate Agency Affairs Board has approved the code of conduct. After approval by the 
Department of Trade and Industry it is proposed that the code be made a part of the 
Regulations of the Estate Agency Affairs Act, applying to those estate agents that act as 
managing agents. The proposed code focuses on openness, transparency and full 
disclosure and is based on four principles.1450 The first principle is that the managing 
agent should give full and proper disclosure of his or her qualifications and experience. 
This will enable the body corporate to make an informed decision when appointing a 
managing agent. Managing agents should be honest and the trustees should trust them 
in the exercise of the management functions. The second principle requires that there 
must be certainty regarding the nature of the relationship between the management 
body and managing agent and their respective responsibilities (agency, master and 
servant or fiduciary relationship).1451 This will have the effect of avoiding or at least 
reducing disputes. The third principle requires proper protection of management bodies 
against unscrupulous practices of managing agents. In this way managing agents will 
be held accountable in cases of negligence. The fourth and final principle requires the 
managing agent to discharge its management functions in a professional and 
responsible manner. The managing agent will stand in a fiduciary relationship to the 
body corporate and will be held responsible in cases of breach of this fiduciary 
relationship. The proposed code therefore requires the managing agent to make certain 
disclosures before an agreement is concluded. It stipulates that the agreement must be 
in writing. Certain terms must be included in the agreement. These terms include the 
management agent’s responsibilities; the prohibition against unscrupulous conduct; the 
duty to account and report to the management body; an obligation on the managing 
agent to perform its services with due care and skill diligently on time and in accordance 
with the law; a requirement to avoid conflict of interest; to assign skilled staff to render 
the services in the management of the scheme and to make available all relevant 
documents on termination of its services.1452 This document will change the way in 
which the management industry will deliver service to customers and will enhance 
                                            
1450 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-6. 
1451 Pienaar Sectional Titles 190. 
1452 Explanatory Memorandum on the Proposed Code of Conduct for Managing Agents cl 3-9; Van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 15-7. 
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protection of consumers. This has been described as a groundbreaking and as a major 
step in the right direction for the managing agent industry.1453 NAMA has adopted this 
code of conduct for managing agents to utilize as a set of standards to which the 
voluntary members of NAMA bind themselves and their employees. 
11 6 Should the Community Scheme Ombud Service regulate managing agents?  
 
As I have mentioned there is no law that specifically regulates the managing agency 
industry and it is not compulsory to join NAMA. The STA does not contain any provision 
that regulates the conduct of the managing agents. The Minister of Trade and Industry 
decided that there needed to be some kind of insurance against theft of the funds that 
the managing agent is entrusted with. The Estate Agency Affairs Board already 
operated a suitable insurance programme in the form of its Fidelity Fund. As I have 
mentioned managing agents become estate agents when they collect or receive money 
due to a body corporate. When managing agents are involved in this type of estate 
agency service the managing agent is obliged to put his or her client’s money in a trust 
account, and any money stolen from this account is covered by the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board Fund.  
 
However, the Estate Agency Affairs Act, its regulations and the code of conduct 
applicable to estate agents is not the best legislation to regulate the managing agency 
industry as it does not regulate the full scope of managing agent activities, but rather 
regulates the business of persons who directly or indirectly buy, sell and rent immovable 
property. The Estate Agency Affairs Act extends only to managing agents levy collection 
activities and not to the financial, legal and administrative services they render. 
Therefore, the clients of the managing agents are not protected from other types of 
mismanagement other than theft from the trust accounts. The limited supervisory role of 
the Estate Agency Affairs Board needs to be extended to cover all the functions of 
managing agents. Management agency therefore remains largely unregulated.  
 
                                            
1453 Maree (November 2003) MCS Courier 7. 
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NAMA was formed and it prepared a code of conduct specifically dealing with managing 
agents. However, this association is voluntary and neither the Department of Trade and 
Industry nor the Estate Agency Affairs Board have recognized the managing agents as 
a separate category of estate agents and has not adopted the code of conduct 
developed by NAMA. Managing agents pay the Estate Agency Affairs Board a 
registration fee for each business and for each of the principals involved in that 
business to whom it issues Fidelity Fund Certificates. These businesses also pay the 
Estate Agency Affairs Board one half of the interest that accrues on the money in their 
trust account and that is not claimed by their clients.  
 
It has been suggested that the CSOS, once it is in operation, should take over 
regulation of the management agency from the Estate Agency Affairs Board.1454 The 
CSOSA includes sectional title schemes among the “community schemes” that requires 
either volunteer or professional management services.1455 It could provide a solution to 
this shortfall in the regulation of the managing agency industry.  
 
Documentation for sectional title schemes is currently filed at the Deeds Registries 
Office, but since 1997 the quality of these documents filed has not been examined or 
controlled. Many of these documents have been amended or removed without 
authorization. The CSOS’s role in ensuring that sectional title scheme participants and 
                                            
1454 G Paddock “Should the Community Scheme Ombud Service regulate managing agents?” (October 2009) 4-10 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1455 In terms of section 2 of the CSOSA the purpose of the Act is to provide for the establishment of the Service; the 
functions, operations and governance of the Service; and a dispute resolution mechanism in community schemes. In 
terms of section 4 the functions of the Service are that the Service must develop and provide a dispute resolution 
service in terms of this Act; provide training for conciliators, adjudicators and other employees of the Service; 
regulate, monitor and control the quality of all sectional titles scheme governance documentation and such other 
scheme governance documentation as may be determined by the Minister by notice in the Gazette; and take custody 
of, preserve and provide public access electronically or by other means to sectional title scheme governance 
documentation and such other scheme governance documents as may be determined by the Minister by notice in the 
Gazette. In performing its functions the Service must promote good governance of community schemes; must 
provide education, information, documentation and such services as may be required to raise awareness to owners, 
occupiers, executive committees and other persons or entities who have rights and obligations in community 
schemes, as regards those rights and obligations; must monitor community scheme governance; and may generally, 
deal with any such matters as may be necessary to give effect to the objectives of this Act. Any person who is party 
to or materially affected by a dispute may make an application for dispute resolution in terms of section 38. The 
Service does not have unlimited jurisdiction and the dispute must fall into one of the categories set out in section 39 
which includes financial issues; behavioral issues; governance issues; meetings; management services; works 
pertaining to private or common areas; or general and other issues. 
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role players have reliable and ready access to governance documentation will greatly 
improve the operation of the sectional title schemes.1456 With regard to monitoring the 
fact that schemes will have to prepare annual returns including financial reports will 
keep trustees and managing agents accountable regarding the statutory governance 
requirements. There is a focus on educating those with rights and obligations in 
sectional title schemes. This awareness will serve to lower instances of disputes and 
will make governance of schemes more efficient.1457 
 
The CSOS will be able to make certain specific orders in regard to managing agents. 
The CSOS is empowered to grant an order requiring a managing agent to comply with 
the terms of the contract of appointment and any applicable code of conduct or 
authorization.1458 The CSOS can also grant an order declaring that the association, or 
body corporate in the case of sectional title schemes, does or does not have the right to 
terminate the appointment of a managing agent, and that the appointment is or is not 
terminated.1459 Therefore, the CSOS, once in operation, will be the most suitable forum 
for regulating the managing agent industry. 
11 7 How does the Consumer Protection Act affect managing agents? 
 
The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (the “Consumer Protection Act”) sets out the 
minimum requirements to ensure adequate consumer protection in South Africa. It is 
intended to promote fair and equitable conduct in the market place. All suppliers of 
services including managing agents will have to comply with these measures.1460 The 
owners, and possibly even tenants will be consumers that are recipients or beneficiaries 
of the management services. Chapter 2 of the Consumer Protection Act affords the 
consumer (sectional owner) with a number of fundamental rights including protection 
against discriminatory marketing; the right to select suppliers; a cooling off period; the 
                                            
1456 CSOSA ss 4(1)(c); 4(1)(d); 4(2)(b); 4(2)(c) and 39(7)(a). 
1457 G Paddock “Overview of the Community Scheme Ombud Service Bill, 2010” (March 2011) 15 Property Law 
Digest; G Paddock “Overview of the CSOS Bill – recent advancements” (April 2011) 6-4 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 2. 
1458 CSOSA s 39(7)(a). 
1459 CSOSA s 39(7)(b). 
1460 A managing agent who advertises and contracts to deliver management services to a body corporate is a supplier 
in terms of CPA s 1. 
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right to fair and honest dealing; the right to fair, just and equitable terms and conditions 
and the right to fair value, quality and safety. In practice it is unknown to what extent the 
owners can rely on these provisions, but they will be able in theory to insist on 
compliance and direct complaints to enforcement agencies. 
11 8 Conclusion 
 
A well-run scheme is always the result of good management.1461 One of the biggest 
causes of failure of sectional title developments is ignorance.1462 The managing agents 
will be required to provide guidance in good corporate governance, correct procedures 
and adherence with the legislative requirements to the trustees who are more often than 
not ill equipped to manage the scheme properly. Therefore, the success or failure of the 
scheme will often depend on the professional performance of the managing agent. 
 
Due to the competitive nature in the career market, the managing agent with the best 
qualification and the most experience in the industry will be in a better position to secure 
a management contract with a body corporate. Qualifications set out the knowledge 
foundation that forms the basis for the interpretation of experience in practice.1463 The 
sectional titles management industry is a very technical field and the managing agents 
are faced with many and varied issues on a daily basis. The more qualified the 
managing agent, the more secure the trustees can be in the knowledge that the 
managing agent knows and understands the relevant legislation and the rules 
applicable to the scheme. In this way problems and conflicts in the scheme can be 
avoided even before these occur. Furthermore, the more knowledge and experience the 
managing agent has in the field of sectional titles the more confident he or she will be 
with implementing the management decisions on a practical level. Therefore, a balance 
between knowledge and experience is exactly what a sectional title scheme needs to 
function optimally without unnecessary conflict and mismanagement. 
                                            
1461 Mohamed S “Effective management is the backbone of a scheme” (March 2013) 8-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 
2. 
1462 P Henry “Body corporate trustees and managing agents make or break sectional title developments” (August 
2013) 8-2 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1463 Van der Walt (May 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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When selecting a managing agent to manage a scheme certain factors must be 
considered. The managing agent should have some qualification by examination in a 
course specifically designed to train the managing agent in the specialized skills 
required in sectional title property administration. The managing agent should preferably 
possess a secretarial diploma or a commercial degree. The managing agent should at 
least possess a University of Cape Town Certificate in Sectional Titles Scheme 
Management, which would then be the minimal entry-level qualification for any person 
working in this industry.1464 This course has been going on for ten years and is 
supported and approved by NAMA.1465 Initial qualifications are preferable, but it is 
important to note that on-going training will also be necessary.1466 The managing agent 
needs to keep his or her knowledge up to date. Companies that conduct business in 
these harsh economic times often decide to take expenses for staff training and 
development out of the budget to save money.1467 This could be a very expensive 
mistake as the training of managing agents is integral to the success of the business 
that they conduct. Training is needed most in such times to ensure optimum efficiency 
in service delivery and that the highest level of client services is maintained. This has 
the result of saving time and ultimately costs. Porteous states that:  
 
“Well equipped, trained and efficient staff is one of the biggest assets of a 
business in the service industry. Ultimately this translates into cost saving factor 
for clients as well as their peace of mind.”1468  
 
The managing agent should be very familiar with the relevant legislation and its 
amendments and should have a library of the Acts, regulations, rules, legal 
developments and administrative guidelines. Managing agents furthermore need to be 
computer literate. They need to deal with communications between varying persons 
including clients, contractors, municipal officials, trustees, tenants and owners.  
                                            
1464 L Reynard “Guidelines for choosing a sectional titles managing agent” (October 2008) 3-10 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 6; Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1465 Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1466 2. 
1467 D Porteous “The importance of sectional title training” (May 2009) 4-5 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1468 1. 
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The experience of the agent should be determined, and the trustees should find out how 
long the management agency company has been around. If a company has been 
around for a long time and has a good reputation, the chances are that the problems in 
a particular scheme would have been dealt with before. New companies are under a 
higher risk of failing.1469 The trustees should establish whether the managing agent acts 
as an individual, in a partnership or as a company. Woudberg is of the opinion that the 
managing agent should have at least five years’ experience working in the field under 
another suitably qualified senior agent.1470 In my opinion a managing agent should have 
at very least two years’ experience in property management.  
 
The next important factor to consider is whether the managing agent can supply 
references from at least ten existing and satisfied bodies corporate.1471 If the managing 
agent has a good track record it would be happy to supply references. The trustees 
should get the names and addresses of the schemes that the managing agent 
manages, and should then consult with trustees from these schemes to establish how 
the managing agent performs. The recommendation from other schemes managed by 
the managing agent could help the trustees establish what services the managing agent 
offers; the number of staff available and whether the staff gets along with the sectional 
owners; compliance with relevant legislation; reliability and efficiency and his or her 
reputation. This will assist the trustees in establishing whether the managing agent 
conducts his business in a professional and ethical manner.1472 Word of mouth is a 
good place to start when selecting a service provider. Trustees should ask their 
counterparts in other schemes in the area if they can recommend a good managing 
agent.1473 Obviously there should be disqualification of persons who have a criminal 
record or who have been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty.1474 
 
                                            
1469 Reynard  (October 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
1470 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 49. 
1471 Reynard (October 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 6-7. 
1472 Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1473 A Kelly “Choosing a good managing agent” February 2013 Volume 8 Issue 2 Paddocks Press 1. 
1474 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 124. 
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The sectional title industry is still under threat of mismanagement of trust and 
unprotected funds by managing agents who believe that it is not necessary to register 
under the Estate Agency Affairs Board, and who therefore do not manage the funds in 
terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act. An important aspect that must be established is 
whether the managing agent is a registered estate agent and whether the managing 
agent holds a current and valid Fidelity Fund Certificate issued by the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board. This will give the body corporate cover by the Fidelity Fund operated by 
the Estate Agency Board for loss arising from the theft of body corporate funds from the 
trust account by the managing agent. It is not necessary for every individual at the 
agency to be registered, as only the principal is required to be registered. If the 
managing agent collects levies thenit is legally bound to register with the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board so that the body corporate’s money is protected by the Fidelity Fund when 
it is deposited in its trust account. Leaving the trust money unprotected leaves it open to 
mismanagement, which places the trustees who appointed the managing agent in a 
vulnerable position in terms of their fiduciary relationship with the body corporate. 
Therefore, trustees should seek proof of the managing agent’s Fidelity Fund Certificate. 
The Fidelity Fund cover is only for money stolen from the managing agent’s trust 
account. Therefore, the trustees should establish with the managing agent’s insurer that 
he or she has professional indemnity cover.1475 The trustees will have to ensure that the 
body corporate takes out sufficient fidelity insurance in terms of prescribed management 
rule 29(2)(b), and that it is reviewed annually in the general meeting.The trustees will 
have to confirm with the Council of Debt Collectors that the managing agent is a 
member of this compulsory body.  
 
A code of conduct should be adopted which, if breached, results in the agent being 
deregistered. The trustees should consider whether the managing agent is a member of 
NAMA and whether he or she is willing to agree in his or her contract to be bound by 
NAMA’s code of conduct. Currently NAMA is a voluntary organization and there are no 
consequences for members who breach the code of conduct. It is my opinion that 
                                            
1475 Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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managing agents must be held legally accountable to a code of conduct, thereby 
making the managing agency industry more professional. 
 
One of the most important tasks of a managing agent is to assist the trustees and body 
corporate in the management of finances. The managing agent should offer more than 
just a bookkeeping service and needs to know and understand accounting and financial 
recording. At very least the managing agent must be able to read, understand and 
correctly interpret these financial documents due to the fact that reporting to the trustees 
and bodies corporate on these matters is subject to different bookkeeping standards. 
Managing agents are further required to have a sound knowledge of the relevant 
legislation as this assists them with the allocation of expenses. Further considerations 
are how the managing agent reports; how his or her levy collection policy works and 
whether outstanding levies are handed over to collection attorneys promptly. The 
trustees should request copies of the managing agent’s monthly financial statements to 
see if they are understandable, and should ensure that all additional information they 
might need is available. All these requirements need to be set out clearly in the contract. 
The trustees must finally check the accounts and bank statements monthly to make 
sure that the bills are being paid and that the scheme’s records are audited annually.1476 
 
The personal attributes of the managing agent are also important. Managing agents 
need to be committed and dedicated to their work. The trustees must ensure that the 
agents can be trusted and that there is not any serious personality clashes as the 
trustees and managing agents will have to work closely on various tasks. The managing 
agent should have a calm disposition, as he will work with people from different walks of 
life with varying demands.1477 The trustees should organize a face-to-face meeting to 
assess the managing agent in an informal setting. This is a vital step in the selection 
process. It should be established if the management agent and his staff would get along 
with the trustees and the body corporate and individual sectional owners.1478 The 
trustees should also visit the managing agents’ place of business to ensure that the 
                                            
1476 Annexure 8 rule 40; G Moore-Barnes (June 2013) 9-6 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1477 Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1478 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-11; Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 320.  
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agent is not overworked or disorganized. The trustees can then see for themselves how 
the managing agent functions; what office infrastructure is available; how well the staff 
works together and who will do the work while the managing agent is on holiday or ill.  
 
Managing agents spend much of their time attending various meetings.1479 They need 
to manage these meetings; take accurate minutes and give advice at owner and trustee 
meetings. The trustees should factor in whether the agent can talk in public, deal with 
difficult people and handle conflict management.  
 
The managing agent will have to be good at time management. The time spent 
managing sectional title schmes is not a normal 8:00am to 17:00pm job. Meetings are 
usually held after working hours as trustees and owners have their own jobs to 
consider. Managing agents will have to manage meetings and make sure that the 
matters in the agenda are dealt with and that no time is wasted. Delays in dealing with 
trustee instructions or resolving issues arising at meetings will cause more issues. Many 
managing agents in New South Wales have started to arrange meetings at their offices 
during business hours to minimize expensive and tiresome evening meetings at the 
premises. The trend is also to limit services to a minimum and to demand ever-
increasing co-operation and assistance from sectional owners and the trustees. This 
trend will continue, unless more funds can be arranged for the fees.  
 
The potential draft agency agreements must be studied and scrutinized. It should be 
discovered whether the managing agent would require a complete or partial delegation 
of powers, functions and duties and whether specific services will be provided for in the 
management agreement and what additional extra services are provided. The contract 
must set out exactly what is required from the managing agent. 
 
The cost of the managing agent’s fee is an important consideration. The trustees should 
obtain and compare quotes from as many reputable managing agent firms as is 
possible. The trustees must compare the management fees, expenses and charges for 
                                            
1479 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 319. 
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services provided and when these charges, expenses and fees are payable. They 
should also consider any hidden costs in appointing a professional managing agent. 
Possible additional costs that could be levied against the body corporate are bank 
charges, printing and stationery, cost of administering levies and statistical returns.1480 
Bodies corporate should be prepared to pay the managing agent for the professional 
service that he or she will be offering. It is important to note that the cheapest quote is 
not always the best one. The managing agent should give a comprehensive and 
competent service at a competitive rate.1481 It is clear that the price of the managing 
agent should not be the only consideration when appointing a new managing agent.1482 
There are various other factors that need to be taken into consideration. If the body 
corporate cannot afford the most prominent company, it is always best to employ a 
company that is personally run by its owners.1483 The body corporate and the trustees 
must therefore exercise extreme caution when choosing a managing agent. 
 
The most crucial aspect of the managing agent, besides transparency and integrity, is 
that of education. There should be a minimum education requirement for managing 
agents to be registered as such. The managing agent should be able to educate the 
trustees by way of trustee training and the sectional owners by way of newsletters and 
legislation updates. A good managing agent would share knowledge and guide the 
trustees so that the body corporate is managed efficiently and effectively. The managing 
agent should not keep all the information to himself and run the body corporate as 
though he or she owns it. A professional managing agent educates, guides and serves 
its bodies corporate in this fast changing industry. Often following the laws and rules 
applicable to sectional titles may not always be perceived by sectional title owners as 
being fair and correct. However upholding the STA and company name must be the 
driving force behind doing a difficult and arduous job well and with integrity. 
 
                                            
1480 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title 49. 
1481 Reynard  (October 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 7. 
1482 7. 
1483 6. 
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It is essential for managing agents to work together and support one another to begin to 
establish a professional managing agent industry and profession.1484 It is the only way 
to get the South African sectional title industry to the standard where New South Wales 
has been for years now. Managing agents should be registered as professionals similar 
to the way in which lawyers are required to be registered as such before they can 
operate their own practice. It will give the body corporate the security of knowing that its 
investment in the property is secure because it is in the good hands of the professional 
managing agent that is there to guide the trustees in their everyday management of the 
scheme.  
 
Some of the most recent Chinese local regulations have recommended that a 
competent and autonomous professional body of managing agents ensure high 
standards of management services.1485 Chen Lei and Van der Merwe state that such an 
autonomous professional body promotes the managing agent industry by standardizing 
the way in which managing agents’ business is conducted and developing a code of 
conduct to monitor the managing agents’ business conduct.1486 This professional body 
should also provide specialized training and resolve internal disputes among its 
members. The code of conduct should require that the managing agent should conduct 
itselfself in a responsible manner in the best interests of the body corporate that it 
serves; that the managing agents and their employees have the required qualification 
and experience, and knowledge of the relevant statutes and must contain disciplinary 
procedures. The code should be included in the management contract.1487 
 
Trustees are increasingly opting to use managing agents that are members of NAMA as 
NAMA has the mission to expect high ethical and professional standards from its 
members.1488 The trustees appointing a managing agent should make sure that the 
agent is not only a member of NAMA, but that the agent will adhere to the NAMA Code 
of Conduct. It is my hope that NAMA, or a similar regulatory board created in terms of 
                                            
1484 Lenhof (October 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
1485 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007. 
1486 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 28. 
1487 Chen Chinese Condominium Law 162. 
1488 Moore-Barnes “(June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2 2. 
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the CSOSA, will create a situation where all managing agents will have to be suitably 
qualified and have proven track records of experience. In this way all agents will be 
professional and accountable for the responsible discharge of their management 
functions.  
 
NAMA has an ongoing aim to provide facilities to its members that give value to their 
membership. Managing agents had no common voice to speak before NAMA was 
formed in 2001.1489 It has given managing agents an forum to make representations to, 
and which can legitimize the industry of managing agents by enforcing a code of 
conduct, training, and maintaining accountability and the highest degree of 
professionalism in the industry. NAMA can further function to make continuous 
representations to the legislature to effect the necessary amendments to legislation 
governing the industry. NAMA should continuously expand and develop the examination 
curriculum to ensure that all managing agents are properly educated in all spheres of 
sectional titles. NAMA should advertise the industry to keep the professional body in the 
public eye and ultimately work to eradicate the existence of unqualified managing 
agents. It should send out regular newsletters to its members in order to keep them 
informed of any and all developments in the industry. NAMA, through its regional 
bodies, should organize regular seminars to provide a platform for discussing hot topics 
and developments in the industry. These motivational meetings create pride in NAMA 
and the industry that will attract a high caliber of members. Finally, NAMA can function 
to control and punish its members who abuse their position of trust by acting unethically 
towards their clients. In this way the public is protected from unscrupulous operators in 
this industry.1490  
 
Since the advent of the first Sectional Titles Act in 1971 the managing agent has played 
an ever-increasing role in the management of sectional title schemes. The standards 
required from managing agents have risen dramatically. These elevated standard 
requirements have been achieved largely due to the formation of NAMA and the 
                                            
1489 Maree  (November 2003) MCS Courier 7. 
1490 Woudberg Basic Sectional Titles Book Two 140. 
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enthusiastic participation therein by the majority of managing agents. NAMA has 
improved the standard requirements for managing agents largely through education and 
an emphasis on ethical principles. Patently, NAMA has taken huge strides to promote 
the professionalism of the managing agency profession.1491 The sectional title industry 
is a dynamic, challenging and ever-changing environment. Managing agents have and 
will continue to play a significant role in the development and evolution of the industry 
as a whole.1492  
 
Managing agency still remains largely unregulated. Since the Estate Agency Affairs Act, 
its regulations and the code of conduct extends only to managing agents’ levy collection 
activities and not to the financial, legal and administrative services they render, estate 
agency legislation is not the best legislation to regulate the managing agency industry. 
Furthermore, NAMA is a voluntary association, and neither the Department of Trade 
and Industry nor the Estate Agency Affairs Board have recognized managing agents as 
a separate category of estate agents and has not adopted the Code of Conduct 
developed by NAMA. It has been suggested that the CSOS should take over regulation 
of the management agency from the Estate Agency Affairs Board.1493 It could provide a 
solution to this deficiency in the regulation of the managing agency industry. The 
Service must then be given the jurisdiction to rule on the various aspects of 
management agency and the capacity to investigate and solve all community scheme 
disputes relating to managing agents in a transparent and fair manner. The CSOS must 
be given the power to approve a code of conduct and to register management agents, 
arrange for their fidelity insurance, and investigate and hear complaints against 
managing agents accused of professional misconduct as being a species of dispute 
resolution procedure for which it is designed. In this way managing agents will have a 
duty to account for their management of schemes to the service thus granting the 
service the power of judicial oversight. This body is therefore more fundamentally suited 
                                            
1491 Paddock (May 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1492 T Maree “The Managing Agent Issue” (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 1. 
1493 Paddock (October 2009) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
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to the job than the Estate Agency Affairs Board.1494 If the CSOS were to be empowered 
to regulate managing agents it would have a positive effect on the property 
management industry as a whole.1495 It is my hope that the managing agency industry 
become subject to mandatory regulation by professional standards boards in the same 
way as other professions are subject to maintain ethics and standards of service. 
 
Finally the Consumer Protection Act could ensure that a more professional service is 
provided by managing agents. For example there is no prescribed fee for the certificate 
a conveyancer in terms of section 15(B)(3)(a) of the STA is obliged to obtain before a 
unit can be transferred. Managing agents have been known to charge high fees for 
rendering this service. Owners should take this matter up with the Consumer Protection 
Commission using the protection of the right to fair value. 1496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1494 Paddock (October 2009) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1; Paddock (December 2009) 4-12 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 1. 
1495 Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1496 G Jooste “The Consumer Protection Act and managing agents” (August 2012) 7-8 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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Chapter 12: Legal status, liability, indemnity and 
remuneration of the managing agent 
 
12 1 Introduction 
 
The legal status of the managing agent will depend on whether the managing agent is 
merely an employee of the body corporate or something more. Connected to this 
enquiry is the issue of whether the managing agent stands in a fiduciary relationship 
with the body corporate, and thus owes the body corporate a fiduciary duty. Once this 
has been established, I will examine the liability of the managing agent, and the 
possibility for the body corporate to sue the managing agent for breach of duty. 
Following this I will examine whether the managing agent can avoid liability for negligent 
performance of his or her functions, and if the managing agent can be indemnified for 
any breach of duty. Finally, I will discuss the payment of remuneration and expenses to 
the managing agent in rendering the management services.  
12 2 Legal status of the managing agent  
 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert are correct in their assertion that there have been 
“verbal oversights on the part of the legislature with regard to the position of the 
managing agent,” and that “the nature of the managing agent’s duties towards the body 
corporate has as of yet, not received sufficient scholarly attention.”1497 Professor Gerrit 
Pienaar is also of the opinion that “the nature of the relationship between the body 
corporate and the managing agent is not completely clear.”1498  
 
In what follows I will attempt to explain the legal status of a managing agent in relation 
to the body corporate and the trustees. The term “managing agent” is not used in the 
Act, although the body corporate has the power appoint such agents and employees as 
                                            
1497 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 474. 
1498 Pienaar Sectional Titles 186. 
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it may deem fit.1499 The managing agent, as an optional appointment under the 
prescribed management rules, does not qualify as an organ of the body corporate, but 
is appointed by the trustees in terms of a written agreement.1500 Trustees automatically 
exercise and perform the powers and functions (duties) of the body corporate in terms 
of the STA and rules,1501 while specific powers and duties must be delegted to the 
managing agent in the contract.1502 The terms of the written contract, required in terms 
of prescribed management rule 46, read together with the management rules govern 
the legal relationship and the extent of the delegation of powers and duties to the 
managing agent.  
 
Neither the STA nor the prescribed management rules provide any clarity on the nature 
of the agreement with the body corporate.1503 The managing agent is appointed by the 
trustees on behalf of the body corporate to assist with the day-to-day management and 
maintenance of the sectional title scheme against payment of a fee. The appointment is 
authorized through the passing of a resolution by the board of trustees by majority vote. 
The resolution must indicate the fact of the appointment, the duration of the 
appointment and must authorize the written contract specifying the extent of the 
managing agent’s powers and duties.1504 The relationship between the managing agent 
and the body corporate is clearly contractual and the scope of the managing agent’s 
powers and duties will be clearly and extensively specified and defined by the 
contract.1505 The legal term “agent” must be understood in a contractual context. The 
unanswered question that I will deal with in the discussion that follows concerns the 
nature of the written contract concluded with the managing agent.  
 
In this regard it is crucial to determine whether the contact with managing agent is 
merely a contract of employment, or something more. The relevance of this question 
                                            
1499 STA s 38(a) [STSMA s 4(a)] and Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(a). 
1500 Annexure 8 rule 46(1); Pienaar Sectional Titles 186. 
1501 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)] and Annexure 8 rule 28(1) and (2). 
1502 Annexure 8 rule 46(1); Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 474; 
Pienaar Sectional Titles 186. 
1503 Pienaar Sectional Titles 187. 
1504 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 473. 
1505 Annexure 8 rule 46(1); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 25. 
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pertains to the fact that if the managing agent is merely an employee of the body 
corporate or the trustees, then the managing agent does not stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to either of these parties, and the managing agent is only appointed to 
assist the trustees in exercising administrative functions.1506 Although this view is 
supported by referring to the agreement as a “contract of master and servant” in the 
rules,1507 several arguments could be advanced why the contract of appointment of the 
managing agent should not be construed as a contract of employment or service, and 
that the role of the managing agent should not be reduced to that of a mere employee of 
the trustees or the body corporate.1508  
 
In the first place there is no limitation in the prescribed management rules as to powers 
and duties that may be entrusted or delegated to a managing agent.1509 The managing 
agent performs the executive functions usually performed by the trustees, which implies 
that even functions falling within the fiduciary responsibilities of the trustees may be 
entrusted to the managing agent.1510 In this way the managing agent assumes a 
fiduciary status, and he or she will have a duty of care and trust towards the body 
corporate.1511  
 
Secondly, the prescribed management rule pertaining to the requirements for the 
signing of documents on behalf of the body corporate provides that the levy clearance 
certificate, issued in terms of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the STA, may be signed by the 
managing agent alone.1512 All other documents and instruments of the body corporate 
need to be signed by two trustees or by one trustee and the managing agent. The levy 
clearance certificate is one of the most important mechanisms available to the body 
corporate in ensuring that owners who wish to sell and transfer their units cannot do so 
unless a clearance certificate certifies that all moneys still owed to the body corporate 
                                            
1506 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-19. 
1507 Annexure 8 rules 46(2)(a) and (b); Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-19. 
1508 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 324; G Paddock “Grahams Mutterings” (May 2009) 4-5 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 8 9. 
1509 Annexure 8 rule 46(1). 
1510 Pienaar Sectional Titles 187. 
1511 Fairbrass v Estate Agents Board 1999 4 SA 1052 (W); Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 25. 
1512 Annexure 8 rule 27. 
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have been paid. The fact that the managing agent can sign this very important 
certificate on behalf of the body corporate shows that the managing agent stands in a 
fiduciary relationship to the body corporate, and that his or her status differs from that of 
the employee in terms of a contract of employment.  
 
Thirdly, prescribed management rule 48 expressly provides that the managing agent 
has a fiduciary duty towards the body corporate to keep full records of his or her 
administration and to notify the body corporate and holders of registered mortgage 
bonds of all matters that detrimentally affect the value or amenity of the common 
property and any of the sections. Furthermore, the managing agent is expressly referred 
to as the holder of office in prescribed management rule 47.  
 
The prescribed management rules have therefore elevated the legal status of the 
managing agent to approximate to some extent the status of an office bearer of the 
body corporate, depending on the powers and duties entrusted or delegated to the 
managing agent in his or her contract of appointment.1513 This status differs vastly from 
the status of the traditional employee of the body corporate.1514 As shall be seen later, 
the fact that the status of the managing agent is apparently elevated to that of an office 
bearer does not detract from the fact that ultimate control of the scheme rests with the 
trustees under the supervision of the body corporate, even though the trustees may 
appoint a managing agent and entrust him or her with certain functions and powers. 
Ultimately it seems as if the trustess have the capacity to delegate some of their powers 
to the managing agent, but cannot disentangle themselves from their functions as the 
official executive organ of the body corporate.  
 
The final argument is that the managing agent is usually a firm of estate agents or 
company specializing in property management services.1515 The firm or company is 
clearly not an employee of the body corporate, particularly if it performs that role for 
several schemes. 
                                            
1513 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 25. 
1514 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-4. 
1515 Pienaar Sectional Titles 189. 
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Since the managing agent is usually entrusted to exercise certain powers and functions 
of the body corporate, his or her contract of appointment should be construed as a 
mandate rather than as a contract of employment.1516 A contract of mandate is a 
consensual contract between the mandator and the mandatary, in terms of which the 
mandatary undertakes to perform a mandate or commission for the mandator.1517 It is 
difficult to distinguish a contract of mandate involving the rendering of services from a 
contract of employment because remuneration may be agreed upon in both types of 
contract.1518 An employment contract usually involves the rendering of services over a 
period of time and is subject to the control of the employer. On the other hand a contract 
of mandate generally relates to an undertaking to complete a particular task, project or 
function, however long it may take without the mandatary being subject to the directions 
of the mandator as to the time, place or manner of carrying out the mandate. The 
mandatary must however comply with the instructions of the mandator given at the time 
of acceptance of the mandate, and he or she must not act in conflict with any of the 
instructions.1519 In my mind the nature of the contract by which the managing agent is 
appointed is more closely aligned with the contract of mandate due to the nature of the 
powers and functions that are delegated to the managing agent and the relative 
independence in the exercise thereof.1520 The trustees do not usually supervise and 
control the manner in which the managing agent performs his or her functions or 
exercises his or her powers. The trustees opt to appoint a managing agent because 
they do not have the time to do the work themselves, and can therefore not control and 
supervise the entire range of governance obligations of a body corporate in a sectional 
title scheme. 
 
A contract of mandate can relate to the performance of both juristic and non-juristic 
acts. This is important, as one of the primary functions of managing agents involves the 
collection and acceptance of levy contributions on behalf of the body corporate. It is 
                                            
1516 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-19.  
1517 G Bradfield “Agency” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2009) 983 985. 
1518 In Roman and Roman-Dutch law the contract of mandate was essentially gratuitous; DJ Joubert & DH Van Zyl 
“Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LTC Harms & JA Faris LAWSA 17(1) 2 ed (2009) para 4. 
1519 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 5. 
1520 Pienaar Sectional Titles 187. 
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important to note that where the mandate includes the authority to represent the 
mandator, the mandatory is also an agent.1521 Therefore, in cases where the managing 
agent represents the body corporate, for example, entering into a contract with a 
security company on behalf of the body corporate, the managing agent will also act as 
agent for the body corporate. In this way it is clear to me that the contract with the body 
corporate is a contract of mandate rather than a contract of employment as the mandate 
gives the managing agent the authority to act as agent of the body corporate. 
 
Further evidence for construing the contract concluded with a managing agent as a 
mandate can be garnered from the duties that attach to the mandatory and the 
mandator. In the first place the mandatory must take all reasonable steps to carry out 
the mandate that he or she accepted. The managing agent is likewise obliged to 
exercise and perform all powers and duties delegated to him or her in the contract of 
appointment. Secondly, the mandatory must not exceed the terms or the limitations 
imposed by the contract of mandate. This is true for the managing agent who must 
exercise the powers and comply with the duties as set out in the written contract without 
exceeding them. Thirdly, the mandatory must perform the mandate personally, unless 
there is an agreement between the parties that the mandatory can make use of the 
services of an employee or agent. The right to delegate must be either expressly 
authorised or tacitly implied in the mandate. A managing agent will, for example, make 
use of the services of a maintenance company rather than to mow the lawns of the 
scheme or paint the walls him or herself. Furthermore, the mandatory must act with 
reasonable care and diligence. If the mandatory fails to exercise reasonable care and 
diligence he or she can be held liable for such negligence.  
 
Following on from this, the mandatory must act bona fide (in good faith) and must not 
act with malice or the intention to commit fraud against the mandator. The mandatory 
must act honestly and in the interest and for the benefit of the mandatory and must 
avoid conflicts of interest, for example by not making a secret profit when contracting on 
behalf of the body corporate, through accepting an undisclosed commission from the 
                                            
1521 Bradfield “Agency” in Wille’s Principles of South African Law 986. 
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other party. This is the one of the main reasons why I submit that the agreement with 
the managing agent is based on mandate as this places the managing agent in a 
fiduciary relationship with the the body corporate. Consequently, the mandatory must 
render account of the performance of the mandate to the mandatory. This duty is in 
conformity with the duty set out in prescribed management rule 48 that the managing 
agent must keep full records of his or her administration and shall report to the body 
corporate and certain holders of registered sectional mortgage bonds of all matters that 
in his or her opinion detrimentally affect the value or amenity of the common property or 
any sections.  
 
Finally, the mandatory has the duty to account to the mandator by the giving of the 
property and information back to the mandatory at the end of the mandate. This is in 
line with the managing agent’s duty to return books, records, accounts and keys and 
other body corporate property after his contract has been terminated. I will discuss this 
duty of the managing agent in more detail in chapter 14.  
 
The duties of the mandator include to refund the mandatory for expenses or losses 
incurred in the performance of the mandate and to pay the agreed remuneration to the 
mandatory. These two duties are also in line with the duties owed by the body corporate 
to the managing agent.  
 
In South Africa the managing agent may exercise any powers and duties delegated or 
entrusted to him or her by the body corporate or trustees subject to their contract of 
appointment and the rules of the scheme. Where the managing agent contractually 
undertakes to perform the functions or duties assigned to the body corporate and 
trustees under the STA and rules, the managing agent’s duty remains subsidiary to that 
of the trustees. As the law stands the ultimate control of the scheme rests with the 
trustees under the supervision of the body corporate, even though the trustees may 
appoint a managing agent. The body corporate and trustees have the final say as to 
what powers and duties are delegated to the managing agent in the written contract. By 
appointing a managing agent, the trustees are not absolved from their powers and 
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duties in terms of the STA and rules.1522 The fact that the managing agent is only 
allowed to attend the meetings of trustees with their consent1523 also indicates that it is 
the trustees who ultimately have executive control over the scheme. In practice, 
however, it is not uncommon for the managing agent to take the leading role in trustee 
meeings and to handle all the administrative duties related thereto, including sending 
notices, setting the agenda, drawing the trustees attention to the matters requiring 
discussion, taking minutes and advising the trustees on the procedures that need to be 
followed in terms of the Act and rules. 
 
In practice the managing agent is appointed to undertake broad administrative, 
secretarial and financial tasks. Therefore, when asking an owner to refrain from 
breaching the conduct rules, the managing agent would be acting on delegated 
authority of the trustees. However, managing agents are not normally entrusted with 
decision-making or policy-making functions such as giving permission to keep pets, to 
subdivide and consolidate units or to extend the common property. The general rule is 
that managing agents cannot make decisions that affect the lives or living conditions of 
the sectional owners.1524 Therefore, it is clear that certain tasks cannot be delegated to 
or entrusted to managing agents.  
 
Despite the fact that the prescribed management rules refer to the relationship as one of 
service,1525 it is my view that the legal relationship between the managing agent and the 
trustees or body corporate should rather be classified as based on a contract of 
mandate. This has the legal effect that the managing agent will have a fiduciary duty to 
the body corporate, and will have a duty to carry out his or her delegated instructions 
with due care, skill and diligence.1526 
 
                                            
1522 Pienaar Sectional Titles 187, 191. 
1523 Annexure 8 rule 49(1). 
1524 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
1525 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 474. 
1526 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 10; Bradfield “Agency” in Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law 993. 
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As the appointment of a managing agent is not obligatory, it should be noted that there 
could be cases where the managing agent is appointed in terms of a contract of 
employment, for example in cases where the body corporate of a large scheme 
appoints an individual as managing agent with a contractual duty to work 40 hours a 
week for the body corporate under the supervision of the trustees, or where the body 
corporate appoints a full-time caretaker. 
12 3 Liability of the managing agent 
12 3 1 Introduction 
 
As I have mentioned, the trustees, as the executive organ of the body corporate, 
appoint the managing agent to manage the affairs of the body corporate. Despite the 
fact that the relationship between the managing agent and the body corporate is not 
explicitly referred to as such, I am of the opinion that the nature of the written contract is 
a contract of mandate. This means that the managing agent has inherent fiduciary 
responsibilities to the body corporate and trustees, and owes both a duty of trust and a 
duty of care and skill towards the body corporate.1527 Because of this fiduciary duty the 
managing agent could incur liability to the body corporate and trustees in appropriate 
circumstances. This is logical as the managing agent, more often than not, deals with 
substantial amounts of money. 
12 3 2 South African position 
 
As stated above the managing agent could incur delictual liability to the body corporate 
for certain negligent actions or omissions, Thus the body corporate could sue the 
managing agent for loss suffered on account of incorrect incorrect legal advice or 
interpretation furnished by the managing agent. The body corporate may in appropriate 
circumstances recover damages, even in cases where the advice was given free of 
charge.1528 The same applies to prospective purchasers or mortgagees who rely on 
                                            
1527 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 10. 
1528 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 25; Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 47. 
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advice given negligently by the managing agent, and who suffer loss in reliance on such 
advice.1529  
 
If the body corporate is under a duty to give information, contained for example in a 
certificate, the managing agent would be liable if he or she issues a false certificate 
without inspecting the relevant documents and records. This is the case even if the 
managing agent endeavoured to exclude liability by means of an exemption clause 
when handing over the certificate.  
 
In cases where the managing agent fails to renew insurance when he or she was 
entrusted with the function of ensuring that the building is adequately insured, and 
damage is caused by fire, the managing agent will be held liable to the body corporate 
for the damage. The insurance firm would have compensated for the damage had the 
managing agent renewed the insurance. A reasonable and prudent managing agent 
would have taken prompt action to ensure that the insurance is renewed.  
 
Where a managing agent pays an account for repairs without declaring that he or she is 
duly authorized, or where the repairs were not authorized by the body corporate and the 
managing agent failed to note that fact, the body corporate can claim reimbursement 
from the management agent.  
 
In the situation where the managing agent fails to rectify defects for example in outdated 
electrical wiring which he should have observed in view of his or her expertise, and 
short-circuits in the flow of electricity cause damage to the building, the body corporate 
could recover the ensuing damages from the management agent.  
 
Finally, if the managing agent contracts with a maintenance firm, in which he or she 
owns a substantial number of shares, without declaring his or her interests the contract 
                                            
1529 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 25 – 26; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-20.  
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could be terminated and the managing agent could be required to hand over the benefit 
derived from the contract on account of a breach of his duty of trust.1530  
12 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
Since 1964 New South Wales law has entitled natural and juristic persons such as the 
owners corporation, the executive committee, owners, tenants, other occupiers, visitors, 
solicitors, accountants, prospective purchasers, other managing agents, legal searchers 
and persons relying on a section 109 certificates to recover damages from the 
managing agent on account of negligent information or advice furnished on request. 
The Trade Practices Act of 1974 and the New South Wales Fair Trading Act of 1987 
impose strict liability for conduct and statements that mislead or deceive other persons. 
Consequently, the managing agent can be held liable in damages on account of 
negligent misstatements in appropriate circumstances. The information or advice can be 
given verbally or in writing by a person whose business or profession includes giving 
advice or information or by a person who claims to have the required skill and 
competence. It is irrelevant whether or not the information or advice is given for a fee or 
free of charge. It must be proved that the skill and judgment of the adviser was relied on 
or trusted, the adviser must have been aware that the recipient intended to act on the 
information or advice and it must have been reasonably foreseeable that the recipient 
would suffer loss if the information was incorrect or the advice was unsound. When the 
adviser does not make it clear that the information or advice is given on the basis of the 
adviser not accepting responsibility or liability for its accuracy, the adviser can be held 
liable on the ground of negligent furnishing of information or advice. Examples of 
conduct which would render the managing agent liable are where he or she gives 
incorrect information to a prospective purchaser as to the structural soundness of the 
building or as to the good relations between the owners in the scheme; or he or she 
gives incorrect advice to the owners corporation as to the level of building insurance 
required for the scheme.1531  
 
                                            
1530 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-20. 
1531 Ilkin NSW Strata 176. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 318 
In Singapore the managing agent can also be liable for damages in contract where he 
has breached a term of the agency agreement entered into with the management 
corporation or the subsidiary management corporation. Liability for negligence arises 
where the managing agent does not take reasonable care to ensure that his or her 
actions, omissions and statements do not cause harm or loss to the proprietors, tenants 
and prospective purchasers. In such a case an award for damages may be made 
against the managing agent. Examples of negligence, similar to those in South Africa, 
are where the managing agent fails to renew the insurance; fails to take adequate 
measures to prevent injury occurring on the common property or in giving incorrect 
information or advice. Where loss or damage is suffered as a result of such negligence, 
the person concerned can recover damages from the managing agent.1532 
 
In the event that non-performance of a duty delegated to the managing agent carries a 
penalty, the managing agent is liable to the same penalty as the management 
corporation would be if proceeded against.1533 This ensures that managing agents are 
made liable for offences committed by them as delegates whether or not he or she was 
conferred a complete or partial delegation. For example, where the managing agent has 
been delegated the duty to retain the records and books of account relating to any of 
the management corporation’s transactions for a period of at least five years after the 
completion thereof,1534 he or she is liable to prosecution involving the same penalty if he 
or she defaults in the performance of the duty.1535  
12 4 Avoidance of liability and indemnity 
12 4 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows I will consider the possibility of the managing agent avoiding personal 
liability, and the possible indemnity against liability. 
                                            
1532 Keang Sood Strata Title 555. 
1533 BMSMA s 67(9)(a) and (b). A similar provision is found in NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 30. 
1534 BMSMA s 48(2). 
1535 BMSMA ss 48(3) and 128. 
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12 4 2 South African position 
 
It is a possibile for managing agents to avoid personal liability by conducting itself by 
means of a limited liability company or close corporation instead of a partnership.1536  
 
Liability for furnishing incorrect legal advice or interpretation could be avoided by using 
an exemption clause that could read roughly as follows:  
 
“The above information is given on the strict understanding that I accept no 
responsibility or liability on any account for any error or inaccuracy contained 
therein and I intend by this statement to exclude any such responsibility or 
liability.”1537  
 
Section 32 of the Estate Agency Affairs Act requires that estate agents be in possession 
of Fidelity Fund Certificate and effect fidelity insurance to the satisfaction of the Estate 
Agency Affairs Board.1538 I have already mentioned that managing agents are deemed 
to be estate agents when they collect or receive money due to a body corporate. When 
managing agents are involved in this type of estate agency service the managing agent 
is obliged to deposit the client’s money into a trust account, and any money stolen from 
this account is covered by the Estate Agency Affairs Board Fidelity Fund. However, the 
Estate Agency Affairs Act, the regulations under the Act and the Code of Conduct 
applicable to estate agents is not the best legislation to regulate the managing agency 
industry as it does not cover the full scope of managing agent activities, but rather 
regulates the business of persons who directly or indirectly buy, sell and rent immovable 
property. The Estate Agency Affairs Act extends only to managing agents levy collection 
activities and not to the financial, legal and administrative services they render. 
Therefore, the clients of the managing agents are not protected from other types of 
mismanagement other than theft from trust accounts. The Estate Agency Affairs Board’s 
                                            
1536 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-20. 
1537 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 26; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-20 – 15-21. 
1538 Porteous (May 2009) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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limited supervisory role therefore needs to be extended to cover all the functions of 
managing agents.  
 
The managing agent could also take out professional indemnity cover to protect him or 
herself against claims in the event of negligence.1539  
 
The fact that a professional managing agent is in a fiduciary position in relation to the 
body corporate puts managing agents on the same footing as trustees, although the 
managing agent is more qualified and more experienced to perform the functions. The 
fact that the managing agent owes a fiduciary duty to the body corporate does not limit 
the fiduciary duty that the trustees owe the body corporate. The trustees remain the 
official executive arm of the body corporate and have to supervise the exercise of 
powers and functions of the managing agent.1540 Unless restricted in the managing 
contract, the managing agent may validly exercise all the powers and duties entrusted 
in the contract of appointment. Where the trustees feel that the managing agent failed to 
perform adequately, the trustees must take speedy remedial action.  
 
The trustees are indemnified against all costs, losses, expenses or claims for which 
they become liable by reason of any acts done in the discharge of their duties as 
trustees. The only exception is where the trustees caused the costs, losses, expenses 
or claims by their mala fide or grossly negligent acts or omissions.1541 This indemnity is 
expressly excluded in the case of managing agents.1542 The managing agent would not 
be entitled to reimbursement of costs, losses, expenses or claims that he or she has to 
pay on account of breach of his or her fiduciary duty. Where the trustees have acted 
mala fide or with gross negligence in respect of the action for which the managing agent 
had to pay damages, the trustees should be required to reimburse the managing agent 
in appropriate circumstances.1543 
                                            
1539 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-21. 
1540 Van der Merwe (1994) 5 Stellenbosch Law Review 326. 
1541 Annexure 8 rule 12(1)(a). 
1542 Annexure 8 rule 12(2). 
1543 Van der Merwe (1994) 5 Stellenbosch Law Review 327; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-21. 
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12 4 3 Comparative Survey 
 
In order for the managing agent to avoid liability for negligent misstatements in New 
South Wales the managing agent should take care to make correct and accurate 
representations and respond correctly when giving information or advice. If the accuracy 
of the information is in doubt the management agent is advised to recommend the 
engagement of an expert or professional consultant to provide an opinion. Where the 
statement is gratuitous the managing agent should expressly and in writing disclaim or 
exclude liability. This disclaimer would not be valid when a fee is charged as those who 
pay for information or advice are entitled to rely on the managing agent’s professional 
expertise, and should be able to recoup any loss or damage suffered. A disclaimer to a 
person not in a contractual relationship with the agent is effective. For example where a 
prospective purchaser employs a legal searcher, he or she can rely on the information 
provided to the legal searcher by the managing agent, regardless of whether or not the 
managing agent provided the information under a disclaimer clause as to its accuracy. 
A subsequent purchaser would not be in a contractual relationship with the managing 
agent and the information provided to the legal searcher by the managing agent would 
be subject to an agent’s disclaimer clause as to its accuracy, and could not be relied 
upon by the subsequent purchaser.1544  
 
The managing agent can also obtain professional indemnity insurance protection.1545 
This will indemnify the managing agent against liability for damages resulting from its 
negligent acts or omissions and those of their partners or employees in the performance 
of its professional duties. It also extends to provide cover in respect of damages 
awarded against the managing agent for misleading and deceptive conduct referred to 
in section 42 of the Fair Trading Act of 1987. It does not extend to personal injury, 
property damage or fines resulting from a criminal charge under any legislation. It also 
does not provide automatic cover for defamation. An extension of the insurance policy 
needs to be obtained for additional protection. This insurance is not compulsory, but it is 
recommended. 
                                            
1544 Ilkin NSW Strata 176-177. 
1545 Agents Act s 22. 
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In Singapore managing agents can take out professional indemnity insurance policies 
that affords protection against liability for damages resulting from their negligent acts or 
omissions.1546 
12 5 Payment of remuneration and expenses  
12 5 1 Introduction 
 
The next discussion will focus on the payment of remuneration and expenses to the 
managing agent for rendering management services. A comparative review will 
describe the position in foreign jurisdictions. 
12 5 2 South African position 
 
The prescribed management rules do not contain a provision regarding the 
remuneration of a managing agent. The fee that the management agent can claim for 
his or her services is a matter to be negotiated between the parties. Managing agents 
generally charge a fee for a service that is a recurring cost to the sectional title 
scheme.1547 Obviously the more powers, functions and duties the management agent 
are entrusted with, the higher fee he or she will be entitled to charge.1548  
 
The fee paid to a managing agent can be calculated in one of two ways.1549 The first is 
on a pro rata basis where the monthly management fee is calculated on a percentage 
rate system and the monthly management fee is expressed as a certain percentage of 
the total levies collected. The Institute of Estate Agents has recommended a tariff of 
fees based on a percentage of levies collected which differs from region to region.1550 
The advantages of this system include the fact that if the agent forgets or fails to collect 
levies he or she does not receive any remuneration. This would encourage agents to 
perform their duties timeously and effectively.1551 The second advantage is that the fees 
                                            
1546 Keang Sood Strata Title 555. 
1547 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31. 
1548 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 45. 
1549 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31. 
1550 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 327. 
1551 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-22. 
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are inflation resistant because they automatically increase with the increase of levies, 
and the remuneration does not have to be renegotiated every year. The disadvantage of 
this system is that it loses sight of other important management functions of the 
managing agent. This may be potentially detrimental for managing agents who are 
responsible for extensive administrative functions and whose functions are not limited to 
the collection of levies.1552 The Institute of Estate Agent’s recommendation is only a 
guideline and this tariff is seldom used in practice. 
 
The second way in which the fee of a managing agent can be calculated is on a 
standard basis which means that a fixed amount per unit is paid to the managing agent. 
This standard system of remuneration is linked to the total cost of the project as in the 
case of the remuneration of architects and quantity surveyors. This method of 
calculation is preferable in most instances.1553  
 
It is important to note that an estate agent who acts as a managing agent without a valid 
Fidelity Fund Certificate is not entitled to be paid for estate agency services such as the 
collection of levies and related administrative functions. 
 
Fees are subject to negotiation between the parties and are generally dictated by free 
market competition. Managing agents are, in current practice in South Africa, paid a 
monthly fee per unit and will usually in addition charge a specific fee to attend 
meetings.1554 Most managing agents will be prepared to tailor their services and 
charges to suit the needs of a particular scheme.1555  
12 5 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales managing agents are not bound by a prescribed scale of fees 
when they charge for their services. Theoretically their fees are dictated solely by free 
                                            
1552 Pienaar Sectional Titles 190. 
1553 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-22. 
1554 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31; van der Walt (October 2007) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
1555 Van der Walt (October 2007) 2-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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market competition. The Tribunal can vary the amount in the agency agreement, and 
certify a sum that will be binding on both parties that it believes is reasonable.1556  
 
In most instances, the managing agent will be delegated the authority to operate a 
cheque account on behalf of the owners corporation in order to deduct remuneration 
and expenses, except in the event of a partial delegation where the owners corporation 
decided to manage its own finances.1557 
 
In terms of the Agents Acts a managing agent must satisfy three conditions before he or 
she is entitled to commence legal proceedings to recover remuneration. These are that 
the managing agent must be licensed to perform services as a managing agent;1558 a 
valid agency agreement must have been concluded between the managing agent and 
the owners corporation1559 and the managing agent must serve personally or by post a 
statement of claim on the owners corporation specifying the amount claimed and the 
details of the services performed.1560 The managing agent is only entitled to commence 
proceedings in court to recover the remuneration after 28 days after service of the 
statement of claim have elapsed. The owners corporation is allowed within a period of 
three years to apply, on the prescribed form, to approach the dispute resolution tribunal 
to determine whether the amount of the remuneration and expenses claimed are 
reasonable and whether the managing agent is entitled to receive the amount 
claimed.1561 
 
The managing agent is not obliged to hand over any records on expiry of his or her 
appointment if he or she has any claim against or lien over the records or property of 
the owners corporation for outstanding fees.1562 If any of the three conditions are not 
satisfied then the managing agent is unlikely to have any valid claim or lien.1563 
                                            
1556 Agents Act s 34(6). 
1557 Ilkin NSW Strata 162. 
1558 Agents Act ss 8 and 9, 
1559 Agents Act s 55. 
1560 Agents Act s 36. 
1561 Consumer Claims Act 1998 s 7; Ilkin NS Strata 161. 
1562 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 10(3). 
1563 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 36(4).  
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In Singapore managing agents negotiate the fees payable and are not subject to a 
prescribed scale of fees for their services. If the managing agent is appointed at a 
general meeting of the management corporation by ordinary resolution the fees and 
expenses are fixed at the general meeting, or if the appointment was authorized by the 
owners at the previous general meeting, the fees and remuneration are fixed by the 
executive council.1564 Where the managing agent is appointed by the executive council, 
the fees and expenses are fixed by the council without a general meeting.1565 Where the 
executive council is involved in negotiating the fees it is important to ascertain whether 
the executive council has the requisite authorization to do so in order to avoid any 
difficulties that may arise when the fees subsequently fall due.1566 
 
As in South Africa, Chinese law allows parties to select either method of payment 
namely on a pro rata or standard basis.1567 Chinese local law does not have a 
prescribed scale of management fees, but accepts that the remuneration of a managing 
agent is a matter of negotiation between the management body or the developer and a 
managing agent.1568 The executive council should continually monitor whether the 
scheme is getting value for the fee being paid. If not, the executive council should shop 
around for another management company. 
12 5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have illustrated that there needs to be clarity in the legislation as to 
whether the contract of appointment of the managing agent is a contract of employment 
or a contract of mandate that creates a fiduciary relationship between the body 
corporate and the management agent as well as between the trustees and the 
management agent. The wording of in prescribed management rule 46 does not supply 
sufficient clarity in this regard, and it is hoped that legislative reform in this regard would 
remove that uncertainty. Clarity on this point is required because it defines the legal 
                                            
1564 BMSMA s 66(3)(a). 
1565 BMSMA s 66(3)(b). 
1566 Keang Sood Strata Title 558. 
1567 Measures Governing Property Management Fees Collection of 2003 arts 11 and 12; Chen & van der Merwe 
(2009) TSAR 31. 
1568 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 art 68. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 326 
status of the managing agent and establishes whether the managing agent is in a 
fiduciary relationship with the body corporate and trustees. If the managing agent is in a 
fiduciary relationship then he or she owes a fiduciary duty to the body corporate, and 
any failure in this regard could lead to the managing agent being held personally liable 
to the body corporate. 
 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert correctly state that construing the relationship 
between the managing agent and body corporate as one of employment would not 
provide the body corporate with sufficient protection against fraudulent and negligent 
conduct of the managing agent.1569 The relationship is construed as one with varying 
fiduciary dimensions in terms of which liability will be incurred by the managing agent, 
depending on the specific expectations of actions performed by the managing agent 
from case to case.1570 However, as I have shown in this chapter the managing agent 
cannot be seen as mere employee of the body corporate. Construing the relationship 
between the body corporate and managing agent as a contract of mandate 
automatically requires that the managing agent act bona fide and with reasonable care, 
skill and diligence. If the managing agent, as the mandatory, fails to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence he or she can be held liable for such negligence.  
 
A balance must be struck between the responsibilities of the managing agent and the 
trustees. As the law stands the trustees should continuously supervise the managing 
agent. Furthermore, the trustees must authorize all expenditures made by managing 
agents.1571 The fact that the managing agent has been appointed will not discharge the 
trustees ultimate fiduciary duty to the body corporate. The trustees will ultimately be 
held liable in circumstances of gross negligence if they fail to fulfill their delegated duties 
in terms of the STA. This is one of the pimary reasons why I am of the opinion that a 
professional manager should be the executive organ of the body corporate with the 
primary fiduciary duty toward the body corporate.  
                                            
1569 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 475. 
1570 475. 
1571 Henry (August 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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As the law now stands the trustees should take the utmost care in selecting a 
professional, reliable and reputable managing agent. Word of mouth referrals can be 
the most reliable and effective source for finding the best managing agent.1572 The 
selection process requires the trustees to obtain quotes from reputable managing firms. 
The trustees should scrutinize the draft agency agreements and establish whether the 
prospective managing agent acts as an individual, in a partnership or as a company; 
whether he would require a complete or partial delegation of powers, functions and 
duties; whether specific duties will be provided for by the managing agent; his 
management fee, expenses and charges and the time when they are payable; whether 
the management agent holds professional indemnity insurance; the experience of the 
managing agent in managing sectional title schemes together with the number and 
names of other schemes managed by the managing agent with a possible 
recommendation as to the agent’s reputation, services, compliance with the Act, 
reliability and efficiency; the number of staff available and whether the managing agent 
and his staff would be a good fit for the scheme. 
 
The fact that managing agents are appointed by the trustees can make it difficult for the 
managing agent to put trustees in their place when they are committing actions or 
omissions that are not acceptable in terms of the relevant legislation or the rules of the 
scheme. Trustees are not as qualified or knowledgeable when it comes to the laws 
applicable to the management of sectional title schemes. It is for this reason that all 
managing agents should have the duty to warn trustees that contravention of the 
relevant legislation or the rules of the scheme, could impair the the well-being and 
reputation of the scheme. It has been suggested that every managing agent should 
make a policy statement on his or her appointment that he or she will strictly follow the 
provisions of the STA and the rules of the scheme; that the trustees cannot expect him 
or her to deviate from these provisions and that it will be a breach of contract if the 
trustees terminate the contract with the managing agent if he or she refuses to deviate 
from these provisions.1573 In cases where the managing agent is prepared to overlook 
                                            
1572 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 47. 
1573 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-11; Maree (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 8. 
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the strict application of the provisions of relevant legislation and rules of the scheme, the 
trustees should be more concerned that the managing agent is not a professional and 
ethical person, and should not be trusted in any other situation or especially with the 
finances of the scheme. In most cases the managing agent stands in a fiduciary position 
with the body corporate, which should take precedence over any loyalty to the trustees 
or to any single trustee.  
 
As the law currently stands the managing agent and trustees should work together on 
almost all matters for the most successful management of the sectional title scheme. 
The managing agent should revert to the trustees constantly and should keep them 
updated on all developments affecting the scheme.1574 It is important that there be 
regular, transparent and targeted communication between the trustees, managing 
agents and owners.1575 The tensions that often result from communal living will escalate 
in cases where the participants are not privy to direct and speedy information, feedback 
and communication. Communication can be facilitated through channels such as the 
annual trustees report for general meetings; telephonic conversations; text messages; 
emails; online community portals; property websites and newsletters that can give 
relevant information and status reports regarding management and maintenance issues 
such as security, community events, meetings, and finances. Achieving harmony and 
reducing the tensions in communal living will be significantly promoted by consistent 
communication between all the participants. 
 
It is important to note that a managing agent can also be elected as a trustee if he or 
she is also an owner. This could create problems as such person now has a fiduciary 
duty to supervise his or her own work and these two positions are now inextricably 
linked.1576  
 
                                            
1574 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 46. 
1575 A Schaefer “Communication between managing agents, trustees and owner” (July 2013) 8-7 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 2. 
1576 J Paddock (December 2011) Paddocks Press Newsletter 5. Paddock (November 2012) Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 4. 
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It can be argued that the non-regulation of the fees payable to managing agents will 
detrimentally affect the industry. Regulation will create greater certainty and prevent 
disputes as well as time-consuming and expensive negotiations.  
 
The body corporate, in reaching agreement on the management agent’s fee, will have 
to consider whether the managing agent is offering a fully comprehensive service or just 
specific services limited to accounting and financial management; the size of the 
company the managing agent works for; its reputation and the availability of 
infrastructure such as staff, offices, computers, and accounting programs.1577 Constas 
and Bleijs are of the opinion that “goedkoop is duurkoop” in this industry.1578 If a 
cheaper managing agent is used instead of a reliable and reputable one, then the cost 
could incease rapidly in tandem with costly mistakes made by an unqualified and 
inexperienced managing agent.  
 
The trustees should continually monitor whether the fees are competitive and whether 
the body corporate is getting value for money. If this is not the case, the trustees should 
renegotiate the fees charged or shop around for a new managing agent.1579 It should be 
noted that there might be hidden costs.1580 The trustees, before appointing the 
managing agent, should ask for a quotation that would include any additional costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1577 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 47. 
1578 47. 
1579 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31. 
1580 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 49. 
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Chapter 13: Powers and duties of the managing 
agent 
 
13 1 Introduction 
 
In order for a managing agent to assist the trustees in the day-to-day management of 
the sectional title scheme it is necessary that certain powers and duties are delegated 
and entrusted to him or her. I will start this chapter with a discussion on the delegation 
of powers and duties by the trustees to the managing agent, and the possible sub-
delegation of powers and duties by the managing agent to others. I will then set out 
some of the possible specific powers and duties of the managing agent.  
13 2 Delegation of powers and duties 
13 2 1 Introduction 
 
If certain powers and duties are not delegated to the managing agent, then he or she 
would be no more than a secretarial assistant of the trustees, and would be unable to 
act independently. In what follows I will set out the powers and duties that are capable 
of being delegated to the managing agent. I will discuss how the trustees delegate 
these powers and duties, and how the delegation can be revoked. I will also examine 
whether it is possible for the managing agent to delegate all or some of his or her duties 
and powers to another. An important matter to be considered is what the consequences 
are of the managing agent exercising a power or duty delegated to him or her.  
13 2 2 South African position 
 
A managing agent may exercise or perform any of the powers and duties entrusted to 
him or her in terms of the contract entered into with the body corporate or in terms of the 
management rules. Prescribed management rule 26(1) provides that: 
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“Subject to any restriction imposed or direction given at a general meeting of the 
body corporate, the powers of the trustees shall include the following: to appoint 
for and on behalf of the body corporate such agents and employees as they 
deem fit in connection with the control, management and administration of the 
common property;1581 and the exercise and performance of any or all of the 
powers and duties of the body corporate;1582 to delegate to one or more of the 
trustees such of their powers and duties as they deem fit, and at any time to 
revoke such delegation.1583 (My emphasis added.) 
 
The implication that all the powers and duties of the body corporate may be delegated 
to a managing agent1584 is deceptive as obviously not all the powers and duties of the 
body corporate can be delegated to the managing agent. Although framed widely, this 
provision must be interpreted and applied restrictively and with caution, as there are 
exceptions. The managing agent cannot be authorized to appoint another managing 
agent. Furthermore, the power to make a unanimous or special resolution cannot be 
delegated to the managing agent. The trustees cannot delegate powers that they do not 
themselves possess and very importantly, the trustees are not entitled to delegate their 
power to formally determine levies.1585  
 
The routine administrative powers and duties required for the day-to-day management 
of the scheme should be delegated to the managing agent, but policy decisions should 
not be so delegated. Examples of policy decisions are the permission to keep pets;1586 
to subdivide or consolidate sections;1587 to park on common property1588 and to affix 
notices, billboards or advertisements on any external part of the building.1589  
 
                                            
1581 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(a)(i). 
1582 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(a)(ii). 
1583 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
1584 Maree (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 3. 
1585 3. 
1586 Annexure 9 rule 1(1). 
1587 STA s 20(1). 
1588 Annexure 9 rule 3(1). 
1589 Annexure 9 rule 6. 
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The managing agent could be made responsible for diverse tasks such as the sending 
of notices and accounts to the owners; the collection and banking of owners’ 
contributions; the institution of legal proceedings for the recovery of levies; the 
preparation of a budget; supplying the trustees with monthly reports on income and 
expenditure; keeping accounting records available for perusal by the trustees; ensuring 
that all expenses are supported by documentation; ensuring that disbursements are 
made for maintenance of the common property; arranging the audit; recruiting and 
dismissing cleaning and gardening staff; paying staff salaries and all other accounts; 
arranging for insurance cover; investing the scheme’s funds subject to the directions of 
the body corporate; enforcing the management and conduct rules; handling official 
correspondence and complaints and arranging how the swimming pool and recreation 
facilities may be used.1590  
 
To illustrate how delegation works in practice, we can look at prescribed management 
rule 42, which states that:  
 
“The trustees may authorise the managing agent to administer and operate the 
account referred to in rule 41 and 43…”  
 
The words “administer and operate” include the signing of cheques. However, the 
managing agent is not automatically authorized to sign cheques on the basis of rule 42 
alone. Such a power must be specifically delegated to the managing agent in the 
managing contract or by a trustees’ resolution.1591 Furthermore, the managing agent will 
have to sign the cheque subject to the requirement set out in prescribed management 
rule 27 that requires instruments to be signed by a trustee and managing agent for it to 
be valid and binding on the body corporate. 
 
In terms of prescribed management rule 46(1) the powers and duties may be entrusted 
to the managing agent notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in rule 28, 
                                            
1590 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-16. 
1591 Maree (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 2. 
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and subject to the provisions of section 39(1) of the STA.1592 Prescribed management 
rule 28, which governs the general and statutory duties of the trustees, provides that the 
trustees shall perform the functions entrusted to them by sections 371593 and 391594 of 
the STA and exercise the powers of the body corporate on its behalf. The only 
restriction on the delegation of powers and duties is the fact that the appointment and 
delegation of powers are made subject to the provisions of section 39(1) of the STA in 
terms of which the functions and powers of the body corporate must, subject to the 
provisions of the Act, the rules and any restriction imposed or direction given at a 
general meeting of the owners, be performed and exercised by the trustees of the body 
corporate holding office in terms of the rules. Section 39(1) will be replaced by section 
7(1) of the STSMA, which is a substantially similar provision. This implies that if the 
trustees’ powers and functions are restricted in the above manner then those limitations 
would apply to functions and powers delegated to the managing agent.  
 
The delegation of powers should never be effected in an informal manner, and neither 
the trustees nor the managing agent should assume that the agent is endowed with 
certain powers. The exact powers and duties should always be set out in writing in the 
agreement concluded with the managing agent which in turn should comply with both 
the substantial and formal requirements of the STA and the applicable management 
rules. Where a power or duty is not specified in writing in the management agreement, it 
may be delegated to the managing agent in terms of a formal minuted trustees’ 
resolution, provided that the managing agent formally accepts it.  
 
Prescribed management rule 26(1)(b) provides that the trustees have the power to 
delegate to one or more of the trustees such of their powers and duties as they deem fit, 
and at any time to revoke such delegation.1595 The contract should also contain the 
power on the part of the trustees or the body corporate to revoke some of the duties or 
powers delegated to the managing agent if they wish to restrict the powers and duties 
                                            
1592 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(a). 
1593 STSMA s 3. 
1594 STSMA s 7. 
1595 Annexure 8 rule 26(1)(b). 
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previously delegated. This should only be done on the strength of a resolution passed 
by the trustees or the body corporate, and notification to the managing agent.  
 
Regarding the delegation of powers and duties, a managing agent cannot unilaterally 
transfer the management contract to another without the consent of the body corporate. 
This limitation is consistent with the maxim delegatus delegare non potest which means 
that a delegate cannot further delegate his or her powers to someone else.1596 The 
managing agent cannot transfer the management contract entirely, but can contract out 
certain tasks to secific third parties such as plumbers and electricians who are more 
skilled to perform the task.1597 This is also in conformity with construing the contract of 
the managing agent as a contract of mandate in that one of the inherent obligations is 
that the mandatory is required to perform the mandate personally.1598 
 
Notwithstanding any delegation of powers and duties to the managing agent the body 
corporate would still be entitled to exercise all or any of these powers and duties, or 
place restrictions on the exercise thereof by the managing agent.1599 Any act done or 
suffered by a managing agent in the exercise of the powers and functions delegated to 
him or her has the same effect as if it was done by the body corporate.  
13 2 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the ordinary resolution of the general meeting authorising the 
appointment of a managing agent comprises both the appointment1600 and a delegation 
of various powers, authorities, duties and functions to the managing agent.1601 The 
NSW Strata Management Act gives the owners corporation three options with regard to 
the type of delegation. In the firstl place it allows for a complete delegation where every 
                                            
1596 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 33. 
1597 33. 
1598 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 9. 
1599 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-19. 
1600 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 27. 
1601 S 28; Theoretically the owners corporation can pass a resolution of mere appointment without a delegation 
(known as a bare appointment), but this would serve no practical purpose as the managing agent would then not be 
able to perform any of the tasks associated the management of the scheme, and tis would defeat the purpose as the 
scheme would have a managing agent in name only; Ilkin NSW Strata 150; The Owners – Strata Plan No 61643 
v183 On Kent Management Pty Ltd (2007) NSW Titles Cases 80 – 117. 
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power, authority, duty and function that the owners corporation possesses by virtue of 
the Act, regulations or by-laws may be delegated to the managing agent.1602 For 
example, the managing agent will be allowed to invest the owner corporation’s 
money;1603 make application to the Supreme Court to terminate the strata scheme; or 
change the scheme’s insurance company.1604 The exception to this delegation occurs 
where the Act specifies that the managing agent may not consider certain matters. 
Secondly it permits a partial delegation of one or more of its powers, authorities, duties 
and functions specified in the instrument of appointment, with the consequence that any 
act outside the instrument would be a breach of the delegation.1605 The Institute of 
Strata Title Management has recommended a form that provides the managing agent 
with a clearly identifiable list of tasks that the managing agent is required to perform.1606 
Thirdly it also permits a partial delegation of powers, authorities, duties and functions 
except those specified in the instrument.1607 The NSW Strata Schemes Management 
Act also allows the owners corporation to delegate all or some of the chairperson’s, 
secretary’s, treasurer’s and executive committee’s powers, authorities, duties and 
functions to the managing agent.1608 The extent of the delegation with the conditions 
and limitations imposed thereon should be evident from the agency agreement. 
 
Some managing agents are given a complete delegation, whilst others are only given a 
partial delegation. Added to this the owners corporation may impose many different 
conditions and limitations on the managing agent under either type of delegation. The 
Act specifies three matters that cannot be delegated to the managing agent.1609 The first 
matter is “a delegation under this subsection” which means that the managing agent 
cannot allow a third person to exercise or perform the powers, authorities, duties and 
functions that have been delegated to the managing agent. This provision prohibits the 
managing agent from subcontracting to another managing agent. Matters involving a 
                                            
1602 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(1)(a). 
1603 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 73. 
1604 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 84. 
1605 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(1)(a). 
1606 Ilkin NSW Strata 150. 
1607 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(1)(c). 
1608 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 29. 
1609 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(3). 
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discretionary use of power, authority, duty or function cannot be delegated to a third 
person. Where the managing agent is a company the whole firm has been appointed as 
the managing agent and any licensed individual can exercise the powers, authorities, 
duties and functions delegated under the agreement. Where a managing agent is a firm 
of licensed partners and one partner to whom a particular scheme has been allocated is 
ill or on holiday, then any other licensed partner can exercise the powers, authorities, 
duties and functions delegated under the agreement because the whole firm who has 
been appointed as the schemes managing agent, and not just the individual partner. 
The Agents Act allows a member of a partnership to be unlicensed, but that partner 
cannot carry out the functions of a managing agent. Either way the managing agent will 
delegate acts such as typing, posting of mail or the engagement of skilled and qualified 
tradespeople to carry out repairs.1610  
 
The second matter is “a decision on a matter that is required to be decided by the 
owners corporation” which means that the managing agent cannot make a decision on 
a restricted matter. The third matter is “a determination relating to the levying or 
payment of contributions” which applies to managing agents and the executive 
committee.1611 It is clear from these limitations that the legislature intended that the 
general meeting, and not the executive committee and managing agent, to decide what 
money needs to be raised to meet future expenses of the scheme.1612  
 
A managing agent who has been given a complete delegation should follow certain 
procedural steps when making decisions, subject to the conditions and limitations 
imposed.1613 In the first place the managing agent should not take any action unless an 
initial resolution has been passed and recorded in the owners corporation’s minute book 
authorizing the action. The managing agent should keep record of any decision, which 
could be used as evidence. The managing agent may serve a written record of his or 
her decision seven days before the action is to be taken, but this is only necessary if the 
                                            
1610 Ilkin NSW Strata 154. 
1611 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 76(2). 
1612 Ilkin NSW Strata 154. 
1613 155. 
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general meeting is to be consulted1614 If owners holding more than one-third of the 
aggregate unit entitlement lodge a written objection to a proposed decision the 
managing agent would be prevented from making that decision.1615 Once the managing 
agent has served the written record and the owners corporation or executive committee 
objects to the managing agent’s decision, a meeting can be held in order to pass a 
resolution overruling the decision.1616  
 
Secondly, the managing agent must, after taking action, make a written record 
specifying the function and the manner in which it was exercised and serve a copy on 
the owners corporation.1617 A managing agent who has a partial delegation must look to 
the agency agreement to see if that particular power, authority, duty or function has 
been delegated to him or her.1618  
 
A managing agent that fails to perform a delegated duty that has a penalty in terms of 
the Act for non-performance, would be subject to the same penalty as the owners 
corporation if the latter had been convicted for failure to perform the duty instead.1619 
When, for example, the duty to record the particulars of all notices and orders was 
delegated to the managing agent, he becomes liable to prosecution on the failure to do 
so.1620  
 
                                            
1614 A former Commissioner suggested that the managing agent affix an agenda detailing the matters proposed to be 
considered to the notice board at least 72 hours before he or she proposed to make a decision. It is appropriate that 
owners be given the opportunity to oppose the proposed decision, but the Commissioner’s opinion is not supported 
by any cases or general law. 
1615 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 3, cl 11(2). 
1616 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(6). 
1617 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 31 which requires decisions involving the exercise of the owners 
corporation powers, authorities, duties and functions to be served on the owners corporation, but not those of the 
chairperson, secretary and treasurer. A managing agent can exercise a power before making a record of the decision 
to do so, but it is better to record the proposed decision before the power has been exercised. The managing agent 
does not have to affix a notice of the decision to the schemes notice board as is the case with executive committee 
decisions. The managing agent must the affix the common seal to those documents requiring it; Ilkin NSW Strata 
156. 
1618 Ilkin NSW Strata 157. 
1619 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 30. 
1620 Ilkin NSW Strata 157. 
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Any condition or limitation may be imposed by the owners corporation provided that it is 
not contrary to law.1621 Despite the delegation of powers to the managing agent the 
owners corporation may still continue to exercise or perform all or any of its powers, 
authorities, duties and functions.1622 Any decision of a managing agent that is objected 
to may be rescinded, overruled or repealed by a decision of the owners corporation or 
the executive committee by passing a resolution.1623 The only problem is that the 
managing agent is not required to notify the owners corporation, executive committee or 
any owner of the proposed decision, unless the agency agreement specifically requires 
it.1624 The owners corporation might not become aware of the decision until it receives 
the written record from the managing agent.1625  
 
Any act done or allowed by the managing agent when acting under the terms of the 
delegation will be binding upon the owners corporation and it will have the same force 
and effect as if it had been done or allowed by the owners corporation.1626 If a third 
party that contracts with the managing agent has ensured that a certain authority was 
delegated to the managing agent in the instrument then he or she will be entitled to rely 
on the managing agent’s exercise of that power or duty, and will not need to make 
further enquiries.1627 
 
In Singapore the management corporation has a discretionary right to delegate certain 
powers and duties to the managing agent.1628 The delegation is effected by a written 
instrument of delegation,1629 and the form will be determined by the parties as it is not 
prescribed by the BMSMA. There can be a complete delegation1630 to the managing 
agent of all the powers, duties and functions conferred on the management corporation 
                                            
1621 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(5). 
1622 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(4). 
1623 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(6). 
1624 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(5). 
1625 In terms of section 31. 
1626 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(7); It will be deemed to have been done or suffered by the owners 
corporation. 
1627 Ilkin NSW Strata 151. 
1628 Like in New South Wales an appointment without a delegation is possible; Keang Sood Strata Title 550. 
1629 BMSMA s 67(1). 
1630 BMSMA s 67(1)(a). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 339 
by the BMSMA and the relevant regulations or by-laws, subject to any limitations. The 
management corporation can also make a partial delegation of any one or more of its 
powers, duties and functions specified in the instrument with the result that any act 
outside the instrument would be a breach of the delegation1631 or a partial delegation of 
all of its powers, duties and functions, except those specified in the instrument.1632 The 
managing agent may exercise or perform the delegated powers, duties or functions 
whether complete or partial, from time to time in accordance with the delegation.1633 The 
BMSMA also permits the corporation to make a delegation of all or some of the powers, 
duties and functions of the chairperson, secretary and treasurer or the executive council 
or those powers, duties and functions to the managing agent1634 as specified in an 
ordinary resolution.1635 
 
There are limitations on the managing agent’s exercise of the delegated powers, duties 
and functions. The BMSMA does not permit the management corporation to delegate to 
the managing agent its powers to make a delegation.1636 Where the managing agent is 
an individual he or she would not be allowed to delegate his or her powers to a third 
party. Where the managing agent is a partnership or company the non-availability of a 
particular partner or employee does not prevent another from undertaking the task. A 
managing agent may delegate certain acts to a third party, and can delegate some 
tasks to a more qualified person, for example a more skilled person can undertake 
necessary repairs.  
 
The BMSMA does not permit the corporation to make a decision on any matter that may 
only be made by the management corporation pursuant to a unanimous resolution, a 
special resolution, a 90% resolution, a resolution by consensus or at a general meeting 
                                            
1631 BMSMA s 67(1)(b). 
1632 BMSMA s 67(1)(c). 
1633 BMSMA s 67(4). 
1634 The managing agent can be delegated the secretary’s duty to make available certain records for inspection or the 
treasurer’s duty to prepare the certificate pertaining to the details of the amounts of any financial contributions, other 
money and interest due in respect of a lot in the circumstances specified in the Act; Keang Sood Strata Title 553. 
1635 BMSMA s 67(3). 
1636 BMSMA s 67(2)(a). 
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of the corporation.1637 The management corporation cannot make a determination on 
any matter referred to in section 59 of the BMSMA (which deals with the restrictions 
imposed on the council by the management corporation in relation to what matters or 
class of matters shall be determined only by the latter in the general meeting1638) and 
specified in a resolution of the management corporation passed for the purposes of that 
section.1639 These last two limitations prohibit a managing agent from making a decision 
on a matter that only the management corporation may decide pursuant to the specified 
resolutions or in a general meeting. Where matters are restricted to being determined in 
a general meeting, it will defeat the managing agent’s principal function of administering 
the scheme on a day-to-day basis. 
 
A delegation, whether complete or partial, may be made subject to such conditions or 
limitations as to the exercise or performance of all or any of the powers, duties or 
functions, or as to time and circumstances, as may be specified in the instrument of 
delegation.1640 As an example the managing agent could be prohibited from arranging 
for the repair and maintenance of any one item of common property exceeding a 
specified cost without prior approval from the executive council.  
 
The managing agent is also prohibited from engaging in election activity of the 
executive council including canvassing for proxy votes, and cannot by word, message, 
writing or in any other manner endeavor to persuade or dissuade any person to vote or 
abstain from voting, by proxy or in person, in any particular way at any such election.1641 
The managing agent is not permitted to visit any person entitled to vote at the election 
at his or her home or place of work for the purposes of any candidate’s election1642 or to 
conduct any other activity in this regard.1643 Contravention of this is an offence.1644 A 
vote by a proxy who is a managing agent is invalid if it would obtain or assist in 
                                            
1637 BMSMA s 67(2)(b). 
1638 BMSMA s 79(3). 
1639 BMSMA s 67(2)(c). 
1640 BMSMA s 67(5). 
1641 BMSMA s 68(1)(a). 
1642 BMSMA s 68(1)(b). 
1643 BMSMA s 68(1)(c). 
1644 BMSMA s 68(3). 
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obtaining a pecuniary interest for, or confer or assist in conferring any other material 
benefit on the proxy.1645 Examples of benefits includes an extension of the term or an 
additional term of appointment of the proxy as managing agent; an increase in the 
remuneration of the proxy; a decision of the management corporation not to proceed 
with, withdraw, to delay, to compromise or to settle litigation or other legal proceedings 
relating to the proxy; or any other decision of the corporation that affects litigation or 
other legal proceedings relating to the proxy.1646 
 
Notwithstanding any delegation made the management corporation, office bearers, or 
executive council may continue to exercise or perform all or any of the delegated 
powers, duties or functions.1647 If the corporation disagrees with a decision of a 
managing agent on a matter it may pass a resolution rescinding or repealing the 
decision. It is however improbable that a managing agents decision may be revoked 
after it has been put into force and given effect to for instance if work has been 
undertaken or an item has been purchased. This follows from the fact that there is no 
duty on the managing agent to notify the corporation, executive council or any 
proprietors of proposed decisions unless the instrument of delegation requires the 
managing agent to give prior notice.1648 
 
Any properly effected act or thing done or allowed by the managing agent while acting 
in the exercise of a delegation shall have the same force and effect as if it had been 
done or allowed by the management corporation.1649 This ensures that any act by the 
managing agent with a third party will be binding upon the management corporation. 
Once the third person is satisfied that the managing agent has been delegated the 
particular power, he or she can rely on it without making further enquiries to the 
management corporation, office bearers, or the executive council.1650 
                                            
1645 BMSMA s 68(2). 
1646 BMSMA s 68(4)(a)-(d). 
1647 BMSMA s 67(6). 
1648 Keang Sood Strata Title 556. 
1649 BMSMA s 67(7)(a) and (b). 
1650 BMSMA s 68(a) and (b). 
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13 3 Powers and duties of the managing agent 
13 3 1 Introduction 
 
Having established how the powers and duties are delegated to the managing agent, 
what powers and duties are capable of being delegated and their sub-delegation to 
other persons, I will set out some of the specific powers and duties of the managing 
agent.  
13 3 2 South African position 
 
The STA does not contain any provisions on managing agents. The only possible 
exception is section 38(a) of the STA1651 which states that the body corporate has the 
power to appoint such employees and agents as it deems fit. The powers and duties of 
a managing agent are mainly set out in the prescribed management rules in Annexure 8 
to the STA, read together with the provisions in the management agreement concluded 
with the trustees on behalf of the body corporate. The prescribed management rules 
deal with the managing agent’s contract of appointment, and stipulate a few functions of 
the managing agent, but do not provide an exhaustive list.1652 Prescribed management 
rule 46(1)(a) states that: 
 
“The managing agent is appointed in terms of a written contract to control, 
manage, and administer the common property and the obligations to any public 
or local authority by the body corporate on behalf of the unit owners, and to 
exercise such powers and duties as may be entrusted to the managing agent, 
including the power to collect levies and to appoint a supervisor or caretaker.”1653  
 
However, prescribed management rule 46 is not the only rule that impacts the powers 
and duties of the managing agent.1654 Generally, a managing agent’s function is to 
assist the body corporate to administer and maintain the common property and to 
                                            
1651 STSMA s 4(a). 
1652 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 24-25. 
1653 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(a). 
1654 Maree (December 2010) 38 MSC Courier 2. 
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enforce the rules of the scheme. The managing agent needs to co-ordinate and deal 
with the issues involving the owners, tenants, visitors and others.1655 He or she is also 
entitled to be given reasonable prior notice of meetings of the trustees, and from time to 
time to be furnished with copies of the minutes of the trustees’ meetings and of the 
general meeting.1656 However, the managing agent can only attend meetings of the 
trustees with their consent.1657  
 
The managing agent should keep records and reports up to date, and to give access to 
and to allow for inspection of this information. In an article dealing with the daily life of a 
managing agent the author wrote that: 
 
“Being a professional managing agent does not mean hogging all the information 
to yourself and trying to run the body corporate as though you own it.”1658 
 
Prescribed management rule 48 obliges the managing agent to keep full records of his 
or her administration and to notify the body corporate and all holders of registered 
sectional mortgage bonds of all matters that in his or her opinion detrimentally affect the 
value of the common property and any of the sections.1659 Before this rule was 
amended in 1997 the managing agent had to report to all registered sectional 
bondholders, even if they had not notified the body corporate of their interest. The report 
must now be made to registered sectional bondholders who have notified the body 
corporate of their interest.1660 In this way the body corporate will have the addresses of 
the interested sectional bondholders. The amendment avoids unnecessary reporting 
and additional expenses. It is also more practical in that the managing agent need not 
make arduous inquiries of the addresses of all sectional bondholders as the body 
corporate would have been furnished with the addresses of interested bondholders. The 
reference to rule 54(1)(b) also limits sectional bondholders to those holders of 
                                            
1655 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31. 
1656 Annexure 8 rule 49(1) and (2). 
1657 Annexure 8 rule 49(1). 
1658 Lenhoff (October 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
1659 Annexure 8 rule 48. 
1660 Annexure 8 rule 54(1)(b). 
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registered sectional mortgage bonds over units, and excludes sectional bondholders 
over exclusive use areas and over the right to develop the scheme in phases in terms of 
section 25 of the STA. Van der Merwe states that since the reporting to the body 
corporate would be by way of a report to the general meeting, it should be sufficient 
reporting to a sectional bondholder who has informed the body corporate of his interest 
in attending general meetings.1661 In practice reporting to the body corporate would, 
however, usually be in a report to the trustees.1662 
 
These provisions have the purpose of imposing an obligation on the managing agent. 
The trustees should add a clause in the managing agent’s contract of appointment that 
would require the managing agent to notify the body corporate and all holders of 
registered bonds over units in the scheme of all matters which in his or her opinion 
detrimentally affect the value or amenity of the common property and any of the 
sections. This should include an obligation on the managing agent to regularly inspect 
the common property and sections to seek out problems that could have a detrimental 
effect. Such problems are not only limited to the physical condition of the building, but 
should extend to the operations and affairs of the body corporate and trustees 
generally. The trustees should also include a term in the managing agent’s contract of 
appointment that specifies which records the managing agent is required to keep of his 
or her administration of the scheme. This duty to keep record of administration is 
important as it keeps the managing agent accountable. 
 
Managerial problems may result when the body corporate’s records and reports are not 
up to date. As the trustees will be unaware of the financial situation of the scheme from 
month to month, the management rules and contract of appointment dealing with the 
duties of managing agents should include a clause similar to this:  
 
“The managing agent shall keep the records and accounts of the body corporate 
up to date. The books of account shall be balanced on a monthly basis and 
                                            
1661 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-18.  
1662 15-18.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 345 
financial reports issued to the trustees at the end of each month. Failure to 
comply with this rule shall be grounds for terminating the services of the 
managing agents.”1663 
 
Managing agents are in possession of contact details including addresses of the owners 
of units. It is important to know who is entitled to access this information and whether 
there is a cost involved.1664 Prescribed management rule 35 requires that:  
 
“The trustees shall cause proper books of account and records to be kept so as 
fairly to explain the transactions and financial position of the body corporate 
including… a register of owners and of registered mortgagees of units and of all 
other persons having real rights in such units (insofar as written notice shall have 
been given to the trustee by such owners, mortgagees or other persons) showing 
in each case their addresses.”1665  
 
The rule states further that on application of any owner, registered mortgagee or the 
managing agent, the trustees shall make all or any of the books of account and records 
available for inspection by such owner, mortgagee or managing agent.1666 The 
managing agent exercises its duties for the body corporate and is not the agent of any 
individual owner. If a municipality wishes to send notices regarding the valuation of 
individual sectional title units to the individual owners or to collect rates and taxes then it 
should request the owners’ addresses using the PAIA. The body corporate is 
considered a private body in terms of the PAIA.1667 The municipality must complete a 
form whereupon it, as the applicant, must indicate the right that it wishes to exercise. 
The trustees, as the executive organ of the body corporate, then have thirty days to 
respond to the request for information and upon payment of the access fee, furnish the 
contact details of the owners to the municipality. The municipality should not dump its 
                                            
1663 AB Kenyon-Thompson “Body corporate rules: Are they effective?” (October 1987) 4.2 Juta’s South African 
Journal of Property 50. 
1664 Maree (March 2007) 22 MCS Courier 8. 
1665 Annexure 8 rule 35(1)(c). 
1666 Annexure 8 rule 35(2). 
1667 Maree (March 2007) 22 MCS Courier 8. 
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notices at the door of the managing agent who is not employed by the individual 
owners, but by the body corporate. The municipality should send them to the individual 
owners after receiving their contact details from the trustees.1668 
 
The scope of the managing agent’s powers and duties will depend on the terms in this 
contract of appointment and the circumstances of the scheme.1669 The variety of powers 
and duties of the managing agent depends largely on the size and nature of the 
sectional title scheme, and on the capacity of its members to pay for a professional 
managing agent.1670 The body corporate and trustees can tailor the management 
package to suit their scheme’s needs.1671 The main tasks, duties and functions of the 
managing agent can be divided into managerial, secretarial and financial services.1672  
 
The managerial services are mostly administrative in nature.1673 The managing agent 
could be made responsible to open and operate a current or savings account with a 
bank or building society, and to charge bank charges per unit per month. As I have 
explained in chapter 11 all managing agents that collect or receive levies for a body 
corporate have been defined as estate agents, and the Estate Agency Affairs Act 
applies to the managing agent. Therefore, all managing agents are under a legal 
obligation to register as an estate agent with the Estate Agency Affairs Board before he 
or she can collect or receive any levies and should be in possession of a valid Fidelity 
Fund Certificate and effect fidelity insurance to the satisfaction of the Estate Agency 
Affairs Act.1674  
 
The managing agent is also responsible to manage trust money and operate a trust 
account in terms of section 32 of the Estate Agency Affairs Act.1675 In the unreported 
                                            
1668 Maree (March 2007) 22 MCS Courier 8. 
1669 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31-33. 
1670 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-8. 
1671 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 45. 
1672 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-8. 
1673 Lenhoff (October 2008) 3-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1,3. 
1674 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 28; Paddock (January 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 6; Van der Walt (April 
2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-9; Jooste (January 2008) Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 1-2. 
1675 Jooste (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
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case of Body Corporate of Fucia Gardens et al v Bakenkop (Pty) Ltd t/a Wierda et al1676 
the court decided that, where a managing agent agreed to pay levies collected into a 
trust account, but failed to open the trust account and paid it into his business account, 
such money had to be paid to the various bodies corporate, and did not fall into the 
insolvent estate of the managing agent. The managing agent is obliged to open a trust 
account or accounts with a bank for the purpose of depositing monies received from 
clients.1677 Only once money has been deposited into the current account1678 may it be 
transferred into a savings (interest bearing) account.1679 Both accounts must be in the 
name of the managing agent and must contain a reference to section 32(1) or 31(2) of 
the Estate Agency Affairs Act as the case may be. The managing agent can therefore 
open a trust account for all of his clients collectively or separate accounts for each 
client. All the accounts must be reconciled after every 30 days. The managing agent 
must notify the Estate Agency Affairs Board of the details of the current account 
including the bank name and account number. There is no such requirement for the 
savings or interest bearing account as the trust funds may not be deposited directly into 
a savings account.1680  
 
The Estate Agency Affairs Act stipulates that the managing agent must keep a record of 
the trust money received and must ensure that an audit is done within four months after 
the end of the financial year of the managing agent.1681 All trust money, including 
individual accounts for each body corporate or a collective account for all bodies 
corporate, must be included in the report that the auditor of the managing agent sends 
to the Estate Agency Affairs Board annually.  
 
Prescribed management rules 41 to 44 of the STA provide more options when dealing 
with trust money. Rule 41 instructs the managing agent to deposit all monies in the 
account of the body corporate. Rule 42 provides that the trustees may authorize the 
                                            
1676 Unreported Case 50444/2007 (T) of 4 April 2008. 
1677 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 32. 
1678 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 32(1). 
1679 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 32(2)   
1680 Jooste (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1681 Estate Agency Affairs Act s 29. 
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managing agent to administer and operate these accounts of the body corporate. It 
further adds that the trustees may authorize the managing agent to deposit the money 
in a trust account in terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act. This leaves the impression 
that the trustees have the option to instruct the managing agent to either manage their 
funds on their own account or on the account of the managing agent. The Estate 
Agency Affairs Act only gives the option to receive or manage trust funds on a trust 
account.1682  
 
The managing agent therefore has duties that include the collection of contributions and 
levies, rentals, other sundry fees, ancillary charges from owners, and any other income 
due to the body corporate and must then deposit such receipts into the trust account. 
Late or non-payment of levies can lead to financial loss for the body corporate. Outside 
managing agents are in a much better position than the trustees to collect levies, to 
warn owners who are in arrears and finally to institute legal proceedings for the recovery 
of arrears.1683 The managing agent is also responsible for exercising credit control in 
respect of all amounts owing by timeously addressing letters of reminder to owners in 
arrears; following due process in the imposition of fines in terms of a penalty clause in 
the rules applicable to the scheme for arrear levies; corresponding with attorneys in the 
case of serious defaulters; charging interest on arrears where necessary and taking 
other steps as directed by the trustees for the recovery of the arrears. He should also 
conduct a regular analysis of debtors and charge an administration fee to defaulting 
debtors for each final demand issued and for litigation action taken. Finally, the 
managing agent must also furnish a monthly statement to the trustees showing amounts 
due and received from each owner, as well as a monthly report on owners in arrears.  
 
The managing agent could also be made responsible for the preparation of annual 
expenditure estimates for tabling at the annual general meeting, a periodic review for 
comparisons of year-date actual expenditure to budget1684 and the investment of any 
surplus income. He must provide the trustees with a monthly statement of receipts and 
                                            
1682 Jooste (January 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
1683 Van der Merwe Sectional Title 15-8. 
1684 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 46. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 349 
expenditure and must verify and pay all accounts and expenses from available funds in 
the administration fund of the body corporate, subject to any restrictions imposed or 
directions given by the trustees. Accounts are paid with or without authority from the 
trustees or the body corporate, depending upon the amount of money involved and the 
extent of the delegation of powers to the managing agent.1685 The managing agent must 
keep records of guarantees and of service contracts for lifts, plant and machinery and 
check that the related accounts are correct. He must insist that maintenance work is 
properly carried out to his or her satisfaction  
 
The managing agent has various duties regarding insurance. These duties may include 
assisting the trustees in determining the replacement value of the buildings and 
improvements to the common property and the replacement value of each of the units 
for the purpose of insurance; negotiating with the insurance firm for the best cover and 
premiums possible; ensuring that proper and adequate insurance is obtained and 
renewed; and attending to insurance claims with regard to the common property. If the 
managing agent has contacts with reputable insurance companies he or she should be 
able to arrange the best possible deal for cover and premiums for the body corporate. 
The managing agent’s relationship with the insurance company should furthermore 
ensure a satisfactory and speedy settlement of all claims.1686  
 
The managing agent should arrange for the maintenance, repair and replacement of 
common property.1687 In this regard the managing agent should inspect the property 
regularly. A service and inspection division could inspect a scheme twice weekly or 
immediately in a case of an emergency. It could furthermore supervise cleaning staff; 
deliver cleaning materials; supply petrol for the lawnmower; ensure that the gardens 
and common areas are kept clean and tidy and report breaches of rules and damage to 
the common property to the office. This division could also affect minor repairs and 
maintenance, especially in schemes predominantly occupied by tenants. The managing 
agent should therefore assist and advise the trustees with all matters relating to 
                                            
1685 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-8. 
1686 15-9. 
1687 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 32. 
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maintenance of the common property including negotiating and obtaining of quotations 
on the repair and maintenance of common property and the employment of plumbers, 
electricians and other contractors where necessary. They usually have regular contact 
with service providers such as electricians, plumbers, building contractors, architects 
and quantity surveyors. For this reason maintenance contracts can be easily negotiated 
and arranged so that maintenance or repairs can be speedily effected. Negotiations with 
local authorities and governmental bodies can furthermore speedily be arranged and 
conducted if necessary since managing agents generally know a person in these 
various departments who helps with obtaining permits and consent. The managing 
agent must generally fulfill any obligations towards any public or local authority on 
behalf of the scheme or the body corporate in terms of the STA and the rules.1688  
 
The managing agent could be made responsible to appoint, control, pay, supervise and 
if necessary dismiss gardeners, cleaning staff, caretakers and any other staff. This 
includes the payment of salaries and calculation of the contributions for the employees 
for the Unemployment Insurance Fund and workmen’s compensation fund. This also 
includes the furnishing of the necessary employees Pay As You Earn (“PAYE”) 
contribution and the completion and submission of income tax returns.1689 The written 
contract should specify whether the remuneration of the caretaker, supervisor or 
employees should be paid as administrative expenses of the body corporate out of 
levies, or funded by the managing agent itself as part of its management fees.1690 
 
The impartial manager could handle disputes better than the owner trustees who would 
usually avoid dissatisfaction and friction in the scheme.1691 The managing agent is 
therefore the most suitable person to deal with complaints and queries of the unit 
owners, mortgagees or third parties, and to manage any possible conflict in the 
sectional title scheme.  
 
                                            
1688 Pienaar Sectional Title 191.  
1689 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-9. 
1690 Pienaar Sectional Titles 191. 
1691 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-9. 
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The most frequent secretarial tasks performed by the managing agent include the 
arrangement of meetings of trustees, special general meetings and the annual general 
meeting of the body corporate. This includes the organization of the notices, preparation 
of resolutions, and proxies. This task is extremely time-consuming and can include the 
drafting of the Chairperson’s report.1692 The managing agent must assist and advise 
members, trustees, and the chairperson on such matters as the general meetings, 
special general meetings, quorums, proxies, resolutions (special and unanimous) and 
voting rights. Managing agents attend numerous meetings that give them much 
knowledge and experience in this field. The managing agent must examine proxies and 
nominations and prepare agendas, budgets and insurance schedules for the general 
meeting. The managing agent may prepare and serve meeting notices including notices 
for entering individual units to do repairs and for levying maintenance contributions. The 
managing agent must attend the annual general meeting and prepare and distribute 
minutes at this meeting. To ensure continuity and personal involvement the managing 
agent should also attend and take minutes at important special general meetings and 
quarterly meetings of the trustees.1693 It has been suggested that the management 
agent should not merely offer answers to the questions at the meetings, but should 
make the scheme’s governance documents available, understand the scheme’s 
finances and be willing to solve problems.1694  
 
Another secretarial task of the managing agent is the storing and safeguarding of the 
books with the meeting’s minutes, records, notices, sectional plans, levy schedules, 
conduct rules and all other important documents and statutory records related to the 
sectional title scheme. Maintenance of the statutory records of the body corporate is an 
important task. The managing agent is also responsible to keep address lists and 
registers of owners and mortgagees up to date. This task can be difficult in large 
sectional title schemes where most units are let out and the tenants move frequently 
                                            
1692 15-10. 
1693 15-10.  
1694 G Paddock “Extracts from the Law of Sectional Title Meeting Course” (December 2009) 4-12 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 2; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-10. 
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without notifying the trustees. The use of computers to store such important information 
would be ideal, but could be expensive to purchase.1695  
 
The managing agent should read and respond to correspondence and liaise with 
litigation attorneys. He is should is also responsible for the compilation and enforcement 
of the management and conduct rules as required by the trustees. Another important 
task is that the managing agent should advise the body corporate, the trustees and the 
chairperson regarding their role in terms of the STA and the rules and resolutions of the 
scheme.1696 The managing agent therefore provides the members, trustees, and the 
chairperson with knowledge of the relevant legislation and the enforcement of the 
provisions of such legislation. The managing agent is contracted by the trustees to 
assist them in their statutory management duties, which includes paralegal advice of 
what trustees can and cannot do.1697 This means that if the trustees act contrary to the 
STA the managing agent concerned should distance him or herself from such illegal 
action. This means that if the trustees act contrary to the STA the managing agent 
concerned should distance him or herself from that illegal action, and make it clear that 
he or she is not associated with that action. Furthermore, the managing agent has a 
duty to inform the trustees if they intend to act against the Act or the rules of a scheme. 
Every managing agent should make a policy statement on appointment that he or she 
will strictly follow the provisions of the Act and the rules and that the trustees should not 
expect him to deviate from these provisions.1698 The managing agent should read and 
respond to correspondence and liaise with litigation attorneys.  
 
The financial and accounting services require that the managing agent must keep 
record of financial management according to generally accepted accounting practices 
and maintain adequate accounting records. The managing agent must prepare an 
annual budget of income and expenditure for the following year for approval by the 
trustees and the general meeting. The managing agent must determine the monthly 
                                            
1695 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-10. 
1696 Pienaar Sectional Title 192. 
1697 Paddock (May 2009) Paddocks Press 8.  
1698 Maree (December 2010) 38 MSC Courier 7 8. 
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levy that would meet the proposed budget and have it approved by the trustees. The 
budgeted expenditure should be revised periodically throughout the year and the 
managing agent should advise the trustees on whether special levies are required. The 
managing agent must prepare monthly unaudited accounts of income and expenses so 
that the cash flow of the body corporate can be monitored by the trustees. The 
managing agent is also responsible for the preparation of interim and draft annual 
financial statements for audit, and should arrange audits of the accounts as required by 
the body corporate from time to time, and should work in association with reputable 
auditors.1699 He or she is also responsible for the submission of income tax returns 
relating to the body corporate. Finally, the managing agents have the duty to tend to the 
investment of the body corporate members. 
 
Financial management of a sectional title scheme is of the utmost importance. The 
trustees who are elected at the annual general meeting cannot abdicate their 
responsibility for the body corporate’s financial interests. The trustees often place the 
entire task of financial management on the shoulders of the managing agent. This can 
be done, but the managing agent will not be liable, unless he or she has committed 
some unjustifiable act with regard to the financial management. For this reason trustees 
are advised to have intimate and consistent knowledge of the financial affairs of the 
sectional title scheme. The trustees should be familiar with matters such as which 
owners are in arrears with their levies and what action has been taken to collect the 
arrears; which body corporate accounts still need to be paid; the balances in the 
accounts held by the body corporate; whether insurance claims have been submitted 
and if the insurance claim has been paid out by the insurance company. This 
information can be made available to the trustees at monthly meetings or can be sent to 
the trustees with a copy of the monthly accounts. 
13 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
In New South Wales the actual powers and duties delegated to the managing agent by 
the owners corporation will be found in the resolution of appointment and the agency 
                                            
1699 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 46. 
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agreement, which must contain a specific appointment and delegation of powers, 
authorities, duties and functions of the owners corporation to the managing agent.1700 
The managing agent can have a complete or partial delegation, and therefore the extent 
of the delegation can vary.1701  
 
In addition to the duties delegated to the managing agents by the owners corporations 
in terms of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, managing agents must comply 
with their obligations in terms of the Agents Act and the NSW Property, Stock and 
Business Agents Regulations 2003 (the “Agents Regulations”).1702 In terms of these 
legislative instruments the managing agent has eight major financial and accounting 
obligations regardless of whether the managing agent has a complete or partial 
delegation. 
 
The managing agent must have a trust account with an authorized deposit-taking 
institution such as a bank, and must notify the institution in writing that the account is a 
trust account1703 in the name of the managing agent that appears on the agency 
agreement. Since 1 September 1994 all managing agents (including licensed real 
estate agents) have the option of deciding whether to keep a separate trust account for 
each owners corporation, or one general trust account for all the owners corporations 
that he or she manages. All moneys received by the managing agent on behalf of the 
owners corporation should be paid into a general or separate trust account until the 
owners corporation informs the managing agent how the money should be 
disbursed.1704 In total six specific trust account books and records must be kept by all 
managing agents.1705  
 
                                            
1700 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 27 and  s 28. 
1701 Ilkin NSW Strata 147. 
1702 Ilkin NSW Strata 166. 
1703 Agents Act s 86(4). 
1704 Agents Act s 86. 
1705 Agents Regulations regs 22, 23 and 24. These include a trust receipt book; a trust deposit book; a trust account 
cash receipts and payments book; a trust account ledger; a trust account ledger trial balance; and a trust transfer 
journal. The trust accounts and records can be kept by a computer system. 
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Within three months of 30 June of each year (unless the Director General has fixed 
another date) a managing agent must cause the records and documents relating to 
moneys kept in a trust account and held during the year to be audited and must lodge 
the auditor’s report with the Director General.1706 During January of each year a 
managing agent must furnish the Director General with a statement in the approved 
form showing details of moneys received more than two years previously and which 
were held in the managing agent’s trust account.1707  
 
The Director General has to establish and maintain an account called the Property 
Services Statutory Interest Account.1708 The money in the account is applied for the 
purposes specified in the Agents Act, for example towards administration costs of the 
Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal.1709 In the case of a general trust account kept 
by the managing agent the Director General raises funds for the account via the 
authorized deposit-taking institution using a formula to the general trust account on the 
first business day after the end of each month. 
 
Each application for a license or renewal of a license by a managing agent must include 
a monetary contribution to the Property Services Compensation Fund1710 (commonly 
called the fidelity fund).1711 The purpose is to compensate persons who suffer pecuniary 
loss on account of a failure to account to a licensee, an associate of a licensee or a 
person reasonably believed to be a licensee or associate.1712 For example, owners may 
lose money if the managing agent misappropriates maintenance levies for his or her 
                                            
1706 Agents Act s 111. The managing agent is responsible for the payment of the auditor’s fee for preparing the 
report as it is an administrative requirement that must be fulfilled in order to retain a practicing license. The 
managing agent must retain the report for three years in terms of the Agents Act s 113(3). 
1707 Agents Act s 96. 
1708 Agents Act 63B. 
1709 Agents Act s 189 and 190. 
1710 Established under Agents Act s 165. 
1711 Agents Act s 168; Agents Regulations reg 46. 
1712 Agents Act ss 171 and 173. 
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own purpose. The fund is not available for compensation to persons who sustain loss or 
damage through the negligence of a licensee.1713  
 
Managing agents must permit an authorized officer to inspect the trust account and 
other accounts kept by them1714 in order to safeguard the Compensation Fund and 
those who have dealings with licensees. The authorized officer completes a confidential 
report noting any alleged or suspected irregularity for consideration by the Director 
General. If the Director General thinks that the irregularities have substance he or she 
can apply to the Supreme Court to have a receiver appointed for the property held by 
the managing agent.1715 
 
In New South Wales owners and tenants often wish to obtain information about the 
scheme from the managing agent. The managing agent is only obliged to comply with 
such a request if he or she has been delegated such a duty. The NSW Strata Schemes 
Management Act sets out seven requirements that must be met before the managing 
agent is obliged to provide information on request.1716 The application must be in writing 
and must set out what is sought. Each application must be in respect of one specified 
lot. Only an owner, mortgagee or authorized person may apply for such information and 
a prescribed fee must be paid. The application must be served in a prescribed manner. 
A time and place for the inspection of the records must be set. An Adjudicator is not 
required to comply with these requirements.1717  
 
There are six methods available for the owners corporation to obtain financial 
information, including information about the trust account, from the managing agent. 
The NSW Strata Schemes Management Act1718 sets out that an owners corporation 
may serve a notice on the managing agent requiring him or her to supply the specified 
                                            
1713 Legal fees are also not recoverable from the fund. Claims must be made within the period specified in terms of s 
173. One person is restricted to a claim of $500, 000, while a number of people combined can claim a maximum 
amount of $2 million in terms of Agents Act s 175.  
1714 Agents Act 105. 
1715 Agents Act 138. 
1716 Agents Act s 108 and 109; Ilkin NSW Stata190. 
1717 Agents Act s 175. 
1718 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 33-40. 
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executive committee member with a written statement setting out information about one 
or more of the following matters as requested: the names of the trust accounts, the 
name of the financial institution with whom the accounts are kept, the credit balance of 
each account at the date specified in the notice and particulars of cheques drawn on the 
accounts, but not presented and paid;1719 the names of any non-trust accounts that he 
agent operates for the owners corporation; the name of the financial institution with 
whom the accounts are kept; the credit balance of each account at the date specified in 
the notice and particulars of checks  drawn on the accounts, but not presented and 
paid;1720 particulars, including the manner and time of disbursement of money paid or 
received by the managing agent on behalf of the owners corporation where the money 
is no longer held by the managing agent1721 and particulars of any specified transaction 
involving the managing agent when acting for or on behalf of the owners corporation,1722 
but not in respect of any transaction that occurred more than three years before service 
of the owners corporation notice. The statement must be provided within seven days of 
receipt of the notice.  
 
The Agents Regulations permit only executive committee members to inspect the 
managing agent’s records and books of account.1723 The managing agent may not 
charge a fee for making the records available for inspection. The Regulations set out 
the requirements of the financial management report that the managing agent must 
prepare, sign and forward to the treasurer within one month of its preparation and to the 
owners corporation at regular intervals.1724 On payment of the prescribed fee the owner, 
mortgagee, covenant chargee or authorized person who applies is entitled to the 
certificates and to inspect all the documents.1725 The owners corporation or any other 
person who has been directly involved in any transaction by or with the managing agent 
may require him or her to supply an itemized account of the transaction within fourteen 
days of request, provided that the transaction took place not more than six months 
                                            
1719 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 33. 
1720 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 34. 
1721 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 35. 
1722 NSW Strata Schemes Management s 36. 
1723 Agents Regulations reg 40(10. 
1724 Agents Regulations reg 39. 
1725 Referred to in the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 108 and 109. 
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before the request was made1726 There is a mechanism to seek delivery of the various 
records and property of the owners corporation held by the managing agent.1727 
 
Contravention of or failure to comply with any of these obligations is an offence and can 
result in the managing agent facing criminal conviction with monetary penalties and 
imprisonment;1728 civil proceedings for recovery of money improperly taken;1729 penalty 
notice by an authorized officer requiring the agent to pay the specified monetary 
penalty;1730 disciplinary action by the Director General resulting in the managing agent’s 
license being suspended or cancelled or the agent being disqualified from holding a 
license1731 or a warning notice by the Director General advising the public of the 
particular risks involved in dealing with the particular agent.1732  
 
The Agents Act and Regulations also impose a number of general obligations on the 
managing agent. These obligations include the responsibility to have a licensed person 
in charge of each place of business;1733 to have a registered office within New South 
Wales;1734 to notify the Director General of a change to the registered office’s address 
within the time period specified in the regulations;1735 to legibly display the managing 
agent’s name, description as licensee and type of license held outside the registered 
office and each place of business;1736 to keep written record of all transactions at the 
registered office for three years;1737 to furnish the Director General with a statement of 
the trust account particulars and other money held within seven days of request;1738 to 
provide an itemized account to a person concerned in a transaction within fourteen days 
                                            
1726 Agents Act s 101. 
1727 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 105;  Ilkin NSW Stata173. 
1728 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 215. 
1729 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 215(4). 
1730 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 216. 
1731 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 191 – 200. 
1732 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 201. 
1733 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 31. 
1734 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28. 
1735 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 28(4). 
1736 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 29 
1737 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 104. 
1738 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 100. 
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of the request;1739 to permit an authorized officer to inspect and make notes, copies or 
extracts of the books of account and other records;1740 not to employ disqualified 
persons whose license or certificate of registration has been cancelled or suspended 
and nor replaced or whose application was refused due to not being a fit and proper 
person;1741 not to share fees with persons other than employees or licensees;1742 to 
show his or her license when requested by authorized officers;1743 not to let out or lend 
their license;1744 to show the instrument of appointment and delegation of each scheme 
managed to an authorized officer on demand;1745 not to solicit clients through false and 
misleading advertising;1746 to notify the Director General of any failure to account as 
soon as possible or of any overdrawing of a trust account within five days;1747 not to 
fraudulently convert or fail to account for trust money or to render a false account or 
statement of commission or expenses;1748 to comply with the Agents Regulations;1749 to 
observe the Rules of Conduct in Schedule 1 of the Agents Regulations, unless the 
managing agent has a good reason not to do so;1750 to observe the specific rules of 
conduct applicable to managing agents in Schedule 6 of the Agents Regulations and to 
observe the specific rules applicable to agency agreements in Schedule 14 of the 
Agents Regulations. 
13 5 Conclusion 
 
The scope of the powers and functions that are capable of being delegated to the 
managing agent is quite wide and is only limited by the scope of the actual delegation to 
the managing agent in terms of the contract; the powers and functions specifically 
reserved for the trustees or body corporate by the STA or the rules and the powers 
                                            
1739 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 101. 
1740 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 105 and 107. 
1741 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 43. 
1742 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 33. 
1743 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 12. 
1744 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 13. 
1745 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 109 and 110. 
1746 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 51. 
1747 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 39 and 89. 
1748 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 211 and 212. 
1749 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act ss 191 and 230. 
1750 Agents Regulation reg 11. 
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which fall outside the capacity of the trustees, and which may therefore not be 
delegated to the managing agent.1751 The fact that it is not always clear what powers 
and duties can and cannot be delegated to the managing agent, could lead to 
uncertainty.1752  
 
All powers and functions that are delegated to the management agent must be 
assessed restrictively and according to its own nature before it can be determined 
whether they are capable of being delegated to the managing agent or not. The general 
rule should be that the managing agent should not make any decisions that will affect 
the lives or living conditions of the owners or residents in the sectional title scheme. In 
this way the trustees’ position can be compared to a board of directors of a company, 
while the position of the managing agent would correspond to that of a general manager 
of a company.1753 The trustees should seek legal advice in cases of uncertainty as to 
whether the power or duty can be delegated or not.  
 
To avoid this uncertainty South African legislation should adopt the New South Wales 
and Singaporean provisions that create three options of how the powers and functions 
can be delegated to the managing agent. The first option, consisting of a complete 
delegation, avoids any confusion as to who is responsible for which task. The second 
option is a partial delegation of a clearly identifiable list of tasks specified in the 
instrument. The third option, which consists of a partial delegation of powers, 
authorities, duties and functions except for those specified in the instrument, is the best 
option where the managing agent is required to undertake most, but not all of the 
powers, authorities, duties and functions. It is better to list the particular identifiable 
matters that the managing agent is not permitted to undertake. South African legislation 
could also provide for the delegation of all or some of the chairperson’s, secretary’s, 
treasurer’s and trustees’ powers, authorities, duties and functions to the managing 
agent.  
 
                                            
1751 Maree (December 2010) 38 MCS Courier 4. 
1752 3. 
1753 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-16. 
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The exercise and performance of the powers and duties by the managing agent should 
also be subject to certain limitations. The South African legislation should ensure that 
there is a prohibition on allowing a third person to exercise or perform the powers, 
authorities, duties and functions that have been delegated to the managing agent. This 
is consistent with the principle delegatus non potest delegare which means that a 
delegate cannot further delegate his or her powers to someone else.1754 This ensures 
that the powers and duties are exercised by the very delegate to whom the body 
corporate had entrusted them, and not just by any third party whom the body corporate 
might not even know. The justification for this is that the body corporate relies on the 
judgement and wisdom of the managing agentto whom the powers and duties have 
been delegated. This limitation illustrates how important it is to consider how the 
managing agent operates, and who should be appointed as the managing agent in the 
agreement. If an individual is named as the managing agent then he or she cannot 
delegate. If a partnership is listed then the powers, authorities, duties and functions 
could be shared between the partners. If a corporate managing agent is listed then 
there must be a delegation to an authorized person. The managing agent cannot 
transfer the management contract entirely, but can contract out certain tasks to certain 
third parties who are more skilled to perform the task such as to plumbers and 
electricians.1755 Either way the extent of the delegation with the conditions and 
limitations imposed should be evident from the agency agreement with the managing 
agent.  
 
Other limitations restrain a managing agent from making a decision on a matter 
preserved for the body corporate pursuant to a particular resolution. For example the 
general meeting, and not the trustees or managing agent, should decide what money 
needs to be raised to meet future expenses in the scheme. Where too many matters are 
preserved for decision by the general meeting, it could defeat the managing agent’s 
primary function of administering the scheme on a day-to-day basis. These two 
                                            
1754 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 33. 
1755 33. 
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considerations need to be balanced when powers and duties are delegated to the 
managing agent. 
 
The South African legislation could adopt the Singaporean provision that prohibits the 
managing agent from engaging in activities that concern the election of the executive 
council, including canvassing for proxy votes. This prevents abuse by executive council 
members or owners in directing the managing agent to solicit for votes on their behalf.  
 
A managing agent’s business is highly labour orientated.1756 The minimum functions of 
the managing agent should be incorporated in the prescribed management rules in 
order to guarantee the quality of service and to assess whether the managing agent is 
acting within his or her authority. As the law now stands these functions will have to be 
included in the contract between the body corporate and managing agent. The 
managing agent would then not be able to exercise and perform the duties or powers in 
excess of the body corporate or trustees’ authority. This will avoid potential 
management uncertainty, incompetence, abuses and disputes.1757 The duties and 
powers that are delegated to the managing agent should also be clearly set out in the 
written contract of appointment, regardless of how insignificant the task may seem. This 
would save time, avoid uncertainty, and the confusion, chaos and disputes that could 
arise if the managing agent is not certain of the scope of his or her appointment and of 
the functions and powers delegated to him or her. The more detailed these duties and 
powers are specified, the fewer misunderstandings and disputes are likely to occur.1758 
 
Based on the New South Wales provisions, any act performed by the managing agent 
in the exercise of powers or functions delegated to him or her in the contract of 
appointment has the same force and effect as if it had been performed by the body 
corporate.1759 Therefore, the managing agent should keep full and complete records of 
all acts of administration and management, and notify the trustees in writing of such 
                                            
1756 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 31. 
1757 32. 
1758 33. 
1759 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-18. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 363 
acts immediately after they have been performed as is required in New South Wales. If 
a third party that contracts with the managing agent has made sure that the certain 
authority was delegated to the managing agent in the instrument of appointment, then 
he or she will be entitled to rely on the managing agent’s exercise of that power or duty, 
and will not need to make further enquiries.  
 
Following on from this reasoning it should be noted that the body corporate should still 
be entitled to exercise any or all of these delegated powers and functions, or to restrict 
the exercise thereof by the managing agent.1760 Likewise, the trustees are not absolved 
from their duties, functions and powers by appointing a managing agent.1761 
Furthermore, any decision of a managing agent that is objected to could be rescinded, 
overruled or repealed by a resolution of the body corporate or the trustees. The 
instrument of delegation should specifically require the managing agent to give prior 
notice before it takes any decision that would have serious financial implications for the 
body corporate. The South African legislation should include a provision whereby a 
managing agent that fails to perform a delegated duty should be subject to some form of 
penalty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1760 15-9. 
1761 Annexure 8 rule 46(1) read with STA s 39(1); Annexure 8 rule 28; Pienaar Sectional Titles 191. 
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Chapter 14: Term of appointment of the 
managing agent 
 
14 1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the term of appointment of a managing agent including 
topics such as the period of the appointment and the termination of appointment. I will 
then answer the question of whether the managing agent can retain the books and 
records of the body corporate after his or her services have been terminated. As before 
I will do a comparative survey on all these topics.  
14 2 Period of appointment of a managing agent  
14 2 1 Introduction 
 
In what follows I will discuss the period of appointment of the managing agent in detail. I 
will set out the minimum period of appointment; the notice requirements for terminating 
the appointment of the managing agent and the level of consensus necessary to 
terminate the appointment.  
14 2 2 South African position 
 
The provision regulating the appointment and duration of appointment of a managing 
agent, contained in prescribed management rule 46(1), was amended in 2008. Before 
the amendment of rule 46(1) the appointment of a managing agent was restricted to a 
minimum period of one year, after which the appointment could be terminated on one 
months’ written notice of termination of appointment by either party. The contract would 
then come to an end after the one month notice period had lapsed. At the May 2006 
meeting of the Sectional Titles Regulations Board (the “Board”), at the suggestion of 
NAMA and due to many complaints by managing agents that they could not work on a 
month-to-month basis, it was decided to recommend to the Minister of Land Affairs that 
the management rule regulating managing agent contracts be amended to restore the 
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year-to-year renewal of managing agents’ contracts, in the absence of a contrary 
decision by the body corporate.1762 It also addressed the practice of making managing 
agency contracts more difficult to cancel by the incorporation of a clause that would 
require a special resolution to cancel the contract. However, the Board decided that an 
ordinary resolution would be sufficient to cancel the contract. Therefore, notice of 
termination of the contract may be given by the trustees in accordance with a resolution 
taken at a meeting of trustees, or as directed by an ordinary resolution of the general 
meeting. The proposal of NAMA was therefore accepted with only minor amendments, 
and the legislator accepted this recommendation. 
 
The Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs then amended the Regulations promulgated 
under the STA.1763 The amendment became effective on 28 November 2008. It reverted 
to the original position before the 2005 amendment. The position that applied before 18 
November 2005, and that applies again, is that if by the end of the initial or any 
subsequent one year period the body corporate has not given notice that the contract 
will be terminated then the contract will be automatically renewed for another year. The 
rule has been substituted to provide for the automatic renewal of managing agency 
contracts as well as the types of resolutions required to authorize the termination of 
such a contract.1764 Prescribed management rule 46(1)(b) was amended to read: 
 
“A managing agent is appointed for an initial period of one year and thereafter 
such appointment shall automatically be renewed from year to year unless the 
body corporate notifies the managing agent to the contrary: provided that notice 
of termination of the contract may be given by the trustees in accordance with a 
resolution taken at a trustee meeting or an ordinary resolution taken at a general 
meeting.” 
 
                                            
1762 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 34. 
1763 By amendment to the Regulations by section 6(g) of GN R1264 in GG 31626 of 28-11-2008. 
1764 G Paddock “Overview of the November 2008 Amendments to the Sectional Titles Regulations” (December 
2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1; CG Van der Merwe “Review of the recent amendments to the Sectional 
Title Regulations” (2009) 3 TSAR 560.  
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The managing agent is therefore appointed for an initial fixed period of one year from 
the date of appointment with automatic renewal year upon year, unless the appointment 
is terminated by the body corporate by notice to the managing agent prior to the end of 
any year of appointment. The notice of discontinuance, to be given by the trustees, may 
be on the authority of a trustees’ resolution or an ordinary members’ resolution.1765 
 
There was no change to the provision that the managing agent is appointed for an initial 
period of one year. The possible reason for this minimum initial period of appointment of 
one year is that the management tasks involved in taking on of a new scheme to 
manage is a time-consuming and labour intensive task with minimum associated 
income. It involves taking collecting all the required and relevant documentation and 
preparing administrative systems and establishing working relationships with all the key 
players such as the trustees and service providers such as accountants, auditors and 
caretakers. The initial year period gives the managing agent time to recover setup 
expenses and to start making a profit from the contract.1766 
 
To provide job security for managing agents, it is no longer possible to terminate the 
contract of a managing agent upon one months’ written notice after the initial year. 
Instead, his or her contract will be automatically renewed from year to year, unless the 
body corporate notifies the managing agent to the contrary. The effect of this provision 
is that if by the end of the initial or any subsequent one year period the body corporate 
has not notified the managing agent that the contract will be terminated, the contract is 
renewed automatically for another year. Consequently, if the trustees conclude a 
contract with a managing agent from 31 December 2013 to 30 December 2014, the 
contract will continue for another year, unless the trustees notify the managing agent 
during 2014 that the contract will expire at the end of 2014. The contract will then 
automatically continue until 30 December 2015.1767  
 
                                            
1765 T Maree “Amendments relating to removal of improvements and appointment of managing agent” (December 
2008) 33 MCS Courier 5. 
1766 Paddock (December 2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 8; Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 561.  
1767 Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 561. 
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This provision is subject to the proviso that the trustees may give notice of termination 
of the contract in accordance with a resolution taken at a meeting of trustees or an 
ordinary resolution taken at a general meeting.1768 The proviso to subrule 46(1)(b) 
therefore deals with the authority for the termination of the contract and specifies the 
level of consensus necessary to terminate the appointment.1769 In the past some 
managing agents have included a clause in their contract that in the absence of breach 
by the managing agent, the trustees can only give notice if it is authorized by a special 
resolution of the body corporate.1770 It is clear from the above provision that either the 
trustees by a resolution passed at a trustees meeting or the owners by ordinary 
resolution passed at a general meeting can authorize notice of termination of the 
management agency contract. This provision is applicable to normal termination in the 
absence of breach of contract by the managing agent.1771  
 
It is important to note that the rule contains no period of notice. Previously it was 
provided that there needed to be a minimum one months’ notice period. Now there is no 
stipulation on a minimum notice period that must be given. The notice period is 
presumably covered in the contract of appointment between the trustees and the 
managing agent with which the parties will have to comply. It must be assumed that a 
reasonable period of notice is required, and that the termination of the appointment 
takes place at the end of the year. The notice may be given irrespective of whether 
there is a breach of contract or not. 
 
There is a circumstance under which no notice is required. Prescribed management rule 
46(2)(a) states that the trustees must ensure that there is included in the contract of 
appointment of all managing agents a provision to the effect that if the managing agent 
is in breach of any provision in the contract or if the managing agent is guilty of conduct 
which in terms of common law would justify termination of a contract between master 
and servant, then the trustees can cancel the contract without any notice. Prescribed 
                                            
1768 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(b). 
1769 Paddock (December 2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 8. 
1770 Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 561. 
1771 Pienaar Sectional Titles 187. 
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management rule 46(2)(b) states that any one or more of the owners or mortgagees of 
sections in the building may require the trustees to cancel the contract in the same 
circumstances as above.  
 
The terms of the proviso to rule 46(1)(b) go further than those of rule 46(2)(b). This rule 
allows any owner or mortgagee who is willing to furnish the trustees with appropriate 
security and to indemnify the body corporate against costs which could result from 
cancellation, to request the trustees to cancel the contract in cases where the managing 
agent has breached the contract.1772  This provision does not detract from the trustees’ 
entitlement to cancel the contract or the entitlement of a majority of owners to to give 
notice of termination of the contract at a general meeting irrespective of whether there is 
a breach or not and without furnishing security and provide an indemnity against 
potential loss caused as a result of the cancellation.1773  
 
The consequences of rule 46 are threefold. The first consequence is that a contract of 
appointment is required in all cases. The second consequence is that the appointment 
will be renewed automatically from year-to-year, unless the body corporate notifies the 
managing agent that here will be no renewal. The third consequence is that the trustees 
or the general meeting can, at any time, by a majority vote decide to notify the 
managing agent that the contract is terminated, or will not continue after its renewal 
date.1774 
14 2 3 Comparative survey 
 
In terms of the agency agreement of the New South Wales Institute of Strata Title 
Management, a managing agent is appointed for an initial term of twelve months with a 
provision for the agreement to automatically roll over for successive terms of the same 
length. The owners corporation can terminate the agreement by giving the managing 
agent at least three months’ written notice before the end of a term or successive term. 
                                            
1772 Rule 46(2)(b) read with rule 46(2)(c) and (d)  
1773 Paddock (December 2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 9. 
1774 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Question on management agreements” (June 2007) 2-5 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 6; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-14. 
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Where the managing agent has been so appointed the owners corporation can consider 
whether to continue the appointment and delegation during the initial twelve month 
period or during a successive term. 
 
Sections 27 and 28 of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act confer the power on 
the owners corporation, and not the executive committee, to revoke the appointment 
and delegation of the managing agent by passing an ordinary resolution at a general 
meeting to that effect.1775  
 
In Singapore a managing agent stays in office until the conclusion of the third annual 
general meeting of the management corporation after his or her appointment; the expiry 
of the term of appointment or the termination of his or her appointment in accordance 
with the BMSMA, whichever occurs first.1776  
 
A local condominium management rule of Chinese law provides that management 
contracts must last between two and five years. 1777 
14 3 Termination of appointment of a managing agent  
14 3 1 Introduction 
 
In the event that the services rendered by the managing agent is not up to standard or 
where there is a personality clash between the trustees and the managing agent, the 
body corporate may wish to terminate the appointment of its managing agent and 
appoint a new one. The prescribed management rules provide the body corporate or the 
trustees with four ways to terminate the appointment.1778 The next discussion will deal 
with these, and indicate the often hidden implications and consequences that may 
create liabilities at a later stage for the body corporate.1779  
                                            
1775 Ilkin NSW Strata 158. 
1776 BMSMA s 66 (2)(a)-(c). 
1777 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 art 69; Chen & Van der Merwe 
(2009) TSAR 34. 
1778 A Kelly “Termination of a managing agent’s contract” (July 2011) 6-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1779 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 48. 
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14 3 2 South African position 
 
In terms of prescribed management rule 46 the contract of appointment of a managing 
agent can be terminated in four ways.1780 First, as already indicated, the trustees may 
by means of a trustees’ resolution, or the body corporate may by means of a majority 
resolution of the general meeting, notify the managing agent that his or her contract will 
not be renewed automatically for the next year.1781 The decision not to renew is usually 
taken by the trustees, unless the body corporate has reserved for itself the right to 
decide on the renewal of the contract of the managing agent.1782 This provision is 
applicable to normal termination of the contract in the absence of breach of contract by 
the managing agent.1783 No period of notice is specified, but sufficient and reasonable 
written notice should be given. I suggest that at least one months’ notice should be 
given before the expiry of the year and then termination will take place at the end of the 
specific one-year term. If the written notice were given less than one month before the 
end of the year, then the contract would be automatically renewed for another year.1784  
 
The second manner of termination occurs when trustees have ensured that the contract 
of appointment includes a provision to the effect that if the managing agent is in breach 
of any of the provisions of his or her contract, or if he or she is guilty of conduct which at 
common law would justify the termination of a contract between master and servant, the 
trustees may, without notice, cancel such contract of appointment. The inclusion of the 
appropriate provision in the contract would empower the trustees to cancel the contract 
in these circumstances. In such a case the managing agent will not have any claim 
against the body corporate or any of the owners as a result of the cancellation.1785 
Failure by the trustees to include such a provision in the contract of appointment 
                                            
1780 Van der Merwe (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 327; van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 33-35; Van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 15-22. 
1781 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(b). 
1782 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)].  
1783 Pienaar Sectional Titles 187. 
1784 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-23. 
1785 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(a); Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-23. 
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renders the trustees liable for compensation to the body corporate, as this is an 
example of gross negligence that is not covered by the indemnity of the trustees.1786  
 
The third manner of termination occurs when any sectional owner or mortgagee of a 
section requests the trustees to cancel the managing agent’s contract in cases where 
he or she is in breach of the provisions of his or her contract or is guilty of any conduct 
which justifies the termination of a contract between master and servant at common 
law.1787 The reference to “master and servant” in this rule, as in rule 46(2)(a), is 
misleading and creates the impression that the managing agent is an employee of the 
body corporate. It is my submission that this rule should be amended to state:  
 
“…if he or she is guilty of conduct which at common law would justify the 
termination of a contract of mandate...”  
 
This legislative amendment would remove the uncertainty surrounding the nature of the 
contract between the managing agent and trustees. The trustees are not required to 
cancel the contract of appointment, unless and until the owner or mortgagee has 
furnished them with the security and indemnity as specified in prescribed management 
rule 46(2)(c).1788 The trustees must, in their discretion, determine what amount of 
security would be sufficient to indemnify them against all claims resulting from the 
cancellation. This includes all litigation costs reasonably incurred by the trustees in 
enforcing the cancellation against the managing agent1789 as well as any costs and 
damages resulting from the cancellation, purported cancellation or litigation for which 
the trustees or the body corporate might be liable up to the time such owner or 
mortgagee formally notifies the trustees that he or she no longer requires them to 
pursue the action.1790 The trustees may also require the owner or mortgagee to 
indemnify the trustees and the body corporate against costs and damages. The trustees 
are not required to cancel the contract of appointment of the managing agent unless 
                                            
1786 Annexure 8 rule 12(1); Pienaar Sectional Titles 188. 
1787 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(b). 
1788 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(d). 
1789 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(c)(i). 
1790 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(c)(ii). 
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and until the owner or mortgagee requiring cancellation has furnished the trustees with 
the security and indemnity.1791 The trustees may therefore refrain from any action until a 
sufficient security payment and/or indemnity has been furnished.  
 
The final manner of termination occurs when the contract contains a mandatory clause 
that allows the contract of appointment to be legally revoked, in which case the 
managing agent will cease to hold office under certain circumstances.1792 The first 
circumstance occurs where the agent is a natural person and he or she applies for the 
surrender of his or her estate as insolvent or his or her estate is sequestrated either 
provisionally, or finally or where the managing agent is a juristic person such a 
company, and an order is made for its provisional or final liquidation or it is placed under 
business rescue.1793  
 
The second circumstance is where the managing agent himself or herself, or where the 
managing agent is a company or close corporation and any of its directors or members 
are convicted of an offence involving an element of fraud or dishonesty.1794 A further 
provision to this rule was deleted on 31 October 1997.1795 That provision allowed for the 
valid revocation of the contract of appointment of a managing agent that is a close 
corporation where any of its members is convicted of any offence. Shortcomings of this 
provision were that it did not apply to directors of a close corporation, but only to any of 
its members and that it covered included a conviction of any offence, which could 
include traffic offences. The current and narrower provision is preferable, although it still 
implies that a managing agent could be penalized if a director of his or her company 
who had nothing to do with the particular scheme is convicted of an offence involving 
fraud or dishonesty.  
 
                                            
1791 Annexure 8 rule 46(2)(d). 
1792 Annexure 8 rule 47. 
1793 Annexure 8 rule 47(i). 
1794 Annexure 8 rule 47(ii). 
1795 By regulation 24(k) of GN R1422 in GG 18377 of 31-10-1997. 
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The final circumstance is where a special resolution of the members of the body 
corporate is passed to revoke the appointment of the managing agent.1796 This 
circumstance is expressly made subject to the proviso that the managing agent 
removed from his or her office in such a way must not be deprived of any claim for 
compensation or damages for breach of contract.1797 Before terminating the managing 
agent’s contract by special resolution, the contractual liability of the body corporate 
should be carefully considered. If the managing agent is appointed for a specific term or 
is entitled to a specific period of notice then the body corporate could incur liability for 
damages if the contract is terminated before the term of the contract has expired or if 
insufficient notice was given. By way of explanation, since the managing agent is 
appointed for an initial period of one year,1798 the termination of a managing agent by 
special resolution after nine months would entitle the managing agent to claim for 
damages on account of his or her loss of income for the last three months.  
 
These instances of termination are dependent upon an appropriate provision being 
included in the contract of appointment. If these provisions have not been included, the 
body corporate or trustees will have to use normal common law provisions to justify the 
termination of the contract.1799 The inclusion of these provisions in the contract with the 
managing agent is mandatory. Therefore, if the managing agent claims compensation 
or damages in the absence of the provision then the body corporate can reclaim this 
from the trustees, as this is a manifestation of gross negligence that is not covered by 
the trustees’ indemnity.1800  
14 3 3 Comparative survey 
 
I have already indicated that a managing agent is appointed in New South Wales for an 
initial term of twelve months with a provision for the agreement to automatically roll over 
for successive terms of the same length. The owners corporation can terminate the 
                                            
1796 Annexure 8 rule 47(iii). 
1797 Van der Merwe (1994) 5 Stellenbosch Law Review 328. 
1798 Annexure 8 rule 46(1)(b). 
1799 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-24. 
1800 Pienaar Sectional Titles 189. 
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agreement by giving the managing agent at least three month’s written notice before the 
end of a term or successive term. The owners corporation further has the power to 
revoke the appointment and delegation of the managing agent by passing an ordinary 
resolution at a general meeting to that effect.1801 Prior to revocation the owners 
corporation must consider the terms of the agency agreement to determine the most 
appropriate method to revoke the contract, and to familiarize itself with the 
consequences of such an action.1802 
 
There are three methods of termination during the initial twelve-month period, which is 
called the first term. The first method is termination for breach in which case strict 
compliance with certain provisions in the Act is essential if the agreement is to be validly 
terminated. The owners corporation must pass a resolution that authorizes notifying the 
managing agent of the breach. If the breach continues for 28 days, the owners 
corporation is entitled to pass a further resolution and issue notification of termination to 
the managing agent. If the agreement is terminated due to the managing agent’s 
breach, then he or she will forfeit any entitlement to fees due for the remainder of the 
twelve-month term, provided that the owners corporation was not in breach.1803  
 
Secondly, the owners corporation can give the managing agent three months’ written 
notice of termination of the agreement. Due to the wording of the applicable clause, 
which states that the termination is effective “on the expiry date,” the termination will 
only be effective at the end of the term, and not at the end of the three months. Good 
cause for the termination will be unnecessary. An ordinary resolution must be passed in 
the general meeting and then a prescribed form must be served on the managing agent 
in accordance with the method of service specified in the agreement. It is recommended 
that the notice be served personally and that the server obtain receipt of service as 
proof in case the service is contested.1804  
 
                                            
1801 NSW Strata Management Act ss 27 and 28. 
1802 Ilkin NSW Strata 157. 
1803 158. 
1804 Ilkin NSW Strata 158. 
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Finally, the agreement can be terminated in terms of general law such as when there is 
a breach of a condition of the agreement or pursuant to a court order made under the 
Contracts Review Act of 1980. If the owners corporation does not terminate the 
agreement in accordance with the terms in the contract or the general law, then the 
managing agent might have a claim for damages for fees due for the rest of the term 
which would be based on a breach of contract due to the fact that the agreement is 
terminated prematurely without legal justification. The damages are likely to be 
assessed at an amount less than the total fee payable for the balance of the agency 
period because revocation would free the managing agent to earn fees elsewhere.1805 
The managing agent need not serve a statement of claim1806 to recover damages as the 
damages are not in respect of services performed, but rather in respect of services to 
be performed. The termination will not avoid the obligation of the owners corporation to 
pay the managing agent any remuneration already earned or to reimburse and 
indemnify the managing agent for expenditure or liability already incurred.1807  
 
The managing agent’s agreement can also be terminated during a successive term. If 
the agreement provides for a successive term of appointment and delegation after the 
first term has expired for more than three months, then the owners corporation can 
terminate the agreement without penalty by giving the managing agent three months’ 
notice at any time during the successive term. The agreement will be validly terminated 
at the end of the three months. An ordinary resolution must be passed in the general 
meeting and then a prescribed notice form must be served on the managing agent in 
accordance with the method of service specified in the agreement.1808  
 
The most difficult step for the owners corporation in seeking to revoke the managing 
agent’s appointment is convening a meeting to pass the resolution of revocation whilst 
the managing agent holds the scheme’s records. The managing agent should convene 
such a meeting on the request of an executive committee member, but if the owners 
                                            
1805 158. 
1806 Agents Act s 36. 
1807 Ilkin NSW Strata 158. 
1808 159. 
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corporation fails to secure the managing agent’s co-operation in this matter there are 
four options that the owners corporation can pursue. The first option is to hold an 
executive committee meeting and pass a motion to have the managing agent convene 
an extraordinary general meeting.1809 If the resolution is passed then the secretary must 
send a letter to the managing agent informing him or her of this decision. If the 
managing agent still refuses, then an interim order can be sought by an Adjudicator 
requiring the managing agent to convene the meeting.1810  
 
If an interim order is not made under section 170 and in view of the fact that an 
Adjudicator’s order in terms of section 138 takes a long time,1811 it is better to use the 
second option which entitles the executive committee to obtain the owners corporation’s 
records and property from the managing agent.1812 The executive committee can then 
convene an extraordinary general meeting to pass the resolution and serve this on the 
managing agent. A strata searcher is used to obtain a list of all the owners and their 
addresses from the managing agent.1813  
 
The third option applies where there is no executive committee. In such a case the 
owners can convene an extraordinary general meeting of the owners corporation. The 
requisition should be addressed to the managing agent and list on the agenda motions 
depending on the circumstances. If the motions are passed, a prescribed form can be 
served on the managing agent.1814 The last option applies where there is an executive 
committee, but no chairperson, secretary or treasurer. In such a case an owner can 
apply to the Adjudicator to appoint a person (often the proposed new managing agent) 
to hold an executive committee meeting to pass the resolution.1815  
 
As I have mentioned, a managing agent stays in office in Singapore until the conclusion 
of the third annual general meeting of the management corporation after his or her 
                                            
1809 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act, sch 2, cl 31(2). 
1810 Under NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 138 or 170; Ilkin NSW Strata 159. 
1811 Ilkin NSW Strata 159. 
1812 By using the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 105 procedure. 
1813 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 108. 
1814 Ilkin NSW Strata 159. 
1815 NSW Strata Schemes Management Act s 19. 
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appointment; the expiry of the term of appointment or the termination of his appointment 
in accordance with the BMSMA, whichever occurs first.1816 The managing agent’s 
performance must be reviewed annually. The appointment must be terminated at the 
annual general meeting where it is shown that his or her performance is unsatisfactory. 
A managing agent that retires is still eligible for re-appointment.1817 
 
The management corporation, and not the executive council, has the power to terminate 
the appointment of the managing agent. This could occur where the latter was guilty of 
gross misconduct for example where he or she is convicted on a charge of stealing from 
the corporation. This appointment can be terminated at any time in accordance with the 
terms of the appointment and if authorized by an ordinary resolution at a general 
meeting, or without a general meeting if authorized by its subsidiary proprietors at the 
last general meeting.1818 This ensures that the subsidiary proprietors participate in the 
decision making process of termination. In the absence of such authorization it may 
prove difficult to convene a general meeting to pass a resolution of termination where 
the managing agent holds the records. If the managing agent withholds his or her co-
operation in convening the meeting then the executive council should first obtain the 
corporation’s records and property from the managing agent. Once this is done a 
general meeting may then be convened to pass the resolution of termination. Where 
there is no executive council, the proprietors themselves may convene an extraordinary 
general meeting to pass the resolution of termination.1819 
14 4 Can the managing agent retain the books and records of the body corporate 
after his or her services have been terminated?  
14 4 1 Introduction 
 
The body corporate often finds it difficult to recover its books and records from former 
managing agents after termination of their appointment. This can be for a variety of 
reasons including animosity between the parties concerned or allegations by the 
                                            
1816 BMSMA s 66 (2)(a)-(c). 
1817 BMSMA s 66(5). 
1818 BMSMA s 66(6)(a) and (b). 
1819 Keang Sood Strata Title 558. 
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managing agent of improper termination of his or her appointment. I will discuss how 
this is dealt with in South Africa and then present a comparative survey of how other 
jurisdictions deal with the issue. 
14 4 2 South African position 
 
The question of whether the managing agent can retain the books and records of the 
body corporate after his or her services have been terminated is a problematic issue. 
The answer to this question could depend on whether the termination of the managing 
agent was legally valid or not. If the termination was valid then the only way in which the 
managing agent can retain the books is in cases where the body corporate still owes 
the managing agent money for past services. In such a case the managing agent has a 
lien over the body corporate’s books and records and possible funds until remuneration 
has been paid in full.1820 If the termination was illegal then the managing agent may 
refuse to recognize the cancellation of the contract and can continue managing the 
scheme and retain the records.1821 
 
In terms of the prescribed management rules the managing agent is obliged to keep full 
records of his administration,1822 but there is no duty on him or her to make these 
records available to his or her successor when the appointment is terminated. This 
lacuna in the rules often causes problems in practice. A newly appointed managing 
agent will not be in a position to manage the scheme effectively without these 
documents, and probable detriment to the scheme will ensue. There should therefore 
be a provision in the management rules that requires the managing agent to hand over 
all relevant documentation on termination of his or her services. The trustees should be 
required to send a notice to the departing managing agent that would require all records 
and documents to be returned within a specified time period.  
 
                                            
1820 Van der Merwe (1994) 5 Stellenbosch Law Review 329; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-24; G Paddock “Q 
& A with the Prof: Changing Managing Agent” (December 2010) 5-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
1821 Constas & Bleis Demystifying Sectional Title 49. 
1822 Annexure 8 rule 48. 
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An attorney has a right of retention on all documents that are the product of his or her 
labour, skill and knowledge as security for payment for labour expended and expenses 
incurred in connection with that property and until his or her client has paid his or her 
account in full.1823 The right of an attorney to retain papers and documents that he has 
drawn up, or upon which he has done work arises from the debtor and creditor retention 
lien.1824 The attorney has the right to retain the documents in his or her possession until 
he or she has been compensated in terms of the contract, or if no agreement exists, 
until such time that the attorney has been compensated for work done and expenses 
incurred to the extent that the client has been enriched. 
 
Similar to an attorney, the managing agent’s contract should be construed as that of 
mandate. This has the benefit that the mandatory (the managing agent) has the duty to 
account to the mandator (the body corporate and trustees) by giving of the property and 
information back to the mandatory at the end of the mandate. In this way the managing 
agent has an inherent contractual duty to return books, records, accounts and keys and 
other body corporate property after his contract has been terminated.  
 
The CSOS, once it is operational, would be the most appropriate forum for enforcing 
this obligation. One of the prayers of relief for an application in terms of the CSOSA in 
respect of management services is for an order requiring a managing agent to comply 
with the terms of the contract of appointment and any applicable code of conduct or 
authorization.1825 It is therefore important that trustees ensure that the contract includes 
a provision requiring that the managing agent return all records and documents to the 
body corporate within a specified time period after notice of termination of the contract. 
This also illustrates the importance for the notice period for termination to be reasonable 
so that the managing agent has an opportunity to gather all the relevant information. 
 
Any person may make an application to the CSOS for an order on any one or more of 
                                            
1823 CG van der Merwe & Anne Pope “Real security” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed 
(2009) 630 661. 
1824 Botha NO v EM Mchunu 1992 (4) SA 740 (N). 
1825 CSOSA s 39(5)(a). 
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the prayers of relief if such person is a party to or affected materially by a dispute.1826 
The application must include statements of the relief sought by the applicant, which 
relief must be within the scope of one or more of the prayers for the relief contemplated 
in section 39 of the CSOSA.1827 One of the prayers of relief for an application in terms of 
the CSOSA is an order declaring that the applicant has been wrongfully denied access 
to information or documents, and requiring the association (body corporate) to make 
such information or documents available within a specified time1828 or any other order 
proposed by the chief ombud.1829 An application for such an order would require that the 
managing agent must return all books and records. 
14 4 3 Comparative survey 
 
When the appointment of a managing agent comes to an end in New South Wales there 
are certain books and records that should be obtained from the managing agent. These 
records include a trust cheque payable to the owners corporation for the balance of 
money to the credit of the administrative fund and sinking fund; a cheque for the 
balance of money to the credit of any investment and savings account books whether 
with a bank, building society or other financial institution; all of the owners corporation’s 
income tax returns and assessment notices; a certified copy of all records and books of 
account kept by the managing agent; all statements of income and expenditure 
prepared until the date prior to the last general meeting; all statements of the existing 
financial situation and estimated receipts and payments; a Financial Management 
Report within fourteen days of ceasing to be the managing agent; the common seal; the 
levy register; correspondence; keys (for example to the letterbox and electricity meter 
box); the strata roll; the notices and orders register; notices and minutes of meetings of 
the owners corporation and executive committee including minutes of delegated 
authority exercised by the strata managing agent; the documents required to be handed 
over by the original owner; original insurance policy documents, including receipts for 
payment of the latest policies and copies of claims made on those insurances; proxy 
                                            
1826 CSOSA s 38(1). 
1827 CSOSA s 38(2)(a) 
1828 CSOSA s 39(7)(a). 
1829 CSOSA s 39(7)(b). 
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notices; voting papers; duplicate copies of levy contribution notices and section 118 
notices.1830 A receipt of acknowledgment that all the records of the owners corporation 
have been handed over should not be signed unless all of the items I have listed have 
been individually checked. Two owners should colllect these records so that there is a 
corroborating witness to verify which records are received and which records are 
missing.1831  
 
The comprehensive procedure for recovering books, records and other property that are 
not handed to the owners corporation by former officers and the managing agent is set 
out on section 105(2) of the NSW Strata Schemes Management Act. The defaulter can 
be subject to prosecution proceedings and can be liable for a fine.1832 If the executive 
committee gives a notice to a person who has possession or control of books, records 
or property of the owners corporation advising of the decision to terminate the contract, 
then the managing agent must, within 7 days after receiving the notice, deliver that 
property to a member of the executive committee specified in the notice.1833 This 
provision does not take away or affect any just claim or lien or other rights which the 
managing agent may have against or on any records or other property of the owners 
corporation.1834 
 
In Singapore the BMSMA contains a similar provision. If the managing agent withholds 
his or her co-operation in convening the meeting to pass a resolution of termination then 
the executive council should first obtain the corporation’s records and property from the 
managing agent. It could be difficult to obtain these records due to animosity between 
the parties concerned or allegations by the managing agent of improper termination of 
his or her services. Any person who has possession or control of any records, books of 
account or keys belonging to a management corporation,1835 or the strata roll kept by a 
                                            
1830 Ilkin NSW Strata 160. 
1831 161. 
1832 108. 
1833 NSW Schemes Management Act s 105(2). 
1834 NSW Schemes Management Act s 105(3). 
1835 BMSMA s 48(1)(a). 
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management corporation,1836 or any other property of a management corporation1837 
must within seven days after service to him or her of notice of a resolution of the council 
requiring him to do so, deliver those records or books of account or keys or strata roll 
and other property to the member of the council specified in the notice.1838 The 
requirements relating to a resolution of the executive council (not the management 
corporation) and a notice of the resolution must be complied with so as to ensure that 
the recovery of such records or documents from the managing agent is validly 
affected.1839 Once this is done a general meeting may then be convened to pass the 
resolution of termination. 
14 6 Conclusion 
 
Before the amendment of prescribed management rule 46(1) in 2008 the appointment 
of a managing agent was restricted to a minimum period of one year, whereafter it could 
be terminated on one month’s written notice of termination of appointment by either 
party. The contract would then terminate after the one-month notice period had lapsed. 
The rule now stipulates that a managing agent is appointed for an initial period of one 
year and that thereafter such appointment shall be renewed automatically from year-to-
year, unless the body corporate notifies the managing agent to the contrary. The 
amendment of this management rule improved the job security of managing agents.1840 
 
The STA does not indicate whether this will have retrospective effect. If not, then all 
management contracts concluded after this date are governed by the amended 
provision, while contracts concluded before this date will be governed by the previous 
provision. The case is probably that contracts entered into before 18 November 2008 
will be bound by rule 46 as it stood at the time that the contract was entered into as well 
as the terms of the contract as long as they do not conflict with rule 46 of that time.1841 It 
                                            
1836 S 48(1)(b). 
1837 S 48(1)(c). 
1838 S 48(1). 
1839 Keang Sood Strata Title 559. 
1840 Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 555.  
1841 J Paddock “The effect of the amendment to the PMR 46(1)” (December 2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 
9. 
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is my opinion that contracts entered into between 18 November 2005 and 28 November 
2008 should be changed if their terms conflict with prescribed management rule 46.  
 
For the sake of the success of the scheme it is in the best interests of both the body 
corporate and the managing agent to maintain continuity of services.1842 A South 
African managing agent is appointed for one year at a time. Chinese law provides that 
management contracts must last between two and five years.1843 In Singapore a 
managing agent stays in office until the conclusion of the third annual general meeting 
of the management corporation after his or her appointment. The three-year term 
enables the managing agent to put a maintenance plan in order instead of merely doing 
ad hoc repairs.1844 This needs to be balanced against the need to review the managing 
agent’s performance annually. The appointment must be terminated where it is shown 
that his or her performance is unsatisfactory at the annual general meeting.  
 
There needs to be a balance between the principle of continuity of services of a 
managing agent and maintaining the services of a substandard managing agent. On 
expiry of the term the appointment can either be renewed or terminated. The fact that 
the managing agent’s contract is automatically renewed from year-to-year, except if the 
general meeting resolves to terminate his or her appointment, or there is termination on 
the grounds set out in rule 46(2) and rule 47, is a good compromise which ensures 
stability in the industry and continuity in services provided by good managing agents.1845 
In order to maintain the continuity of management services here should not be a limit on 
the number of times that a contract of appointment can be renewed when the trustees 
are satisfied with the services provided by the managing agent.1846  
 
Managing agents often face an insecure position due to the fact that they can be 
replaced after the first year of service. It often occurs that the managing agent clashes 
                                            
1842 Chen & Van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 33. 
1843 Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 art 69; Chen & Van der Merwe 
(2009) TSAR 34. 
1844 Keang Sood Strata Titles 549. 
1845 Chen & van der Merwe (2009) TSAR 35. 
1846 34. 
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with an owner in one year due to, for example, the collection of arrear levies from that 
owner who then becomes a trustee in the next year. If trustees can cancel a managing 
agent’s contract simply by giving notice then the managing agent is at risk of having his 
or her contract cancelled due to a personality clash with a trustee, and not due to 
contract breach. There should be some protection for the managing agent. If for 
example the trustees have to motivate their reasoning to the body corporate then the 
managing agent’s contract would only be terminated if the body corporate also thinks it 
is fair to do so. It has been argued that in cases where the working relationship has 
broken down irretrievably, the trustees should put the decision to terminate the 
managing agent to a vote at the general meeting. If the decision is taken to terminate 
the appointment of the managing agent then written notice must be given to that effect.  
 
In New South Wales and Singapore it is the owners corporation, and not the executive 
committee, who have the power to revoke the appointment and delegation of the 
managing agent by passing an ordinary resolution at a general meeting to that effect. 
The rationale for this is that it ensures that the owners participte in the decision making 
process of termination. However, the most difficult step for the owners corporation in 
New South Wales in seeking to revoke the managing agent’s appointment is convening 
a meeting to pass the resolution of revocation whilst the managing agent holds the 
scheme’s records. The managing agent should convene such a meeting on the request 
of an executive committee member, but the owners corporation often fails to secure the 
managing agents co-operation in this matter. There are four options for solving this 
problem. Similarly in Singapore, where the managing agent withholds his or her co-
operation in convening the meeting, the executive council should first obtain the records 
and property from the managing agent. Once this is done a general meeting may then 
be convened to pass the resolution of termination. Where there is no executive council, 
the proprietors themselves may requisition an extraordinary general meeting to pass the 
resolution of termination. This seems very complicated to me. 
 
There is nothing in the South African rules that requires that the trustees obtain the 
body corporate’s approval to cancel the managing agent’s contract. A managing agent 
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has the same common law rights as any other contracting party. If the contract is not 
renewed on its expiry or is terminated in accordance with a cancellation provision then 
the managing agent does not have any recourse. A provision in the contract that states 
that the trustees may not cancel the contract (except if the managing agent is in breach 
or if common law principles would justify cancellation), unless it is supported by a 
resolution of the body corporate would not be enforceable because prescribed 
management rule 46(1)(b) was specifically amended to allow cancellation on the basis 
of trustee resolutions or ordinary member’s resolutions. Otherwise managing agents 
could entrench their management contracts.1847 It is theoretically possible as an owner 
to control the managing agent, but in practical terms it is the trustees who control the 
managing agent.1848 It is therefore desirable that the trustees can terminate the 
managing agent on their own.  
 
In New South Wales, when a managing agent’s contract is terminated for breach during 
the initial twelve month period, the owners corporation must pass a resolution that 
authorizes notifying the managing agent of the breach and, if it continues for 28 days, 
the owners corporation is entitled to pass a further resolution and issue notification of 
termination to the managing agent. If the agreement is terminated due to the managing 
agent’s breach then he or she will forfeit any entitlement to fees due for the remainder of 
the twelve-month term, provided that the owners corporation was not in breach. I think 
that in South Africa the managing agent should be given adequate notice of a possible 
termination to give the managing agent an opportunity to remedy his or her behavior 
before being dismissed. This notice of warning should list details of the misconduct. 
This remedial notice could serve the purpose of inspiring the managing agent to remedy 
the omission or misconduct and to comply with the STA and terms in his or her contract.  
 
The relationship between the body corporate, trustees and the managing agent are 
primarily regulated by prescribed management rule 46, but it is also governed by the 
                                            
1847 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: When are trustees entitled to cancel a managing agent contract?” 
(October 2011) 6-10 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5.  
1848 G Paddock “Q & A with the Professor: Petitions and controlling the managing agent.” (February 2011) 6-2 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 5.  
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terms of the contract. It is important to note that the contract can never conflict with rule 
46. Rule 46(1) is one of the rules which cannot be altered by a developer on submission 
of an application for the opening of a sectional title register.1849 For example the contract 
cannot state that if the trustees fail to give notice then the contract will be renewed for a 
period of two years instead of the prescribed one year. The contract can prescribe a 
minimum notice period though, as rule 46 does not prescribe one. This notice period will 
have to be reasonable. I suggest one month’s written notice. Then the trustees would 
have to comply with this notice period set out in the contract as well as the provisions in 
rule 46. The termination of the appointment will then take place at the end of the year. 
 
It is important to note that the rules do not deal with the cancellation of the contract of 
appointment by the managing agent. This is presumably catered for in the contract of 
appointment between the body corporate and the managing agent.1850 This once again 
illustrates how the contract of appointment is so pivotal. There is also no provision made 
in the rules for remedies in the case of breach of contract by the trustees or the body 
corporate.1851 If there is no provision made in the written contract of appointment the 
managing agent will have to make use of the normal common law remedies for breach 
of contract. 
 
When considering terminating the contract of appointment of the managing agent, the 
body corporate or trustees should look to the legal source of the relationship, which is 
the contract of mandate. If the body corporate does not wish to renew the contract for 
another year then the body corporate must consider what the notice period for 
termination is. If this notice period cannot be fitted into the year in question then the 
body corporate cannot terminate the managing agent’s contract, and will have to retain 
his or her services for another year. However, if the body corporate wishes to terminate 
the managing agent’s contract due to his or her breach of provisions in the contract, or if 
the managing agent is guilty of conduct which in terms of common law would justify 
termination of a contract of mandate, then the body corporate can cancel the contract of 
                                            
1849 Regulation 30(1) made under the STA. 
1850 Van der Merwe Sectional Title 15-13. 
1851 Pienaar Sectional Titles 188. 
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appointment without notice if the trustees had added a clause in the contract to this 
effect. The body corporate can also immediately revoke the managing agent’s contract 
in cases where he has been sequestrated, or the company is liquidated or if the agent 
or directors or members of the managing company have committed and were convicted 
of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty. The various manners of termination of the 
contract of appointment of the management agent should be provided for directly 
instead of clothing them indirectly as mandatory provisions of the contract of 
appointment.1852 
 
If one of the owners or a mortgagee insists that the managing agent’s contract should 
be terminated because the managing agent has breached his or her contract or acted in 
a manner which constitutes a breach of the master servant relationship then he or she 
can ask the trustees to do so. However, the trustees will require the owner to put up an 
amount of security at their discretion to cover litigation costs or damages that they 
foresee that the managing agent could bring against the body corporate. The trustees 
will not be obliged to cancel the contract unless they have received the security. If the 
owner or mortgagee does provide the security the trustees must terminate the 
appointment. If more than one owner support the decision to terminate the managing 
agent then this can be done by obtaining a special resolution. The managing agent will 
retain his or her right to claim compensation from the body corporate for damages for 
breach of contract. The body corporate can, after obtaining a special resolution, 
remunerate the managing agent for the duration of his or her contract instead of 
allowing the managing agent to complete his or her full contract.1853 
 
The body corporate or trustees can therefore terminate the managing agent’s service in 
terms of a contract or, if there is no contract, in terms of common law and the rules. 
Prescribed management rule 46 only deals with written contracts. Where there is no 
contract and the managing agent was appointed at the annual general meeting then he 
or she can be dismissed at the annual general meeting. No special resolution will be 
                                            
1852 Van der Merwe (1994) 5 Stellenbosch Law Review 329; van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-24. 
1853 Constas & Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 48-49. 
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required because no written contract exists. If the trustees cannot wait for the annual 
general meeting then they may terminate the contract with one months’ notice, as this is 
acceptable notice period in terms of common law. The reason for the termination will 
have to be sound, or the body corporate could be sued by the managing agent for an 
unfair termination.1854 
 
There needs to be legislative certainty as to whether the managing agent will enjoy 
labour law protection if the management contract is terminated. Labour law protection 
requires that the correct practices and procedures in dismissing employees must be 
followed to avoid the possible costly and time-consuming legal battles that could arise 
with the unfair dismissal of an employee. As I have discussed an argument can be 
made that the prescribed management rules 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) make reference to 
“master and servant,” and therefore the managing agent is merely an employee of the 
body corporate. However, I have shown in this thesis that the managing agent is more 
that an employee, and is an agent of the body corporate in terms of a contract of 
mandate. Pienaar argues that, due to the managing agent’s relatively independent 
duties and functions the relationship between the body corporate and the managing 
agent is based on agency, and not merely on a master and servant agreement.1855 In 
this regard I agree with Pienaar that the managing agent is therefore placed outside the 
sphere of labour protection.1856  
 
Certain principles that can be extracted from fair labour practice should still, in my 
opinion, be apllied when the managing agent’s contract is terminated. The termination 
must be fair on two grounds, namely substantive and procedural fairness. Substantive 
fairness weighs up whether the termination is appropriate in the circumstances. 
Procedural fairness considers the rights of the managing agent to be treated justly in the 
course of the procedure that is followed in the termination process. This requires that 
the trustees should warn the managing agent that his or her work is not up to standard, 
and that if the necessary standard is not achieved, the contract will be terminated. The 
                                            
1854 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book Two 118-119. 
1855 Pienaar Sectional Titles 188. 
1856 188. 
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managing agent should understand the complaint against him or her, and be given 
enough time to respond to the trustees. The trustees should hear the explanation before 
deciding on the termination, and should ultimately have fair reason and follow due 
process in terminating the contract.  
 
In cases where the managing agent is a one-man show and it is no longer possible to 
work with him then it is advisable to terminate his contract and appoint another. 
However, in cases where the managing agent is merely one portfolio manager who is 
part of a large corporation then it is better to have another portfolio manager from the 
same corporation assigned to manage the scheme. Before terminating the contract with 
that portfolio manager the trustees should investigate whether the same management 
company can still deal with the management of the scheme. The reason why this is a 
preferable situation is that the previous portfolio manager’s knowledge of the operation 
of the scheme and documentation relating to the scheme is valuable. It could take a 
new portfolio manager a long time to build a similar understanding in the governance of 
the scheme and to become familiar with the existing governing bodies. Furthermore, 
there might be resistance from the outgoing managing agent in handing over the 
documents relating to the management of the scheme.1857 If the potfolio manager is 
connected to the managing company, he would be contractually obligated to pass this 
valuable information over to the new portfolio manager within the management 
company if he wants to keep his job. 
 
Once the CSOS is in operation it will have jurisdiction to decide on whether the 
termination of the managing agent’s contract is valid or not. The CSOS is empowered to 
grant an order declaring that the association (body corporate) does or does not have the 
right to terminate the appointment of a managing agent, and that the appointment is or 
is not terminated.1858 This gives the managing agent a forum to dispute the validity of an 
unfair dismissal.  
 
                                            
1857 Paddock (December 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 6. 
1858 CSOSA s 39(7)(b). 
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The managing agent should maintain professionalism at all times and should hand the 
books and records back to the body corporate on termination of its contract, and then 
have recourse to the circumstance that his or her appointment was unjustifiably and 
unlawfully terminated. The managing agent should consider its reputation and not 
prejudice the scheme in any way on its termination.1859 However, in circumstances 
where the managing agent refuses to hand over the property, books and records of the 
body corporate there should be a specific provision, as in New South Wales and 
Singapore, that the failure to do so is an offence subject to some form of penalty. There 
should also be a consequence for failure in this regard. The CSOS, when in operation, 
will be best forum for the recovery of books, records and other property from former 
managing agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1859 Constas & Bleis Demystifying Sectional Title 49. 
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Chapter 15: Conclusion 
 
 
The Roman law maxim superficies solo cedit1860 was taken over into South African law. 
This had the result that the law did not recognize separate ownership in a building or 
parts of a building apart from ownership of the land on which the building was erected. It 
was essential that legislative recognition needed to be given to separate ownership of 
sections in a scheme built on one piece of land. It was only in 1973 that the first 
generation Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 came into operation. The second generation 
Setional Titles Act 95 of 1986 came into operation in 1988. The next development came 
in 2011 with the promulgation of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 and the Community Schemes Management Act 9 of 2011, both of which are yet to 
come into operation. What is clear is that there has been much development in the law 
of sectional titles over a relatively short period of time.  
 
South Africa has experienced a shift from an emphasis on individual title to that of 
communal living. Van der Merwe states that almost 50% of all ownership is now in the 
form of some kind of community scheme including sectional title schemes, share block 
schemes, retirement schemes and homeowner’s associations.1861 This illustrates how 
important the recognition of sectional ownership is to the social, economic and 
psychological needs of the South African society, especially in urban areas.1862 This 
increasing need for sectional ownership can be attributed to many reasons. The fast 
growth in the population and limited urban land available makes optimum use of 
available land a necessity. Pienaar also attributes mass urbanisation to the demise of 
apartheid and repeal of racially based legislation1863 that provided for the system of 
separate residential areas for different races in South Africa.1864  
                                            
1860 In terms of which a landowner was also considered owner of any building erected on it; Van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 1-3. 
1861 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(12). 
1862 1-10(1). 
1863 The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991 repealed the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 and 
the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984.  
1864 Pienaar Sectional Titles 8. 
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Within the context of the wider interpretation of property in terms of the new 
constitutional dispensation in South Africa, the most important aim of sectional title 
ownership is to provide residential accommodation for all income brackets within 
commuting distance from employment. The use of sectional title schemes as a tool to 
develop housing in South Africa offers the fastest and most cost effective option to 
make access to ownership available for a broader group of citizens. Conventional home 
ownership may be exclusive, individualistic and may offer maximum privacy, but 
sectional ownership offers a wide range of benefits such as a closer social life, 
additional amenities (with the costs being shared) and security.1865 However, most of 
the difficulties experienced in sectional title schemes arise from the shared common 
property and the more intensified communal element. It is for this reason that sectional 
title schemes require a centralized administrative and management executive.  
 
A large section of the South African population was previously excluded from acquiring 
home ownership in certain areas. In addition to this, the concept of sectional title is 
relatively new in the context of South African property law, the 1971 Act having only 
come in operation in 1973. This contribution to the understanding of how these 
schemes should be managed cannot, in itself, solve the housing shortage in urban 
areas in South Africa. However, it is my hope that a better understanding of how 
sectional title schemes should be managed, would contribute to the sustainability and 
success of sectional title schemes catering for a larger segment of the population. In 
this way the use of sectional title schemes to provide access to adequate housing to 
those South Africans who were previously excluded from home ownership in certain 
areas would become a more viable option. 
 
As I have shown in this thesis the success of the sectional title scheme is largely 
dependent on a well-organized management structure being put into place. Each 
sectional unit owner automatically becomes a member of a central management body 
                                            
1865 Van der Merwe Sectional Title 1-12. 
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called the body corporate when the unit is registered in his or her name.1866 The body 
corporate is responsible for the control, management and administration of the common 
property for the benefit of all owners.1867 Besides the general meeting, the two most 
important dramatis personae in the management of sectional title schemes are the 
trustees and the managing agent. The trustees are elected to act as the executive 
board of the body corporate and their duties and powers are subject to the STA, the 
rules and any restriction imposed, or direction given at a general meeting.1868 The 
general meeting sets out the standards and policies for the administration and 
management of the scheme, whereas the trustees handle the routine management 
functions of the scheme with the possible assistance of a managing agent.  
 
Trustees need to know and understand the sectional title legislation, and follow the 
applicable rules in such a way so as to organise the sectional title scheme in the 
owners’ best interests. The legislation creates onerous and complex duties. What has 
become clear in the 40 years of sectional title ownership and management in South 
Africa is that the legislator was far too optimistic with regard to the trust placed in the 
trustees’ capabilities in managing the scheme.1869 The body corporate or the trustees, 
the majority of whom must be owners or spouses of owners, are not always able to 
resolve certain difficulties and manage conflict. In challenging circumstances the body 
corporate or trustees may be unwilling, unable, or incapable of properly managing, 
controlling and administering the scheme.  
 
A prudent community of sectional title owners can take certain steps to prevent the 
breakdown of the community of owners. In terms of the prescribed management rules: 
 
“The trustees may whenever they think fit and shall upon a request in writing 
made either by owners entitled to 25% of the total of the quotas of all sections or 
                                            
1866 STA s 36(1) which has been amended by the STSMA by the substitution of this subsection to now read “when a 
unit is registered in the name of any person other than the developer, the registrar must issue a certificate in the 
prescribed form.”  
1867 STA s 36(4) [STSMA s 2(5)]. 
1868 STA s 39(1) [STSMA s 7(1)]. 
1869 Maree (August 2005) MCS Courier 6 7. 
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by any mortgagee holding mortgage bonds over not less than 25% in number of 
the units, convene a special general meeting. If the trustees fail to call a meeting 
so requested within fourteen days of the request, the owners or mortgagee 
concerned shall be entitled themselves to call the meeting.”1870 
 
At this special general meeting the body corporate can discuss the irregularities in the 
mananagement of the scheme, and attempt to find appropriate solutions. Moreover, the 
irregularities can be placed on the agenda for the next annual general meeting, which 
must be held within four months from the end of the financial year.1871 At the general 
meeting the owners can attempt to find solutions or can, if necessary, elect new 
trustees who are more capable and qualified of sorting out the problems in the 
scheme.  If no one is willing to act as trustee then one possibility is for the body 
corporate to offer to pay an amount of money to professionals to act as trustees.1872 
This possibility is subject to the restriction that the majority of trustees will still need to 
be owners or spouses of owners.1873 Another option available to trustees is appoint a 
managing agent who could diffuse arguments in the community and deal with the 
financial mismanagement.1874  
 
However, the solution of convening a special meeting to get the co-operation of all the 
owners; the election of new trustees; paying a professional to act as a trustee or the 
appointment of a managing agent might not be practical possibilities anymore. If the 
above steps have already been taken and were unsuccessful, or would probably not 
produce permanent solutions, then the appointment of an administrator could be 
considered.1875 After an attempt to organise the body corporate’s financial and 
management affairs fails and the scheme has reached management atrophy, the 
appointment of an administrator becomes the only workable solution to prevent the 
                                            
1870 Annexure 8 rule 53. 
1871 Annexure 8 rule 50; Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 658. 
1872 Annexure 8 rule 10. CM Durham “No financials or BC – I can’t sell” (20-06-2014) Property24 
<http://http://www.property24.com/articles/no-financials-or-bc-i-cant-sell!/20073> (accessed 15-08-2014). 
1873 Annexure 8 rule 5. 
1874 Annexure 8 rule 46. 
1875 Van der Merwe CG “Criteria for the appointment of an administrator of a sectional title scheme” (4) 2011 TSAR 
750; Williams v Nathan 2006 JOL 18414 (W). 
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breakdown of the community of owners, and the possible deemed destruction of the 
scheme.1876  
 
Section 46 of the STA makes provision for the appointment of an administrator by the 
court upon being approached by interested parties.1877 This is the best option in the 
circumstances where a body corporate in general, and its trustees in particular, are 
unwilling or unable to properly manage and administer the scheme in accordance with 
the Act and the scheme's rules. It is the most effective mechanism to ensure proper 
management of the scheme and due compliance by the body corporate and its organs 
with its statutory obligations,1878 and serves as one of the most important tools of 
protection available to owners of units in sectional title schemes. The appointment of an 
administrator is a drastic step, by removing the control of the affairs of the body 
corporate from the trustees elected by its members, and placing it in the hands of the 
administrator.1879 It is for this reason that the enquiry into the need for the appointment 
of an administrator will inevitably turn on whether the affairs of the body corporate need 
to be taken out of the hands of the trustees and members of the body corporate in order 
to address and resolve the problems giving rise to the application.1880 Van der Merwe 
points out that an administrator should therefore only be appointed when the trustees 
are not in a position to properly perform the functions assigned to them; when the body 
corporate has not elected trustees; or where for some other reason the affairs of the 
body corporate are not being, or are not capable of being, administered in the manner 
envisaged by the STA and the rules applicable to the scheme.1881 Therefore, the court 
will only exercise its discretion to appoint an administrator in exceptional 
                                            
1876 STA s 48(6) [STSMA s 17]. 
1877 These interested paries include a body corporate, a local authority, a judgement creditor of the body corporate 
for an amount of not less than R500, or any owner or any person having a registered real right in or over a unit may 
apply to court for the appointment of an administrator; STA s 46(1) [STSMA s 16(1)]. 
1878 Van der Merwe & Kloppers “Die aanstelling van ‘n administrateur by wanbestuur van ‘n deeltitelskema” 1997 
Stell LR 309; T Maree “Sectional Title Administrators: When is appointment justified?” February 2003 MCS 
Courier 6. 
1879 Grundler NO v Rambadursing (13500/2010) 2011 ZAKZDHC 24 (20 May 2011) para 11-12. 
1880 Herald Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd v Meer; Meer Body Corporate of Belmont Arcade 2010 6 SA 599 
(KZD) par 46; Van der Merwe 2011 TSAR 751. 
1881 Van der Merwe 2011 TSAR 751. 
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circumstances1882 including cases where the sectional title scheme is under pressure of 
confusion and chaos due to severe mismanagement. In this way the appointment of an 
administrator is considered as a measure of last resort.1883 The purpose of appointing 
an administrator is remedial. The management of the affairs of the scheme should 
subsequently be restored to the members of the body corporate.   
 
The possible results that can be achieved by the appointment of an administrator can 
be outweighed by the risks inherent in that appointment. Van der Merwe1884 lists these 
risks. First, the legal costs involved in the appointment of an administrator are high as a 
paid professional will be doing what the volunteer trustees would usually do free of 
charge. The administrative costs increase as both the administrator and the managing 
agent (if one has been appointed) must be remunerated.1885 This will mean increased 
levies for the body corporate, as funds will have to be made available to rehabilitate the 
scheme. Some owners will possibly not be able to afford this. Smaller schemes, 
especially those schemes that are having financial problems, might not have available 
funds for such an application. Secondly, there is a shortage of suitable, trained and 
disinterested persons available to fill the positions. The STA contains few guidelines on 
how the administrators should function. Thirdly, there is the risk, if the managing agent 
is appointed as administrator, that he will not necessarily come to grips with the 
administrative problems speedily and properly. There is no quick fix to the problems that 
have escalated over some time.1886  
 
In order to avoid the mismanagement of the scheme and to avoid the possible 
appointment of an administrator it is important to have an efficient management 
structure in place. Without an executive the general meeting of owners would have to 
convene a general meeting every time a decision needs to be taken regarding the 
management of the scheme. In practice many of the owners do not attend the annual 
                                            
1882 Van der Merwe and Kloppers 1997 Stell LR 323.  
1883 Williams v Nathan and others [2006] JOL 18414 (W)[22]; van der Merwe 2011 TSAR 751; van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 18-82. 
1884 Van der Mewe Sectional Titles 14-150. 
1885 STA 46(5) [STSMA s 16(5)(d)]. 
1886 Maree (August 2005) 17 MCS Courier 8-9.  
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general meetings. If the owners are reluctant to attend the general meetings, where vital 
decisions relating to the scheme must be made, it is clear that getting the entire body 
corporate together to make routine decisions would be a practical impossibility.1887 For 
this reason it is essential that provision needs to be made in the South African sectional 
title legislation for the constitution of an executive organ. As I have repeatedly 
emphasised in this thesis the existence of an executive organ to manage the day-to-day 
operation of a sectional title scheme is of the utmost importance for the effective and 
efficient governance of the scheme. 
 
Currently the STA and the prescribed management rules make provision for the 
trustees to act as the executive organ of the scheme. As I have repeatedly highlighted 
throughout this thesis the trustees, most of whom are owners, are not always the most 
experienced or qualified persons to take on the task of administering the scheme for the 
benefit of all the members of the body corporate. Owners might not have the necessary 
time at their disposal to volunteer for the office of a trustee due to the demands of their 
own full-time jobs and family responsibilities. Being a trustee requires a significant 
amount of time and effort, especially in large mixed-use schemes that consist of many 
units.1888 It involves hard work, dealing with varied and strong personalities including 
apathetic and ignorant owners, and complicated physical, financial and legal issues. 
However, trustees do have a certain degree of control in the administration of the 
scheme; can contribute constructively to the scheme and the value of the property and 
can ultimately play a vital role in the success of the scheme. Ideally trustees should be 
properly elected, experienced and qualified in all matters relating to sectional titles. 
Trustees, as their name implies, are in a position of trust and must manage the scheme 
for the benefit and in the interest of all the owners.  
 
In my experience, most of the persons who are elected as trustees do not understand 
the nature and extent of an ideal involvement in the running of an office of trustees. The 
management and financial functions of the trustees have social and financial 
                                            
1887 A Kelly “How the trustee system works: trustee decisions” (May 2014) 9-5 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1. 
1888 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title book One 45. 
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consequences for the unit owners. The fact that trustees, more often than not, do not 
have the requisite expertise and experience to fulfil the functions of a trustee in a 
professional way indicates the dilemma facing sectional title scheme management. It is 
common practice in South Africa for the trustees to supplement their expertise by 
appointing a managing agent to assist them if need be. The problem is that it is not 
mandatory to do so. As a result, unqualified and incapable owners can manage even 
large schemes. Furthermore, even if a managing agent is appointed to assist in the 
management of the scheme, the trustees remain the executive organ of the scheme, 
and must continue to have a supervisory role over the exercise of the powers and 
performance of functions delegated to the managing agent. 
 
Management by a board of trustees with an optional employment of a managing agent 
could be appropriate in smaller schemes.1889 However, it should be kept in mind that 
there are small schemes that have complicated management issues due to the nature 
of the scheme. It is not only the size of the scheme that affects the complexity of the 
administration functions. Management of larger mixed-use schemes in South Africa 
would be better facilitated by introducing a mandatory professional manager as the 
executive organ of the body corporate, similar to the German Verwalter. This would 
avoid the problems experienced by South African bodies corporate of finding qualified 
trustees, and could prevent the issues that arise due to mismanagement by 
unprofessional trustees.1890 The involvement of the owners in the management of the 
scheme could be integrated by establishing, especially for larger schemes, a small 
committee of owners to act as an advisory council, similar to the German 
Verwaltungsbeirat.  
 
Therefore, in my opinion the German system of appointing an experienced and 
knowledgeable single professional manager or managing agency firm as an executive 
organ of the body corporate, who may be assisted by an advisory council, is preferable 
to the position in South Africa where the trustees are elected as the executive arm of 
                                            
1889 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 44. 
1890 46. 
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the scheme, and who may supplement their expertise by appointing a managing agent 
to assist them in the day-to-day management of the scheme. I set out the advantages 
for the appointment of a managing agent in chapter 9. This reasoning would also apply 
to the appointment of a professional manager appointed as the executive organ of the 
body corporate. In my view the compulsory appointment of a professional manager as 
the executive organ of the body corporate, instead of the voluntary appointment of a 
managing agent would place the routine management of sectional title schemes in the 
most capable hands. 
 
As I have shown the management of a scheme requires a high level of knowledge and 
experience in various fields such as physical maintenance, accounting, meetings, 
human resources, banking, law, and insurance. Although outsiders can also be trustees, 
the majority of trustees are required to be sectional owners.1891 By contrast the 
professional manager would have the required knowledge, training, experience and skill 
for the management of a scheme. Furthermore, the professional manager would not act 
alone, but employ staff such as accountants and secretaries. Consequently, a 
professional manager rather than a group of owners and outsiders chosen at random 
would be given the task of administering larger sectional title schemes. The professional 
manager could run a specialised management company with professional facilities and 
infrastructure at his or her disposal, which would render the management of the scheme 
much more professional and business-like. 1892 
 
In chapter 4 it was shown that in South Africa the trustees owe the members of the body 
corporate a fiduciary duty.1893 They are indemnified against liability for negligent 
administration.1894 This is standard and typical of an honorary office, but is not suitable 
for the high financial and legal responsibility that the management of a large sectional 
title scheme entails.1895 As the trustees are indemnified against liability for negligent 
administration themselves, they cannot be held liable for the wrongdoing of the 
                                            
1891 Annexure 8 rule 5. 
1892 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 45. 
1893 STA s 40. 
1894 Annexure 8 rule 12. 
1895 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 44. 
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managing agent. There are often not a sufficient number of owners who are prepared to 
stand for election as trustees and the law does not want to discourage owners who 
volunteer for that office by burdening them with possible personal liability and excessive 
limitations. As the law stands the managing agent can be held accountable to the body 
corporate on the basis of contractual breach. In my view this is not ideal and the South 
African legislation should elevate the managing agent to that of executive organ of the 
body corporate. In this way the legislation would expressly create fiduciary duties for the 
managing agent. The professional manager, as the executive organ, could then be held 
legally responsible for his or her mismanagement of the scheme. The professional 
manager could take out fidelity insurance to cover these risks.  
 
Unlike the German Verwalter, the South African managing agent is not an executive 
organ of the body corporate. At the law stands the trustees are tasked with appointing 
and supervising the actions of the managing agent. The trustees are still able to take 
over the executive tasks themselves, which can lead to conflict and confusion between 
the managing agent and the trustees with regard to competence and authority. There 
should be clear separation of powers and duties to avoid this confusion. 
 
As I have explained the trustees in South Africa are entrusted with the day-to-day 
management of the scheme and are empowered to exercise all the powers and perform 
all the duties of the body corporate, subject to certain restrictions. This general and wide 
empowerment could, and often does, lead to trustees mismanaging the scheme. Most 
owners may not be aware of their competence to limit and restrict the powers of the 
trustees by imposing restrictions and giving directions at the general meeting.1896 The 
trustees could burden the body corporate with excessive obligations, and could rule the 
scheme in a way that is financially unsound. On the other hand it should also be noted 
that no minimum amount of powers is guaranteed to the board of trustees. The powers 
of the trustees could be reduced substantially by directions and restrictions imposed on 
trustees in the general meeting.1897 In such an event the trustees would not be able to 
                                            
1896 STA s 39(1); Annexure 8 rule 56(g). 
1897 STA s 39(1). 
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perform the most basic and necessary maintenance and management measures for the 
upkeep of the scheme without explicit permission of the general meeting.1898  
 
By contrast the German Verwalter is only empowered to exercise the powers and 
perform the functions that have been explicitly assigned to him.1899 His powers and 
duties are determined largely by the provisions of the WEG,1900 and not only by the 
terms of his contract of appointment and the resolutions of the body corporate, as is the 
case with the South African managing agent. The Verwalter has wide general powers to 
manage the scheme which include all measures that are necessary for the maintenance 
of the common property and the financial management of the scheme. These tasks and 
powers of the Verwalter are mandatory and cannot be taken away.1901 I suggest that the 
minimum powers and duties of the professional manager in South Africa need to be 
included in the legislation.  
 
The German Verwalter is usually not a sectional owner, but an outsider. While nothing 
prevents a skilled owner from being appointed as professional manager, a non-owner 
with knowledge and experience of sectional title administration or indeed a professional 
managing firm is almost invariably appointed in practice as professional manager of a 
scheme. Management by owners has the advantage that there is personal involvement. 
The owners will have an invested interest in the scheme, more so than an outsider. 
Often the owners of a scheme will be in a better position to know and understand the 
needs of the residents of a scheme and what management and maintenance measures 
have to be taken to ensure that the scheme runs efficiently. This can have the 
disadvantage of conflict and infighting between owners which could negatively influence 
the management.1902 Furthermore, the fact that the majority of trustees must be owners 
or spouses of owners does not necessarily mean that their actions will always be to the 
benefit of the scheme.1903 There is a risk that they might misuse their powers to their 
                                            
1898 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 43. 
1899 43. 
1900 WEG § 27; Pienaar Sectional Titles 174. 
1901 WEG § 27(4); Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 31. 
1902 Reinlein A comparison of the legislative and executive management organs 45. 
1903 43. 
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individual advantage, and to the disadvantage of the community of owners. In this way 
the objectivity offered by a professional manager will be advantageous to the scheme. 
The argument that non-owner outsider professionals managing the scheme leads to a 
lack of personal interest can be counteracted by the fact that an advisory council 
consisting of unit owners may assist the professional manager.  
 
The disadvantage of management by a professional manager is the higher cost. 
Management by trustees has the advantage that it is in general done for free or is at 
least cheaper than the management by a professional manager. Although the German 
Verwalter is basically in the same executive and management position as the trustees in 
the South African scheme, the difference is that he normally receives remuneration for 
performing his executive functions. This equates the Verwalter with the South African 
managing agent, but with the difference that he holds an office and is not appointed as 
an agent of the body corporate. A professional manager like the Verwalter charges a 
relatively high fee for his services.1904 However, schemes managed by unqualified 
owners usually consider it a good investment to make use of managing agents which 
could be equally expensive. Since the office of the board of trustees is an honorary 
office, often exercised without remuneration, some trustees will do the minimum amount 
of work. Every owner would be interested in the management of his unit, but not 
necessarily in the management of the whole scheme.1905  
 
A further disadvantage is that a professional manager operates as a business and has 
profit as the main objective. If a professional manager takes on too many schemes to 
increase his earnings, he or she might not be able to pay sufficient attention to each 
individual scheme, which could lead to a loss of quality of management.1906 However, 
the professional manager would be accountable for the efficient administration of the 
scheme in terms of not only the contract with the body corporate, but also in terms of 
the minimum powers and duties set out in the legislation. 
 
                                            
1904 45. 
1905 43. 
1906 46. 
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Another reason why it would be better to have the executive functions entrusted to a 
professional manager in South Africa is the lack of continuity in the current executive 
structure. It is possible for the same trustees to be elected to office year after year until 
they are removed from office and as there is not a requirement for rotation of trustees, 
the same trustees could be in office for a long time leading to stagnation in the 
management of the scheme. In contrast the German Verwalter is initially appointed for a 
period of three years, which may be extended for an additional term of five years.1907 
This ensures that the body corporate appoints a person with the necessary knowledge 
and expertise on a continuous basis. Although the Verwalter is basically in the same 
executive and management position as the trustees in the South African scheme, the 
difference is that the Verwalter is appointed contractually (Verwaltersvertrag), and may 
be dismissed by the body corporate if he or she does not fulfill his executive functions in 
a professional manner. This is yet another convincing reason why I suggest that South 
Africa consider following the German position. 
 
It is therefore my opinion that the appointment of a professional manager in larger 
schemes should be made compulsory in South Africa. Unlike managing agents 
appointed in terms of prescribed management rule 46, the professional manager would 
then be the sole executive arm of the body corporate. This would place the professional 
manager in a fiduciary relationship with the body corporate, and he or she would be 
held liable, not only in contract, but also for any breach of this trust or breach of his or 
her duty of care and skill. This increase in accountability will serve to render the 
property management industry more professional. 
 
It is my submission that these professional managers should obtain a minimum entry-
level qualification. In this regard I advocate that professional managers should be 
accredited; adhere to a professional code of conduct and be held accountable for the 
ethical management of sectional title schemes by a regulatory body. In terms of current 
established infrastructural support in South Africa, the professional manager should 
register as an estate agent with the Estate Agency Affairs Board, and manage the body 
                                            
1907 WEG § 26; Pienaar Sectional Titles 173. 
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corporate funds in terms of the Estate Agency Affairs Act, which requires that the 
manager hold a current and valid Fidelity Fund Certificate.  
 
In my opinion the CSOS, once in operation, would be better suited to oversee the 
regulation of this industry. It could be given the power to approve a code of conduct; to 
register professional managers; to arrange for their fidelity insurance; and investigate 
and hear complaints against professional managers accused of professional 
misconduct, as being a species of dispute resolution procedure for which it is designed. 
If the CSOS were empowered to regulate managing agents it would have a positive 
effect on the property management industry as a whole.1908 It my hope that the 
managing agency industry become subject to mandatory regulation by a professional 
standards board in the same way as other professions such as accountants, lawyers, 
doctors and engineers are subject to maintain ethics and standards of service.  
 
In my final analysis, the general meeting would maintain its legislative function, while 
the professional manager would take over the executive function from the trustees. 
Furthermore, to maintain some kind of personal involvement in the management of the 
sectional title scheme, the general meeting should be given the power to appoint an 
advisory board from amongst the owners to assist the professional manager in the 
administration of the scheme. Some functions could be delegated to this board, but its 
role should be essentially advisory without any executive authority. Therefore, the legal 
status of the South African managing agent should be increased to that of a 
professional manager and executive organ of the body corporate. 
 
Throughout my thesis I have made suggestions for improvements in the sectional title 
legislation regulating all the aspects relating to the appointment of managing agents. If 
these suggestions could be incorporated into the STSMA and the Regulations and rules 
made thereunder, then the suggestion that the professional managing agent become 
the executive arm of the body corporate would not only be a academic possibility, but 
could become a pracical reality.  
                                            
1908 Moore-Barnes (June 2013) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
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In conclusion, if the South African legislation were amended to follow this approach it 
could go a long way toward solving the financial and administrative difficulties currently 
experienced in sectional titles schemes. With a more efficient management structure in 
place sectional title schemes could be used to make an invaluable contribution to 
urgently needed harmonious residential housing, not only for the affluent sector of the 
population, but also for those who are currently living in informal settlements. The 
provision of housing in the form of sectional title offers the most practical and workable 
solution to fulfill the constitutional objective of promoting access to adequate housing to 
all South African citizens.1909 The state should take these reasonable legislative steps, 
within its available resourses, to achieve the progressive realisation of the constitutional 
right to adequate housing.1910 In my view this constitutional objective could be achieved 
by sectional title schemes, which offer affordable residential accommodation to a large 
section of the population in muti-unit buildings, while at the same time offering a more 
efficient utilisation of available residential land in congested urban areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1909 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26(1). 
1910 S 26(2). 
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